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During the past two decades fighting corruption became an important objective of 
manifold international and transnational actors. Yet this powerful international 
anticorruption agenda has so far avoided detailed scholarly scrutiny of the ways in 
which it potentially contributes to the construction and advancement of particular 
societal ideals. This thesis addresses this lack of systematic engagement by conducting 
a detailed empirical analysis of the international anticorruption discourse expressed in 
the form of anticorruption practices of the World Bank, Transparency International and 
the United Nations Development Programme on the strategic policy level. Adopting a 
post-Marxist discourse and hegemony theoretical perspective based on the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe, Nonhoff as well as Howarth and Glynos, it interrogates the 
international anticorruption discourse with regards to the kinds of societal ideals it 
constructs, the ways in which they are advanced, and the extent of consensus 
surrounding these ideals. 
The thesis traces the surprisingly coherent ways in which the discourse is structured by 
a particular conception of human nature as self-interested and rational and centres on 
the manipulation of individual behaviour via institutional and cultural incentive 
structures. Importantly, it shows how this elevates the securing of governing processes 
that guarantee the stable pursuit of individual economic interests to the very purpose of 
societies. As the thesis demonstrates, this hegemonic project is expanded through the 
accommodation of a wide range of positively connoted concepts, anticorruption co-
operations between powerful social actors, reliance on an objectivist kind of 
knowledge, and the elaborate construction of corruption as the enemy of a good 
society. While international anticorruption discourse is found to be broadly reflective 
of what can be called advanced liberal ideals of governing, the thesis enables an in-
depth understanding of the manifold and complex discursive moves through which 
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“The international community simply must deal with the cancer of corruption, because 
it is a major barrier to sustainable and equitable development” (James Wolfensohn, 
World Bank president, 1997). 
 
“...the term `corruption' is not in itself problematic: it is rooted in the sense of a thing 
being changed from its naturally sound condition, into something unsound, impure, 
debased, infected, tainted, adulterated, depraved, perverted, etcetera. The problem 
arises in the application of this to politics. (...) there is hardly a general consensus on 







In 2005 I joined the international anticorruption non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) Transparency International (TI) for an internship. Eager to form part of a 
social movement that I saw as fostering in people a concern to care for and act in 
solidarity with their fellow humans and thus create a better world for everyone, I 
took on a placement at the TI chapter in Panama. However, the work experience I 
gained there in between two university semesters strangely frustrated my 
expectations; it left me thinking “so that is how corruption is combated” and sapped 
my interest in the topic for some time. It was only when a number of years later I 
returned to ‘corruption’ and was given the opportunity to address this topic within 
the scope of a PhD thesis that I came to understand my confusion back in 2005. So 
while this thesis deals with a topic of major international concern, it is also inspired 
by a personal experience.  
When working with TI back then I was not aware that this organisation formed part 
of an international enterprise occupied with combating corruption the scope of which 
seems to have grown constantly over the past twenty years. International actors keep 
surpassing each other in emphasising the detrimental consequences of corruption. 
The Secretary-General of the OECD holds it to be “the most pervasive crime which 
erodes the very foundations of fair business, good government, and sustainable 
development”, with repercussions sweeping “across entire populations”.1 For the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “corruption is one of the main obstacles 
to peace, stability, sustainable development, democracy and human rights globally”.2 
This extraordinary preoccupation with corruption as “a stand-alone obstacle to 
development”3 is reflected in different developments at the international level. New 
international and transnational programmes and organisations have been founded 
which aim to combat corruption all over the world and to pursue transparency in 
political and economic life; international legislation has been created in order to deal 
with the internationalisation of corruption and related crimes and to harmonise 
international development aid respectively; and numerous countries of the Global 
                                                 
1  OECD (2006) 
2  UNODC (a) 
3  Harrison (2006: 15) 
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South4 have developed national anticorruption plans and institutions, often with 
funding and other kinds of support from international organisations.5  
Among the powerful actors that advance the global fight against corruption count the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 
the non-governmental organisation (NGO) TI, as well as other NGOs6 and the 
governments of many countries in their function as bilateral development donors.  
Although the United Nations (UN) attempted to deal with the topic of corruption in 
the early 1970s, the United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions was only adopted in 1996. In subsequent 
Resolutions, the UN shifted the emphasis “from the corrupting influence of 
transnational corporations to corruption in the public sector”.7 Subsequently, this 
new focus was consolidated in the new United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) of 2003.8 Two UN institutions are active in the fight against 
corruption. UNODC functions as the Secretariat of the States Parties to UNCAC and 
the respective Implementation Review Mechanism. Together with the World Bank 
Group it also runs the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) which aims at 
facilitating the recovery of assets stolen through acts of corruption.9 The UNDP 
claims to have been “one of the first organizations in the early 1990s to develop 
programmes to address and curb corruption” in the context of its engagement with 
good governance.10 Today it is active in the fight against corruption through its 
Global Thematic Programme on Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness 
(PACDE)11 as well as a through a regional anticorruption project covering Eastern 
                                                 
4 The use of terms like Global South, Third World, developing countries, developed countries etc. 
does not express an endorsement of the meaning and values conventionally associated with them.  
5  Brown/Cloke (2004: 273) 
6 Other NGOs active in the global fight against corruption are for example Tiri, Global Witness, and 
the Open Society Foundation. 
7  Bukovansky (2006: 187) 
8  Bukovansky (2006: 187) 
9  UNODC (b)  
10  UNDP (2008a: 2) 
11  UNDP (2008d) 
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Europe and the CIS Region.12  
The OECD established a working group on corruption as early as 1989, but it took 
the organisation until 1997 to adopt its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which entered into force in 
1999. At a time when bribery of foreign public officials was normal Western 
business practice and could even be deducted from taxes, the Convention meant a 
major policy change in that it established that the range of domestic penalties for 
bribery of a foreign public official “shall be comparable to that applicable to the 
bribery of the Party’s own public officials”.13  
In 1993 TI was founded, portraying itself as “the global civil society organisation 
leading the fight against corruption”. Its principle purpose is to mobilise people 
around the world against corruption but it also provides concrete policy advice for 
the prevention of corruption in different areas.14 TI is probably best known for its 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which has been published annually since 1995. 
This Index ranks about 200 countries according to their levels of corruption as 
perceived by expert assessments and opinion surveys.15  
Up until 1996 the World Bank (WB) considered corruption too political a topic to be 
included in the organisation’s portfolio. The decision of President James Wolfensohn 
to place the topic on the WB’s agenda was a significant boost for the international 
anticorruption campaign. Soon the WB came to consider corruption as “the greatest 
obstacle to reducing poverty” and as “among the greatest obstacles to economic and 
social development”.16 In 2007 the WB adopted a new strategy for Strengthening 
World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC)17 and 
between 1996 and 2009 has supported more than 600 governance initiatives or 
programmes with anticorruption components.18 The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which identified corruption as a hindrance to economic prosperity for the first 
                                                 
12 CIS refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States consisting of former Soviet republics. This 
programme primarily aims at the creation and capacity development of anticorruption agencies. 
13  OECD (1997) Art. 3 (1) 
14  TI (z) 
15  TI (B) 
16  WB (k)  
17  WB (r) 
18  WB (k) 
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time in 199619 now covers corruption in its surveillance, lending and technical 
assistance activities as part of “economic governance issues”. According to the 
organisation “roughly half of the structural conditions in IMF-supported programs 
focus on improving governance”.20  
Also many bilateral donors, for example the German GIZ21 and the Danish 
DANIDA22, have developed an interest for corruption and run different 
anticorruption projects. The Swedish development agency SIDA even states that 
“[f]ighting corruption is one of Sida’s most prioritized areas”.23 
Among these organisations mentioned above, TI is alone in that it is exclusively 
concerned with the fight against corruption, whereas other actors active in the 
international fight against corruption see their anticorruption efforts as part of their 
wider agenda of development co-operation.24 However, TI explains that “[t]he range 
of anti-corruption conventions and instruments in existence today are the 
manifestations of an international consensus that emerged in the early 1990s 
identifying corruption as an important problem needing to be addressed and in 
particular requiring internationally agreed solutions”.25 This thesis refers to the 
anticorruption practices of the international actors mentioned above jointly as the 
international anticorruption (IAC) agenda or the international fight against 
corruption.26 
The literature has given several explanations for this increase in the importance of 
corruption and the rise of the IAC agenda – after “decades, [when] international 
institutions had little if anything to say about corruption”.27 The most frequently 
found explanation as to the sudden emergence of corruption as “the new star of the 
                                                 
19  Bukovansky (2006: 189) 
20  IMF (see bibliography) 
21  GIZ 
22  DANIDA 
23  SIDA 
24 However, for the sake of simplicity, these organisations as well as TI will be referred to in this 
thesis as international anticorruption (IAC) organisations.  
25 TI (C) 
26 However, this is not meant in an exclusive way but potentially could also include anticorruption 
activities of any other actor with an international scope of activity in this area. The empirical part of 
this thesis is based on a further operationalisation of the IAC agenda. 
27  Bukovansky (2006: 185) 
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development scene”28 points to the end of the Cold War as a decisive event. 
According to this explanation, strategic geopolitical concerns of the Cold War were 
consistently prioritised by the major powers over the integrity of their allies in the 
developing world. However, the attenuation of these priorities and the disappearance 
of global hemispheric partisanship as a result of the breakdown of the Eastern bloc 
allowed for questions of corruption and human rights to be addressed,29 and drew 
increased attention to the weaknesses of the ‘victorious’ system, i.e. Western liberal 
democracy.30 Since the leaders of allied developing countries could no longer 
threaten to support the Soviet Union, Western countries became less reluctant to 
interfere in their domestic politics, putting new pressure on aid and lending 
contracts.31  
While the shift in international geopolitical priorities is seen to have facilitated the 
rise of corruption on the political agendas of Western countries and subsequently 
international organisations, other reasons have been given as to why it became so 
prominent. Following decolonisation, it is argued, rapid modernisation was expected 
in the countries of the South, which was supposed to lead to stable and democratic 
market economies that were to be fostered through international aid. When, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, it became clear that these expectations were not being 
fulfilled in great parts of the Global South, donors came up with a new recipe: the 
good governance agenda, which “dominated the development paradigm of the 
1990s”.32 Thus, democratic institutions, increased popular participation, social 
capital, rule of law and an independent judiciary, human rights, a free press and, 
importantly, anticorruption measures were given renewed or intensified importance 
in development.33  
Academic interpretations of the reasons for the prominence of the good governance 
agenda can be broadly divided in two. The first and more benign interpretation of the 
motivations of donor institutions assumes that, after the failure of genuinely 
economic approaches aimed at fostering economic development, scholars and 
                                                 
28  Polzer (2001: 2) 
29  Brown/Cloke (2004: 278) 
30  Krastev (2004: 7) 
31 See also de Sousa et al (2009); Johnston (2005: 5) 
32  Harrison (2006: 17) 
33 See for example Bukovansky (2006: 185); Marquette (2004: 419) 
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policymakers undertook a “search for relevant variables that may have been 
overlooked in the first waves of development literature”.34 By focussing more 
intently on institutions and other aspects of ‘governance’, the problem of corruption 
was then discovered.35 This is in line with explanations used by the WB in framing 
its concern with corruption as a result of a learning process in which it came to 
appreciate the role of a functioning state and of democratic institutions for economic 
development in the target countries.36 The second interpretation adopts greater 
scepticism regarding such explanations and suggests that development organisations, 
but especially the WB welcomed the topic of corruption as a “convenient 
explanation as to why the pro-market economic reforms of the past two decades in 
the South have not borne the fruit that they were supposed to”.37 By making 
corruption in developing countries an important topic, so the argument goes, the WB 
could implicitly blame the failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)38 of 
the 1980s on the incompetence and corruption of the target countries during their 
implementation.39  
In addition to these ‘top-down’ explanations regarding the sudden importance of the 
fight against corruption for policymakers, there are also suggestions that pressure 
from ‘below’ may have contributed to its emergence on the agendas of international 
organisations. For example, scholars cite the “ever growing influence of a vociferous 
international civil society toward the end of the century” which was pushing for 
corruption to be tackled and which voiced its concerns particularly in the area of the 
former Soviet Union and in Africa.40 It is argued that the difficulties which 
                                                 
34  Bukovansky (2006: 185) 
35  Bukovansky (2006: 185); see also Szeftel (1998); Schmitz (1995) 
36  WB (2000: 1-6); see also Marquette who links this re-orientation process of the WB not only to its 
own learning about the role of the state during the debt crisis of the 1970s and the failure of SAPs 
of the 1980s Marquette (2003: 53), but also to a “changing orthodoxy on democracy and 
development” in academia towards the view that democratisation and economic development can 
enhance each other (Marquette 2003: 42). 
37  Brown/Cloke (2004: 273); see also Krastev (2004) 
38 Administered by the WB and the IMF and backed by their member countries, Structural 
Adjustment Programmes have emerged from earlier conditionalities and have been carried out in 
developing countries around the world since the 1980s. When SAPs are mentioned, what is meant 
are often the SAPs from the 1980s, yet current Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers can equally be 
regarded as SAPs as they aim to reform politico-economic structures in the target countries. SAPs 
are often criticised for implementing irresponsible free market policy while avoiding political 
debate with the target countries.  
39  Marquette (2003: 155); George et al (1994: 142), Krastev (2004: 20) 
40  Bracking (2007: 16), see also Krastev (2004: 9), Harrison (2006: 17) 
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accompanied most democratic and market transitions led many to feel excluded and 
to have their expectations frustrated and that consequently people resorted (and still 
resort) to protests against the corruption of their leaders. While such protests are 
“one way to take regimes to task without directly challenging their claims to rule”, 
they contribute to the salience of the topic of corruption and boost IAC 
interventions.41 The ‘new media’ that has made it easier for investigative journalists 
and other corruption critics to report on local and international corruption scandals is 
also given as a reason for the emergence of the IAC agenda.42 While it is likely that 
a combination of these different developments enabled the explosion of IAC 
activities, nonetheless now undoubtedly they constitute a significant international 
undertaking.  
Against this background, this thesis is motivated by the desire to provide a detailed 
interpretation of what the international fight against corruption is about, specifically 
seeking to address this interest through focussing on the kinds of societal ideals that 
this agenda seeks to advance. This is necessary because, while a range of authors 
have endeavoured to explain how the anticorruption agenda came about, little 
research exists about what it means and does, how it influences the way we 
understand corruption, what kind of societal ideals it entails, and how it constructs 
and advances them. However, these concerns are of no lesser significance given the 
importance assigned to the global fight against corruption by powerful international 
organisations, the great amounts of money spent on it, the enormous numbers of 
publications produced by IAC actors and, most of all, the unquestioning public 
acceptance and support of these activities. As de Sousa et al. put it, “being against 
corruption is a bit like favouring sunshine over rain”;43 consequently, IAC efforts are 
generally conceived as self-evidently positive and are hardly ever subject to political 
                                                
contestation.  
Furthermore, they hardly ever subject to substantive academic criticism or 
questioning. As chapter 1 shows, in the current mainstream literature on corruption 
the debate centres mainly on refining the variables and measurements applied to 
 
41  Johnston (2005: 5) 
42  Krastev (2004: 8) 
43  De Sousa et al (2009: xix) 
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explain corruption which can then be used to improve anticorruption strategies. 
While the insights that can be gained through such ‘problem-solving’44 approaches 
in the field of corruption research should not be dismissed altogether, more detailed 
inquiries into the political nature of the IAC agenda are urgently needed.45 
Mainstream positivist studies of corruption that are based on causal designs 
necessarily work with objectivist definitions of corruption and other variables. In 
treating corruption as an objectively observable fact, these neglect that it is a highly 
normative construct, the meaning of which is linked to wider and differing social 
norms, practices and societal ideals. As a consequence, such studies are unable to 
understand and investigate IAC efforts as a site where conceptions of corruption and 
potentially also of concomitant societal ideals and structures are shaped. Thus, they 
are unable to address questions about the potentially political nature of the IAC 
agenda, and the ways in which it may influence what people see as good or bad 
behaviour, and as good or bad ways of societal organisation. 
                                                
Although IAC policies are certainly transformed and partly subverted when applied 
‘on the ground’ in developing countries, the ways in which they are conceived by the 
key advocates of a world without corruption are likely to have important 
consequences for how and by whom (national but also international) societal 
structures and social relations are reformed. By constructing corruption and its 
counter-measures in particular ways, a powerful IAC agenda may run the risk of 
excluding or marginalising other conceptions of corruption and good forms of 
societal organisation. Thus, it is important to gain clearer insights into the logics and 
the political workings of the IAC agenda in order to assess its potential and real 
socio-political implications. Given the limitations of the positivist take on 
corruption, this can best be achieved by letting go of positivist research principles 
and instead adopting a view on anticorruption measures as a social construct rather 
than as a technical instrument dealing with an objective problem. Far from denying 
the existence of a material world or the suffering that can be caused by corruption (in 
 
44  Cox (1981: 129) 
45 While the term ‘political’ is usually used with regards to the sphere of the state or party politics, this 
thesis also uses it in another meaning, namely as referring to ways of changing societal organisation 
more generally (so including also economic and civil society organisation while being not 
necessarily limited to these three categories) which are at the same time understood as always 
potentially contested. The political nature of the IAC agenda thus refers to the ways in which the 
international fight against corruption changes or aims to change ways of societal organisation.  
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all its diverse conceptions), a focus on its social construction and representation 
suggests that “because objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse, 
an understanding of the relevant discourses is a necessary part of any attempt to 
change prevailing conditions and relations of power”.46 In this spirit, the present 
analysis seeks to contribute to an understanding of how corruption, societies free 
from corruption and concomitant subject positions are constituted in the international 
 critical 
                                                
fight against corruption.  
This thesis is not the first attempt to address IAC activities from such a perspective. 
A limited number of critical IAC studies have already opened up important 
analytical points concerning the IAC agenda and have drawn out some of the 
normative assumptions, political characteristics and operating modes of current IAC 
activities of some actors in the field.47 Overall, this critical literature has portrayed 
the IAC agenda as comprising a neoliberal consensus among powerful international 
organisations who conduct technical one-size-fits-all anticorruption interventions 
that are designed to reform developing countries’ institutional structures to suit open 
markets and take the shape of a small state and that at the same time contribute to 
continued Western domination. Scholars have highlighted IAC actors’ rationalist 
conception of human nature or behaviour, their focus on institutional engineering, 
their neglect of morality with regards to IAC measures and their conceptualisation of 
corruption as mainly an economic problem. Yet, taking a closer look at the
IAC literature, many gaps and blind spots can be identified (see chapter 1).  
The first of these gaps concerns what is actually meant by ‘neoliberal anticorruption 
measures’ within the literature; authors do not explicate their understandings of 
neoliberalism which seem to vary and are not very well substantiated by the 
empirical material. Also, a range of concepts that appear to be important to IAC 
efforts seem to have gone unnoticed by the literature, such as civil society 
participation, democracy, inclusion, equality, integrity, and private sector corruption. 
Given that these concepts do not self-evidently fit within neoliberal interpretations 
but may indicate contestations regarding the political ideal inherent in the IAC 
 
46  Abrahamsen (2000: 14) 
47  Polzer (2001); Brown/Cloke (2004); Krastev (2004); Hindess (2005); Bukovansky (2006); De 
Maria (2008c); Murphy (2011) 
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agenda, their neglect within the critical literature is problematic for the argument of a 
neoliberal consensus. Moreover, critical scholars themselves point to contradictions 
within the discourse involving elements that they see as disputing neoliberal 
measures (such as the strengthening of institutions48). These doubts about the 
coherent neoliberal nature of the IAC agenda are enhanced by the limited scope of 
empirical research which covers only fragments of IAC practices by some actors. 
IAC actors differ substantively with regards to their organisational structures and 
functioning, and these differences could well impact upon their anticorruption 
approach. While existing research on IAC measures of the WB and TI is not 
systematic and comprehensive enough to confirm the consensus thesis, IAC 
activities of actors such as the UNDP, UNODC and the OECD have as yet received 
little or no attention.49 Therefore, questions of agreement and difference between the 
different IAC organisations have not been dealt with in any depth. Thus, it is less 
than clear whether the IAC agenda represents a coherent and consensual neoliberal 
                                                
project, or whether it entails contradictory and/or inconsistent policy measures.  
Thus, much remains to be discovered with regards to the political and consensual or 
controversial nature of the IAC agenda. Given the ambiguities surrounding the 
meaning of neoliberalism with regards to the fight against corruption, I suggest that a 
detailed investigation of the ways in which IAC activities construct corruption and 
particular societal ideals is a more promising approach with which to explore the 
IAC agenda rather than attempting to identify features of neoliberalism within it. If 
there were a neoliberal consensus, it is far from clear how a neoliberal societal ideal 
is brought about or supported through IAC measures. While many elements of the 
IAC agenda remain to be uncovered, the literature remains divided and unclear about 
the ones that have already been identified and discussed such as the link between 
rationalist conceptions of human nature, the institutionalist approach to reform and 
neoliberal ideals in the global fight against corruption. While critical scholars note 
the presence of rational choice based knowledge in the IAC agenda, how exactly this 
kind of knowledge contributes to the construction of a neoliberal political ideal is left 
 
48  Brown/Cloke (2004: 287) 
49  Bukovansky covers the UN Convention Against Corruption  (2006: 186-189) as well as the 




unexplored. There is also confusion about the role of morality in the global fight 
against corruption; critical scholars seem unsure whether or not morality is excluded 
or the moral ‘core’ of corruption is present in the IAC agenda but in tension with the 
technical approach of IAC measures. In any case, clarification of whether and how 
morality is at work in IAC measures and how it relates to its neoliberal nature is 
required. Thus, a detailed investigation of the manifold IAC measures of different 
r 
l consensus is interesting but full of blind spots which merit 
anner, by 
tant section of) the IAC agenda. 
actors is still absent.  
This is also important in order to understand how the IAC agenda acquires its power 
and persuasiveness. While all critical IAC studies acknowledge that the global fight 
against corruption is a powerful enterprise, they mainly point to what they see as the 
weaknesses and problems of the fight against corruption and thus cannot account for 
its strength. Thus, more a detailed inquiry into its working logics is needed in orde
to better understand its status as hitherto unquestioned and politically uncontested.  
In sum, despite the salience of IAC activities on the international level, 
comprehensive insights into IAC measures are not available, potential differences 
between different IAC actors are not appreciated, and a general and empirically 
persuasive overview of the political nature of the IAC agenda does not emerge from 
the literature. The picture that the critical literature has drawn of the IAC agenda as 
containing a neolibera
further investigation.  
It is the aim of this thesis to contribute a more detailed and comprehensive picture of 
the political nature of the IAC agenda. It aims to do so by making theoretically 
informed empirical contributions to the four (closely interrelated) analytical areas 
that have been opened up but not systematically studied by the critical literature 
namely: the question of the political ideals inherent in the IAC agenda; and, closely 
related, the ways in which they are constructed through IAC measures; the extent of 
consensus about them; and the ways in which the IAC agenda may work to advance 
them. For this purpose this thesis adopts a theoretical framework that allows these 
questions to be addressed together and in a theoretically coherent m





Theoretical approach and method  
Having taken leave of the positivist approach to the study of  corruption and having 
adopted a general social constructivist perspective on corruption and anticorruption 
in chapter 1, in chapter 2 I turn to post-Marxist discourse and hegemony theory 
(henceforth PDHT) as elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe50 and further developed by 
Nonhoff51 as well as Glynos and Howarth.52 By drawing on this specific theoretical 
framework the thesis is enabled to investigate in detail the complex and contingent 
ways in which IAC interventions are constructed and rendered powerful and normal, 
while simultaneously bringing to light both the societal ideals that emerge from these 
constructions and revealing the extent of consensus about them. Based on the PDHT-
specific integrated concept of discourse as comprising both linguistic and non-
linguistic practices, the thesis analytically approaches the IAC agenda in the form of 
IAC discourse comprising not only policy documents and speeches/acts but also 
projects, funding, organisational structures and co-operations etc. The focus on 
articulation that PDHT entails shifts the attention to the ways in which corruption, 
the ideal uncorrupted society, and the measures to create it are articulated in complex 
discursive logics53 involving manifold closely interlinked linguistic and non-
identified in the critical literature, the 
cen
advanced, and to what extent is there a 
e thesis pursues this central research 
ques
                                                
linguistic practices.  
Derived from the need for further research 
tral research question the thesis asks is: 
What are the societal ideals inherent in the international fight against 
corruption, how are they constructed and 
consensus on them? 
By looking through a Laclau-Mouffian lens, th
tion through the following sub-questions: 
 
50  Laclau/Mouffe (2001[1985]) 
51  Nonhoff (2006) 
52  Glynos/Howarth (2007) 
53 Discursive logics are here understood as the ways in which different elements (signifiers) of the 






; in doing so it speaks to the questions of consensus and power at the 
                                                
at extent does IAC discourse constitute a hegemonic project? 
How do hegemonic stratagems and/or other discursive logics structuring 
IAC discourse construct and advance particular soc
Or how do they diverge and dislocate each other? 
The three questions are closely interconnected and can only be 
and simultaneously in the course of the analysis.  
The first research question approaches both the questions of consensus and power (or 
advancing of the discourse) through the concept of the hegemonic project as 
developed by Nonhoff. The Nonhoffian approach entails tracing the hegemonic 
stratagems or the ‘general logics’ in the discourse that according to Nonhoff 
characterise a hegemonic project. According to PDHT, on its way to hegemony, that 
is, in the course of becoming more powerful, we can expect a hegemonic project to 
clearly divide the discursive space in two discursive chains, one of which constructs 
a universal good while the other constructs hindrances to this good. Viewed through 
the chosen theoretical frame, a clear consensus on what corruption means and how it 
should be combated would thus entail a clear division of the discursive space of the 
IAC discourse, with corruption located in one chain and its counter-measures in the 
other. Such a clear, i.e. consensual, division of the discursive space of IAC discourse 
would in turn indicate that the discourse is a hegemonic project somewhere on its 
way to becoming more powerful. By way of tracing this core hegemonic stratagem 
as well as other hegemonic stratagems, the thesis establishes a sense of whether IAC 
discourse can be understood as a hegemonic project and how far advanced the 
transformation into such a project is within the section of discourse accessed through 
my analysis
same time.  
Closely connected to this is the second research question, without which the first 
cannot be answered.54 It examines the societal ideals inherent to IAC discourse via 
 
54 Given that a hegemonic project is characterised by a clear division of the discursive space into two 
chains of equivalences, one of which articulates a societal ideal, the first research question cannot 
be answered without a detailed inquiry into the ways of construction of that potential universal and 
of its hindrances which is the aim of the second research question. 
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an analysis of how the (eventual) hegemonic stratagems, and other discursive logics 
more specific to IAC discourse, construct these ideals, and work to advance and 
establish them as desirable ways of societal organisation. In doing so it draws on the 
typology provided by Glynos and Howarth, according to which discursive logics 
(including Nonhoff’s hegemonic stratagems) can be characterised as political, 
fantasmatic and social logics.55 By tracing these discursive logics the thesis renders 
intelligible the societal ideal pursued by the fight against corruption, it draws out 
how it is organised and in what ways it may be neoliberal – or something else. At the 
same time it explains how the discourse advances the societal ideal it constructs, 
through both linguistic and non-linguistic articulations. The latter also entails 
investigating the logics through which corruption is constructed as a dangerous 
threat and the discursive effects this has on the expansion of IAC discourse. While 
speaking to the questions of construction, functioning and advancement of the 
societal ideal inherent in IAC discourse, this close analysis of discursive logics also 
ened up by these contestations 
                                                
speaks to the question of consensus, enabling the thesis to detect and explain 
eventual contestations of political ideals within the discourse.  
This allows answers to the third question to emerge, which examines the possibility 
that the discourse may not be as consensual as is portrayed by the critical literature. 
Should the analysis of discursive logics reveal that no coherent universal is 
articulated in the IAC discourse but rather a variety of contradictory or conflicting 
political ideals, this would undermine the consensus thesis. In this case, the empirical 
chapters will also show whether the IAC discourse can be understood as a 
hegemonic project or whether there are different hegemonic projects within the IAC 
discourse, articulating different universals that contest each other. By drawing out 
the main lines of contestation between different logics, the thesis will be able to tell 
how and which societal ideals, or parts of them, are in conflict with each other within 
the IAC agenda and whether the discursive divides op
extend within, between or across organisational lines, thus speaking to the consensus 
question as well as to the question of societal ideals.  
Thus, while PDHT has never been applied to the study of discourses on corruption or 
anticorruption, it offers particular advantages for the analysis of the IAC agenda. 
 
55  Glynos/Howarth (2007) 
14 
 
Apart from addressing different gaps in the critical literature, these advantages are 
also partly due to its particular match with the ‘negative nature’ of the IAC agenda. 
Given the post-Marxist conception of society as a product of antagonism, PDHT 
lends itself particularly to an analysis of a discourse which is all about antagonising 
corruption; at the same time it enables the thesis to make fruitful Philp’s56 proposal 
that conceptions of corruption always entail societal ideals, an insight which so far 
does not seem to have been applied systematically to the study of IAC efforts. While 
so far PDHT (in different academic interpretations) seems to have been used 
exclusively to investigate positively framed political agendas,57 the thesis 
anging societies. Moreover, the thesis 
illustrates the usefulness of post-Marxist theory for the analysis of negatively framed 
                                                
demonstrates its particular qualification for the analysis of a negatively framed 
discourse such as the international fight against corruption.  
Thus, the main contribution of the thesis is that it provides a more detailed 
understanding of the political nature of the international fight against corruption than 
currently exists. This is important because in order to determine whether to accept or 
support the international fight against corruption, we first need to understand how it 
proposes to change and arguably is ch
political agendas such as the IAC agenda. 
Methodically the thesis proceeds in the following way. The section of IAC discourse 
that it examines comprises linguistic and non-linguistic practices of three 
organisations which are active in the fight against corruption: the World Bank, the 
NGO Transparency International and the United Nations Development Programme. 
While these organisations are not the only actors fighting corruption inter- and 
transnationally, this section of IAC discourse is particularly interesting to examine 
not only because of their importance in setting the IAC agenda but also because of 
their quite different organisational structures, which could be expected to play out in 
the organisations’ approach to combating corruption. While the prominent position 
held by the WB in the fight against corruption is due mainly to its general financial 
power and accumulated expertise as the world’s largest development bank, the 
 
56  Philp (1997) 
57 For example, Nonhoff’s investigation of social market economy as a hegemonic project (2006) or 
Wullweber’s analysis of nanotechnology discourse (2010). 
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UNDP’s significance arises from it being the development branch of the UN 
organisation, which currently counts 193 member states. Most of these states are 
parties to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which forms the basis 
of the UNDP’s anticorruption work. Since its foundation in 1993, interestingly not 
by governments but by a handful of private actors whose principal aim was to put 
corruption on the international political agenda, TI has become a world-renowned 
el before future studies 
                                                
international NGO and the primary source of information and policy advice 
regarding corruption.  
The empirical analysis of the discourse involving these three actors is situated at the 
strategic policy level. The material analysed comprises core policy documents 
(strategies, policy papers, working papers, policy positions, research papers, reports) 
and core online information such as website content provided by the headquarters of 
the three organisations. However, besides these texts, the thesis also uses substantial 
material collected during interviews carried out by the author with staff based at the 
headquarters of the three organisations.58 Clearly, a single study cannot be 
exhaustive of the entire IAC discourse, since this would involve dealing with too 
great a volume of concrete project documentation as well as studying an immense 
number of local discourses on the implementation of anticorruption projects. 
However, the focus on the strategic policy level allows us to grasp a particularly 
important part of the IAC discourse which can be expected to have a relatively 
significant structuring effect for the rest of the discourse. The organisations’ 
headquarters and their core documents can be conceived as ‘nodal points’ which 
concentrate articulations within IAC discourse. Thus, it is particularly important to 
understand how the discourse is structured on this general lev
can investigate how these structures are eventually re-structured, reinforced, 
subverted, resisted or antagonised in different local contexts.  
 
58 The interviews covered a broad range of different aspects of the organisations’ anticorruption work 
including operational/organisational aspects such as public and private sector work, programme 
funding and co-ordination, co-operations with and differences to other organisations, consensus and 
difference among TI chapters and the TI Secretariat, and relations to governments. The interviews 
also covered conceptual issues such as conceptions of corruption, conceptions of human nature, 
political and economic ideals, the meanings of different important concepts (for example integrity, 
accountability, development) and their relation to corruption, questions of cultural relativity or 
universality with regard to corruption, as well as research methods and sources of knowledge. Both 




Following retroductive principles of explanation the analytical process was 
conducted so as to allow for the greatest possible openness to the discursive logics 
emerging from the material in the search of an explanation.59 In this process the 
hypothesis that the IAC discourse constitutes a hegemonic project was rendered 
plausible as an explanation of how the IAC discourse operates. Importantly, this 
finding is accounted for in the structure of this thesis in that its four empirical 
chapters (3-6) are structured according to the two discursive chains that generally 
characterise hegemonic projects according to PDHT. While chapter 3 deals with the 
discursive chain containing corruption and other negatively articulated concepts, 
chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the (‘longer’) discursive chain that articulates the aims 
t corruption as well as the strategies and the concrete policy 
measures used to combat it.  
                                                
of the fight agains
 
Structure of thesis and argument 
Chapter 1 Corruption as a social construction – implications for an analysis of 
international anticorruption efforts delineates the research landscape regarding 
corruption and anticorruption. It sums up the implications of the dominant positivist 
research approach for studying corruption and argues that this approach is unable to 
address the normativity of conceptions of corruption and the resulting potential 
political implications of the international fight against corruption. By drawing on 
relevant literature on corruption from the fields of political theory, history and 
ethnography the case is made for an alternative perspective on corruption as a social 
construction and, consequently, on the IAC agenda as a site where conceptions of 
both corruption and uncorrupted societies are constructed. Importantly, the chapter 
surveys the existing critical literature on IAC activities, distinguishing four sets of 
findings which comprise the argument of a consensus among IAC actors about 
corruption and adequate counter-measures; the argument that this consensus 
comprises the advancement of a neoliberal societal ideal; some of the ways in which 
this neoliberal ideal is constructed in IAC efforts; and some of the ways in which it 
is advanced or rendered powerful and persuasive. While these sets of findings 
 
59 See Howarth (2010).This process is explained more in detail in chapter 2. 
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provide interesting insights into the IAC agenda, in each of these broad analytical 
fields substantive gaps, obscurities or blind spots are identified that give reasons to 
hesis and 
 IAC discourse (this section will henceforth be called 
doubt the neoliberal consensus thesis and to call for much more detailed empirical 
investigation of the IAC agenda.  
Chapter 2 A post-Marxist discourse and hegemony theoretical approach to the 
analysis of international anticorruption discourse makes the case for post-Marxism 
as a theoretical take on the IAC agenda. It defines the advantages of the chosen 
approach for an investigation of IAC discourse and specifically for answering the 
central research question that emerged out of the critique of the critical IAC 
literature. By explicating the ontological and epistemological implications of the 
Laclau and Mouffian framework, it introduces the reader to the discourse and 
hegemony theoretical take on the IAC agenda which guides and structures the 
empirical analysis carried out in the following four chapters. Specifically, it explains 
how the thesis will use the concept of the hegemonic project and the concept of 
logics as joint theoretical tools through which to draw out the ways in which 
particular societal ideals are constructed and advanced in the fight against corruption 
and to assess the existing consensus or contestations about them. Finally, the chapter 
accounts for the way in which IAC discourse is operationalised in the t
explains the applied retroductive method of analysis and the implications that the 
findings achieved through this method have for the structure of the thesis.  
Each of the four empirical chapters – chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 – deals with a different 
part of the selected section of
IAC discourse), incrementally answering the sub-questions of the central research 
question as specified above.  
Chapter 3 Corruption – the creation of an enemy investigates how corruption is 
constructed in particular ways in IAC discourse. It reveals how the concept comes to 
acquire a particular meaning by drawing out the logics through which corruption is 
linked to other elements in the same discursive chain that are articulated as its 
definitions, causes and consequences but also as metaphors. Most importantly, the 
chapter demonstrates that the main logic which links corruption to its causes and 
consequences in this discursive chain centres on a particular conception of human 
nature as rational and inalterably selfish, that its causes are articulated primarily as 
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inadequate external structures, and that ultimately corruption is articulated as a 
serious threat to the stability and economic welfare of societies in general but 
especially in developing countries. It also uncovers how, through the use of 
metaphors and other discursive moves, corruption is constructed as an enormous 
threat victimising people all around the world and how this serves the persuasiveness 
of the fight against corruption as an enterprise worth supporting. In the process of 
revealing these logics, the chapter shows how articulations of corruption in IAC 
ted actors to stick to the rules. To govern people’s 
self-interest properly,  
discourse prepare the ground for the antagonistic division of the discursive space, the 
main political logic of the hegemonic project. 
Chapter 4 Vagueness and specificity – aims of the fight against corruption and 
specifications of the uncorrupted society is the first of three chapters which deal with 
the second discursive chain of the discourse (that which defines how corruption is to 
be fought and ultimately defines the nature of societies without corruption) and 
which work from a more general to the specific level. Accordingly, chapter 4 begins 
by looking at the aims of the fight against corruption as articulated in this chain. 
Having identified the ‘fight against corruption’ as the representative of this 
discursive chain the chapter shows the openness to interpretation of this concept 
which encompasses aims like a ‘world without corruption’, a ‘world without 
poverty’, development but also economic welfare, democracy, equality, inclusion 
etc. which are themselves only vaguely and incoherently defined in the discourse. 
While this openness to interpretation enables the discourse to be persuasive to a 
variety of actors, the chapter reveals that, in contrast, the specifications of the good, 
uncorrupted society are established very clearly. They consist of competition, clear 
rules, transparency, accountability and integrity and are shown to constitute a 
particular conception of an uncorrupted society as defined by the presence of the 
right incentives for self-interes
 the chapter argues, becomes the highest principle of societal
organisation in IAC discourse. 
Chapter 5 Instrumental claims – how to realise the uncorrupted society is concerned 
with the strategies and instruments through which the fight against corruption is 
undertaken by IAC actors. The first part briefly outlines the main strategies for IAC 
reform, which consist of legal, institutional and civil society reform, and shows that 
these entail a comprehensive restructuring of societies in target countries in order to 
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institute the ‘right’ incentives for self-interested actors. The second part of the 
chapter then discusses in detail the instruments by which these reform measures are 
pursued by IAC organisations, rendering further insights into the political logic of 
IAC discourse. It shows how the three organisations function as important subject 
positions in the fight against corruption, and how they are supported in their efforts 
by many other important societal actors, rendering the fight against corruption a 
powerful undertaking. It also discusses how in diverse though consensual ways the 
three IAC actors advance the IAC reforms through monetary and technical support 
and advocacy work. Importantly, through analysing the knowledge that IAC 
discourse produces and draws on in the design of reform measures, the chapter 
demonstrates that the incentives logic that dominates the fight against corruption is 
heavily informed by the kind of positivist, rational-choice-inspired research on 
                                                
corruption that in chapter 1 has been found unable to deal with the normativity of 
corruption and the potential political nature of the fight against corruption.  
Chapter 6 Concrete socio-politico-economic claims: the shape of the uncorrupted 
society examines in detail the concrete policy measures by which IAC discourse 
attempts to reform the political and economic spheres of societies as well as the 
sphere of civil society. Based on the findings of the incentives logic in chapter 4 and 
the logic of reform in chapter 5, the analysis of policy claims in this chapter is able to 
discern the complex governing logics of the uncorrupted society advanced in IAC 
discourse. The comprehensive model of society that emerges as a societal ideal from 
IAC discourse, it is noted, closely resembles advanced liberal societies as conceived 
by Dean.60 It is a society in which a) the state is structured according to incentives, 
has the safeguarding of competitiveness and stability in the economy as one of its 
main tasks, and provides only basic services to its citizens, b) private sector actors 
adopt corporate integrity measures which are to be controlled and enforced mainly 
by active citizens, and c) civil society fulfils a key role in monitoring private and 
state actors and holding them accountable by acting upon their economic interests. 
The chapter argues that, next to institutions, culture assumes an important function in 
the governing of the uncorrupted society via incentive-setting, as another way to 
 






 via institutional logics. The 
chapter is also able to point to the exclusions of alternative political ideals that the 
 
provides an example of the empirical application of an innovative theoretical 
approach, highlighting its merits and suggesting some ways of further development. 
direct individuals’ self-interests; it shows how this is particularly important for the 
creation of an active civil society as envisioned in IAC discourse, while the realms of 
the economy and most of all the state are governed more
advancement of this fairly distinct societal ideal entails. 
The conclusion ties up the empirical findings, relating them to the research 
questions. By summarising the logics of construction and advancement of the 
societal ideal revealed in IAC discourse, the conclusion highlights the main 
contribution of this thesis, namely a detailed critical explanation of the political 
nature of IAC discourse via an analysis of its constituting logics. It concludes that 
within the section of IAC discourse analysed there is a fairly well established 
hegemony that constructs an advanced liberal ideal of society and advances it via a 
construction of corruption as a hindrance to this ideal. Despite what could have been 
expected given the organisational differences of the actors considered as well as the 
confusion about certain concepts in the critical literature, the thesis revealed a clear 
consensus in the IAC agenda regarding both the societal ideal to be pursued and the 
appropriate actors and strategies required to achieve it. Especially through the 
assessment of the roles of positivist research on corruption and different powerful 
actors in IAC discourse this consensus is also shown to feature tie points with wider 
hegemonic structures that are conducive to the societal ideals advanced in IAC 
discourse. In addition to pointing to the consequences of the insights of this thesis for 
IAC practitioners, the conclusion situates the findings within a broader context of 
critical literature on international development co-operation activities and PDHT 
inspired research. It points out that the thesis contributes not only to a better 
understanding of the political nature of the IAC agenda but also speaks to wider 
debates about the neoliberal nature of the international development agenda and the 
subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which it is advanced in target countries with the 
help of powerful international organisations and Western expertise; lastly, the thesis
1 Corruption as a social construction – implications for an 
analysis of international anticorruption efforts 
IAC efforts are not only carried out by a number of powerful international actors 
who see corruption as a “stand-alone obstacle to development”;1 this “latest growth 
area in international development”2 also seems to be surprisingly uncontroversial not 
only to the general public but also to many academic scholars. Starting from this ob-
servation, this chapter depicts the research landscape with regards to corruption and 
anticorruption activities. It shows that current positivist mainstream literature on cor-
ruption is not equipped to deal with the normative and potentially political nature of 
corruption and anticorruption activities. Consequently, it argues the case for a post-
positivist approach to corruption which shifts the focus to the ways in which corrup-
tion is socially constructed in the contexts in which it appears, including in IAC ac-
tivities. By way of presenting interesting findings of broadly post-positivist studies 
of corruption the chapter illustrates how such a perspective can yield insights into the 
normativity as well as historical and geographical contingency of corruption. Impor-
tantly, the post-positivist perspective on corruption also entails a move away from a 
conception of IAC efforts as a technical and politically neutral enterprise; rather, it 
allows understanding them as practices that construct and advance particular concep-
tions of corruption and the societal ideals tied to it. While reviewing important find-
ings that post-positivist studies have so far contributed to an understanding of the so-
called ‘international anticorruption consensus’, at the same time, the chapter identi-
fies important gaps that remain in this literature – specifically with regards to the 
questions of the specific politico-economic ideals inherent in the IAC agenda, the 
extent of a consensus on these ideals, the exact ways in which the ideals are con-
structed and rendered powerful, and the potential effects of these constructions. In 
doing so it sets out the aim of the thesis which consists of contributing to this litera-
ture by providing answers to these questions.  
 
 
                                                 
1  Harrison (2006: 15)  
2  Harrison (2006: 16) 
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The fight against corruption – an intrinsically good project? 
While other policy fields, including the realm of international development co-
operation, attract criticisms from different actors, IAC activities seem to go almost 
entirely unchallenged by parties, civil society interest groups, social movements, 
academics, and the media. They seem to be regarded as an intrinsically desirable set 
of measures that work towards the general improvement of societies. De Sousa, 
Larmour and Hindess note that “[i]n other policy areas, such as environmental pro-
tection or the war in Iraq, there are groups who are for or against. The case of cor-
ruption, in contrast, only attracts opponents”.3 Similarly, to Bratsis it seems... 
...that there is hardly any contemporary political tendency that does not 
contain some form of anticorruption agenda. It is striking that so many dis-
parate and competing political discourses all agree that corruption is a 
problem, oftentimes the problem. Regardless of the interpretive frame 
(right, left, populist, technocratic, religious, secular, etc.), the specter of 
corruption is a constant, and is both unavoidable and unquestioned.4 
This characteristic is very likely to be, at least partly, due to the fact that corruption 
is generally acknowledged to be damaging and consequently that hardly anyone 
would dispute that it needs to be combated. Harrison points to what she sees as con-
ceptual differences between corruption and concepts with a positive connotation: 
Corruption is by definition bad, not something to aspire to, and its effects 
may be extremely harmful for some people. However poorly defined par-
ticipation and empowerment may be, they are positive objectives. Critiqu-
ing their use in the language and practices of development generally has a 
subtext of getting close to the ideal of what they might be. This is not the 
case for corruption.5 
This seems to suggest that the concept of corruption, as opposed to other concepts, 
does not entail an ideal on which people could disagree. This would indeed explain 
why IAC efforts enjoy such broad support and are hardly ever subject to political 
debate. All we can do is agree on its damaging nature and think of ways to combat it. 
                                                 
3  De Sousa et al (2009: i) 
4  Bratsis (2003: 9) 
5  Harrison (2006: 16) 
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But is it really the case that corruption is not about ideals and thus uncontroversial? 
Why do we judge it as damaging? Do we not do so because we see it as detrimental 
to something that we value highly or conceive as desirable, i.e. an ideal of some-
thing? And given that people tend to value things differently, may different people 
not have differing views on what corruption means? If this was so, how could we all 
agree on what needs to be done to combat corruption?  
The following sections turn these questions to the academic literature; they explore 
the literature on corruption and anticorruption activities with a focus on what it 
makes of this potential normativity and the potentially controversial character of 
both corruption and anticorruption activities, whether and how it pays attention to 
these issues and their consequences, and what the most important findings on them 
ave been so far.  h 
Positivist research on corruption – corruption as a fact 
The first thing one notices when turning to the literature in search for answers to 
these questions is that investigations of ‘ideals’ in IAC efforts are rather rare,6 while 
studies on corruption, what causes it and how it should be combated,  abound. What 
is distinctive about the current mainstream literature on corruption is that it relies on 
a positivist epistemology and tends to look at corruption as something which can be 
objectively assessed through empirical observation.7 Based on the assumption that 
reality is driven by general laws of cause and effect which exist “independently of 
social and historical context”, the main aim of positivist studies is to discover the 
laws of corruption – what causes it, what facilitates it – through “empirical testing of 
hypotheses and deductive statements”.8 For this purpose, valid and testable hypothe-
ses are provided regarding relations between corruption and other ‘factors’ which 
cause mis- or mal-development in countries and the ways in which such factors in-
                                                 
6 The few existing studies will be discussed further on in the chapter. 
7 The understanding of positivism that forms the basis of the present discussion is based on Wight 
(2006) and Fischer (2003). 
8  Fischer (2003: 118). Positivism holds that social science does not require methods that are distinct 
to those in the physical or natural sciences; neutral/factual empirical observations as well as quanti-
tative operationalisation and analysis can be applied to the social sciences, enabling the same gener-
alisations and predictions Wight (2006: 21). 
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fluence each other negatively and/or positively. These hypotheses concerning the 
causal relations in which corruption is embedded then need to be proven via empiri-
cal observation.  
This entails a focus on the appearances of corruption as perceived by the observer (in 
this case the corruption researcher or other researchers who have collected data on 
corruption and other ‘factors’).9  Positivist corruption studies then usually start off 
with an a priori definition of what, in the researcher’s opinion, should be treated as 
corruption for the purpose of the study. Despite this focus on the researcher’s per-
spective, nevertheless positivists explicitly dissociate themselves from objectivism 
by never claiming that what they distinguish, analyse and make causal statements 
about as corruption is in fact corruption. Rather they claim to treat theoretical terms 
like corruption in an instrumental way only – as referring not to real entities but ‘as 
if’ entities; according to positivism, what is defined as corruption is researched ‘as if’ 
it existed, and while it might not actually exist, it is claimed that this way of dealing 
with it still helps to explain it as an empirical phenomenon.10 Thus, positivist corrup-
tion studies are characterised by a disinterest in a potential ‘essence’ of corruption 
but also in what corruption might mean to different people in different contexts. 
What matters to positivist researchers is not whether what they observe as corruption 
is what is conceived as corruption by others who observe it or by those who commit 
it, but rather whether it is ‘helpful’ to explain (through causal inferences) why cor-
ruption happens, what its effects are, and to predict when and where it will happen.11  
The most widely used definition of corruption in positivist studies is that of the 
‘abuse of public office for private gain’. It derives from Nye’s so-called public-
office-centred definition of corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence”.12 Far from being the only definition of corruption with 
universalist pretence, it is the most popular one and “has become standard in recent 
                                                 
9  Wight (2006: 21) 
10 See Wight (2006: 22). Against this argument one can however raise the objection that as soon as it 
is argued that some observations are more correct than others in relation to the observable world, 
positivism veers towards objectivism. 
11 Wight (2006: 21) 
12 Nye (1967: 284) 
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cross-national empirical studies of corruption”.13 In addition to several similar, pub-
lic-office centred definitions14 it is used by a great number of scientific studies on 
corruption and is generally regarded as being free from normative connotations. An-
other set of corruption definitions are the economistic or ‘market-centred’ ones. Van 
Klaveren gives one such example and states that a “corrupt civil servant regards his 
public office as a business, the income of which he will…seek to maximize. (...) The 
size of his income depends…upon the market situation and his talents for finding the 
point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve”.15 Other categories of defini-
tions, which are more difficult to understand as ‘neutrally’ observable and thus much 
less frequently used, are public-opinion-centred definitions16 and public-interest-
centred definitions.17 
Importantly, the definitions and observations of corruption are expected to be made 
in a value-neutral way. The conviction that definitions of corruption as well as the 
researcher’s observing gaze can and should be free from any normative judgments 
about corruption and other concepts that are used in the study is due to the positivist 
belief in the possibility of fact-value-separations and the concomitant prioritisation 
of cognitive over normative statements. Thus, not only is it believed that normative 
and factual judgments can be separated, but also that unlike normative judgments 
about corruption, factual or cognitive statements about corruption can be (objec-
tively) judged as right or wrong and therefore are useful for the explanation of causal 
relations involving corruption.18 Therefore, it is assumed that researchers can (and in 
fact should) defy everything they may have learned about corruption, put aside every 
normative judgment that they may hold about corruption, and instead look at, hy-
pothesise about and analyse corruption and its related ‘factors’ from a neutral per-
spective, thus generating only factual statements about it.  
                                                 
13 Sandholtz/Gray (2003: 765) 
14 See for example Rose-Ackerman (1999); Treisman (20000); Shleifer/Vishny (1993); Sand-
holtz/Gray (2003); Theobald (1990); Scott (1972); Kaufmann (1997) 
15 Van Klaveren (1970: 25-26); see also Wilson (1970: 62-64) 
16 See for example Rundquist and Hansen (1976) who state that an act is corrupt “when the weight of 
public opinion determines it so” (Barry Rundquist and Susan Hansen, "On Controlling Official Cor-
ruption: Elections vs. Laws," unpublished manuscript quoted in Peters/Welch 1978). 
17 See for example Rogow and Lasswell (1963:132) who argue that a corrupt act is one that “violates 
responsibility towards at least one system of public and civic order and is in fact incompatible with 
(destructive of) any such system”, or also Friedrich (1966: 74). 
18  Wight (2006: 21) 
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Given the need to generalise, the formulation of hypotheses is often based on theori-
sations of corrupt behaviour using universalist assumptions about human behaviour. 
The desire for quantitative analysis in turn favours simplistic and mechanistic mod-
els of human nature which are easily translated into mathematic formulae. A particu-
larly popular way to model corrupt behaviour and to generate hypotheses about its 
relation with other variables is the rational choice approach. Borrowed from econom-
ics, it “constitutes one of the leading theoretical orientations in political science and 
sociology”19 and has considerably shaped positivist corruption research. Its basic 
assumption is that “human beings behave rationally in the effort to achieve their self-
interested ends”.20 Self-interest is regarded as the sole and unchangeable drive of 
human behaviour and human beings are assumed to mechanistically act and react to 
their environment in striving for interest-maximisation. The most famous application 
of rational choice theory to model corruption is Klitgaard’s 1991 formula: C = M + 
D – A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability), which is based on 
the assumption that rational individuals will in any decision-making situation calcu-
late the potential gains arising from their discretion and monopoly over decision-
making and balance them against the risk of loss arising from the likelihood of detec-
tion and punishment. If the former outweighs the latter, any individual will perpe-
trate the corrupt act. Interestingly, Fischer notes that whereas early day rationalists 
have generally assigned things like ideas to “such general categories as ‘unexplained 
variance’”, (...) various modern-day rational choice theorists try to integrate ideals 
and beliefs held by individuals or groups without giving up or modifying their basic 
contention” of human self-interested rationality.21  
Given that internal validation and replicability of research are particularly important 
demands from a positivist perspective, definitions of corruption (as well as other 
‘factors’) are usually operationalised through quantitative data sets or indicators as 
this kind of operationalisation is regarded as most ‘objective’ and best suited to rep-
lication and validation by other scholars. Since direct observation and measurement 
of corruption is hardly ever possible, the positivist corruption researcher usually re-
lies on data sets on levels of corruption as perceived by others. The Corruption Per-
                                                 
19  Fischer (2003: 119) 
20  Fischer (2003: 22) 
21  Fischer (2003: 22) 
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ceptions Index (CPI) by the NGO Transparency International (TI) is the “best known 
‘measure’ for ‘corruption’ in the world”22 and is used by countless positivist studies 
to operationalise corruption.23 The annually published index is “a composite index, a 
combination of polls” which gathers information on perceptions of corruption from 
polls conducted by various research institutes.24 It ranks countries according to their 
levels of corruption as perceived by international business persons, public officials, 
and general public opinion. While the index is frequently criticised by non-positivist 
scholars for being business-centred, bribe-focused or Western-centric,25 positivist 
scholars sometimes find the index unreliable and insufficiently objective because it 
only measures perceptions26 and because the relational ranking does not reveal if 
world-wide corruption is growing or not. Yet, as there is no qualitatively better alter-
native,27 researchers seeking to carry out quantitative analysis rely on the CPI most 
of the time. 
The final aim of positivist research is the generation of replicable and falsifiable em-
pirical evidence about causal relations involving corruption in the sense of covering 
laws on the basis of which future phenomena can be explained and predicted.28 Most 
frequently these take the form of ‘if levels of Y rise then levels of corruption de-
crease’ or ‘if corruption increases then X happens’. The generalisability of discov-
ered causal relations is often tested through comparing changes in factors between 
countries or different time periods.  
                                                 
22  De Maria (2008c: 778) 
23 See e.g. Treisman (2000); Gundlach/Paldam (2009); Goldsmith (19998); Montinola/Jackman 
(2002); Xin/Rudel (2004); Lipset/Lenz (2000); de Jong/Bogmans (2011); Melgar et al (2010); 
Das/DiRienzo (2010); Baughn/Bodie (2010); Judge et al (2011); Saha et al (2009); Gokcekus 
(2008), to mention but a few  
24  TI (q); see also TI (B) 
25 For detailed critiques of the CPI see Andersson/Heywood (2009); Galtung (2006); Sampford, 
C./Shacklock, A./Connors, C./Galtung (2006); De Maria (2008c); Sik (2002) 
26 This practice of relying on the perceptions of non-scientific persons is regarded as being in tension 
with the positivist principle of value-neutrality, given that the capacity to make value-neutral state-
ments is usually regarded as a particular quality of the scientific researcher.  
27 There are two other corruption indices, both of which are based solely on expert opinions and less 
frequently used than the CPI: the bribe-focused index of Business International (BI) and the corrup-
tion index of Political Risk Services (PRS). In 1999, TI also started to publish an annual Bribe Pay-
ers Index (BPI) based on data gathered by Gallup International. It relies on the perceptions of busi-
ness leaders from 14 leading emerging market economies for the generation of a ranking of 19 lead-
ing exporting countries according to the degrees to which their corporations pay bribes abroad (see 
TI D). 
28 Fischer (2003: 118) 
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The explanations offered and the results obtained in such studies are rather diverse. 
Findings have been quite contradictory regarding the causes of corruption,29 such as 
the state of economic development;30 openness to foreign trade;31 level of public 
employment;32 federalism;33 cartel parties/number of cleavages;34 political competi-
tion;35 salaries of public officials;36 percentages of religious people37 etc. The two 
most important consequences of corruption for states’ development that positivist 
studies distinguish (and more or less agree on) concern the negative effects of cor-
ruption on the economy, embodied by variables such as GDP per capita,38 levels of 
productivity,39 persistent capital flows40 and the quality of public investments,41 and 
the negative effects it has on democratisation.42 Other scholars have examined the 
impact of democratisation on levels of corruption and here again some controversial 
findings are revealed.43 While especially during the 1960s ‘functionalist’ corruption 
scholars disputed the noxiousness of corruption and tried to show that it can have 
positive effects,44 nowadays most scholars agree that corruption is problematic and 
aim to contribute to finding solutions to this problem. 
                                                 
29 See Manow (2003) for an overview on the most important hypotheses concerning causes of corrup-
tion in the positivist corruption literature. 
30 See e.g. Treisman (2000), assuming a negative relationship; Mauro (1995), Wolfinger (1972) hold-
ing the antithesis 
31 See e.g. Ades/Di Tella (1999), assuming a negative relationship 
32 See e.g. Treisman (2000), assuming a positive relationship; Rosenthal (1998) holding the antithesis 
33 See e.g. Wilson (1970), assuming a positive relationship; Weingast (1995), holding the antithesis 
34 See e.g. Hine (1996); Katz/Mair (1995); Mauro (1995), assuming a positive relationship; Lijphart 
(1999) holding the antithesis 
35 See e.g. Della Porta/Vannucci (1999), assuming negative relationship; Clapham (1982), Warner 
(1997), holding the antithesis 
36 See e.g. Klitgaard/Klitgaard (1991); Besley/McLaren (1993); Montinola/Jackman (2002), assuming 
a negative relationship; Treisman (2000); Schiavo-Campo et al (1999); Van Rijckeghem/Weder 
(2001) holding the antithesis 
37 See e.g. Treisman (2000), assuming a negative relationship; La Porta, Rafael et al. (1998), holding 
the antithesis 
38 Different researchers find a negative correlation between a country’s ranking on corruption indices 
and GDP per capita. See e.g. Kaufmann et al (2002); Rose-Ackerman (1999); Mauro (2002) 
39  Lambsdorff (2003) 
40  Lambsdorff (2003) 
41  Davoodi/Tanzi (1997) 
42  Lipset/Lenz (2000) dissent on this negative relationship (cited in Johnston 2005: 18). 
43  Amundsen (1999 and Treisman (2000) argue that the level of corruption becomes substantially 
reduced only through democratic consolidation or ‘deep democracy’. According to Harris-
White/White (1996), however, the process of democratisation can also lead to increased corruption. 
Diamond/Plattner (1993) hold that democratisation increases both the opportunities for graft and the 
likelihood to be discovered. 
44  Leys (1965); Bayley (1966); Huntington (1968) 
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While some interesting correlations between corruption and other social phenomena 
have been revealed, the fact that these findings are partly rather contradictory ham-
pers the positivist aim of a coherent body of predictive generalisations on corruption. 
Yet what is more interesting with regards to the question of the potential normativity 
and contestation of corruption and anticorruption efforts is that due to positivist re-
search principles such questions are virtually absent from positivist studies. The pri-
oritisation of ‘facts’ over values as an analytical category prevents positivists from 
deeper inquiries into the potentially normative content of corruption. In fact, such 
enterprises would be discounted as un-scientific. The positivist focus on the re-
searcher in judging reality does not allow for the consideration of other perspectives. 
The need for ‘objective’ definitions, universalist models of social relations and the 
endeavour to create generalisations render positivist studies unable to investigate po-
tential differences in the meaning of corruption, how they come about, how they 
might differ across actors and spaces, how they are related to other social norms or 
ideals, and how all this might affect social relations in diverse ways. Given the ad-
herence to positivist research principles of the majority of contemporary studies of 
corruption, most corruption studies are interested in IAC activities only insofar as 
they might be able to contribute to problem-solving45 with regards to corruption, 
namely by providing better knowledge about its causes and consequences and by as-
sessing the effects that IAC measures may have on levels of corruption. Thus, we 
can identify an overall lack of interest in the literature in questioning IAC activities 
with regards to its normative and political content.  
 
After positivism – corruption as a socially constructed concept 
Thus, it seems that we have to reject positivist principles of science if we are to ad-
dress these questions. Fischer, who argues for a general move away from positivism, 
reasons that...  
... [b]eyond seeking to explain a “given” reality, social science also must at-
tempt to explain how social groups construct their own understandings of 
that reality. Not only do such constructions constitute the most basic level 
                                                 
45  Cox/Sinclair (1996) 
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of social action; their implications are fundamental to an understanding of 
the processes of social change, without which we would have little need for 
social science.46  
Numerous other scholars have argued that a social construction of reality needs to be 
acknowledged in the approach to the study of social phenomena – a task positivism 
is unable to undertake. With regards to corruption, a departure from positivist re-
search principles and the concomitant goal of tracing generalisable causal relations 
between corruption and other factors means that our focus can extend to include the 
ways in which people (including researchers and practitioners) come to understand 
corruption in the first place.47 Instead of approaching the research process as an un-
dertaking in which appearances of corruption can be objectively observed and evalu-
ated in just one correct (objective and value-neutral) way, we can give up the search 
for ‘truth’ about corruption and instead direct our attention to another level of reality 
which lies behind these analytic processes and consists in our reality-defining onto-
logical, epistemological and ideological premises and assumptions.48 Instead of be-
ing ignored altogether, processes of social construction of corruption, related social 
norms or ideals but also of scientific knowledge itself can then be apprehended as an 
analytical category for the understanding of social relations involving corruption that 
is at least of equal importance to hypotheses, explanations and theoretical models 
concerning it.49 Thus, the move away from positivism allows corruption to be ana-
lysed as a normative concept that can mean different things to different people in dif-
ferent social contexts and the meaning of which is shaped through social processes 
characterised by a constant interplay of material and ideational structures. Its con-
struction through these processes is closely interrelated with that of manifold other 
social norms and ideals as well as social practices which are again closely linked to 
more general assumptions about what there is in the world, how we can understand it 
and how we should deal with it.  
 
                                                 
46  Fischer (1998: 134) 
47 See Gebel (2011) for an elaboration of a post-positivist approach to research corruption and anticor-
ruption activities (in German). 
48 Lapid (1989: 241) 
49 See Fischer (2003: 121), Lapid (1989: 239, 240, 243) 
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Corruption as the ‘subversion of the naturally sound constitution of society’  
While this thesis is not the first attempt to adopt such a perspective with regards to 
corruption and anticorruption efforts, such studies are scarce. A particularly interest-
ing perspective on the concept of corruption to be considered in regards to the ques-
tion of its potential normativity (but also in regards to ‘technical’ positivist defini-
tions) is offered by Philp.50 He suggests that there is no value-free way of defining or 
conceiving corruption. Arguing that the concept of corruption is historically rooted 
“in the sense of a thing being changed from its naturally sound condition, into some-
thing unsound”, he notes that problems arise as soon as this concept is applied to ar-
eas where there is hardly a general consensus on their ‘naturally sound condition’ 
such as in the sphere of politics.51  
Conceptions of political corruption, he argues, are in fact “intimately connected” to 
conceptions of the public interest and different types of political rule, which involve 
normative decisions and political ideals52 that are bound to be contested by social 
actors with different political views. As Philp explains, it is...  
...difficult to avoid moving from identification of cases of rule infraction to 
more general questions about what such infractions mean within that politi-
cal culture and, thereafter to questions about the character of politics. Small 
questions have a way of leading to big ones and the broader questions al-
most inevitably raise deeper normative and ethical issues.53  
In order to illustrate this, Philp points out that public-office based definitions of cor-
ruption such as the one by Nye cited above imply a notion of the public interest 
which cannot be conceived in purely technical terms (while this possibility is the 
positivist argument for employing it). When defining corruption as behaviour deviat-
ing from the formal duties of a public role, Nye “implicitly recognizes the public in-
terest dimension by insisting that the deviation must be for private regarding 
gains”.54 This is because in order to determine the nature of private gain (or interest), 
                                                 
50 Philp (1997) 
51 Philp (1997: 445) 
52 Philp (1997: 441, 445) 
53 Philp (1997: 446) 
54 Philp (1997: 440); similarly, Philp argues that market-centred definitions might be useful to under-
stand corrupt behaviour, but not to define it.  Neither can they avoid normative questions: “To be 
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one must distinguish it from the public interest, since private and public sphere are 
the two mutually constitutive areas of the modern liberal state to which the definition 
refers. 
This suggests that conceptions of corruption are necessarily tied to ideals; even if 
due to the intrinsic negativity carried by the concept these ideals may be less obvious 
in conceptions of corruption than in those of other concepts in the realm of interna-
tional politics. The peculiarity of conceptions of corruption is that they reveal their 
ideal only indirectly, as that which is negated by corruption. Or put differently: If 
corruption is the subversion of an ideal condition of something, as Philp suggests, 
then what is conceived as corruption depends on what is conceived as ideal. The 
second point this raises is that conceptions of corruption are unlikely to be uncontro-
versial, given that there may be no consensus on the ideal organisation of areas of 
society in which corruption may be identified. Extending Philp’s perspective, think-
ing of corruption as the ‘subversion of the naturally sound constitution of society’ 
may be helpful in making the normative, political character of the concept explicit 
and highlighting the need for interpretation. Thirdly, such a perspective has poten-
tially important consequences not only for the comprehension and analysis of cor-
ruption but also for activities deployed to combat it. It implies that any attempt to 
examine corruption in a particular context needs to acknowledge its normative and 
potentially political nature, and it also means that IAC efforts cannot be understood 
as intrinsically good but need to be scrutinised in light of the ideals that their use of 
the concept of corruption may entail, which may be regarded as problematic by dif-
ferent social actors. 
The following sections show what can be found if we shift our focus to the ways in 
which people come to understand concepts like corruption in the first place. Drawing 
on different examples from the literature, some illustrations shall be given from stud-
ies that have examined corruption as a social construct and that have analysed the 
historical development of conceptions of corruption across time and that have traced 
differences in conceptions of corruption across different cultural contexts. 
                                                                                                                                          
able to point to those cases of interest/income maximizing which are also politically corrupt, one 
has to appeal to constructions of public office and the public interest which draw in norms and val-
ues which are external to the market-model” (Philp 1997: 445). 
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Corruption as a historically contingent concept 
Conceptions of corruption have evolved over time. Different authors have traced the 
evolution of the meaning of corruption in the West from Ancient Greece to today. 
All authors differentiate between openly moral conceptions of corruption (such as 
unjust rule) and more technical conceptions of corruption (such as the ‘abuse of pub-
lic office for private gain’) which they partly assign to different time periods.  
Génaux carves out historical continuities and changes in the Western understanding 
of corruption. She finds that openly moral and justice-related as well as more techni-
cal conceptions of corruption are both historically rooted in “the politico-moral 
sphere” and closely interrelated.55 According to her, they have the same biblical ori-
gins, expressing “man’s mortality in front of God’s eternity and incorruptio”. The 
task of heaven-sent leaders to create justice on earth was later extended to public of-
ficials, which is why Génaux regards even technical definitions such as ‘the abuse of 
public office for private gain’ as linked to a politico-moral understanding of corrup-
tion.56 Despite its acquisition over time of a more technical character which can be 
seen as reminiscent of the technical conception of bribery in Ancient Greece, she 
holds that the modern concept of corruption is rooted in the concept of injustice up 
until today.57  
Bratsis disagrees with this continuity between ancient and modern understandings of 
corruption. He stresses how understandings of political corruption in Ancient Greece 
were linked to a “normative political project that posits what the good is and on this 
basis is able to establish what is corrupt or bad”, which is not the case for what he 
sees as modern technical conceptions.58 He explains that “[i]n the traditional under-
standing of corruption, there was a strong imagery of decay and regression, of some-
thing becoming less and less capable, potent, or virtuous” in the sense that “the abil-
ity to seek the good and virtuous is decreased and possibly destroyed”. While he ar-
gues that this meaning of the term is still understood and used today, for example 
“when we claim that the minds of the young are corrupted by the entertainment in-
                                                 
55  Génaux (2004: 21) 
56  Génaux (2004: 20) 
57  Génaux (2004: 22) 
58  Bratsis (2003: 17) 
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dustry”,59 he does not recognise it in the conception of political corruption that is 
dominant today and that centres on the public/private split and on the concept of in-
terests.60 According to Bratsis, this modern understanding is based on two interre-
lated assumptions: “that mutually exclusive public and private interests exist and that 
public servants must necessarily abstract themselves from the realm of the private in 
order to properly function”.61 Unlike the traditional conception of corruption which 
was about “a clear division of good and bad”,62 this modern conception in Bratsis’ 
opinion “does not function as an explicitly normative construct but rather as an ar-
ticulation of categories of bourgeois political ontology”.63 This means that it serves 
to constitute and reaffirm the public/private split dominant in today’s Western socie-
ties, namely “through its application and subsequent categorization of phenomena as 
corruption or uncorrupt, as pathological or normal” according to the sphere in which 
they happen.64 For Bratsis, the modern conception of corruption therefore “repeats 
the normative-political emphasis of the traditional understanding of political corrup-
tion but does so in an essentialist and apolitical manner”65 since it takes “the integ-
rity of the public/private split at face value, as a quality immanent in all societies, as 
the normal”.66  
                                                
In his criticism of the apolitical and technical character of the modern conception of 
corruption, Euben draws attention to its roots in a particular political tradition, thus 
highlighting the political character of corruption.67 He compares conceptions of cor-
ruption in the republican and liberal traditions of political thought and points to wide 
differences. Linking the republican conception of corruption back to Ancient Greece, 
Euben explains that Aristotle had very particular and strong views about what he 
conceived to be a healthy polity and that this “sense of political health and decay 
emanating from the Politics has helped define the republican tradition”, influencing 
writers like Machiavelli and shaping republican conceptions of corruption as the de-
 
59  Bratsis (2003: 15) 
60  Bratsis (2003: 14) 
61  Bratsis (2003: 11) 
62  Bratsis (2003: 15) 
63  Bratsis (2003: 17) 
64  Bratsis (2003: 17) 
65  Bratsis (2003: 17) 
66  Bratsis (2003: 18) 
67  Euben (1989) 
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cay of virtue.68 Later, however, the republican image of the communitarian citizen 
and the belief in an ideal polis was deconstructed by Hobbesian liberal thought and 
its particular image of human nature as genuinely driven by self-interest.69 In what 
Euben calls “the liberal transvaluation of corruption”70 Hobbes ruled out the republi-
can viewpoint on human nature and politics and consequently eliminated the specific 
moral, metaphysical and epistemological foundations that the concept of corruption 
had rested on thus far: “Once men are seen as irremediably egoistic subjects rather 
than potentially activist citizens, as sharing a nature which fragments them rather 
than a history which unites them, as requiring an absolutely sovereign ruler rather 
than a sharing of power, we confront a political and conceptual universe in which 
republican political theory is irrelevant”.71  
In his analysis of the ways in which contemporary meanings of corruption are con-
structed Euben goes a step further and links the liberal understanding of corruption 
and its concomitant conception of human nature to the positivist research approach 
discussed earlier. He argues that “the present effort by political scientists to develop 
a politically neutral, methodologically respectable, operationally viable definition of 
corruption (...) is built on the rejection of the republican understanding of corruption 
as moralistic and subjective”.72 What he also sees reflected in the positivist approach 
to understanding corruption is the liberal view of men as “self-interested animals in-
capable of civic virtue”, as “self-enclosed and undisclosed” individuals who “lack 
any internal connections”, who “share a nature, not a history”, who “replicate rather 
than modify each other in the course of collective action and deliberation”.73 While 
made in 1989, this observation by Euben is indeed easily relatable to the rational 
choice models discussed earlier which are currently the most popular way to theorise 
corruption. Thus, Euben shows not only how corruption is shaped in social processes 
which the positivist research approach is not able to grasp, but he also argues that 
this approach itself contributes to the shaping of conceptions of corruption in very 
particular ways. 
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These accounts serve as illustrations of the ways in which meanings of corruption 
have been shaped historically, and how the concept is imbued with or emptied of 
particular values over time. However, scholars disagree on whether modern under-
standings of corruption are linked to moral notions of justice or whether they are 
rather technical or what the relations between these two characteristics of corruption 
may be. Furthermore, despite agreement on the centring of modern conceptions of 
corruption on interests, Euben and Bratsis seem to disagree on the question of politi-
cal content. Both these insights and disagreements make an inquiry into the kinds of 
conceptions of corruption inherent in IAC efforts particularly auspicious. Are those 
conceptions technical, moral, liberal? All of these or none at all? How do they play 
out in the fight against corruption and in the construction of societal ideals that Philp 
argues are necessarily attached to corruption? If they were liberal, why is there 
hardly any criticism from other political actors?  
 
Corruption as a culturally contingent concept 
Another set of authors has investigated the social construction of corruption in dif-
ferent socio-cultural contexts. Several studies with an ethnographic and anthropolo-
gist approach have examined corruption as well as other social and bureaucratic 
norms and revealed differences in these norms and the meaning of corruption be-
tween Western and non-Western countries.  
While developing nations following the end of colonialist periods often officially 
adopted Western laws and bureaucratic regulations, this does not mean that they 
have simultaneously adopted the concomitant values, practices and conceptions of 
public and private sphere, as Scott remarks.74 These norms are responded to, appro-
priated and contested in developing countries by other social rules and traditional 
institutions with competing codes and values.75 Consequently conceptions of corrup-
tion which are closely tied to these norms, values and practices will also vary. Thus 
                                                 
74 Scott (1969: 319) (cited in Sissener 2001: 3) 
75 Cf. Price (1999); Ruud (2000), cited in Sissener (2001: 4); Szeftel (1998: 235) 
37 
 
corruption, as Harrison puts it, “matters to all sorts of people, but it matters in differ-
ent ways and for different reasons”.76 
Gupta gives examples of how bureaucratic norms in a rural Indian region differ from 
Western ones. He describes the working routine of an Indian official responsible for 
the land records of several villages, which he administers at his private home that 
simultaneously functions as office. As Gupta explains, the process of giving bribes 
to this official was quite open; the transactions happened in public and seemed to be 
commonly accepted. Moreover, Gupta argues that in this context the practice of 
bribe-giving was not simply an economic transaction “but a cultural practice that re-
quired a great degree of performative competence”, in particular with regard to in-
formation about and negotiation of the adequate sum of bribes. While in most cases 
“the ‘rates’ were well-known and fixed”77 some villagers were found “expressing 
frustration because they lacked the cultural capital required to negotiate deftly for 
those services”.78 Accordingly, Gupta argues that officials like Sharmaji pose an “in-
teresting challenge to Western notions of the boundary between ‘state’ and ‘society’” 
in that they collapse this distinction “not only between their roles as public servants 
and as private citizens at the site of their activity, but also in their styles of opera-
tion”.79 This points to important differences in how corruption is conceived in these 
settings. While villagers complained about the corruption of state officials and their 
own resulting “exclusion from governments services because these were costly”,80 
nevertheless expectations about the correct relations between state and society and 
about adequate behaviour in this relationship seemed to differ substantively from 
those prevalent in Western countries.81 This means that if corruption is conceived as 
an abuse of public office for private gain, its meaning can differ greatly given that 
different actions count as abusive or legitimate in different contexts.  
Olivier de Sardan demonstrates how, in the context of many African states, many 
practices that are officially illegal and widely condemned (in those very contexts), 
                                                 
76 Harrison (2006: 26) 
77 Gupta (1995: 379) 
78 Gupta (1995: 381) 
79  Gupta (1995: 384). The author makes reference to this as “blurring the boundaries between ‘state’ 
and ‘civil society’” Gupta (1995: 384). 
80  Gupta (1995: 381) 
81  Routley (2012) makes a similar argument using examples from the Nigerian NGO-context. 
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are often not considered as corrupt but legitimate by their perpetrators.82 This does 
not mean that any act that may be considered corrupt from a Western perspective is 
considered as legitimate in African contexts; what Olivier de Sardan argues is that in 
order to really understand such practices it is necessary to consider the wider social 
practices and norms in which they are embedded.83 Accordingly, Olivier de Sardan 
shows that what he calls ‘the corruption complex’ is culturally embedded in different 
logics of negotiation, of gift-giving, of the solidarity network, of predatory authority 
and in the logic of redistributive accumulation which are all “habitual local social 
norms” with a positive connotation.84 For example, the logic of redistributive accu-
mulation, he argues, enables us to understand better how “[i]llegal enrichment and 
nepotism are definitely supported by positive social values, namely the necessity to 
seize all opportunities allowing for a manifestation of cardinal virtues, such as gen-
erosity, largesse and gratitude to all those who in the past (...) provided help, encour-
agement and support”. Who has the luck of acceding to a prestigious position must, 
“in the sight of his relatives, profit from this and spread the benefit around”, making 
‘officially corrupt’ practices a legitimate means of wealth acquisition.85 In this re-
spect, Bracking stresses that in such contexts the question of whether something 
counts as corruption is highly dependent on perspectives which again depend on po-
sitions; corruption is something morally ambiguous and depends on the “class posi-
tionality of the onlooker, relative to the assets in question”.86 
It must be borne in mind that generalisations of the customs of whole continents 
necessarily oversee and neglect manifold differences and nuances between and 
within African, Asian and European societies. Nevertheless these accounts highlight 
how social norms regarding legitimate and illegitimate behaviour can differ across 
the world, preventing a universally valid understanding of corruption. Furthermore, 
they confirm Philp’s point regarding concomitant societal ideals in that they show 
how conceptions of corruption are closely tied to wider societal structures, social 
norms and ideals. These insights raise important questions for the analysis of IAC 
                                                 
82  De Sardan (1999: 34) 
83  De Sardan (1999: 35) 
84  De Sardan (1999: 35) 
85  De Sardan (1999: 43). See Bracking (2009a) for similar arguments based on an analysis of the cur-
rent Zimbabwian political context. 
86  Bracking (2009a: 45) 
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efforts. If corruption is understood differently in different cultural contexts, how will 
international organisations go about combating it? How will they take into account 
the differing social norms and structures with which conceptions of corruption are 
closely interlinked in the countries that are the targets of IAC activities? 
 
International anticorruption efforts as a site where corruption is con-
structed 
While the previous sections have reviewed different social constructions of corrup-
tion in different periods of time (in the West) and in different cultural contexts, it is 
now time to come back to the starting point of this inquiry into social constructions 
of corruption, which is the IAC agenda. As we have already seen, by conceiving of 
corruption as a social construction, important openings and new foci can be consti-
tuted not only on corruption per se but also on related social norms and ideals. Yet 
simultaneously, the change in perspective also shifts the focus to the ways in which 
corruption and concomitant ideals are shaped and constantly re-shaped through dif-
ferent social processes, and how these processes come to establish particular mean-
ings as the correct ones. From this perspective the international fight against corrup-
tion can no longer be regarded as a simple accumulation of intrinsically good meas-
ures to combat what everyone knows is corruption, or as a project the success of 
which can be neutrally evaluated through positivist research; rather, it turns itself 
into a site where corruption is constructed and, if we are to believe the studies re-
viewed above, a site in which interrelated values, social norms and societal structures 
are shaped. Given the importance attached to IAC efforts, the powerful institutional 
and monetary resources behind them and the unquestioning widespread support such 
efforts enjoy, it is of crucial importance to inquire more deeply into these issues.  
It was only in the past decade that some academic scholars have ventured to do so 
and the overall number of such studies is still rather small. The following sections 
examine this literature according to its main analytical findings and while doing so 
identify important blind spots and contradictions within the picture painted of the 
IAC agenda. Four important sets of closely interrelated findings about the interna-
tional fight against corruption can be distinguished in the literature: The first con-
40 
 
cerns the normative and political content of IAC efforts; the second refers to a con-
sensus on these ideals among IAC actors; the third concerns the specific ways in 
which corruption and its concomitant ideals are constructed by IAC activities; and 
the fourth regards the ways in which these constructions become persuasive or pow-
erful. Below, I will jointly discuss the first and second set and then separately the 
third and the fourth set of these findings; however it must be stressed that all of them 
are very closely interrelated. 
 
The political nature of IAC efforts – a neoliberal consensus? 
To begin with it should be noted that most studies discussed here are analyses of 
strategic policy documents; only some also investigate non-linguistic practices of 
different IAC actors. All of them are article-length studies which mostly deal with 
just one IAC actor.87 The studies that will be reviewed are almost solely concerned 
with documents and activities at the level of the headquarters of IAC organisations.88 
Several authors who have critically analysed IAC efforts have found a consensus 
with regards to conceptions of corruption, its causes, consequences and remedies. 
Johnston summarises that “a new consensus has emerged over corruption’s origins, 
consequences, and remedies” which has been “driven primarily by business, and by 
international aid and lending institutions”.89 Similarly, Bukovansky identifies a “so-
lidifying consensus” that corruption is “a primary villain for underdevelopment and a 
host of other ills” and that it is “a problem of international concern, requiring multi-
lateral solutions”.90 Krastev agrees and sees contemporary efforts to fight corruption 
as reflecting a ‘Washington Consensus on Corruption’91 among international finan-
cial institutions while Sampson, too, emphasises the “unified character of the anti-
                                                 
87 An exception is Bukovansky (2006) who includes several IAC actors. She analyses around 30 anti-
corruption policy documents by the UN, the IMF, the WB, the OECD, and TI.  
88 There are hardly any studies that deal with the concrete implementation of IAC projects on the 
ground in target countries (see only Brown/Cloke 2005); yet as we will see on this more general 
level there is already much room for elaboration and further analysis. 
89  Johnston (2005: 16). While Johnston gives a review of IAC efforts in the beginning of his book, it 
is however not his main aim to critically analyse the IAC agenda; this is why he does not provide 
any further empirical detail on the agenda and will not be mentioned in the following literature cri-
tique. 
90  Bukovansky (2006: 182); see also Sampson (2010: 273) 
91  Krastev (2004) 
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corruption industry”92 in its construction of corruption as a significant problem for 
development.93   
Thus, these scholars seem to agree that there is a consensus among international or-
ganisations of different kinds about what corruption is and about the ways in which 
it should be combated. Most critical anticorruption scholars who have analysed parts 
of the IAC agenda have also substantiated Philp’s argument that conceptions of cor-
ruption always come with particular societal ideals. They have pointed out that anti-
corruption reforms arising from the IAC consensus advance a particular societal 
ideal that displays neoliberal characteristics.94 Given that neoliberalism is a much 
debated concept which can have quite diverse meanings, the insights that the neolib-
eral label renders into the kind of political or rather politico-economic ideal implicit 
in the fight against corruption are limited – all the more so as hardly any of the criti-
cal scholars explicates what they mean by the term. Respective scholars seem to at-
tribute the neoliberal labelling mostly (and for the most part only implicitly) to the 
emphasis by IAC actors on economic growth,95 their advocacy of market liberalisa-
tion,96 privatisation,97 and deregulation.98 With regards to the state the neoliberal 
characteristics detected consist of smaller government99 or an “anti-state slant”,100 an 
emphasis on transparency, separation of powers and government accountability101 
and ultimately in the creation of a “lean, technically competent state that is little 
more than a kind of referee in the economic arena”.102 Corruption in this neoliberal 
consensus, so goes the argument of the critical literature, is mainly conceived as 
bribery;103 it is framed as an economic problem arising mainly from the public sec-
                                                 
92  Sampson (2010: 264) 
93  Sampson (2010: 273) 
94  Polzer (2001); Hindess (2005); Brown/Cloke (2004); Bukovansky (2006); Bracking (2007); Johns-
ton (2005); Krastev (2004) 
95  Hindess (2005); Bukovansky (2006) 
96  Bukovansky (2006); Brown/Cloke (2004); Krastev (2004) 
97  Bukovansky (2006); Brown/Cloke (2004); Bracking (2007); Hindess (2005: 1390) 
98  Brown/Cloke (2004); Bracking (2007: 15) 
99  Bukovansky (2006); Brown/Cloke (2004: 276, 278); Johnston (2005: 17) 
100  Brown/Cloke (2004: 286); see also Bracking (2007: 15) 
101  Bukovansky (2006: 183) 
102  Johnston (2005: 17) 
103  Johnston (2005: 18) 
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tor,104 with IAC organisations being nearly blind to the potential corruption of the 
private sector.  
Along with these findings about a neoliberal consensus, most critical authors also 
agree that the fight against corruption is a Western-centric enterprise which ignores 
the existence of other conceptions of corruption and societal ideals in the target 
countries of IAC efforts (which are mainly located in the Global South and Eastern 
Europe105) and tries to impose Western political ideals on them.106 
While these features may be indicative of a broadly (neo)liberal system, and while 
the literature is rather unified in pointing to a consensus on such a system within the 
IAC agenda, different opacities and blind spots in the literature create doubt with re-
gards to the interpretation of a neoliberal IAC consensus. First, there is confusion in 
the literature regarding what a neoliberal system entails. Secondly, there is neglect in 
dealing with a number of concepts in the IAC agenda that do not immediately seem 
to fit the neoliberal framework. Thirdly, there are disagreements and blind spots in 
the critical literature with regards to the neoliberal nature of the diverse IAC actors 
involved in the fight against corruption. 
 
Neoliberal?  
Despite the characteristics of the neoliberal consensus detected by the critical litera-
ture, its contours remain rather vague. Unlike other critical IAC studies, Hindess’ 
article examining TI’s anticorruption efforts provides a clear account of what con-
temporary neoliberalism means.107 His understanding seems to differ at least partly 
from that of other critical IAC scholars in that according to him, neoliberal systems 
feature not only liberal markets and privatisation but also “expand the sphere of 
competition and market-like interaction,108 and (...) promote individual choice along-
side or in place of public provision”. Rather than through direct control by the state, 
                                                 
104  Brown/Cloke (2004: 285); Bukovansky (2006: 194);  Hindess (2005: 1390); Murphy (2011: 133) 
105 TI is the only IAC organisation that does not concentrate its efforts mainly on developing coun-
tries; it has national chapters that work on corruption all over the world.  
106  Hindess (2005); Bukovansky (2006); Brown/Cloke (2004); Bracking (2007); Polzer (2001); Mur-
phy (2011); De Maria (2008c) 
107  See Hindess (2005: 1390) 
108  See also Johnston (2005: 17) 
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neoliberal projects are concerned with regulating the conduct of individuals, private 
bodies and many public agencies indirectly “through the use of market or market-
like arrangements and of auditing”.109 Yet, while this understanding of neoliberalism 
promises to reveal more about the specific kind of un-corrupt society that IAC dis-
course constructs, Hindess only traces it in very rudimentary ways within TI’s publi-
cations. Primarily concerned with showing that “the proposed remedy does not ad-
dress the problem it describes”110 his analysis neglects the dynamics that may exist 
between constructions of corruption and constructions of societal ‘solutions’ and go 
beyond simply ‘not matching’, making IAC efforts persuasive rather than simply 
mistaken.111 While he argues that TI’s Source Book promotes “a programme of nor-
malisation in which other forms of political and economic organisation are to be 
brought in line with neoliberal norms”112 the analysis of what that entails and how 
that actually happens through IAC efforts remains rather underdeveloped. Hindess 
restricts his comments to stating that TI suggests “a Western institutional structure 
for the state”, insists “on the role of civil society and the private sector in the overall 
government of society” and places international agencies in “a tutelary role” in the 
implementation of this neoliberal system.113 How exactly these aspects come to 
make up a neoliberal system as he defines it remains unclear and the empirical evi-
dence presented is scarce. Thus, while arguing that TI pursues a neoliberal agenda, 
Hindess fails to trace convincingly how what he conceives as neoliberalism is inher-
ent to TI’s anticorruption activities. Overall, it can be concluded that the understand-
ing of neoliberalism that underlies the interpretation of the IAC consensus as neolib-
eral is for the most part only vaguely defined in critical IAC studies. It seems to dif-
fer among these studies and does relatively little to explain how exactly these ele-
ments are linked to each other, how this system would function and what exactly 
makes it neoliberal. 
Second, what contributes to the doubts about the neoliberal consensus is that an in-
vestigation of IAC documents reveals the presence of a range of concepts that have 
so far received little if any attention by critical anticorruption scholars. One such 
                                                 
109  Hindess (2005: 1390) 
110  Hindess (2005: 1392) 
111 This is also the case for Brown and Cloke’s article Brown/Cloke (2004: see e.g. 287). 
112  Hindess (2005: 1396) 
113  Hindess (2005: 1397) 
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concept is the participation of civil society which, despite figuring quite prominently 
in the fight against corruption, has been almost completely ignored by critical IAC 
analysts. Hindess argues that TI advocates civil society participation as part of an 
agenda of neoliberal reform, yet does so without explaining what this kind of civil 
society participation consists of and what precisely makes it neoliberal.114 Brown 
and Cloke in turn, who criticise the neoliberal nature of the fight against corruption, 
laud its emphasis on civil society participation, claiming that “local journalists, civil 
society organisations and the judiciary have suddenly found themselves with a range 
of international allies in their struggle to expose deep-seated corruption in their coun-
tries”.115 Polzer again claims that “the Bank’s understanding of how to address cor-
ruption is logically contradictory to the new orthodoxy of maximising ownership” 
among which she counts efforts to enhance civil society participation.116 Given that 
these arguments remain underdeveloped they hardly explain the meaning of civil so-
ciety participation in the societal ideal constructed by IAC efforts while their contra-
diction at the same time raises doubts about the straight-forward neoliberal nature of 
IAC discourse. Democracy, inclusion, equality and integrity are other concepts the 
meaning and function of which in the IAC campaigns remains under-researched and 
which may have the potential to challenge the interpretation of the IAC agenda as a 
coherent neoliberal enterprise. For example, Bukovansky leaves us wondering what 
to make of the presence of the concept of equality in neoliberal IAC efforts when she 
notes that “in the neo-liberal anti-corruption discourse governing institutions are 
evaluated primarily on their ability to deliver and sustain economic prosperity con-
ceived of as growth in GDP, although to be fair income inequality often emerges as 
an important secondary concern”.117 Not least, the fact that TI has modified its defi-
nition of corruption several years ago and now claims to deal not only with public 
sector corruption but also with corruption in the private sector has received hardly 
any attention or is simply ignored.118 Murphy, who briefly acknowledges that “TI 
has in recent years started paying more attention to corruption in the private sector”, 
immediately proceeds to arguing that TI’s “anti-corruption focus remains con-
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115  Brown/Cloke (2004: 289) 
116  Polzer (2001: 22) 
117  Bukovansky (2006: 195) 
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strained by the organization’s board level partnerships with major corporate actors” 
without going into any detail about the nature of TI’s engagement with private sector 
corruption.119 Thus, when critical scholars claim that the IAC agenda is neoliberal 
because it constructs the public sector as the main source of corruption in IAC ef-
forts, one wonders what to make of TI’s advocacy of the concept of private sector 
corruption but also of the promotion of things like corporate governance by TI and 
other IAC actors as a means to fight corruption. 
Doubts about the neoliberal consensus are nurtured by the fact that some critical 
studies seem to suggest that there are aspects which do not fit the prevailing neolib-
eral logic. For example, Brown and Cloke seem to regard the WB’s emphasis on 
“strengthening public institutions, the electoral and judicial systems and nurturing a 
civic culture to the struggle against corruption” as running contrary to the WB’s neo-
liberal advocacy of “the dual processes of economic liberalisation and deregula-
tion”.120 While they state that the IAC agenda “remains fundamentally antagonistic 
towards the state”121 they also recognise a rediscovery of the state in contemporary 
IAC efforts by the WB. Given that the analysis does not explore this in greater depth 
we are left to wonder about the ways in which different political ideals may be play-
ing out in IAC efforts. In sum, is the neoliberal label really able to grasp the ideal set 
out in IAC discourse? Is the IAC agenda perhaps not that neoliberal after all? Or 




Thirdly, while critical IAC studies have detected a strong neoliberal consensus, 
doubts can be raised not only with regards to the neoliberal nature of IAC efforts but 
also with regards to the consensual nature of IAC across the variety of different ac-
tors that are active in the fight against corruption.  
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The very different historic trajectories and organisational structures of IAC actors 
could be expected to have an effect not only on those organisations’ approach to the 
fight against corruption but also on the societal ideals inherent in their work. The 
WB for example receives most of its funding from Western governments which also 
have relatively greater power over the WB’s strategic and thematic decisions than 
other countries – a fact which has often led critics to accuse the WB of carrying out a 
Western neo-imperialist project through its development activities.122 The interna-
tional NGO Transparency International in turn was created out of criticism of what 
the NGO’s founders saw as neglect by the WB of the problem of corruption in its 
development efforts especially in African countries; it calls itself a global movement 
and emphasises its decentralised approach. The United Nations organisation UNDP 
is again directed by the decisions of its member states’ governments but, unlike in 
the WB, in UN decision-making every member state has the same weight at least 
officially; the UNDP is also often seen as having a less economistic and more refor-
matory or even radical stance on development issues than the WB.123 
The organisational differences between IAC actors and the potential implications 
that those may have for their IAC approach have however not received much atten-
tion by the critical literature.  
Bukovansky’s study is the only broad empirical study that includes the anticorrup-
tion efforts of different IAC actors (UN, IMF, WB, OECD, TI); while she portrays 
TI as an exception from the neoliberal rule in IAC efforts, the number of organisa-
tions in her article is unlikely to allow for the analytical depth necessary to detect 
nuances between conceptions of corruption and the political ideals pursued by dif-
ferent organisations. Other, more detailed studies of the IAC efforts of UN organisa-
tions like the UNDP and UNODC, the IMF and the OECD do not exist. This is par-
ticularly surprising with regards to the UNDP, a major international organisation 
which has worked on anticorruption since the 1990s.  
The accounts by Brown and Cloke as well as Krastev of the IAC agenda are based 
on cursory overviews of anticorruption policies mainly by the WB which are in need 
of more empirical detail to support their claims. Only Polzer goes into more detail 
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with the WB, reviewing 12 documents and providing convincing evidence for her 
analytical insights.124 However, given that the documents cover the period from 
1989 to 1999 and do not include for example, the WB’s Governance and Anticorrup-
tion Strategy from 2007125 her findings are now rather dated.  
                                                
In what concerns TI, Hindess’ argument is based almost exclusively on a single 
document, the TI Source Book, which dates from the year 2000. While this continues 
to be an influential strategic document for the organisation, considering other and 
more recent strategic documents may be necessary in order to support the author’s 
wide-reaching conclusions. Murphy briefly examines four TI documents to conclude 
that the organisation has nothing to say about private sector regulation; while in do-
ing so he ignores the documents that are concerned with the private sector, he then 
explains TI’s “uncritical approach to the functioning of international capitalism”126 
almost solely by tracing the NGO’s links to development and business elites and ab-
stains from any further investigation into its policy and advocacy work. De Maria 
concentrates his analysis on the CPI, TI’s annually published country-ranking; while 
he provides a powerful critique of how the CPI reinforces Western conceptions of 
corruption as a problem mainly of developing countries, the quantitative index does 
not reveal much about the organisation’s other anticorruption activities. Apart from 
this rather small empirical base there also seems to be disagreement within the criti-
cal literature with regards to TI’s role. While Hindess, Murphy and De Maria con-
ceive it as a neoliberal actor pushing the Western capitalist agenda, Brown and Cloke 
seem to welcome “the role of organisations such as TI in challenging apathy and 
complacency and raising the international profile of the issue”.127 Similarly, 
Bukovansky sees TI as a social movement on its way to becoming a global “moral 
entrepreneur” against corruption128 and assumes that its grass-roots constitution may 
be in tension with the Western-centric and technical approach of anticorruption ef-
forts of other IAC actors.129  
 
124  Polzer (2001) 
125  WB (2007) 
126  Murphy (2011: 125) 
127  Brown/Cloke (2004: 278) 
128  Bukovansky (2006: 193); the concept of ‘global entrepreneurs’ is derived from Nadelmann 
(1990). 
129  See also Roden (2010) 
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Overall, we can conclude that the empirical basis on which the consensus argument 
is built is not particularly strong. There is no detailed and comprehensive study of 
the IAC efforts of various actors; there is only one dated study of the WB’s anticor-
ruption activities that is detailed enough to convincingly trace their economistic and 
Western-centric nature; while there are several studies of parts of TI’s anticorruption 
agenda, the findings are partly contradictory and open questions remain with regards 
to its role in the alleged neoliberal IAC enterprise. Doubts about the consensus are 
validated further as not every aspect of IAC activities is publicly available. In order 
to judge whether the neoliberal IAC agenda is as consensual as is suggested, or 
whether there are openings for contestation, dissenting voices and alternative view-
points, a closer look into the respective organisations would certainly be helpful. So 
far, however, only very few interviews with staff from IAC organisations have found 
their way into critical anticorruption research.130  
May the critical literature have oversimplified the consensus due to the lack of em-
pirical scope and detail? Might there be openings for other political ideals? Or are 
there even opposing political ideals struggling with each other in the IAC agenda? 
Do political ideals differ according to organisational differences? Perhaps, there are 
contestations within the IAC organisations? If there is indeed a consensus among 
IAC actors on the kind of societal ideals promoted, how does it come about as a way 
to fight corruption and what exactly does it mean in terms of societal structures? 
What are the roles of concepts like equality, inclusion and integrity in this consen-
sus? What is the link between the organisations, and why are they so consensual 
about IAC efforts despite their different constitutions? What are the functions of the 
different organisations in the construction of the alleged neoliberal ideal? How do 
organisational differences and neoliberal consensus play out in their actual ap-
proaches to fight corruption?  
Given that there are many open questions regarding the existence of an IAC consen-
sus, and given that the neoliberal label has so far been rather unhelpful in revealing 
the kind of society that is being advanced, it seems that more detailed research into 
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the ways in which particular societal ideals come to be constructed as a solution to 
corruption, and how these constructions make IAC efforts convincing to many peo-
ple is required. We have to look in greater depth into the complex working logics of 
IAC efforts to see how conceptions of corruption and concomitant societal ideals are 
constructed. The state of affairs is not only that we know little about how IAC pro-
grammes play out when implemented on the ground in the extremely diverse country 
contexts; much about how the IAC consensus works internally, its aims, basic as-
sumptions, argumentative logics and truth claims, the ways in which they are formed 
and the strategies used to defend them remains to be addressed.  
 
Construction of corruption and societal ideals – how does it happen? 
Critical scholars have drawn out some of the ways in which the so-called neoliberal 
politico-economic ideals are constructed. In particular Polzer and Hindess have 
traced some of the ways in which IAC organisations construct neoliberal policy 
measures and Western institutional frameworks as the correct remedy against corrup-
tion. Polzer shows for example how the WB frames corruption as something which it 
has been long concerned with, at least indirectly, and argues that the construction of 
this continuity allows it to stick to its established panacea, structural adjustment, in 
order to fight corruption and to promote ‘good governance’ in general.131 As Polzer 
argues the fact that this structural adjustment is based on public/private and politi-
cal/administrative distinctions (conceived as a “universally applicable image of the 
state and of state-society relations”) means that the WB promotes a Western ideal of 
society-state relations against which it evaluates and towards which it tries to push 
‘dysfunctional’ African states.132 Similarly, Hindess argues that the National Integ-
rity System (NIS) that TI advocates as a solution to corruption is “clearly modelled 
on an idealised, and distinctly neoliberal, image of a Western institutional frame-
work”.133 Overall, scholars seem to agree that “[i]nstitutional reform is simply to 
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create the conditions for free market reforms to succeed”,134 thus constructing a neo-
liberal system. 
Yet with regards to how this focus on the free market comes about and how exactly 
institutional reform works towards a neoliberal society, the literature is less plentiful. 
Bukovansky and Polzer argue that institutional reform is linked to the conception of 
individuals as rational and self-interested that is inherent to the IAC agenda; while 
the “corrupt individual is constructed as a rational maximiser responding to incen-
tives, rather than as a moral agent”,135 institutional reform is conceived as a means to 
influence these incentives.136 As Bukovansky argues, corruption control becomes “a 
technical matter of effectively manipulating incentive structures” that “self-interested 
actors face in order to achieve positive collective outcomes or at least minimize 
negative ones”.137 Brown and Cloke also note this particular conception of human 
nature,138 yet do not interpret institutional reform as logically following from it, in-
stead they hold that the two are in a contradictory relationship, arguing that the “con-
tinuing assumption that public officials are primarily motivated by self-interest (...) 
does not sit well with (...) the creation of new public bodies within institutional re-
form programmes. In other words, why are the workers within anti-corruption of-
fices likely to be any less corrupt than other public sector workers who are allegedly 
so prone to rent-seeking behaviour?”139  
While the link between conceptions of human nature, institutional reform and neo-
liberal societal features is left unclear by the critical literature, so too is the relation 
of these elements to particular forms of knowledge used in the IAC consensus. 
Some scholars link the dominance of the economic rationale in the alleged IAC con-
sensus to economic research methods used by IAC organisations. According to 
Bukovansky, the use of such approaches and especially the use of rational choice 
approaches (which have been discussed earlier on in this chapter) in the IAC agenda 
brings with it the view that “corruption hurts foreign investment and economic 
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growth”.140 Thus, Murphy sees these approaches as being responsible for TI’s advo-
cacy of liberal markets and its abstinence from advocating the “curtailment of vari-
ous ‘business freedoms’”.141 For Polzer, who also investigates the kinds of knowl-
edge used in IAC discourse, these approaches bring with them not so much an econ-
omy-centred ideology per se; rather she stresses other features. According to her, the 
WB controls IAC discourse by only accepting ways of acquiring knowledge about 
corruption that are “universalising, empirical, quantitative, institutional, and based 
on the assumption of the calculating and rationally maximising individual”.142 Yet 
how exactly these ways of acquiring knowledge or rational choice approaches more 
generally play out in the construction of open markets and other features of neolib-
eral societies through particular institutional reforms, and how exactly they help to 
construct those as a way to fight corruption needs to be investigated in much more 
detail. Overall, there is ample space for clarification regarding the links between ra-
tional choice theory (or other research approaches), particular conceptions of human 
nature, corruption, institutional reforms, and neoliberal policy-measures in the al-
leged IAC consensus. 
However, most confusion seems to exist with regards to the questions of morality 
and technicality within the IAC consensus. Several authors have pointed to the 
“technical”,143 “technocratic”,144 or “technical-instrumental”145 approach to fighting 
corruption that the IAC consensus takes (in the form of economic and institutional 
reforms) as opposed to a more moral one. Polzer explains that by constructing the 
corrupt individual as “a rational maximiser responding to incentives, rather than as a 
moral agent” the WB simultaneously excludes moral and legal persecution of perpe-
trators of corruption as a way to fight corruption. It also generally excludes “a con-
ception of the morality of the political system or ‘polis’ as a whole”146 and instead 
advocates capitalism and liberal democracy.147  
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Bukovansky agrees that the discourse is technical to the extent that the dominant ra-
tionale for the fight against corruption is economic and institutional “rather than 
normative”,148 thus opening up a distinction between normativity on the one hand 
and economics and institutions on the other. She argues that the IAC consensus ne-
glects “moral and political agency” and that the ‘public good’ as conceived in the 
IAC consensus “lacks the positive normative appeal that would serve as a source of 
motivation” for individuals not to behave corruptly.149 However, Bukovansky does 
not regard the IAC consensus as completely amoral; rather, she also detects “moral 
undertones”150 in it and argues that “the anti-corruption discourse diverges from ex-
isting trade and monetary regimes (...) in its relatively explicit evocation of the moral 
underpinnings of a successful market economy”.151 In her eyes, this makes IAC 
measures with their neoliberal focus extend “beyond the realm of institutional solu-
tions technically conceived and into the realm of ethical mores such as public-
mindedness, fairness, and equality before the law”.152 Yet, these ethical elements and 
the “normative character of anti-corruption discourse”, she argues, are in tension 
with the simultaneously deployed “language and methodologies of economics and 
rational choice”, the “predominantly rationalist, technical and instrumental justifica-
tions for open markets” and the “neo-liberal institutionalist focus on transparency, 
separation of powers, and government accountability” of the IAC consensus.153 As a 
consequence, Bukovansky concludes, “today’s anti-corruption discourse rings hol-
low in its neglect of the moral core of the corruption concept, and this reduces its 
effectiveness”.154 
                                                 
148  Bukovansky (2006: 194) 
149  Bukovansky (2006: 197) 
150  Bukovansky (2006: 183). Even Polzer concedes at some point that the WB’s anticorruption dis-
course is not just “technical, but also moral” (Polzer (2001: 23). 
151  Bukovansky (2006: 182) 
152  Bukovansky (2006: 183). Other authors stress the moral element in the fight against corruption 
even more. Sampson for example sees IAC activities as a “moral force” and as “part of a general 
trend toward global ethics and moral justification in human affairs” (Sampson (2005: 2)) while Ro-
den thinks that in the past decade corruption has “evolved from an economic issue to a moral one” 
(Roden (2010: 15). 
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154  Bukovansky (2006: 182)  
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Thus, the relevant literature is both thin on and divided about the relation between 
moral and economic arguments against corruption in IAC discourse.155 While Polzer 
sees morality excluded from IAC consensus, Bukovansky recognises it in the dis-
course but seemingly considers it to be suppressed by the technicality of the dis-
course.156 That both accounts leave unclear what they mean by morality and/or nor-
mativity makes conclusions difficult and give only limited analytical value to the 
morality/normativity-technicality distinction. Apart from that, the interpretations so 
far are also found wanting because none of the authors even mentions the concept of 
integrity which is very prominent in the IAC agenda and which could well be inter-
preted as having connotations of morality. Moreover, it is notable that while most 
scholars seem to find the issue of (a)morality important, hardly anything is said 
about its function or effects in the discourse. A reconsideration of the role of moral-
ity in IAC discourse and its relation to the ‘technical’ advocacy of economic and in-
stitutional measures will have to take this into account. Are technicality and morality 
in conflict with each other, cancel each other out or do they go hand in hand to sup-
port each other; what does this mean for the IAC agenda; and what is the role of the 
concept of integrity in this relationship? 
It can thus be concluded that detailed investigations of the aims, instruments and 
manifold policy measures of the IAC agenda as well as their interrelations are still to 
be conducted in order to find out how exactly a neoliberal or any other society is 
constructed, or how different measures may support, contradict or contest each other 





                                                 
155 Still another interpretation is provided by Colonomos, who investigates the ‘rise of a market of 
virtue’, argues that concepts like transparency which are used in such discourses operate “on two 
levels” and are “bound up with a vision that is at once economic and moral” (Colonomos 2005: 
460). 
156 Given that she also sees IAC discourse as explicitly evoking the moral underpinnings of a success-




The neglected question of persuasiveness  
Open questions also remain with regards to the uncontroversial nature of IAC ef-
forts. Most critical scholars condemn the “paternalistic slant”157 of the IAC consen-
sus, its universalisation of Western norms158 and its furthering of “the cultural, eco-
nomic and political domination of the North”.159 Yet if the fight against corruption is 
principally about advancing neoliberal societal ideals in developing countries, one 
may wonder why to date IAC efforts seem to be completely uncontroversial even in 
developing countries. This raises important questions about the ways in which IAC 
interventions are rendered powerful enough to avoid these and other criticisms and 
contestations. While the critical IAC literature provides some explanations in this 
regard, there is again considerable space for expansion.160  
For example, Polzer argues that the WB, relying on a very limited conception of 
politics, re-articulates corruption from being a ‘political’ problem to an ‘economic’ 
problem in order to accommodate it under its Articles of Agreement which prohibit 
it from interfering in the political affairs of its member states. This depoliticising ef-
fect is bolstered by the primacy of data in the design of IAC interventions which 
Polzer interprets as a means through which to overcome political resistance to them. 
Moreover, Polzer claims that the institutionalist discourse with its “amoral, i.e. ra-
tional, secular conception of corruption” not only functions as “a strategic means of 
initiating change at a level which is amenable to external intervention” by the WB; it 
also “avoids openly challenging the power status quo in terms of the individuals in 
power”,161 thus remaining uncontroversial at least among the political leaders in 
place.  
In a similar vein, Hindess seems to suggest that the indirect and not obviously intru-
sive approach via a NIS enables TI to foster an “institutional environment within de-
                                                 
157  Brown/Cloke (2004: 280); see also Murphy (2011: 136) 
158 See e.g. De Maria (2008c: 777); Hindess (2005: 1389) 
159  Bracking (2007: 303). Also Hindess regards the indirect ways in which IAC organisations aim to 
make target states conform to neoliberal structures as “an updated version of the older system of 
capitulations, which required independent states to acknowledge the extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
Western states” Hindess (2005: 1397). 
160 This question is of course closely related to and hardly separable from the question of how IAC 
interventions are socially constructed. Some literature can however be sorted into this analytical 
field because the authors have framed their insights more or less explicitly as explanations of the 
power of IAC discourse.  
161  Polzer (2001: 21) 
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veloping and ex-socialist countries in which international investors feel able to do 
business”162 without confronting major opposition. With regards to this indirect ap-
proach Hindess explains that international neoliberalism places “international agen-
cies in a tutelary position, as there to advise and assist, while the promotion of good 
governance and NIS suggests that states should undertake for themselves the reforms 
required to satisfy international investors”.163 According to Hindess, neoliberalism in 
the form of the NIS “prefers to work through the freely chosen actions of states and 
other agents, and it is promoted by a variety of state and non-state actors”;164 this 
includes NGOs like TI “which operate (...) through persuasion and example, suggest-
ing to activists, states and other agencies ways in which they might address their 
concerns and insisting, most particularly, on the role of civil society, the private sec-
tor, NGOs and international agencies”.165  
While these accounts are quite enlightening regarding the depoliticised and indirect 
ways in which the two IAC organisations insert IAC measures into target states, they 
are rather cursory, scarcely evidenced and hardly are sufficient to show how the 
great persuasiveness and support of the discourse comes about. Hindess does not go 
into any more detail about how this indirect strategy works in the concrete case of 
IAC activities; also, none of the critical scholars actually deals in any detail with any 
other linguistic or non-linguistic strategies that may contribute to render the IAC 
consensus powerful, or with the organisational network that backs up the IAC con-
sensus; how do different organisations with their specific approach and structures 
contribute to advance a particular vision of a good, un-corrupt society? 
Thus, we can conclude that while the critical accounts of the IAC agenda provided 
so far have yielded interesting insights into the ways in which IAC efforts ‘work’, 
and while an overall picture of the IAC agenda as a neoliberal project seems to arise, 
there are plenty of blind spots in the literature. Gaps have been identified not only 
with regards to the nature of the political ideals in the IAC agenda, the extent of con-
sensus on those ideals among IAC actors, but also concerning the ways in which 
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IAC efforts are constructed and rendered powerful as the neoliberal enterprise that 
they are alleged to be. 
This thesis aims to address these shortcomings within the critical literature and to 
provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the alleged IAC consensus by asking  
What are the societal ideals inherent in the international fight against corrup-
tion, how are they constructed and advanced, and to what extent is there a con-
sensus on them? 
In order to answer these questions, it chooses a theoretical approach which allows it 
to fully concentrate on drawing out the manifold and complex workings of the IAC 
agenda and to contribute to the four analytical areas identified in previous sections. 
Poststructuralist discourse and hegemony as outlined by Laclau and Mouffe has not 
been applied to study IAC efforts so far; yet it provides a theoretical framework that 
is highly suitable for tracing the ways in which IAC interventions are constructed 
and rendered powerful while simultaneously drawing out the political ideals that 
arise from them in addition to investigating the extent of coherence or consensus 
about those ideals. The next chapter outlines this theoretical approach, explains its 
implications for an analysis of IAC discourse and details the methodological deci-
sions taken for the empirical analysis that follows.  
 
2 A post-Marxist discourse and hegemony theoretical approach 
to the analysis of international anticorruption discourse 
At the end of the previous chapter I highlighted the importance of more thorough 
research into the logics and structures of IAC efforts in order to better understand its 
political but at the same time uncontroversial nature and to address the question of 
consensus within the IAC agenda. The present chapter will outline how I aim to con-
tribute to this kind of research. It argues for a post-Marxist discourse and hegemony 
theoretical (PDHT) approach for the analysis of the IAC agenda by explaining how it 
enables me to make such a contribution. The main part of the chapter is dedicated to 
introducing the reader to the theoretical premise and perspectives of this approach 
and illustrates what such a perspective means for the study of discourses more gen-
erally. It goes on to present the concepts of the hegemonic project and hegemonic 
stratagems which, together with a focus on more specific discursive logics, are used 
as main theoretical devices for the empirical analysis of IAC discourse. Lastly, it 
explains how the IAC agenda can be conceived from a PDHT perspective. The final 
part of the chapter delves into the practical details about the ‘how’ of my study. It 
outlines the concrete ‘operationalisation’ of IAC discourse in my thesis, presents the 
methodological implications arising from my theoretical choices and explains how 
exactly I have put them into practice during my empirical research.   
I will seek to demonstrate here that PDHT, as conceived by Laclau and Mouffe, is 
particularly suited for fulfilling the aims of my thesis. A symbiosis of Marxism and 
post-structuralism, it theorises reality and society in a way that conceives both con-
cepts (such as corruption) and social identities as socially constructed, historically 
contingent and as the product of hegemonic formations in the social space. The main 
advantages of PDHT for addressing the gaps identified in the literature consist of its 
particular conception of discourse, its focus on the logics of discursive construction 
within discourse, and its conception of society as an outcome of hegemonic articula-
tion.  
The concept of discourse in PDHT successfully integrates both linguistic and non-
linguistic (sometimes referred to as ‘material’) practices, thus acknowledging their 
close interrelatedness in the social construction of reality. This allows me to investi-




(conceived as IAC discourse) in the interplay between linguistic and non-linguistic 
practices and to incorporate in the analysis texts and speech produced by IAC actors 
as well as activities carried out by them. 
The theoretical devices offered by PDHT entail a specific focus on discursive logics, 
which allows the joint addressing of the research questions posed in this thesis. 
PDHT shifts the focus away from trying to grasp any ‘essence’ of corruption or 
drawing out any presumed intentionality of social actors.1 Instead, it allows concen-
trating the analysis on the particular logics through which different discursive ele-
ments are linked up within IAC discourse and thus acquire their meaning. In so do-
ing it enables me to trace not only the ways in which corruption and its counter-
measures are socially constructed but also to explore whether in this process particu-
lar ideals of societal organisation are constructed in IAC discourse; what kinds of 
ideals these are; whether and how much of a consensus there is on them; and how 
IAC discourse eventually attempts to advance these ideals through both linguistic 
and non-linguistic means. This chapter will detail how the concept of hegemonic 
stratagems in the sense of general discursive logics of hegemonic projects combined 
with a focus on more specific discursive logics are used as theoretical devices to this 
end.  
Not least, the conception of society in PDHT as an outcome of hegemonic articula-
tion involving the construction of antagonisms seems particularly conducive to an 
analysis of IAC discourse. Given that the discourse is built around the aim of fight-
ing corruption, it seems to reflect at least prima facie some kind of an antagonism 
that PDHT views as the basis of hegemonic articulation. While the existence or not 
of such an antagonism in IAC discourse remains to be proven in the empirical analy-
sis, a conception of society as the outcome of antagonistic struggles entails the rec-
ognition that the advancement of a particular societal ideal necessarily results in the 
marginalisation of a multitude of alternative societal ideals – something which will 
                                                 
1 This does not mean that intentionality does not exist; however it does not assume a privileged func-
tion in shaping or explaining the interrelations of discursive moves within a discourse. In this regard 
the chapter should also be prefaced by the explanation that any verb used here with regard to dis-
cursive articulations that appears to imply some kind of intentionality (such as ‘aim to’, ‘attempt to’ 
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be particularly important to consider if IAC discourse was found to be advancing a 
particular societal ideal. 
The suitability of PDHT for the analysis of the IAC discourse will become even 
clearer during the following sections which detail its main theoretical and epistemo-
logical features and explain its implications for the study of the IAC discourse. For 
the sake of concision and clarity of this chapter, this necessarily implies certain 
eclecticism and some simplifications regarding theoretical concepts which are justi-
fied by the empirical focus of this thesis. Indeed, necessarily, this chapter offers a 
specific interpretation of the Laclau and Mouffian theoretical lenses. It is this inter-
pretation which will be utilised as the basis for the empirical study. 
I start by explaining how we arrive at the concept of discourse in the first place, what 
precisely is meant by it and how the alleged IAC ‘consensus’ qualifies as a (poten-
tially hegemonic) discourse. The concepts of hegemony and antagonism will then be 
introduced in the subsequent section which elaborates on the implications of PDHT 
for a conception of society.  
 
A theory of discourse – a theory of society 
The theory employed here is a discourse theory. While so far I have tried to avoid 
using the term discourse it is now time to elaborate on the meaning of this central 
concept of PDHT and on its implications for theorising society. In chapter 1 I dem-
onstrated that corruption is a socially constructed concept, which is also historically 
contingent, normative and politically contested. In the course of this discussion, it 
should have become clear that according to advocates of broadly ‘social constructiv-
ist’ perspectives all social concepts used, interests pursued and views held by actors, 
as well as their social and political identities in general are shaped by social proc-
esses and structures. As social actors we cannot but understand our reality through 
social constructs. At the same time we are constitutive of these structures. According 





PDHT is not the only perspective which considers discourse important. For many 
social analysts discourse is conceived as both produced and productive,2 and dis-
course theoretical approaches focus on the ways in which this production happens. 
As soon as we recognise that reality is a social construction, “the focus shifts neces-
sarily to the nature of situational context and to the discursive processes that shape 
the construction”.3 However, this does not mean that discourse-theoretical accounts 
simply describe reality; understanding how our reality is constructed does essential 
work in explaining how the world we live in operates.4 It explains how some and not 
other actors are embodied with “narrative authority”, how certain ways of living 
one’s life are rendered right and legitimate while others are not, how particular ways 
of explaining the world come to be seen as true, how certain policies by certain au-
thorities are rendered logical and adequate and how they shape and change people’s 
ways of living, and how all these processes hang together.5 Discourse analyses can 
also be understood as interventions in fields of existing knowledge in the sense that 
they draw out and demonstrate the constructedness and specificity of ‘commonsense’ 
knowledge and routinised practice and thus its non-necessity and contingency.6 Not 
least discourse approaches aim to draw out the links between power and knowledge 
that hold existing social structures together.7  
How then, is discourse conceived in PDHT specifically?8 As we have seen, post-
positivism in general and Laclau-Mouffian discourse theory more specifically, 
“abandons the notion of a true or perfect definition together with a conception of 
social identities as rooted in pregiven essences”.9 Definitions can never be universal 
because meanings are permanently constructed and reconstructed in social processes. 
Instead of discovering the essences of things, the only way in which people can per-
ceive reality is through interpretation. Similarly, social identities are not rooted in 
pregiven essences but they are constantly shaped by the same discursive processes as 
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5  Milliken (1999: 236) 
6  Nonhoff (2011: 104) 
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and consistent way.  




meanings and knowledge. This renders it impossible to understand the social world 
through the same tools as the natural world, as is attempted by positivist research. 
From the need for interpretation of reality it follows that language is not simply a 
tool through which we can express reality, or a reflection of reality; instead, it 
shapes, structures, creates, produces and transforms reality.10 Yet, and very impor-
tantly, discourse in PDHT does not consist of language alone, but it is more gener-
ally conceived as “a decentred structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated 
and constructed”.11 This broad definition of discourse “allows for the inclusion of 
both physical objects and social practices as meaningful parts of discourse”;12 lan-
guage-based communication and any other social interaction beyond language are 
understood as forms of discourse.13 Spoken and written words, rules and norms, ges-
tures, actions, institutions and procedures are all part and result of discursive proc-
esses. There is nothing outside discourse to be grasped, nothing is non-discursive, 
“every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given 
outside every discursive condition of emergence”.14 In fact, the very possibility for 
us to perceive, think and act “depends on the structuration of a certain meaningful 
field which pre-exists any factual immediacy”.15 We interpret the world using our 
knowledge, but this knowledge and our identities are part of the meaningful or dis-
cursive field (or generally ‘discourse’) that consists of different discourses and is 
structured in particular ways. Thus, our perceptions of reality are always and neces-
sarily discursively mediated; they “only become meaningful within certain pre-
established discourses, which have different structurations that change over time”.16 
The discursive field and the particular discourses embedded in it are not ahistorical, 
static, or invariable, but dynamic.17 This is why, as we saw in chapter 1, social con-
structions like corruption vary over time, and according to different social contexts. 
Some meanings and social relations may remain rather uncontested for a consider-
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able time, while others are constantly being re-negotiated. However, “as interpreta-
tion rather than hard evidence”, they always remain “open to reconsideration”.18  
 
Metaphysical assumptions 
If we believe that our perceptions will always and necessarily be mediated by a dis-
cursive field which is dynamic, the logical consequence is that there can be no objec-
tive knowledge. Fischer remarks that “[w]hat we take to be ‘fixed truths’ are only the 
stories that have over time come to be consensually accepted as plausible by a sig-
nificant number of people”.19 Based on this assumption about the impossibility of 
objectivity in the perception of reality, PDHT is post-positivist, realist, anti-
essentialist, non-foundationalist and materialist20, while blurring traditional distinc-
tions between ontology21 and epistemology22.23 
It is important to stress here that the assumption that everything is discourse or that 
there is nothing outside discourse does not mean that reality doesn’t exist.24 PDHT is 
ontologically realist in that it asserts the “existence of a world external to thought”.25 
This world exists independently of thought, but it is to us through discourse. At the 
same time, whatever form of essentialism, be it regarding objects or subjects, is not 
compatible with Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structuralist ontology which is anti-
essentialist. In terms of epistemology, their concept of discourse as mediating be-
tween object and subject is in tune with the materialist affirmation of an “irreducible 
distance between thought and reality”26 and therefore contradicts idealist assump-
tions. According to hegemony theory, the meanings of objects are “not given to us in 
a direct and automatic fashion”, and we also “cannot produce the ‘object’ out of our-
selves as an expression of our omnipotence”.27 PDHT is also epistemologically non-
foundationalist in that it assumes that there is no fixed foundation on which we can 
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23  Wullweber (2010: 46) 
24  Laclau/Mouffe (1987: 82), cited in Torfing (1999: 94) 
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ground ourselves in order to judge objectively what is right or wrong, good or bad, 
true or false. Every notion of such a foundation should be questioned and can be de-
constructed. Similarly, also ontologically there is no fundament which would pro-
vide “an ultimate ground for social life”.28 Torfing explains that...  
...[t]his does not mean that social meaning and action have no 
ground, but rather that the ground is destabilized, divided and disor-
ganized to such an extent that it ultimately takes the form of an abyss 
of infinite play, which turns all attempts to ground social identity into 
provisional and precarious ways of trying to ‘naturalize’ or ‘objectiv-
ize’ politically constructed identities. It is this abyss of infinite play, 
which all signification must necessarily presuppose, that Laclau and 
Mouffe in a deconstructive style refer to as the structural undecidabil-
ity of the social.29                                                       
Since the structure does not provide for any decisions, there are neither essences to 
be discovered, nor an overarching principle whatsoever (like God or Reason) that 
would tell us what is good or bad, how to live our lives and how to organise society, 
or which decision to make when confronted with different options. Every decision 
we take, every judgment we make, and every social construct is contingent in the 
sense that it could also be otherwise.30  
In sum, PDHT “presupposes the original incompleteness of both the given world and 
the subject that undertakes the construction of the ‘object’”.31 This is reflected in the 
concept of discourse as “the articulated meaning-formation resulting from a con-
struction that starts from a situation of radical incompletion”, from an experience of 
something which “escapes the possibility of symbolization”.32  
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Having set out the ontological and epistemological foundations of PDHT, we can go 
more into detail about how discourse is theorised in PDHT. I will explain how La-
clau and Mouffe understand the discursive construction of meaning and clarify dif-
ferent important theoretical concepts which are essential to the empirical part of this 
thesis.  
Laclau and Mouffe give many different definitions of discourse and each highlights 
different aspects of the complex concept; yet, to start with, discourse can be defined 
as a “differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly 
renegotiated”.33 This differential ensemble is further described as an uncentred struc-
ture in which the process of signification extends infinitely.34 This definition, which 
is strongly influenced by Derrida’s concept of text,35 needs to be further unpacked to 
become intelligible.  
All identities within the linguistic system of signs are, within this approach, con-
ceived in terms of “relational and differential values”.36 Relational means that the 
meaning of the term corruption can only be understood in relation to the concepts it 
is usually/currently linked to, like integrity, justice, public office, development and 
so on. What is referred to by differentiality is derived from one of the basic princi-
ples of linguistic analysis – the principle that “in language there are only differences, 
with no positive terms ([Saussure] 1981: 120). Language is a system of differences in 
which all meanings are given as purely negative relations – they are defined by what 
the other meanings are not.37 Yet, to avoid confusion by the linguistic origin of the 
terminology, it bears repeating here that Laclau and Mouffe apply the concept of 
discourse as a relational and differential “ensemble of signifying sequences”38 not 
only to verbal but to all social practices and identities as well as physical objects.39 
They all function as signifiers carrying particular and often multiple meanings.  
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The notion of the lack of a centre of the discursive structure reflects the view that we 
have no reason to claim anything as the centre of the discourse by essence or defini-
tion (e.g. the economy, as in Marxism).40 Furthermore, there can never be an organ-
ising centre that ultimately arrests and grounds the play of meaning;41 the structural 
context of social interaction always remains unstable and contingent.42 
The notion of the infinite process of signification or the infinite play of meaning 
arises again from the relational and differential character of all discourse, or, put 
differently, from the insight that the understanding or explanation of any concept 
will necessarily involve the understanding or explanation of another, to which it is 
related, and so ad infinitum (e.g. capitalism, liberalism, freedom, constraints, and so 
on). This, together with the infinite richness of reality, is the very reason why the 
play of meaning in the discursive field can never end, why the process of significa-
tion extends infinitely, and why this uncentred structure that is discourse cannot be 
closed and has no edges or ends. This also means that reality can never be exhausted 
or totalised by discourse,43 but only ever partly fixed. The possibility of partial fixa-
tion is nevertheless very important. When Laclau states that “the very possibility of 
the system is the possibility of its limits”44 he means that a fundamental condition 
for the stabilisation of a discourse, and as a consequence the establishment of any 
social relation, is the possibility of at least partial closure of the discourse. At the 
same time, however, a full closure can never be achieved because the field of mean-
ing extends itself infinitely.45  
                                                
Another consequence of the infinite extension of the field of discourse and its lack of 
centre is the impossibility to objectively and clearly distinguish one discourse from 
another. Speaking of or analysing ‘one particular discourse’, in this case the interna-
tional anticorruption discourse, will therefore always be a pragmatic decision; it in-
volves picking one part of the field of discourse in an eclectic manner, under the jus-
tification that this particular part connects particular elements in a particular way 
 
40 See also the paragraph on nodal points which form a discourse’s temporary centres.  
41  Torfing (1999: 81) 
42  Torfing (1999: 54) 
43  Torfing (1999: 86) 
44  Laclau (1996b: 37), cited in Wullweber (2010: 72) 
45 According to Derrida (1978: 280), it is actually the always unfulfilled desire for a stable centre 
itself which leads to endless displacements and substitutions of the only temporarily fixed centre – 




(e.g. with relation to corruption) which clearly differs from other discourses. As we 
will see later in this chapter the concept of ‘nodal points’ within discourses facilitates 
their recognition and distinction as one particular discourse.  
Before we move on to discuss this, let us, however, first clarify the relation between 
discourse and society. Despite its linguistic vocabulary, PDHT is a social theory in 
which the field of discourse and the field of the social intersect. Social relations are 
established, identities are constituted and political decisions are taken through dis-
cursive articulations. Truth is negotiated and produced through discursive practices. 
Every social practice, be it constituted of language or acts, can be conceived as an 
articulatory practice; every social/material structure is a discursive structure.  
PDHT thus collapses the frequently made distinction between the Discursive and the 
Non-Discursive; the often so-called non-discursive complexes, such as political in-
tervention, technologies, or productive organisation, can equally be conceived as 
“relational systems of differential identities which are not shaped by some objective 
necessity (God, Nature or Reason)” and therefore are to be regarded as discursive 
articulations.46 Thus, there is nothing non-discursive; everything is part of the dis-
cursive field. Nonetheless, the anchoring of discourse as a meaning-giving field in 
people’s minds and social relations means that “the meaning-giving relations of dis-
course are social as opposed to logical or natural”.47 The following sections will ex-
plain how social relations are constituted according to PDHT.  
 
Articulation 
Given its decentred and dynamic nature, discourse can also be defined as “a decen-
tred structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed”.48 The way 
in which this constant negotiation takes place is through articulations. Laclau and 
Mouffe define articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements 
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such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”. Thus, dis-
course is the “structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice”.49 
In order to understand the concept of articulation, we need several other concepts for 
its specification that will be outlined in the following sections: signifier-signified 
(sign), elements, moments, nodal points, over-determination (or over-flow, or sur-
plus of meaning) and dislocation.  
 
Signifier-signified 
The concept of the signifier is very important for PDHT, since signifiers are con-
ceived as the basic units for the creation of meaning. Together with the concept of 
the signified, it derives from Saussurean linguistics in which both were conceived as 
the two constitutive parts of the sign – the sound-image or the form (signifier) and 
the pertaining content or the substance (signified). In PDHT, however, the notion of 
a closed sign is impossible; instead there is “a split, [...] an impossible suture be-
tween signified and signifier”.50 Saussure’s assumption that each signifier corre-
sponds to only one signified (isomorphism) overlooks the separability and asymmet-
rical relation between phonic substances (the actual sound-expressions) and semantic 
substances (the meaning-objects) which lack any objective laws for their combina-
tion. One particular signifier can have different signifieds (meanings) that depend on 
the discourse in which it is being articulated.51 Furthermore, the concepts of the sig-
nifier and the signified and the general principles of their analysis are applicable not 
only to language but to all forms of discursive articulation, since the signifying sys-
tem encompasses all social relations.52 So the concept of the signifier extends to in-
clude any expression (oral, textual and material), while the signified remains the con-
tent which is expressed by the signifier. Articulation establishes a relationship be-
tween signifiers, generating a chain of meaning which has some but never complete 
stability.  
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Elements and moments 
For analytical purposes, signifiers can be distinguished according to different levels 
of stability or fixation; moments are the “differential positions” that are articulated 
within a discourse, while an element is “any difference that is not discursively articu-
lated”.53 Thus, elements are floating signifiers, while moments are fixed signifiers. 
Nevertheless, it must be made clear that these are theoretical stages which can in 
practice exist only as a tendency.54 A ‘floating’55 signifier is one that is articulated 
differently in different discourses, and one that according to different discourses has 
different signifieds attached to it. However, a signifier can never be totally ‘floating’; 
this would imply that it is totally meaningless. A similar logic applies to moments. 
While a moment implies the state of being fixed in a discourse or, put differently, 
being attached to the same particular signified in many different discourses, this fix-
ing can only ever be partial and temporary. Total fixing would mean total truth with 
no possibility of negotiation or political debate – which is not possible. As Laclau 
and Mouffe emphasise, “neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible”,56 
and “the transition from ‘elements’ to ‘moments’ can never be complete”.57 Yet 
every discourse can be conceived as an attempt to fix meaning, to transform an ele-
ment into a moment – an attempt which can only ever be partially but never fully 
successful.  
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Modification of identity through articulation 
According to the aforementioned definition, articulation establishes a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified. Although identity modification is cru-
cial to discourse theory and its conception of politics, Laclau and Mouffe do not ex-
plain this mechanism very thoroughly.58 Thus, I attempt to clarify this by, first, 
specifying that it is the identity of the sign, or indeed the combination between signi-
fier and signified, which is modified rather than the identity of the signifier or ele-
ment. In fact, ‘identity’ in PDHT seems to assume a role parallel to that which the 
‘sign’ plays in linguistics, with the difference that identity is modifiable. The modifi-
cation of identity occurs because the practice of articulation attaches a particular sig-
nified to a particular signifier, or, put differently, fills the signifier (which is pure 
form) with a particular content. This content depends on the other elements or mo-
ments in the discursive chain that links the signifiers together. As mentioned above, 
the discursive chain is a purely relational structure. The relation which becomes es-
tablished between the signifiers can be seen as generating the signifieds or the con-
tent with which the signifiers are being filled, or, put differently, as producing mean-
ing. This process becomes more intelligible when one imagines the whole of the dis-
cursive structure where, due to the relational character of all its values, “modifica-
tions of the whole and of the details reciprocally condition one another”.59  
When trying to establish the meaning (i.e. the signified) of a particular act, for ex-
ample the exchange of money between two individuals, looking at the act per se (i.e. 
the signifier) is not enough, as it will tell us nothing. We have to look at the social 
context (i.e. the other signifiers in the chain of meaning) which will tell us whether 
the act is condemned by most individuals, punished and combated by particular insti-
tutions,  if it is called corruption and unjust, and if it is said to damage the economy. 
It is only from this that can we infer the meaning (i.e. establish the signified) of the 
particular act. Acts, words and material structures are part of discursive chains, and 
they all only obtain their meaning through the relations which are being established 
between them and other elements through articulation. 
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This notion of discourse and identity modification also has important implications 
for a theory of the subject. First, it means that PDHT rejects any essentialist concep-
tions of social agency, such as the ones underpinning rationalist approaches, and 
instead regards agents, much like social systems, as “constructs that undergo con-
stant historical and social change as a result of political practices”.60 Second, it 
means that if “all identities are to be conceived in terms of formal differences, there 
is no scope for presupposing the existence of a substantial subject outside the discur-
sive system”. Instead, all subjects have their “particular discursive positionality 
(what Althusser termed a subject position)”.61 Nevertheless, especially in the writ-
ings of Laclau, something like a “notion of a creative subjectivity” can be found.62 
The concept of subject positions will be taken up again later in this chapter when 
hegemonic strategies are discussed. Given that the focus of this thesis is an analysis 
of constructions of corruption and societal ideals in IAC discourse, I will however 
abstain from going into any greater detail regarding the question of a theory of the 
subject in PDHT. 
 
Nodal Points 
What remains to be introduced in order to fully elaborate the concept of articulation 
is the concept of nodal points. Laclau and Mouffe explain that discursive articulation 
“consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning”.63 The 
construction of such “privileged discursive points of this partial fixation” is an “at-
tempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to con-
struct a centre”;64 but the fixation can only ever be partial. 
There seems to be considerable confusion in the literature regarding the concept of 
nodal points and its relation to other concepts. While the Laclau-Mouffian notion of 
“privileged discursive points” is not quite self-explanatory, Habermann suggests that 
articulatory practice establishes nodal points between elements.65 Wullweber comes 
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up with the image of strategically condensed and fixed chains of meaning as an ap-
proximation,66 and Howarth and Stavrakakis call a nodal point a ‘structural position’ 
in/of a discourse.67 Torfing, in turn, defines a nodal point as an “empty signifier that 
is capable of fixing the content of a range of floating signifiers by articulating them 
within a chain of equivalence”.68 Although I do not approve of the images of float-
ing and empty signifiers (see footnote 55), it seems to me that the concept of a nodal 
point makes most sense if conceived as a signifier that is privileged in the sense that 
a particular high amount of other signifiers are linked to it. Put differently, the mean-
ings or contents (i.e. signifieds) of many other signifiers (including sound-images, 
acts or social relations) are being generated or fixed through the articulation of these 
signifiers as related to the nodal point. Again, this privileged position can only be 
partial and temporal – there can never be a signifier capable of tying all discourses 
together, thereby becoming the centre of the structure. Nodal points nevertheless 
function as an (always provisional) substitute for the absent centre of the discursive 
structure.  
The signifier ‘corruption’ provides a good example of a nodal point in IAC discourse 
and in all likelihood constitutes the most privileged one. Signifiers like ‘develop-
ment’ (another nodal point?) and ‘economic growth’, but also ‘poverty’ and ‘devel-
oping countries’ are articulated in relation to ‘corruption’, since corruption is alleged 
to have a crucial impact on each.  
 
The field of discursivity  
Several times it has now been emphasised that the fixation of discourse in moments 
and nodal points can only be partial, and that a discursive system will always remain 
unstable and change over time. The reason Laclau and Mouffe give for this is that 
“all discourse is subverted by a field of discursivity which overflows it”.69 The “field 
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of discursivity” is also sometimes termed the “field of irreducible surplus” or “the 
field of overdetermination” in PDHT.70  
When Laclau states that discourse is the “structured totality resulting from the articu-
latory practice”,71 put very simply, he means that discourse is what is already at least 
partially fixed. The field of discourse can be conceived as constituting one enormous 
discourse; yet when parts of it are distinguished for analytical or denominative pur-
poses, they are usually called after nodal points, like ‘the international anticorruption 
discourse’. The field of discursivity however, which comprises all possible signi-
fieds, is bigger than that of discourse and constantly subverts all attempts to fix its 
elements in discourses.72 It is due to the “proliferation of signifieds” (arising from 
the infinite richness of reality) and the resulting polysemy that any articu-
lated/discursive structure is constantly being disarticulated.73 Not every signified can 
be attached to a signifier, and the differential structure of discourse (i.e. articulated 
elements/moments) will never be able to accommodate all the possible signifieds 
from the infinite field of meaning, or the field of discursivity.  
In sum, the field of discursivity provides for both “the condition of possibility and 
impossibility of a partial fixation of meaning”,74 thus of society.75 As it provides 
“the differential trace structure that every fixation of meaning must necessarily pre-
suppose”,76 it functions as “a theoretical horizon for the constitution of the being of 
every object”.77 Yet, at the same time it also “constantly overflows and subverts the 
attempt to fix a stable set of differential positions within a particular discourse”,78 
thus establishing the “overdetermined, symbolic dimension of every social iden-
tity”.79 The transition from ‘elements’ to ‘moments’ which discourses attempt 
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through articulation is thus to be conceived as a transition from the field of discursiv-
ity into discourse which can never be entirely completed.80  
 
Dislocation 
Nonetheless, we must consider that despite the infiniteness of discursive structures 
some kind of structural determinism would still be possible – the structure could still 
provide the subject with some “complete and unquestionable” logic thus determining 
its identity,81 and eventually permanently excluding other possible signifieds. How-
ever, this is prevented by dislocations arising from the field of discursivity. 
While the concept of the field of discursivity denominates the surplus of signifieds, 
the concept of dislocation refers to the sudden emergence of such a ‘surplus’ signi-
fied (which can be an act or an event) for which there is no signifier yet to accom-
modate it in the discourse affected by it. Dislocation is how the excess of meaning 
breaks into already formed discursive structures and makes their stabilisation impos-
sible. Conceived as a permanent phenomenon, there is “always something that resists 
symbolization and domestication”, a “traumatic event of ‘chaos’ and ‘crisis’ that 
ensures the incompleteness of the structure”.82 While dislocation is what makes 
structural determination impossible, it is also “the very form of temporality, possibil-
ity and freedom”.83 To an established discourse, dislocation is a threatening outsider 
since it reveals its “limit, incapacity and contingency”.84  
If discourse and the social correspond, and if the infinite play of meaning in the field 
of the discursive cannot be ultimately arrested due to the absence of centre and per-
manent dislocations, this means that the social structure can never be fully closed or 
sutured, thus can never form a fully stable and coherent society. However, in a fully 
decentred and never closed system of differences everything would be uniform and 
shapeless, and no orientation would be possible. Although everything would have 
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meaning, nothing would be more ‘meaningful’, more important or more ‘powerful’ 
than anything else.85.  
A fundamental condition for the possibility of a coherent differential and relational 
system (discourse/social structure) is the closure of the boundaries of that system. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, such a closure is at least partially and temporarily 
possible. In order to constitute something towards a society, there must be something 
approaching a limit to the social, even if it never reaches a full suture: if not in the 
form of a completely coherent society, the social “exists, however, as an effort to 
construct that impossible object”.86  
So while there is a way to limit the social at least partly, however, this limit cannot 
be conceived as a frontier between two territories – “for the perception of a frontier 
supposes the perception of something beyond it that would have to be objective and 
positive – that is, a new difference”. Since a new difference would not be able to stop 
the play of meaning, the limit of the social must instead be “something subverting it, 
destroying its ambition to constitute a full presence”.87 This something subverting 
the social is antagonism, and the way in which it is present in the social is between 
chains of equivalences.   
Thus, the two logics that enable a partial closure of social structures are antagonism 
and equivalence, and the result of the closure is a hegemonic formation. These con-
cepts will be explained in the following sections.  
 
Antagonism, equivalence, hegemony 
The concept of hegemony was originally advanced by Gramsci88 and was only much 
later developed into its post-structuralist version by Laclau and Mouffe. By fusing 
Gramscian concepts like hegemony (in turn strongly influenced by Marxist thinking 
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regarding class struggles) into poststructuralist ontology, Laclau and Mouffe have 
termed their own approach ‘Post-Marxism’.89  
Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of hegemony is consistent with the Gramscian hegem-
ony in that it is conceived as the “achievement of a moral, intellectual and political 
leadership”.90 They also agree that hegemony “involves more than a passive consen-
sus and more than legitimate actions”, and that it is instead about the “expansion of a 
particular discourse of norms, values, views and perceptions through persuasive re-
descriptions of the world”.91 Yet, their poststructuralist conception of the subject 
makes them disagree fundamentally with Gramsci’s assumption that the role of a 
hegemonic force corresponds to a fundamental class and its actors as unified articu-
lating subjects.92 Laclau and Mouffe get rid of Marxist and Gramscian morphologi-
cal categories and ontological divisions between them. Instead, they argue that social 
actors do not have ultimately fixed but discursively constituted identities or interests 
and thus cannot be identical with a hegemonic force. They concede that as the sub-
ject of any articulatory practice, the social actor must be “partially exterior to what it 
articulates, otherwise, there would not be any articulation at all”.93 Yet, both the 
hegemonic force and the “hegemonized elements”, including subject positions, are 
constituted in the interplay between the field of discursivity and existing discursive 
formations, which are unstable and contingent. The exteriority of the social actor to 
the articulatory practice that is necessary for articulation to be possible, thus only 
emerges between already fixed subject positions in existing discursive structures and 
‘loose’ elements in the discursive field that are still ‘up for articulation’; that is to say 
between the fixed signifiers which partially determine the identity of the social actor, 
and the unfixed surplus signifiers which are located in the field of discursivity and 
constantly overflow the discursive structures.94 The significance of this for the study 
of IAC discourse is that the organisations and staff whose documents, speech and 
actions I analyse are not to be conceived as sovereign subjects intentionally follow-
ing their set interests in the pursuit of a corruption-free world. Rather they occupy 
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particular (different) subject positions in the currently established structure of IAC 
discourse (and in other discourses) that are provided and supported through hege-
monic articulations but are also contingent and unstable.  
Having clarified this major difference between Laclau and Mouffe and Gramsci, the 
main components of the concept of hegemony can be explored. First, hegemonic 
practices consist of more than the ‘simple’ discursive articulations dealt with in the 
previous section of the chapter. As mentioned above, discursive elements acquire 
their meaning through the logic of difference which enables them to exist as positive 
unities differing from all other discursive elements. Yet, the logic of difference alone 
explains neither the dynamics and force of social and semantic structures nor the 
emergence of negative discursive elements that define antagonistic relations. These 
can only be understood through the concepts of equivalence, antagonism and he-
gemony which I will elucidate in the following sections.  
 
Chains of equivalence 
The logic of equivalence which comes into play as a transformation or subversion of 
the logic of difference is the condition for social dynamics and antagonisms.95 
Through the permanent articulation of particular signifiers as joint moments in a par-
ticular chain of meaning in a particular discourse, the moments increasingly become 
not only inseparable from each other, but also acquire a common meaning. At the 
rate at which the specificity of the signifiers becomes dissolved and their sameness is 
emphasised, the chain of meaning becomes a chain of equivalence.96 This never hap-
pens to the extent that all the moments actually carry exactly the same meaning (e.g. 
corruption = poverty) and thus become indistinguishable. While full equivalence 
between the different moments in a chain is not possible, rather every signifier in-
creasingly conveys something identical to all the other parts of the chain. 
The complicated aspect to this is that an “identical something present in the various 
terms of the equivalence”97 cannot be a common external reference towards some-
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thing positive, for this would simply be another difference that would not be able to 
arrest the play of meaning. Thus, it must be a reference to something negative; 
“through the equivalence something is expressed which the [external] object is 
not”.98 What is meant here is not the logical consequence of A being not B.99 Rather, 
this negativity that chains of equivalence point to acquires a form of presence or real 
existence in the form of antagonism. It penetrates the social not in an objective rela-
tion of frontiers, but as a reciprocal subversion of its contents in the form of antago-
nism.100  
A paradox or an ambiguity thus penetrates every relation of equivalence. On the one 
hand, to be articulated in a chain of meaning, two signifiers must be differential. On 
the other hand, however, “the equivalence exists only through the act of subverting 
the differential character of those terms”.101 Once again, this reveals the “ultimate 
precariousness of all difference” and all equivalence; there will always be events that 
penetrate the discursively fixed structures and call for new differentiations.102 In 
sum, the logic of equivalence may be regarded as a “logic of the simplification of 




Phenomena of equivalence and frontier effects are necessary conditions for establish-
ing a limit to the social (and thus for society to be possible) as they create a “field 
criss-crossed by antagonisms” in which hegemony can emerge.104 While possible 
reasons for the emergence of social antagonisms have been the subject of many stud-
ies from Marxism to conflict theory, Laclau and Mouffe’s take is special in its as-
sumption that it is antagonism that makes society possible. This perspective can in 
turn be regarded as a continuation of the Schmittian assumption that antagonism be-
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longs to our ontological condition and that distinctions between friend and enemy are 
an unavoidable characteristic of society but especially of politics.105 
Antagonism “establishes itself as the limit of the social”, so that society can be, at 
least precariously, constituted.106 It is a discursive phenomenon involving the di-
chotomous division of the discursive space into two confronting arrangements of 
discursive elements i.e. two chains of equivalence. The construction of chains of 
equivalence and of the separating antagonistic frontier separating them happens in 
the same process. On one side of the antagonistic frontier there are the elements 
which are articulated in a relation of contrariety to the lack of the Universal, an 
imaginary common good (this concept will be further explained in the section on the 
Particular and the Universal). For reasons of simplicity, the chain of equivalence 
comprising these elements will henceforth be called ‘hegemonic chain of equiva-
lence’. On the other side there are the elements which are articulated as presenting a 
hindrance for the former elements and are therefore articulated in a chain of equiva-
lence to the lack of the Universal, thus symbolically positivising this lack.107 The 
chain of equivalence comprising these elements will henceforth be called ‘antagonis-
tic chain of equivalence’.108 The full meaning of this definition will only become 
clear as I discuss the concept of hegemony in the next section.  
Yet at this stage, it should be clarified that not all articulations involve antagonism, 
and that therefore not all articulations are hegemonic articulations. The criterion 
which distinguishes a hegemonic articulation from other forms of articulations is that 
it takes place in an antagonistic environment, while the latter do not.109 The link be-
tween hegemony and social antagonism is the following; every hegemonic articula-
tion involves “some element of force and repression” of something that is already 
there (in a socially constructed sense).110 This repression takes the form of a nega-
tion of identity “in the double sense of the negation of alternative meanings and op-
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tions and the negation of those people who identify themselves with these meanings 
and options”.111 It is this negation of identity which gives rise to social antagonism 
as a relation between subject positions.112  
                                                
 
The relation between chains of equivalence and antagonism 
The link can now be drawn between the aforementioned negation of identity consti-
tuted by antagonism and the concept of the chains of equivalence. The hegemonic 
force “which is responsible for the negation of individual or collective identity, will 
tend to construct the excluded identity as one of a series of threatening obstacles to 
the full realization of chosen meanings and options”.113 This construction happens 
through the articulation of two chains of equivalence which are separated by an an-
tagonistic frontier; one including the negated identity, the other including the identity 
of the negating force.  
The act of exclusion can have quite diverse effects with regards to the negated iden-
tity. It can lead to an open confrontation between the negated identity and the force 
of negation. The conflict may also be displaced to another discursive field, where it 
may result in acts of aggression or violence. It can also result in self-blame and self-
denial, or trauma and resignation of the respective subjects. Not least, it can also lead 
to the death of the subject whose position is negated.114  
In any case the negation of identity always gives rise to social antagonism, even if 
the negated identity does not openly antagonise the force of negation.115 To clarify, it 
must be emphasised that antagonism can be constituted in a ‘one-sided’ process. 
This relates to the perspectivity (as opposed to objectivity) of antagonism as a so-
cially constructed phenomenon, which means that antagonism does not designate 
two objectively confronting projects or hegemonies, but that the two chains of 
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equivalence divided by the antagonistic frontier are products of the same hegemonic 
formation.116 The antagonistic frontier and what lies before and beyond it is always 
constituted from one side of the frontier, so to say.117 Consequently, if one discourse 
or its particular subject positions are articulated into the ‘antagonistic chain of 
equivalence’ of another discourse, one can speak of antagonism, even if the negated 
identities do not construct the same antagonistic frontier from ‘their’ side.118 How-
ever, in many cases the articulation by the hegemonic discourse of particular ele-
ments into the ‘antagonistic chain’ (as ‘enemies’), will lead to the articulation of an 
counter-hegemonic project that constructs it ‘own’ chains of equivalence and that 
will in turn articulate parts of the elements which are located in the ‘hegemonic chain 
of equivalence’ of the hegemonic discourse as ‘enemies’ in its own ‘antagonistic 
chain’. For illustrative purposes we might imagine that a discourse that articulates 
countries of the Global South as uncivilised and underdeveloped (in its ‘antagonistic 
chain’ of equivalence) and Western countries as civilised and developed (in its 
‘hegemonic chain of equivalence’) is likely (though not necessarily) to be confronted 
by a discourse that articulates Western countries as imperialist and oppressive (in its 
‘antagonistic chain’ of equivalence) and countries of the Global South as fighting for 
their cultural and political autonomy and liberation from such oppression (in its 
‘hegemonic chain of equivalence’). There can even be cases where antagonistic fron-
tiers are being constituted from both sides in a way that they actually substantively 
overlap.119 However, a complete overlap, and therefore a pure, stable and transparent 
antagonism is never possible;120 a hegemonically constructed chain of equivalence 
will always fall short of fully grasping that which resists, or the ‘Other’ which it tries 
to portray.121 Many discourses are antagonistic in the sense of antagonising some 
elements of each other’s ‘hegemonic chain’ but still sharing some elements of their 
respective ‘hegemonic chains’.122 The elements which are being articulated in both 
‘hegemonic chains’ are then over-determined. So it may be possible that both a lib-
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eral discourse and a socialist discourse articulate integrity, participation and justice 
as equivalent to their vision of a good, non-corrupt society. 
Another aspect in the relationship between antagonism and equivalence that needs 
clarification regards the creation of antagonism through equalising signifiers in two 
opposing chains. Here, Laclau and Mouffe have oversimplified the process of 
equivalence, as Nonhoff has pointed out.123 When jointly articulated into a chain of 
equivalence, signifiers are not just equivalised, but equivalised in relation to some-
thing;124 ‘x is different from y, but equal to y in relation to a’.125 Similarly, the ar-
ticulation of signifiers in antagonistic chains of equivalence is not only about articu-
lating these elements as contrary. Rather, it is about articulating them as different 
and opposing in relation to something, ‘x is different from a and contrary to a in rela-
tion to y’.126 In order to clarify this latter relation, between elements of two different 
chains of equivalence, Nonhoff has introduced the concept of contrariety.127  
                                                
In this respect it is also noteworthy that the antagonism between two chains of 
equivalences does not imply that every element of the ‘hegemonic chain’ would be 
in a relationship of direct contrariety to every element in the ‘antagonistic chain’ or 
the other way round; rather, any of the signifiers in the ‘hegemonic chain’ is in a 
relationship of contrariety to any of the signifiers articulated in the ‘antagonistic 
chain’. However, the realisation of the imaginary Universal (at least hypothetically) 
depends on the overcoming of every single element in the ‘antagonistic chain’ (con-
stituting the hindrances to the Universal), as well as on the realisation of every ele-
ment in the ‘hegemonic chain’ – something that is ultimately impossible.128 This 
also leaves clear that the meaning of the Universal, the imaginary common good, can 
only be grasped through an analysis of all the claims in the ‘hegemonic chain’, 
which constitute it.  
This specification of the relationships between signifiers involved in antagonistic 
divisions of the social space also helps explain the phenomenon that there can be, 
 
123  Nonhoff (2006: 88, 212, 227 fn 10)  
124 What that something is shall be further elucidated in the section on the Universal.  
125  Nonhoff (2006: 227 fn 10, 212) 
126 Cf. Nonhoff (2006: 212); I have changed some of the place holders to avoid confusion.  
127 In German ‘Kontrarität’, see e.g. Nonhoff (2006: 88) 




and usually are, multiple antagonisms that separate the field of the social.129 Al-
though antagonism always involves a dichotomous division of the social, every sig-
nifier can be involved in different relationships of equivalence and contrariety with 
other signifiers depending on the claim made by the respective discourse. This is 
why in Western countries not only is there the discourse regarding the fight against 
corruption in order to better serve development in Third World countries, but one 
will also find discourses regarding the fight against Western intervention in non-
Western countries in order for the latter to achieve more sovereignty and independ-
ent development, and one that supports Western industrial farming and export of 
livestock to developing countries in order to avoid losing out in international compe-
tition. The same subject positions (e.g. Western businesses) might be involved in all 
of these discourses but are linked up with different but also similar signifiers in dif-
ferent ways.  
As a final point, it is important to re-emphasise here that, like relations of difference, 
relations of antagonism and equivalence can never be complete and stable. There 
cannot be a complete equivalisation that would “strictly divide [the discursive space] 
into two camps”. The ensemble of the social can never be “absorbed in the intelligi-
ble and ordered framework of a society”.130 As mentioned previously, there will al-
ways be dislocations with respect to them both, with the effect that the discourses, 
i.e. social formations, remain dynamic. Yet, “[i]f society is not totally possible, nei-
ther is it totally impossible”.131 In the next section we will examine in greater detail 
how hegemony structures the social towards ‘society’.  
 
Hegemony 
Having set out the two main concepts which form the precondition for hegemonic 
articulations, it is obvious that we are taken far from the Gramscian perspective on 
hegemony which views social antagonism as an objective relation based on a stable 
core of class interests as its essence.132 However, Laclau and Mouffe assert that 
                                                 
129  Laclau/Mouffe (2001[1985]: 131) 
130  Laclau/Mouffe (2001[1985]: 130) 
131  Laclau/Mouffe (2001[1985]: 129) 




PDHT actually recovers the basic concepts of Gramscian analysis, e.g. historical 
bloc, war of position, organic crisis, but in a radicalised way.133  
While the term ‘hegemony’ itself does not seem to be directly defined by Laclau and 
Mouffe, Torfing calls hegemony “[t]he achievement of a moral, intellectual and po-
litical leadership”.134 Laclau and Mouffe work with the concept of ‘hegemonic for-
mation’ (which in the language of Gramsci is a ‘historical bloc’). A hegemonic for-
mation is a relatively unified social and political space135 that is constructed through 
the expansion of a discourse in which diverse elements proliferate: “systems of dif-
ferences which partially define relational identities”; chains of equivalences (and the 
resulting antagonism between them) which regularly subvert these relational identi-
ties, thus constituting a new difference; nodal points such as for example the econ-
omy, the state and civil society around which meaning is fixed and stable over a cer-
tain time.136 Such expansion of discourse occurs through hegemonic articulation or 
hegemonic practice which presupposes the presence of antagonism (the negation of 
identity and the construction of chains of equivalence) and the instability of existing 
antagonistic frontiers.137 As Laclau and Mouffe explain, “[o]nly the presence of a 
vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation to opposite 
camps – which implies a constant redefinition of the latter – is what constitutes the 
terrain permitting us to define a practice as hegemonic”.138  
Yet, despite important continuities,139 PDHT has moved away from Gramsci’s “pos-
tulate that […] every social formation structures itself around a single hegemonic 
centre”.140 Instead, it is a characteristic of “modern times” that the reproduction of 
the different social areas increasingly takes place in “permanently changing condi-
tions which constantly require the construction of new systems of difference”.141 
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These modern, “hegemonic forms of politics” are what Laclau and Mouffe call ‘de-
mocratic struggles’.142 Despite what one may expect, hegemony in PDHT is not a 
status, but a type of political relation, or a form of politics, and it can emerge any-
where within the “topography of the social”.143 The proliferation of minor antago-
nisms that accompany it means that there can be no single hegemonic nodal point; 
rather there is a proliferation of hegemonic nodal points or centres of discourses, 
depending on different antagonisms and their respective chains of equivalence. Thus, 
these chains of equivalence are not very expanded; they are not all-encompassing as 
happens in dichotomously divided societies, during what Laclau and Mouffe call 
‘popular struggles’,144 rather they are partial, or ‘shorter’. Out of this variety of 
hegemonic nodal points, some may be “highly over-determined”, meaning that “they 
may constitute points of condensation of a number of social relations and, thus, be-
come the focal point of a multiplicity of totalizing effects”.145 Signifiers like ‘free-
dom’, ‘democracy’ but also ‘nation’ that are prominently articulated in many differ-
ent discourses are surely good examples of such over-determined nodal points. To a 
certain extent, ‘corruption’ is probably another such over-determined signifier, as it 
is used frequently in diverse settings to denominate socially unaccepted behaviour. 
Furthermore, the general social spheres like the state, the economy and civil society 
are socially constructed nodal points.146 In PDHT, none of these spheres are re-
garded as functioning autonomously (as is often assumed of the state), or as essen-
tially able to determine the others (as is often believed of the economy). Rather than 
being some kind of structural effect, both autonomy and subordination, both between 
these spheres but also within any social relation, “only acquire their meaning in the 
                                                                                                                                          
categorisations of ‘modern’ and ‘medieval’ societies seem rather dubious. Firstly, there were/are 
certainly quite pronounced differences within these categories; and secondly, this categorisation 
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reduced” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001[1985]: 131), are rather dubious due to their sweeping categorisation. 
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field of articulatory practices and, insofar as these operate in political fields criss-
crossed by antagonisms, of hegemonic practices”.147  
                                                
Another consequence of this broadening of hegemonic practices in ‘modern times’ is 
that “every social identity becomes the meeting point for a multiplicity of articula-
tory practices”.148 The identity of both particular social classes and groups but also 
singular actors depends on “certain precise social and political conditions of exis-
tence” which have been constituted in hegemonic struggles; both the identity and 
interests of the articulator (or the articulating force) and the articulated are subject to 
constant mutual subversion and redefinition in hegemonic struggles.149 
Power, as all concepts in PDHT, acquires its substance only in hegemonic articula-
tions. Instead of belonging to a particular class or a dominant sector which would 
constitute the centre of a hegemonic formation, “every form of power is constructed 
in a pragmatic way and internally to the social, through the opposed logics of 
equivalence and difference; power is never foundational”.150 Yet Laclau and Mouffe 
warn against falling into the extreme opposite of conceiving power as being totally 
diffused within the social as this would “blind the analysis to the presence of nodal 
points and to the partial concentrations of power existing in every concrete social 
formation”.151 So while its status has been redefined, the concept of power still re-
tains an important analytical function, namely in form of the analysis of discursive 
formations and their nodal points which tie together a multiplicity of signifiers, as 
well as via the hegemonic stratagems discussed later in this chapter. Nodal points are 
the locus of power in that they form points of over-determination “which concentrate 
either power, or the different forms of resistance to it”.152  
What follows from hegemony as a type of politics (rather than a topographical con-
cept) is that it cannot be conceived, as power frequently is, as “an irradiation of ef-
fects from a privileged point”. Rather, its effects emerge “from a surplus of meaning 
which results from an operation of displacement”.153 Such operations of ‘displace-
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ment’ have already been outlined as the ontological concept of ‘dislocation’ earlier 
in this chapter. A historical example from IAC discourse might aid the understanding 
here. When Peter Eigen, then World Bank regional director for East Africa, de-
manded that the World Bank start combating corruption, this attempt (articulation) to 
dislocate the WB’s portfolio (part of WB discourse) was resisted by WB-internal 
opposing forces (the dislocatory attempt was not successful, i.e. no immediate suc-
cessful hegemonic articulation). Here, the surplus of meaning arose from the over-
determination of the meaning of the WB’s portfolio which, according to WB-internal 
forces, did not include anticorruption work. The antagonistic divide (for develop-
ment and against underdevelopment in third world countries) was already present, 
but the signifier corruption and WB structures were not sufficiently ‘loose’ or ‘float-
ing’ for anticorruption to be integrated into WB discourse. At first the opposing 
forces prevailed. Eigen dealt with this negation of his identity as WB corruption-
fighter by leaving the WB and founding Transparency International in order to estab-
lish a new identity as an NGO corruption fighter. Three years later, however, it 
turned out that the WB’s discourse had still been dislocated (by Eigen but presuma-
bly also other forces) to the extent that it could/did no longer refuse integrating cor-
ruption and anticorruption measures into its discourse (hegemonic articulation). 
Thus, the WB discourse was reconfigured in order to accommodate them. 
The example of Peter Eigen also serves to explain the effects and the success of dis-
locatory attempts in established discursive structures, in short, the question of articu-
latory power. A former WB country director (signifier and subject position), who has 
formed part of development discourse (chain of equivalence ‘development’) for a 
long time, is likely to be better connected to different prominent nodal points such as 
money/funding, development organisations and other international organisations, 
experts, politicians, business people, and other prominent figures, than an average 
inhabitant of a Nairobi slum. Thus, due to and through these manifold ties, he is 
likely to be in a better position (literally speaking, if imagined in the discursive struc-
ture) to influence or re-articulate (dislocate) development discourse towards the in-
clusion of anticorruption as an important signifier or even nodal point. Again, Laclau 
and Mouffe stress that we should not think of a particular social formation as consti-
tuted by empirically given social agents. Rather, the agents, who are without doubt 




shown by the example of Peter Eigen, must be “reintegrated into the various forma-
tions constituting them”.154 
At this point the concept of hegemony should be sufficiently clear to enable us to 
distinguish different hegemonic social formations from one another which is impor-
tant for any political analysis. It is only through being able to be ‘cut out’ from 
something beyond it through its particular shape that a hegemonic formation can be 
distinguished as a totality. Yet, having noted previously that a hegemonic formation 
cannot be a system of differences alone as it would be impossible to determine any 
limits, it follows that “that beyond cannot consist in something positive – in a new 
difference”. Instead, it must consist in something negative.155 This is the point at 
which the concept of chains of equivalences (with their negation, division and an-
tagonism) comes in: they introduce negativity into the field of the social by con-
structing what is beyond them as that which they are not and by increasingly negat-
ing the existence of this ‘beyond’ as the hegemonic formation expands. So a hege-
monic formation consists, and must consist, of chains of equivalence as it is only 
through them that the frontiers of the formation are established, allowing it to “con-
stitute itself as a totalizing horizon”156 and to be distinguished as such.  
Thus, when attempting to distinguish particular hegemonic formations in the field of 
the social, it is necessary to seek out discourses with antagonistic chains of equiva-
lence which constitute the political boundaries determining these social formations. 
However, challenges arise from the fact that formations acquire a hegemonic charac-
ter only under “continuous redefinition of the social and political spaces and (...) 
constant processes of displacement of the limits constructing social division”.157 The 
instability and constant redefinition of frontiers results in an infringement upon the 
possibility of a formation to constitute itself and to be recognised. Consequently, 
when undertaking an analysis of a social formation, one can only (and thus needs 
to!) look at the articulatory practices which are involved in the construction of the 
boundaries of the respective formation, bearing in mind that this is “an open process 
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which will depend on the multiple hegemonic articulations shaping a given space, 
and operating within it at the same time”.158  
It should now be clear that, from a Laclau and Mouffian perspective, there is nothing 
predetermined about the way in which societies are structured. The discourses which 
become temporarily dominant and consequently structure wide parts of the discur-
sive field in their particular dichotomous ways are just some of the many possible 
options in an open and indeterminable terrain. In the process of their expansion, si-
multaneously, countless other discursive formations are dislocated and/or dissolved 
(or their expansion is at least rendered impossible) and identities are negated. These 
processes are shaped by the interplay between contingent historic and social factors, 
including the actions of social agents, against the background of the always real pos-
sibility that things could be/could have been otherwise159 – which is why Laclau 
calls PDHT “a theory of the decision taken in an undecidable terrain”.160 
Furthermore, we can now understand why a hegemonic formation will never be a 
complete and stable structuring of the social sphere in the sense of a coherent and 
closed social system. The transition from political practices to social practices is a 
fluent one and will always be incomplete and thus instable. In a relatively successful 
hegemonic formation, political practices can pass into social practices and structures 
to such an extent that the political origin of these social relations is “forgotten” and 
they “will seem to have a life of their own”.161 Yet, in these sedimented practices 
there will always be points of rupture and dislocations that allow for resistance in the 
form of a “re-activation of the political ‘origin’ of the social” and for re-articulation 
and change of the existing discursive formations.162 
 
The Particular and the Universal 
Now that the meaning of hegemony and how hegemonic practices work has been 
discussed, we may still wonder why hegemonic struggles happen in the first place. 
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As an answer, Laclau and Mouffe point to the ever present collective desire for an 
imagined common good, an imaginary ‘Universal’. According to PDHT, conflicts 
about the filling of the empty (and ultimately unfillable) place of the Universal form 
the core of politics.163 Below, I will expand on the meaning of the ‘Universal’ and its 
relation to the ‘particular’ as well as its significance for the concepts of chains of 
equivalence and antagonism.  
Laclau and Mouffe are by no means the first scholars to deal with the question of 
universal values. The chasm between the Universal and the particular has been of 
scholarly interest since the era of ancient Classical philosophy.164 However, the La-
clau-Mouffian approach is special in that “it challenges the idea that a radical choice 
must be made between universalization of the particular and particularization of the 
universal”. Instead, they claim that “by rethinking the notions of the universal and 
the particular we can account for their mutual conditioning”.165 The aforementioned 
impossibility of the social field to be fully closed accounts for a constant essential 
lack in society – of completeness, unity, commonality, universality, which would 
structure it and give it a common final aim.166 Yet, even if practically impossible, 
“the idea of closure and fullness still functions as an (impossible) ideal” and results 
in the structuring of societies according to the pursuit of such impossible ideals, 
called ‘Universals’ by Laclau and Mouffe.167 The collective need to redress the lack 
of the Universal is in fact what ultimately constitutes and unites society and brings 
about hegemonic discourses.168  
The Universal symbolises the “very form of fullness”,169 yet as something unreach-
able and thus only imaginary it can have no positive content. It shows itself only 
“through the presence of its absence”170 and can be seen as an ‘empty place’ that can 
never be filled.171 However, as every society strives to fill the void, the desire for the 
imaginary Universal is satisfied at least symbolically in that the Universal is repre-
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sented and approached through discursive articulation.172 It can thus only be discur-
sively present as a ‘symbolic Universal’ and never as a ‘real Universal’.173  
 
Politics – the conflictive filling of the empty place of the Universal 
This discursive representation of the Universal or the symbolic filling of its empty 
place however is a conflictive and ever incomplete process. The precise symbolic 
content of the Universal is fixed in and through particularistic political struggles for 
hegemony.174  
This means, in the first instance, that the collective need for the Universal produces a 
plurality of particular claims in relation to the imaginary Universal which concretise 
and therefore positivise or symbolise it in one form or another.175 In the case of a 
discourse which for example centres around a lack of social justice, particular claims 
could be the call for an increase of capital transfer taxes, calls for special loans for 
economically disadvantaged students, but also the call for fighting economic corrup-
tion in big businesses. But particular claims which seek to concretise the collective 
pursuit of the diffuse Universal can also conflict with and contradict each other and 
often do.176 Since the Universal is by definition supposed to be valid universally, not 
all particularities can be universalised at the same time, and conflicts regarding 
which particular claim should express it are legion. They comprise the core of poli-
tics and are particularly characteristic of democracies, where hegemonic struggles 
abound.177  
However, and crucially, Nonhoff introduces a differentiation with regards to the La-
clau and Mouffian term ‘Universal’; he clarifies that despite its connotation the term 
‘Universal’ does not necessarily refer to the order of the whole of humanity or the 
cosmos.178 Given the diversity of political spaces in modern democracies, he argues, 
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it is usually a ‘specific’ Universal that is articulated with regard to the order of those 
spaces (thus, e.g. the fight about the best social policies would take place in a discur-
sive space at least partly separated from that of the fight about the best environ-
mental politics). It is precisely this specificity with regard to the articulation of par-
ticular aspects of the Universal that makes these spaces differ from each other in the 
first place.  
Accordingly, the particular Universals strived for in struggles for hegemony differ 
with regards to the scope of their claim and its relation to the more comprehensive 
Universal. Nonhoff distinguishes three types of particular claims: Claims which ar-
ticulate a necessary condition for the curing of the lack of the Universal (also called 
cumulative claims); claims that articulate a necessary condition for the curing of the 
lack of the Universal which is at the same time a sufficient condition for the fulfill-
ing of other claims which aim at the curing of the lack of the (more comprehensive) 
Universal (also called subsumptive claims); and claims which articulate a sufficient 
condition for the curing of the lack of the Universal – the latter imply at the same 
time a fulfilling of all claims aiming at the curing of the lack of the Universal and 
can therefore be regarded as comprehensive claims.179 While fighting corruption 
may appear prima facie as a cumulative claim in the sense that corruption needs to 
be combated so that a range of higher aims (such as development) can be fulfilled 
only the empirical analysis will allow answering the question of the type of claim 
that is articulated in IAC discourse. Following Nonhoff, this differentiation however 
means that when the ‘Universal’ is referred to in this thesis (in particular in relation 
to the final aim of IAC discourse), the term does not necessarily indicate a compre-
hensive Universal in the sense of a claim about the overall organisation of society 
but also includes all those more ‘particular Universals’ which refer solely to the or-
ganisation of parts of society i.e. to specific aspects of a more comprehensive Uni-
versal. 
Given that there is no objective or necessary ‘candidate’ for the symbolisation of the 
Universal, every symbolisation of the Universal happens as a contingent and histori-
cally shaped process.180 Yet, of all the symbolic representatives none will ever be 
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able to grasp the imaginary Universal in its fullness and completeness, since every 
such symbolically (i.e. discursively) constituted Universal in its positive form can 
only be the result of a precarious ‘relative universalisation’ which is always exposed 
to discursive changes.181 This instability and inadequacy has consequences for the 
political practice as it “paves the way for a democratic competition between groups, 
as the ‘universal’ is not commensurate with any of the forces that might momentarily 
embody it”.182 Thus, the failure of all those forces to finally fill the empty place of 
the Universal and the subsequent continuation of political struggles can be regarded 
as a condition of democratic politics. 
Now, we can specify the meaning of the term ‘political’ in PDHT as referring to the 
dynamic and dynamising logic which is capable of dislocating and unsettling the 
space of the social. In the logic of the political the particular filling of the empty 
place of the Universal is conflictually negotiated in the discursive space and against 
the background of the lack of objectivity of all particulars and the permanent disloca-
tions brought about by the conflict among them regarding the symbolisation of the 
Universal. Thus, the political implies conflict but also relation to the (comprehensive 
or partial) Universal in that it always entails a contestation/ dislocation/ change (con-
flict) of norms (relation to the Universal).183 Inquiring into the potentially political 
nature of IAC discourse thus means investigating whether and how the discourse 
attempts to re-structure social relations in ways that orient them towards the 
achievement of a particular Universal. 
According to PDHT, conflict is bound to arise because various social groups attempt 
to hegemonise the empty place of the Universal by representing their particular 
claims (and the particular logics linking them) as universally valid (again, this does 
not mean that all these actors necessarily have this as a clear aim in mind).184 The 
(temporary and precarious) filling of the empty place of the Universal is undertaken 
through hegemonic practice.185 Given that within the framework of PDHT there is 
no logical or scientific path people can follow in order to arrive at the ‘right’ deci-
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sions for societal organisation,186 the aim of political struggle must ultimately be the 
creation of a consensus on particular values and beliefs (which would enable the 
taking of constitutive decisions in an undecidable terrain); in turn, such a consensus 
has to be achieved through persuasion.187 Laclau stresses that hegemony should not 
be understood as “a precarious agreement between different political forces that 
‘strike together, but march separately’”. Moreover, it would be a mistake to under-
stand hegemony as “an imposition upon other political groups of a pre-given organ-
izational principle provided by a political vanguard. Rather, hegemony involves the 
construction of a collective will”.188 This construction will only be successful if the 
political project in question “manages to appear to other groups as the force capable 
of providing the best social arrangement possible to secure and expand a universality 
that transcends it”.189 Nonhoff clarifies that this political will is to be understood not 
so much as an actual shared will to institute a particular ideology, but can be con-
ceived as being in place “whenever different individuals or groups become subjects 
of the same discursive formation, whenever they, in other words, adopt the structure 
of meaning put forward by that formation”.190 Below we will see that this means 
taking up the subject positions offered by a hegemonic project.  
                                                
The two core concepts of hegemony, antagonism and chains of equivalence, play a 
prominent role in contestations around the Universal. While hegemony has been 
termed a type of politics, antagonism can be regarded as a particular type of political 
conflict; more precisely, antagonistic conflicts are political conflicts that culminate 
in pluralist conflicts around the filling of the empty location of the Universal by pro-
viding a clear alternative. In turn, this pacifies these conflicts ‘to the inside’ and 
deepens them ‘to the outside’.191 This occurs in the following way: 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that the way in which diverse social groups become per-
suaded and united to acquire a common will is not through being persuaded to adopt 
a particular comprehensive ideology; rather, this happens through “the construction 
of a chain of equivalence that expresses a common feeling of a lack of fullness”, 
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such as the shared feeling of opposition to an oppressive regime or another kind of 
‘enemy’.192 The chains of equivalence which emerge on each side of the antagonistic 
frontier are constituted by elements that are equivalent to each other in relation to the 
lack of the Universal; one chain symbolises the Universal, and the other its lack.193 
In the course of successful hegemonic articulations, the chain of equivalence sym-
bolising the Universal is extended into a horizon for the inscription of social de-
mands and comes to include and unify many different demands, struggles and group-
ings.194 The success of this unification presupposes the symbolic representation of 
the Universal by a prominent nodal point which is capable of unifying all those de-
mands to the point where it erases its own differential meaning and becomes so 
dense with meaning that it turns into nothing more than a place unifying a set of 
equivalent demands.195 
It should be made clear that persuasion does not just happen through linguistic 
means but also through very practical and material articulations. Yet, while behav-
ioural conformity with a particular organising principle can obviously be materially 
enforced, a hegemonic formation will only be relatively stable if the possibility of 
antagonistic struggles and opposition is minimised through the achievement of a 
common will in the sense that the proposed Universal is accepted and adopted as the 
right and normal way of societal organisation.  
Here it is also important to come back to the question of articulatory power. Not all 
actors or groups are equally capable of hegemonising, i.e. of advancing their particu-
lar as a Universal. In the political struggles for hegemony, “particular demands are 
universalized and others are marginalized”. This is due to the “unevenness of the 
structural positions in society”.196 The success of both linguistic and non-linguistic 
ways of persuasion is enhanced (though not determined) by close links to established 
nodal points i.e. power centres in the discursive structure. Articulatory power thus 
comes into play in the form of existing discursive-hegemonic formations which en-
able or disable various political forces to articulate their particular as the Universal; 
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not in the sense that they determine once and for all which political force is able to 
become hegemonic, “but rather by constraining and facilitating the formulation and 
realization of the political strategies of those forces”.197 Some identities may be sub-
verted and their claims marginalised by current discursive formations to the extent 
that they are hardly able to articulate their own subject positions and claims.198 Thus, 
they do not figure in hegemonic discourses unless they manage to dislocate some of 
their moments; in this case, hegemonic discourses are provoked to ‘react’ by at-
tempting to integrate hitherto marginalised elements in one of their chains and thus 
re-articulate them.  
 
Hegemonic strategy, stratagems and other discursive logics 
While much has now been said about how (hegemonic) discourses function, the 
questions of how exactly discourses become hegemonic, and how they construct and 
successfully advance a particular as Universal, need to be discussed in greater depth 
since an understanding of these processes is crucial for the empirical analysis con-
ducted in this thesis. According to Laclau and Mouffe, hegemonic discourses emerge 
through the establishment of antagonistic chains of equivalences;199 yet, these are 
not the only elements that figure in hegemonic practices. Elaborating on this aspect 
of PDHT as developed by Laclau and Mouffe, Nonhoff provides a more systematic 
and detailed take on the processes of hegemonisation by elaborating the concept of 
the hegemonic project.  
                                                
Originally a Gramscian concept, a hegemonic project can be defined as a “political 
project, including a vision of how state, economy and civil society should be organ-
ized, that aspires to become hegemonic”.200 The term ‘aspire’ should not be taken 
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literally as a project can hardly aspire to something. Also the social actors involved 
in hegemonic articulations do not necessarily have a comprehensive political project 
in mind, the realisation of which they consciously strive for. Rather, the term is to be 
understood as referring to articulations that have the potential to aid the discourse on 
its way to hegemony.  
Nonhoff distinguishes different hegemonic stratagems that characterise hegemonic 
projects.201 These are in this thesis understood as the general logics of hegemonic 
projects, as opposed to the more specific logics that differ according to each hege-
monic project. Once again, the term ‘strategy’ must be problematised as it is usually 
associated with a strong subject, a ‘strategist’, which does not exist in the Laclau-
Mouffian ontology. PDHT conceives discourse and subjects as co-originary and as-
sumes that subjects are created through discursive invocation while simultaneously 
they are the place of decisions, therefore neither are they simply the puppet of dis-
course.202 Yet, even if one rejects the actor-centeredness of the term, strategies can 
still be conceived as serving the creation of particular discursive constellations, in 
this case successful hegemonic practices, by arranging discursive elements in par-
ticular ways in space and time. Thus, rather than trying to distinguish strategies that 
have been consciously planned by an actor, Nonhoff stresses that the discourse ana-
lyst is able to investigate the processes of constitution of an advanced hegemonic 
project by examining its (successful and thus discernible) hegemonic strategies.203  
The concept of the hegemonic project is the key analytical device of this thesis. 
While Nonhoff has theorised the hegemonic stratagems of a hegemonic project as a 
means to trace the processes of constitution of what can already be identified as an 
existing hegemonic formation, the starting point of this thesis is a different one. So 
far no hegemonic formation with regards to the international fight against corruption 
has been detected in the literature (and it is unclear what such a formation would be 
like) and it is not the aim of this thesis to reveal such a formation if it exists.  
Rather, it aims at addressing the argument made by the critical IAC literature that 
there is a strong consensus within IAC discourse on corruption and adequate counter-
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measures as well as concomitant societal ideals. As mentioned previously, such a 
consensus would mean that IAC discourse is rather fully hegemonised in the sense of 
consisting of two antagonistic chains of equivalences containing nodal points and 
advancing a particular as Universal. Given the weak empirical basis on which the 
consensus argument is built, the thesis aims to investigate whether IAC discourse is 
actually structured in this way. It deploys the concept of the hegemonic project and 
its different hegemonic stratagems (which will be described in more detail below) in 
order to do so.  
But this concept allows me to do much more than just confirm or reject the consen-
sus hypothesis. Amended with a focus on more specific logics, it provides a grid 
through which to distinguish and highlight the ways in which these structures are 
created within IAC discourse; specify to what extent they are already in place within 
the discourse; assess whether IAC discourse provides a hegemonic project in the 
sense that it aspires to hegemonise a wider discursive space (the scope of which can 
also be determined via the analysis of hegemonic stratagems); to draw out how it 
attempts to do so (if at all); and make detailed statements about the political nature of 
IAC discourse and the potential ideal(s) advanced by the discourse.204 In order to 
clarify how hegemonic stratagems (in the sense of general logics of a hegemonic 
project) as well as a focus on more specific discursive logics enable these contribu-
tions, the following sections will outline these theoretical devices in greater depth. 
According to Nonhoff, hegemonic strategies consist of interplay between four types 
of discursive relations. In order to establish something approaching a closed structure 
(which is necessary for ‘society’ to come to being), the relations of difference in the 
field of discourse (i.e. field of the social) are subverted by relations of equivalence, 
contrariety and super-difference.205 Relying on Gramsci, Nonhoff distinguishes two 
general types of hegemonic strategies: offensive-hegemonic and defensive-
hegemonic strategies. The strategies of an emergent hegemonic formation will nec-
essarily be offensive-hegemonic rather than defensive-hegemonic, as the hegemony 
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is only emerging rather than requiring defence.206 As the anticorruption discourse 
seems to have begun its expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s and has since 
grown increasingly important, it appears as an emerging hegemonic project (if it can 
be called ‘hegemonic project’ at all) more than as a hegemonic formation which 
seeks to defend itself. Thus, in the following pages, I will concentrate on the charac-
teristics of the offensive-hegemonic strategy. 
Overview 1: Stratagems of the offensive-hegemonic strategy 
A. Core stratagems of the offensive-hegemonic strategy 
I. Equivalisation of differential claims which are oriented toward the 
Universal 
II. Antagonistic division of the discursive space 
III. Representation 
 
B. Basic stratagem 
IV. Basic stratagem of super-differential demarcation 
 
C. Complementary hegemonic stratagems 
V. Emergent openness of interpretation of the symbolic equivalent of 
the Universal 
VI. Institution/perpetuation of subject positions for socio-political forces 
VII. Targeted and sporadic breaking of the antagonistic frontier 
 
D. Secondary hegemonic stratagem 
VIII. Stratagem of the actual advocate 
IX. Stratagem of the actual meaning 
Source: Nonhoff (2006: 213), translation AG 
Nonhoff distinguishes nine different stratagems (‘Strategeme’) as characteristic of 
the offensive-hegemonic strategy (see overview 1);207 the (always joint) presence of 
the three core stratagems however suffices to make discursive articulations ‘hege-
monic practice’ in terms of attempting to divide the discursive space in two chains of 
equivalences and linking them to a nodal point.208 As it moves toward hegemony, a 
hegemonic project will attempt to articulate differential claims which are oriented 
toward the Universal into a chain of equivalence. If this is successful, an antagonistic 
division of the discursive space is created. As soon as one claim becomes the sym-
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bolic equivalent of the particular Universal, it is no longer simply a particular claim 
but rather expresses the collective political will of the subject positions that are al-
ready involved in the chain. At that point a discourse turns into a hegemonic project 
on target for expansion.  
‘Equivalisation of differential claims which are oriented toward the Universal’209 (I) 
means that other claims which are oriented toward the Universal (in the sense of con-
tributing to its fulfilment) are articulated in a chain of equivalence with the original 
claim. This not only involves different claims in the sense of demands, but also dis-
tinct subject positions that are articulated as equivalents in the chain. In addition to 
the individuals or groups who articulated the original claim, other individuals or 
groups must be subjectivised in order to secure discursive presence and ‘visibility’ of 
the hegemonic claim.210 It should be noted that the original claim of the chain will 
necessarily be subject to a transformation (in its symbolic form) in the course of the 
equivalisation211 (which creates commonality by subverting the differential meaning 
of the original claim). 
The ‘antagonistic division of the discursive space’212 (II) results from such equivali-
sations. What makes the equivalisations of very diverse signifiers possible in the first 
place is a negation (rather than a difference): the collective lack of the Universal. In a 
chain of equivalence diverse claims become articulated as equivalent in relation to 
the aim of addressing the lack of the Universal and thus indirectly relate to each 
other. While the cure for the lack of the Universal can be symbolised positively, this 
is not possible with the lack of the Universal as it is a negativity and cannot be given 
a positive form. However, what can and will be positively symbolised instead are the 
hindrances to or resistances against addressing the lack – the signifiers that are in a 
relationship of contrariety to the claims for overcoming the lack. This explains why 
two chains of equivalence must be articulated by the hegemonic project: one encom-
passing the claims that aim to overcome the lack of the Universal (the ‘hegemonic 
chain’), and the other encompassing the claims that represent a hindrance to the for-
mer, thereby positively and symbolically embodying the lack (the ‘antagonistic 
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chain’). The result is an antagonistic division of the discursive space.213 Relatively 
speaking, a successful hegemonic project must stabilise the frontier between the two 
chains by articulating it as rigid and impermeable and making the discursive regions 
on both sides of the frontier appear as a stable structure.214 According to Nonhoff, 
the main function of the ‘antagonistic chain of equivalence’ is to provide reasons for 
difficulties in the realisation of the Universal but also for the necessity of a common 
effort. He points out that while for this purpose it may be necessary to articulate sub-
ject positions into the ‘antagonistic chain’, these ‘offered’ subject positions are rather 
unlikely to be taken up by anyone. 
Regarding the relation between the equivalents in a ‘hegemonic chain’ and the origi-
nal (in the constantly transforming hegemonic process) claim of the discourse, Non-
hoff detects a third stratagem, ‘representation’215 (III). Every hegemonic strategy 
centres on a specific claim or demand216 which evokes a lack of an imaginary Uni-
versal, and at the same time claims to address this lack through the attempt to realise 
what is being demanded.217 The stratagem of ‘representation’ denominates the proc-
ess by which one claim becomes the ‘representative’ of the chain which is oriented 
toward the Universal. He distinguishes two ways in which this representation can 
happen.218 It may be directly claimed that the realisation of the ‘representative’ will 
be the realisation of the Universal. In this case, all other claims in the chain become 
articulated as ‘parts’ of the Universal (retaining a differential relation to it). The sec-
ond and more stable possibility of ‘representation’ does not articulate a direct rela-
tionship between one discursive element and the Universal. Here, too, the ‘hege-
monic claim’ or ‘representative’ is articulated in a relation of equivalence to the 
other claims in the chain; yet it is presented as a mediator or linking element between 
all these diverse claims: they are equivalent in relation to the hegemonic claim. This 
function could for example be fulfilled by an instrumental claim, stating that general 
welfare will be achieved if only the social market economy is realised.219 Conse-
quently, the hegemonic claim becomes more than just one moment in the chain; it 
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becomes the star of the chain in that it is the centre for all the other surrounding 
claims and gives the chain its name.220 The two ways of representation have the 
same effect in that they both articulate the ‘representative’ as both equivalent and 
differential to the other claims in its chain. The breakpoints that this paradox neces-
sarily entails are a ‘natural’ characteristic of discourses as never fully and finally 
closable structures.221  
The ‘basic stratagem of super-differential demarcation’222 (IV) is called ‘basic’ be-
cause it demarcates the territories in which particular discursive struggles are carried 
out.  The stratagem of super-differential demarcation articulates particular elements 
or whole ‘regions’ of discourses as super-differential from others, i.e. as unconnected 
with these others and thus restricts the discursive ‘territory’ claimed by hegemonic 
projects. According to Nonhoff, super-differential boundaries are not usually as pre-
carious and contested as antagonistic ones, but they must still be regularly demar-
cated.223 For example, the stratagem of super-differential demarcation is at work in 
discourses which articulate politics and religion as separate spheres, or that claim 
that the state should keep out of family life; but it can also demarcate discursive ter-
ritories in the geographical sense of the word and for example restrict a hegemonic 
project to the borders of a particular nation-state. As Nonhoff explains, this strata-
gem is bound to re-emerge regularly (though not necessarily particularly frequently) 
within a hegemonic project for purposes of clarification of the discursive territory 
that is ‘claimed’ by the discourse. It can also include the withdrawal of claims from 
particularly conflictive discursive ‘territories’ or the shielding of the discourse 
against such territories for purposes of stabilisation of the hegemonic project,224 and 
thus be a way of dealing with dislocation of the discourse. A hegemonic project can 
articulate many different boundaries or super-differences to various other discourses, 
and thus this stratagem can appear in different ways in a hegemonic project.  
In addition to those three core stratagems and the basic stratagem of super-
differential demarcation Nonhoff also distinguishes three complementary stratagems. 
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These are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for characterising a discursive 
practice as hegemonic, and they do not necessarily figure in any hegemonic project 
or formation; nonetheless, they may still have a significant impact on the success or 
failure of hegemonic projects and thus their analysis can render interesting insights 
into the ways in which a hegemonic project evolves and advances.  
The stratagem of ‘emergent openness of interpretation of the symbolic equivalent of 
the Universal’225 (V) means that, due to the immense scope or length that a chain of 
equivalence can acquire in a successful hegemonic project, the principle hegemonic 
claim (the representative or star of the chain, see third stratagem) often develops to 
be extraordinarily open to interpretation. As such, it can accommodate very diverse 
and diffuse expectations regarding the Universal which are united in the chain of 
equivalence, which renders the acquisition of new subject positions easier.226  
A hegemonic project will attempt to recruit as many subjects as possible. However, 
its success will particularly depend on the inclusion of as many socio-political forces 
as possible, which, due to their prominent positions in the discursive structure, can 
foster the expansion and thus success of the project. This is why the ‘institu-
tion/perpetuation of subject positions for socio-political forces’227 (VI) into the 
‘hegemonic chain of equivalence’ is an important stratagem. Nonhoff defines these 
socio-political forces as referring to “all those subjects which are or become particu-
larly perceptible within a given politico discursive field”.228 This elevated percepti-
bility can be due to the sheer size of a group but also to academic or other expert 
competence, access to decision-making; but also monetary and technical power need 
to be included in this list. Such socio-political forces can comprise for example po-
litical parties, associations, international organisations etc. 
The stratagem of the ‘targeted and sporadic breaking of the antagonistic frontier’229 
(VII) is an expression of the dynamic nature of hegemonic practices. The antagonis-
tic frontier does not only become fixed but can also be ruptured strategically in order 
to relocate elements and subject positions from one side to the other. Such a rupture 
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can be the result of dislocations and resulting structural crises of a hegemonic project 
but can also reflect its expansion. This makes it necessary for the discourse to defend 
itself by including particular socio-political forces that have formerly been articu-
lated as parts of the ‘antagonistic chain’ into the ‘hegemonic chain’ or relocating 
problematic elements into the ‘antagonistic chain’.230 This stratagem is however 
unlikely to be discovered in this analysis of IAC discourse. It refers to re-
articulations of the discourse over time and can thus only be distinguished through 
an analysis of the ways in which the discourse changed from its beginnings until 
today. The present analysis however approaches the discourse as an entity existing in 
a specific time and place (see later section on time frames) and, thus, can only point 
to some ad-hoc insights into the chronological development of discursive reloca-
tions. Given that this is a complementary stratagem only, bracketing it out does how-
ever not derogate the usefulness of a stratagems-based analysis on a whole for the 
purposes of this thesis.   
The ‘stratagem of the actual advocate’231 (VIII) and the ‘stratagem of the actual 
meaning’232 (IX) become relevant only at the point where a particular hegemonic 
formation has expanded and stabilised rather successfully. When this is the case, 
reasons Nonhoff, second-order hegemonies can emerge inside this formation.233 The 
political struggle then takes place no more between the hegemonic project and its 
alternatives, but rather within it.234 The two stratagems therefore refer to the exis-
tence of struggles about an actual advocate and an actual meaning within an estab-
lished hegemonic formation. To a certain extent they reverse the effects of the strata-
gems concerning the subject positions and the emergent openness of interpretation of 
the hegemonic claim; once the discourse has achieved a certain influence and degree 
of stability through massive equivalisation, the equivalences can be partly re-
articulated (within the chains) as differences for the sake of concretising and thus 
further fixing the discursive structures.  
The ‘stratagem of the actual advocate’ means that a particular socio-political force 
assumes the role of a ‘champion’ in the advocacy of the hegemonic claim. This im-
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plies convincing articulations that the success of the claim depends primarily on this 
force. Such a strategic articulation would entail that subject positions inside the chain 
of equivalence become clearly differentiated from each other and that something 
resembling a hierarchy is established, or even that some are relocated into the ‘an-
tagonistic chain’.  
The ‘stratagem of the actual meaning’ refers to how a particular interpretation of the 
symbolic equivalent of the Universal can establish itself as dominant throughout the 
chain of equivalence. For this to happen, ‘actual’ and ‘non-actual’ links between the 
respective element and other discursive elements in the chain have to be articulated, 
or at least the relations between those elements need to be concretised and thus fixed 
further. For Nonhoff, the analytical value of this stratagem is that the presence of 
political conflicts about the actual meaning and the actual advocate indicates that a 
hegemonic project has reached very advanced stages.235 
Having discussed the process that a discourse undergoes in order to become a hege-
monic formation, a final comment is required regarding the end point of this process. 
In short, there is none. As mentioned previously, hegemony is not a status but a dy-
namic process that is never complete; this means that hegemonic formations can be 
understood as hegemonic projects in rather advanced stages, and also that the suc-
cess of hegemonic projects can only ever be relative. A successful hegemonic project 
is one that has almost superseded the dichotomy between particularity and universal-
ity;236 that has to a relatively large extent articulated its particular societal project as 
society’s general interest or collective will,237 as the ultimate way to organise so-
ciety238 (be it in a particular area or more generally).  
                                                
By way of the hegemonic stratagems described above, a successful hegemonic pro-
ject is a discourse that has clearly and rather comprehensively divided the discursive 
space demarcated (IV) into two antagonistic chains of equivalences (I, II) containing 
subject positions for socio-political forces that have actually been taken up by those 
forces (VI), that features a prominent symbolic representative of the Universal (III) 
that is open to interpretation, accommodating a wide range of claims (V), that has 
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over time defended its status through targeted and sporadic breaking of the antago-
nistic frontier (VII), and that may, as a result, already (but not necessarily) be experi-
encing conflict about the actual advocate (VIII) and the actual meaning (IX) of the 
Universal. 
Yet, the principal analytical worth of these stratagems is not in assessing the exact 
degree of expansion and stabilisation of a hegemonic formation. Nonhoff conceives 
them instead as an analytical lens through which to look at relatively well-constituted 
and thus easily discernible hegemonic formations in order to examine the (success-
ful) stratagems employed by this discourse on its way to hegemony. I employ the 
hegemonic stratagems in my thesis however in a somewhat different manner.  
While IAC discourse has not been established in the literature as a hegemonic pro-
ject or hegemonic formation, the critical literature however argues that it is charac-
terised by a strong consensus among powerful actors that advance a neoliberal socie-
tal ideals through fighting corruption, as discussed in chapter 1. According to the 
discussion above, such a consensus can be understood as a hegemonic project con-
structing two clearly (and thus consensually) separated chains of equivalences, one 
containing corruption and the other outlining a comprehensive neoliberal Universal. 
With this ‘hypothesis’ in mind, the thesis therefore uses the concept of the hege-
monic project and its stratagems as a theoretical device to inquire into the consensus 
claim by exploring whether the discourse presents in fact two clearly divided chains 
of equivalences that characterise a hegemonic project. But it also employs it to trace 
the ways in which IAC discourse constructs corruption and a particular societal 
ideal; to examine how it advances this ideal, in the sense of expanding the chains of 
equivalences and the division of the discursive space through linguistic and non-
linguistic articulations; and to, ultimately, give a more detailed account of the nature 
of the societal ideal pursued through the fight against corruption than has so far been 
provided.  
In order to be able to pursue these four analytical goals the thesis however requires 
an additional analytical device in addition to the hegemonic stratagems. This device 
consists of a focus on the more specific discursive logics that characterise IAC dis-
course. This is necessary because, while all discursive articulations consist of an in-




difference, it is the different constellations, or logics, of such relations that give rise 
to particular social orders. Chapter 1 has already suggested a focus on specific ways 
of construction as a way to deal with the open questions regarding the neoliberal 
consensus argument. In theoretical terms, this means that only an understanding of 
the exact ways, or specific logics, according to which IAC discourse functions will 
allow us to tell whether IAC discourse is a hegemonic project or not (i.e. whether it 
displays the more general political logics that hegemonic projects have in common, 
most importantly a clear division of its discursive space), and if it is not, how it func-
tions otherwise; and, second, only a very close investigation of the specific logics 
structuring IAC discourse will enable us to get a clearer picture of the societal ideal 
potentially present within it, and of the exact ways in which it is being advanced by 
the discourse. While the latter can be grasped to a certain extent through the general 
logics of the hegemonic stratagems, they also exceed those, making a focus on more 
detailed logics necessary.  
Although a conception of discursive logics exists in Laclau and Mouffe’s writ-
ings,239 it is neither very prominent nor very highly developed. While Nonhoff does 
not use the term ‘logics’, nonetheless he conceptualises logics to a certain but ulti-
mately insufficient extent. The hegemonic stratagems outlined above can be re-
garded as the general logics that hegemonic projects tend to display.240 Furthermore, 
Nonhoff identifies different types of elements which tend to be articulated in hege-
monic projects: aims, specifications of the Universal, instrumental claims, concrete 
demands, and subject positions.241 These different types of elements can be under-
stood as indicating particular kinds of logics within a hegemonic project, linking 
together different relations of difference, equivalence, contrariety and super-
difference and thus operating within chains of equivalence but also stretching across 
the antagonistic divide between them. As Nonhoff explains, these categories of sig-
nifiers are not intended to hierarchically organise the latter but serve the purpose of 
shedding light on the specific Universal that begins to show in the net of claims.242 
                                                 
239 For a summary on their understanding of social and political logics see Glynos/Howarth (2007: 
135 ff) 
240 However Nonhoff stresses that not all hegemonic projects need necessarily ‘employ’ all hege-
monic stratagems in order to successfully hegemonise the discursive space, which is also expressed 
in the categorisation of stratagems into core and complementary stratagems.  
241  Nonhoff (2006: 274)   




As we shall see, this is the way in which they are used as important analytical de-
vices in the empirical chapters 4 to 6. Yet the analytical capacity of this categorisa-
tion does not exhaust the complexity of discursive logics either in hegemonic pro-
jects or in other kinds of discourses.243 In addition to them, the general relations of 
equivalence, difference and contrariety in a specific discourse are structured by and 
render many other, complex and diverse articulations such as reasons, causes, conse-
quences, justifications, contradictions, accusations, definitions, adjectives and meta-
phors etc. which are all constructed in an interplay of linguistic and more material 
articulations. While it seems neither necessary nor useful to categorise the discourse 
mainly according to these types of relations, it is more important to draw out the cru-
cial ways or logics in which these discursive relations are linked up in the particular 
discourse under consideration, thus highlighting the ways in which these ‘relational 
networks’244 come to construct and advance very particular societal structures. 
                                                
In this respect, attention should be drawn to the work of Glynos and Howarth who 
have set out a comprehensive post-Marxist theoretical framework that includes three 
different categories of discursive logics which can be used as an interpretive lens for 
the explanation of discourses: social, political and fantasmatic logics.245 According 
to Glynos and Howarth, social logics are the “rules [that] govern a practice or regime 
in a particular context”246 and are discernible by the analyst through their “regularity 
in dispersion”, for example, the logics of a market.247 Drawing them out allows the 
analyst to characterise a particular social practice or regime,248 taking into account 
the “ensemble of rules, norms, values and regularities” that define everyday life in 
it.249 Political logics illuminate “how social practices come into being”, how they are 
instituted, transformed and sustained.250 Most of the hegemonic stratagems outlined 
earlier seem to fall into this category of logics given that they theorise ways of insti-
 
243 Having elaborated his theoretical framework in relation to a positively framed agenda (the social 
market economy) Nonhoff neglects the complex workings of the antagonistic chain of equivalence 
in particular, and his theorisation of it is restricted to conceiving it as articulating hindrances to the 
Universal articulated in the hegemonic chain. 
244  Glynos/Howarth (2007: 136) 
245  Glynos/Howarth (2007) 
246  Howarth (2008: 14) 
247  Glynos/Howarth (2007: 139, 141) drawing on Foucault (1970) 
248  Glynos/Howarth (2007: 137) 
249  Torfing (1999: 70) 




tuting a new order.251 Political logics are closely interrelated with social logics in 
that social practices can be regarded as relatively sedimented political practices. Fan-
tasmatic logics in turn “provide the means to understand why and how subjects are 
gripped by practices and regimes”;252 they can ‘cover over’ the contingencies of both 
social and political practices in that they either help normalise social practices and 
prevent political practices in sedimented social structures (thus stabilising these 
structures) or provide political practices with “direction and energy”. The latter can 
work through either a beatific or a horrific dimension, for example creating images 
of either omnipotence or victimhood.253 Nonhoff’s stratagem V, the ‘emergent open-
ness of interpretation of the symbolic equivalent of the Universal’ can be conceived 
as referring to a fantasmatic logic as it enables diverse beatific perspectives on the 
Universal.  
This categorisation of logics aids the understanding of the function of different dis-
cursive logics traced in IAC discourse, either for structuring or advancing a particu-
lar Universal, and will thus be used together with the hegemonic stratagems in the 
empirical chapters of the thesis.  
However, in any particular discourse these logics will be jointly articulated and ap-
pear in complex, intertwined ways. This not only means that they can only be traced 
as such but also that this interrelation needs to be brought out by the analysis, as it 
will be the joint articulation of specific logics that makes a particular discourse 
‘work’ as it does, which is why they are hardly separable from each other. This com-
plexity also means that in order to be able to unfold and interpret any broader discur-
sive logics (be it social, political or fantasmatic) in IAC discourse, the analysis must 
start by looking at the discourse very closely, at what is there in the discourse, ac-
cessing it through the manifold discursive moves in which reasons, causes, conse-
quences, subject positions, measures etc. are constructed. Only in so doing is the 
thesis able to draw out the complex ways in which different logics are closely inter-
twined in the actual operations of IAC discourse.  
                                                 
251 However, stratagem V, the ‘emergent openness of interpretation of the symbolic equivalent of the 
Universal’, can be better interpreted as a fantasmatic logic (see chapter 4).  
252  Howarth (2008: 16) 




While I will explain at the end of this chapter how exactly I have made use of the 
theoretical devices described here during the analysis of the empirical material, it 
should be left clear at this stage that my analysis and explanation of the structures of 
IAC discourse takes place not through an exploration of potential hegemonic strata-
gems alone but instead operates from a perspective that is able to detect the complex 
interrelations between these and more detailed and specific logics of the discourse. 
In the following sections I will explain how IAC discourse can be conceived, opera-
tionalised and analysed within the framework of PDHT. 
 
The IAC consensus from a post-Marxist discourse and hegemony theo-
retical perspective 
In the course of the previous sections I have already given some brief examples of 
how IAC discourse can be conceived in the framework of PDHT. However a short 
but comprehensive overview is now required about how the picture of IAC discourse 
that has been provided by the critical literature can be understood through the lens 
that PDHT provides. This brings us back to the open questions with regards to IAC 
discourse and allows me to clarify the way in which the central research question of 
this thesis will be answered through a set of sub-questions informed by the theoreti-
cal concepts outlined above. 
IAC discourse can be understood as a discourse in the Laclau-Mouffian sense in that 
it forms part of the field of discourse and certainly consists of a range of signifiers 
centring on corruption and anticorruption as nodal points. This is why it can be dis-
tinguished as one discourse in the first place. These signifiers in turn can be expected 
to be linked to each other in different discursive logics that socially construct the 
meanings of corruption and anticorruption measures but also of other concepts figur-
ing in the discourse.  
The antagonistic set-up of the discourse (as being ‘anti’ corruption) suggests the 
presence of an antagonistic division of the discursive space. The argument by the 
critical literature about a neoliberal consensus suggests the presence of two opposing 




herently and consensually constructs corruption as mainly an economic problem 
while the other constructs a neoliberal societal ideal, or at least neoliberal measures, 
to address this problem. If there are such chains of equivalences, then the construc-
tion of these chains can be understood as occurring from the perspective of subject 
positions promoting the fight against corruption such as the IAC organisations intro-
duced at the beginning of this thesis.  
Yet given the blind spots in the literature we still do not know whether the discourse 
is actually that consensual and have reasons to suspect that these two chains of 
equivalences may not be that clearly delimited after all, that contestations within 
them (about the meaning of corruption and anticorruption) will blur their boundaries 
and the antagonistic divide established in the discursive space. Are there perhaps 
conflicting hegemonic projects in IAC discourse, struggling to divide the discursive 
field, and competing to establish their particular as Universal? 
Apart from claiming that corruption is constructed as mainly an economic problem, 
the critical literature also hardly provides any insights into how exactly corruption is 
constructed as such through equivalisation with different signifiers (including subject 
positions) according to particular logics in the assumed ‘antagonistic chain’ of IAC 
discourse, as well as through contrarieties articulated with elements in the ‘hege-
monic chain’ (apart from economic welfare).  
We also have only vague insights about the kind of societal ideal constructed by the 
alleged ‘hegemonic chain’. This is again because insights into the signifiers figuring 
in that chain and, importantly, the discursive logics connecting them, are scarce. 
While critical scholars have identified in the discourse a conception of social actors 
as rational and self-interested and found anticorruption measures to consist mainly of 
institutional reform, it remains rather unclear how these elements are articulated in 
logics constituting a neoliberal ideal. Similarly, the function of morality in the 
‘hegemonic chain of equivalence’ remains unexplained. Also, we do not know 
whether IAC discourse articulates a comprehensive or partial Universal, if at all, and 
what the scope of that Universal is. Overall it remains unclear which logics this ideal 
follows and through which discursive moves it is constructed. Given that IAC dis-
course does not seem to openly advocate ‘neoliberalism’ as the solution to corrup-




be constructed as something that is politically uncontroversial? And what is the role 
of the prominent nodal point corruption in the discourse?   
Moreover, we know hardly anything about how IAC discourse renders the fight 
against corruption persuasive or at least works towards doing so. Given that in order 
for a hegemonic project to advance and to further expand the antagonistic division of 
the discursive space, it must offer subject positions in its ‘hegemonic chain’ and per-
suade subjects to take them up, many open questions remain with regards to IAC 
discourse. Through which linguistic and non-linguistic (or ‘material’) articulations 
does it work towards restructuring social relations according to its nodal points, of-
fering and incorporating subject positions (of what kind?) into its ‘hegemonic chain’, 
and advancing the division of the discursive space? Can we maybe distinguish con-
flicts about the actual meaning of its Universal and about the actual advocate of this 
Universal? And finally, what identities and alternative political projects are negated 
by this hegemonic project (if it is one)? 
These open questions, summarised by chapter 1 in the general research question  
What are the societal ideals inherent in the international fight against corrup-
tion, how are they constructed and advanced, and to what extent is there a con-
sensus on them? 
can now be addressed through the following sub-questions that are informed by the 
PDHT framework set out in this chapter: 
To what extent does IAC discourse constitute one coherent hegemonic 
project? 
How do hegemonic stratagems and/or other discursive logics struc-
turing IAC discourse construct and advance particular societal ide-
als? 
Or how do they diverge and dislocate each other? 
Now that the analytical value of PDHT for an analysis of IAC discourse has been 
demonstrated, I will, in the following sections, explain how I operationalise IAC 
discourse for the purpose of answering these research questions and how I go about 




Delimiting and analysing the discourse – ‘operationalisation’ and method 
Given the relational identity of all signifiers and the infinite play of meaning which 
is only precariously arrested by equivalisations, it is difficult to determine the 
boundaries of a discourse for analytical purposes. However, even if it were possible 
to detect the exact boundaries of IAC discourse, including the fight against corrup-
tion, analysing the whole discourse would entail investigating such a vast body of 
data to render a study of its totality impractical.  
The thesis deals with this practical restriction by focussing on analysing a section of 
IAC discourse comprising text as well as interview material relevant to the fight 
against corruption from the three organisations that can be regarded as the most in-
fluential within IAC discourse: the World Bank, the international NGO Transpar-
ency International, and the United Nations Development Programme.  This choice is 
based on the following reasons.  
First, it seems advisable to examine the anticorruption discourses of these three or-
ganisations254 due to their prominent structural positions as internationally well-
known, widely respected and heavily supported (if of course not universally so) or-
ganisations. These positions as nodal points of media and academic attention, exper-
tise, financial resources and decision-making of powerful actors endow them with 
greater articulatory powers regarding the international fight against corruption and 
the eventual Universal to be pursued than smaller and less popular actors in the in-
ternational fight against corruption, such as the anticorruption NGO Tiri. But these 
organisations also occupy prominent positions within IAC discourse due to the fact 
that they are particularly active in the fight against corruption and have made it a 
particularly important topic within their portfolio (or even the topic, in the case of 
TI) – more than for example the IMF or the OECD.  
TI has played an important role in putting the topic of corruption on the agenda of 
bilateral and international donors as well as other NGOs. It is unchallenged as the 
largest and most important INGO in the area of anticorruption, and its documents 
and best practice suggestions are read, used and distributed by both civil society or-
                                                 
254  Please read this with all the theoretical caveats regarding the possibility of social actors ‘uttering’ 




ganisations and government institutions worldwide. It has more than 100 national 
chapters255 which are often asked for statements regarding national corruption cases, 
for help with national anticorruption strategies, and which maintain a huge network 
with business people, governments, development institutions, and other NGOs.  
The World Bank is the world’s largest donor in the area of international development 
co-operation which has made anticorruption an important issue in its governance and 
development agenda since 1996. It calls its governance portfolio “very signifi-
cant”256 and between 1996 and 2009 it supported more than 600 governance initia-
tives or programmes with anticorruption components.257 During the fiscal years 
1997-1999 the Bank’s governance budget was raised from US$4 billion to US$7.5 
billion, while governance-related “lending for technical assistance, including stand-
alone technical assistance projects and technical assistance embedded in other pro-
jects, totaled [sic] approximately $2 billion to $2.5 billion per year – equivalent to 
about 9 percent of total Bank lending”.258  
As the United Nations’ development agency, the UNDP is endowed with extensive 
funds from governments but also from multilateral and local donors from around the 
world and has a major role to play in the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals which articulates their overarching aim of cutting poverty in half by 
2015. In 2011, earmarked contributions to the UNDP from all its partners amounted 
to US$3.86 billion.259 Since 1997, the UNDP has been a “leading provider of techni-
cal assistance in the area of anti-corruption”,260 and via its country and regional of-
fices 103 countries are currently receiving its support in anticorruption efforts.261  
Analysing the section of IAC discourse involving these three organisations also 
promises particularly important insights with regards to the consensus thesis as due 
to their very different historical trajectories and organisational structures these actors 
could be expected not only to have different approaches to anticorruption but also 
different societal ideals inherent in their work.  
                                                 
255  TI (A) 
256  WB (2000: 29)  
257  WB (c)   
258  WB (2000: 29) 
259  UNDP (2012b: 34) 
260  UNDP (2008a: 2) 




Following reforms in the World Bank’s voting power distribution in 2010, high-
income countries still hold over 60 percent of the vote.262 Therefore, their influence 
on the WB’s strategic and thematic decisions remains greater than that of the large 
mass of the very developing and transition countries that the Bank’s loans are sup-
posed to benefit and that remain under 40 percent. Thus, the World Bank continues 
to be criticised for this unequal distribution of power among its members. It has also 
been criticised for its good governance and anticorruption activities.263 The NGO 
Transparency International in turn has been treated somewhat more gently by the 
critics.264 There are certainly a number of critical works as discussed in the last chap-
ter,265 but overall, TI’s engagement in the fight against corruption has often been 
treated positively.266 Having come into existence from criticism of what its founders 
saw as neglect of the problem of corruption in the Bank’s development efforts, espe-
cially in African countries, TI tends to be regarded as an ethically committed fighter 
against corruption,267 and indeed, the inclusion of terms like ‘ethics’ and ‘integrity’ 
in its discourse suggests so too.268 Moreover, hopes seem to rest on TI to take on the 
role of a more culturally and politically sensitive global actor against corruption.269  
Compared to the World Bank and the UNDP, TI is rather well-positioned to assume 
the role of an IAC reformer. As an NGO, TI is free to act politically openly, and to 
change its priorities and approaches according to what is deemed appropriate and 
successful by its members, rather than having to push its policies through a bulk of 
restrictive regulations and governments’ foreign-political considerations. Unlike the 
World Bank and the UNDP, it does not require a mandate from donor and receiving 
governments to sanction its projects and therefore is not forced to evade ‘sensitive 
topics’. Nor is it bound by anything like the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement 
                                                 
262  Bretton Woods Project (2010); WB (a) 
263  Abrahamsen (2000); Harrison (2004); Weaver (2008); Marquette (2004); Williams (1999); Brack-
ing (2009); Polzer (2001); Brown/Cloke (2004) 
264  For a more detailed elaboration on the perception of TI in the literature, please see Gebel (2012). 
265  Hindess (2005); De Maria (2008c); Murphy (2011) 
266  Marschall (2002); Doig/McIvor (2003); Galtung (2006) 
267 See for example Tänzler who calls it a well established “moral and political authority” Tänzler 
(2010: 331), and Wrage and Wrage who think that TI “clearly fit[s] the description of ‘transnational 
moral entrepreneurs’” (Wrage/Wrage 2005: 322). 
268 See e.g. TI (p) 
269  Bukovansky (2006: 194) suggests that “TI’s grass-roots approach may well be in tension with the 
efforts put forth through international institutions, insofar as those institutions draw primarily on the 
economic discourse on corruption, take the ends of modernity for granted, and neglect issues of po-




which prevent the Bank from interfering in the “political affairs” of its member 
states and from acting according to any “political or other non-economic influences 
or considerations”.270 Furthermore, it is organised quite differently from the huge 
bureaucratic apparatus of the World Bank which requires all of its projects to be 
moulded into particular templates which may restrict their potential for innovation, 
adaptation to local contexts and modification during the process of implementation. 
Claiming to be a decentralised grass-roots organisation, TI could be expected to let 
its chapters create innovative projects which fit the cultural contexts under consid-
eration, and to test manifold approaches. On the other hand, one must acknowledge 
that TI is originally the project of a former World Bank country director and other 
like-minded people271 who provided not only the organisational capacities and net-
working but also the intellectual capital for the organisation. Eigen and his co-
founders all came from either legal or economic background; some had worked at 
the World Bank or other development institutions. Thus, it may be plausible that in 
this way the economistic approach of the World Bank became deeply embedded in 
the strategy of TI. These ambiguities present a highly interesting study to establish 
what unites and separates the approaches of TI and the World Bank. Apart from that 
elucidating in greater detail on areas of the discourse that have been partly re-
searched already also seems expedient as it allows me to draw on existing insights 
while amending, modifying and revising them by way of my findings to provide a 
more complete and comprehensive picture. 
In addition to this the research focus of this thesis extends to the anticorruption prac-
tices of the UNDP. Despite its international weight and long-time anticorruption 
work the UNDP has so far been completely neglected in critical anticorruption litera-
ture; the three strategy documents the organisation put out in 2008272 in the context 
of its Programme Against Corruption for Development Effectiveness273 seem to 
have avoided comment entirely. Yet the UNDP’s position is quite interesting to ana-
lyse. While it is a government-led organisation like the World Bank, it takes its pol-
icy decisions in a more ‘democratic’ way than the latter, weighing the voices of its 
member states equally at least officially. Overall, it is often regarded as a less 
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economistic and more reformatory or even radical player in international develop-
ment than the WB.274 It will thus be interesting to assess the ways in which it con-
tributes to the shape of IAC discourse.  
Third, the reason I chose to focus on more strategic and general texts produced by 
the organisations and on the practices of their headquarters rather than on some of 
the diverse practices of implementation of IAC programmes on the ground is be-
cause due to their privileged structural position within the organisations the former 
can be expected to exert greater influence in eventual struggles about a Universal 
than the latter. However, it is important to avoid the trap of thinking in terms of ar-
ticulatory power as a one-way street. It should be clear that IAC organisations’ over-
all strategies and approaches may be subverted ‘on the ground’ to a considerable 
extent and that local and national practices can be expected to partly re-articulate and 
dislocate the overall strategies. Yet the organisations’ headquarters and their strate-
gic documents can be conceived as nodal points which are able to concentrate poten-
tial hegemonic articulations (of money, strategy, experts etc.) regarding the fight 
against corruption. Thus, it is important that they be studied, before (in future re-
search steps) the local practices including ways of subversion and resistance to (or 
dislocation of) an eventually hegemonic IAC discourse can be investigated in a fruit-
ful manner.  
In total, I have examined 117 general anticorruption policy documents and web 
pages associated with Transparency International,275 the World Bank and the UNDP 
all of which were publicly available.  I have also conducted interviews with staff 
from these organisations at their headquarters. The 18 semi-structured interviews, 
which exist in both recorded and transcribed form, were conducted with TI-
Secretariat officials in Berlin during October 2010 (8 interviews), and with UNDP 
officials in New York (2 interviews) and World Bank officials in Washington DC (8 
interviews) during November and December 2010. 
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275 In this respect it must be noted that in April 2012, after the greatest part of the analysis conducted 
here was completed, TI started an overhaul of its website. The latter is not yet completed, which is 
why currently the new website http://www.transparency.org/ exists simultaneously with the former 
one which remains accessible via http://archive.transparency.org.  The material used in this thesis 




In terms of publication dates, the text material analysed extends over the time period 
of twelve years from the year 2000 to 2012. However, it was collected over a period 
of three years from 2009 to 2012. During this time the documents and information 
made reference to here were made available by the chosen organisations as key ref-
erence points in their anti-corruption work. Crucially, they were made available ‘si-
multaneously’ or ‘concurrently’ to each other and thus constituted ‘a discourse’ dur-
ing this time, regardless of their specific publication date. For this reason, and with 
the aims of the thesis in mind (that is, close study of current discursive logics of IAC 
work), the material is analysed independently of publication dates as a ‘discursive 
entirety’ constructing the fight against corruption during the collection period. Thus, 
it is not the aim of the thesis to provide a historical perspective on IAC discourse or 
to discern at which point in time particular discursive articulations have emerged. 
Given the choice to treat discourse as an ‘entirety’ within a specific period only ad 
hoc commentary can be made on chronological and processual developments in the 
discourse. Even so, analysing the texts within the chosen focus and through the La-
clau and Mouffian methods described here comes with great benefits:  it enables us 
to assess in detail, within this period, the presence and absence of specific discursive 
constellations and their discursive effects with regards to constructions of corruption 
and societal ideals.  
The material was selected with the aim of gathering data on conceptions of corrup-
tion and on the main parameters of the societal ideal implicit in IAC discourse 
(which are dominantly structured by particular conceptions of the realms of politics, 
economics and civil society).276 The web pages accessed mainly contain general 
information concerning the organisations, co-operation with partners, approach and 
fields of activity with regards to fighting corruption, while the policy documents 
analysed mainly contain information about anticorruption strategy, programming, 
research and finances.  
                                                 
276 As mentioned before, “the distinctions between political, economic and ideological practices are 
pragmatic and analytical, and strictly internal to the category of discourse,” meaning that the dis-
course itself makes these distinctions, not the analyst (Howarth et al 2000: 6). IAC organisations 
also work on other areas, like e.g. the environment and sports. Yet, these clearly do not play as im-
portant a role for societal organisation as do the areas of politics, economics and general civil soci-




While the statements from the interviews are not to be taken as representative for all 
subject positions in the organisations, the interviewees were selected from diverse 
organisational sectors and according to diverse thematic areas in order to facilitate 
the inclusion of the broadest possible cross-section of organisational subject posi-
tions and articulations within the limited number of interviews. Against the back-
ground of the document analysis the interviews served, on the one hand, to obtain 
more information about approach, cooperation and financing practices; but also to 
highlight the staff’s conceptions of corruption, the societal ideals it subverts and re-
lated concepts in both chains of equivalences. This was done in order to verify or 
question conceptual findings that emerged from the documents; to reveal conceptual 
contestations and ultimately to clarify superficial contradictions. The questions, 
which varied from interview to interview and according to the interviewees’ exper-
tise, covered a broad range of topics including operational / organisational aspects, 
co-operations with and differences from other organisations, conceptions of corrup-
tion, conceptions of human nature, political and economic ideals, the meanings of 
different important concepts ( such as integrity, accountability, development) and 
their relation to corruption, cultural diversity and universality regarding corruption, 
consensus and difference among (different parts of) the organisations, research 
methods and sources of knowledge. Subjects and concomitant subject positions and 
articulations are parts of discourse in the Laclau-Mouffian sense, and therefore the 
interviews are treated as such in the thesis. Data from the interviews have been made 
anonymous in the thesis in order to safeguard the interviewees’ privacy.  
It must be stressed that my study is not a comparative case study in the positivist 
sense, i.e. it does not aim to detect, through comparison of organisations, generalis-
able causal relations between organisational characteristics and policy outcomes. 
Instead, it is more interested in how articulations about (anti)corruption work to-
gether or against each other in the construction of corruption and particular societal 
ideals. Moreover, although I examine a part of the discourse involving three organi-
sations, there is no reason to treat the respective actions and speech as isolated ar-
rangements of practices produced by sovereign social actors, or to assume a neces-
sary divide of the discourse along organisational lines; instead, all articulations are 
understood as part of the same discourse and can be distinguished as ‘pertaining’ to 




fices, resources and names as prominent nodal points. However, those nodal points 
should not be conceived as having an exclusive defining function for the discourse 
since at the same time its elements can be expected to be linked to the practices of 
other organisations and donors, to certain research practices and particular kinds of 
knowledge as well as to societal ideals constructed in other discourses. By now, it 
should also be clear that the discursive area which I delineate with these materials is 
only one part of the whole IAC discourse. The latter includes many more organisa-
tions, extends into the implementation of anticorruption programmes on the ground, 
and is linked to domestic corruption discourses in almost all the countries of the 
world. Thus, my thesis is not an analysis of the dominance or contestation of certain 
constructions of corruption, societal ideals or of subject positions in the target coun-
tries where the anticorruption programmes are implemented or in an even wider dis-
cursive context; rather I examine the ‘organisational main stage’ of IAC discourse, 
by looking at constructions of corruption, societal ideals and their contestations 
within and between the three major IAC organisations (for the sake of simplicity I 
will continue calling this section of IAC discourse that I analyse ‘IAC discourse’ in 
the rest of the thesis). This also means that when drawing out the ‘social logics’ that 
characterise the Universal as constructed in IAC discourse, the analysis does not 
reveal to what extent these logics actually reflect the societal practices ‘on the 
ground’. The principal use of this category of logics in the thesis is thus to character-
ise the kind of Universal that IAC discourse attempts to institute. 
In the pursuit of answers to the research questions centring on the construction and 
advancement of societal ideals through discursive logics, the existence of hegemonic 
stratagems and on eventual contestations within the discourse, the analysis of the 
empirical material was conducted according to retroductive principles of explanation 
(rather than inductive, deductive or narrative ones). These involve the generation of 
multiple hypotheses which are “tested through a to-and-fro movement with the 
available empirical data until we are persuaded that the putative explanans clears 
away the confusion and properly fits the phenomenon under consideration”.277 In the 
present case this was applied in the following way. First, the empirical material was 
categorised according to concepts and other terms figuring frequently in the dis-
course, while paying attention to eventual contradictions and contestations in the 
                                                 




ways in which they were articulated. These concepts were grouped according to con-
ceptual clusters which were then sorted into two chains of equivalences that started 
emerging quite clearly from the material analysed, confirming the hypothesis of the 
hegemonic project – one chain constructing corruption and other problematic aspects 
related to it, and the other constructing adequate counter-measures leading to a socie-
tal ideal. Within the chains, the elements were then analysed and re-arranged accord-
ing to the emerging categories of aims, specifications of the Universal, instrumental 
claims and concrete policy demands. Within these categories, the elements were then 
discussed according to the other hegemonic stratagems and more specific discursive 
logics which, in the form of multiple hypotheses, could be surprisingly distinctly and 
coherently discerned in the material and with much fewer contestations than one 
might have expected. This was done by following catenations of discursive articula-
tions and interpreting the discursive effects of these catenations in terms of fantas-
matic, political and social logics. In a last retroductive step, the found social logics 
were interpreted further with the help of a theoretical framework, a theory of the 
governing logics of advanced liberal rule, to which many of the logics drawn out 
from IAC discourse could be related. 
However, this is not to argue that these logics are objectively observable features of 
IAC discourse. As Howarth puts it, logics are “in the practices examined, yet they 
are not subsumable by the latter”.278 Thus, while many unexpected logics, connec-
tions and contradictions emerged from the material, their interpretations in this thesis 
will necessarily bear my subjective trace. However, at the same time, while logics 
“bring something to the explanation that is not simply given by the practices or in-
terpretations of agents, (...) they are always anchored in some way in the latter”,279 in 
this case the articulations constituting IAC discourse.  
In an attempt to render the ontic level or the social reality of the political project that 
IAC discourse is even more intelligible than it could become through my PDHT in-
spired analytical narrative, the structure of the empirical part of the thesis reflects the 
dominant logic or ontological structure of IAC discourse which is the antagonistic 
division of the discursive space. As we will see, this poses some practical challenges 
                                                 
278  Howarth (2008: 13) 






given that some logics stretch not only within but also across the two chains of 
equivalences; yet overall it has the merit of bringing out how this political logic 
dominates the discourse and other logics, giving it the shape of a hegemonic project. 
Therefore, chapter 3 deals with the ‘corruption chain’ (called chain C), which is ori-
ented against the Universal and constructs the meaning of corruption (amongst other 
things), while chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with the ‘anticorruption chain’ (called chain 
AC), which constructs the meaning of an uncorrupted society, and outlines how it is 
to be achieved. The unequal distribution of chapters per chain is due to the simple 
fact that chain AC is longer because it comprises detailed articulations of the com-
plex workings of the uncorrupted society, while chain C is mainly concerned with 
constructing a (specific) enemy.  
More specifically, chapter 4 deals with the aims articulated in chain AC of IAC dis-
course as well as with the specifications of the Universal; chapter 5 is occupied with 
the instrumental claims with regards to the ways in which to go about in fighting 
corruption; and chapter 6 is concerned with the concrete policy demands for the or-
ganisation of the societal realms of the state, the economy and civil society, unfold-
ing the institutional and cultural arrangements shaping the uncorrupted society, and 
thus completes the unveiling of the Universal advanced by IAC discourse. 
 
3 Corruption – the creation of an enemy  
This chapter investigates the first of two opposing chains of equivalences that can be 
distinguished as constituting IAC discourse – the chain that is oriented against the 
Universal or the ‘antagonistic chain’. This chain articulates all the hindrances to the 
Universal (set out in the second chain). Unlike other hegemonic projects analysed in 
the hegemony theoretical literature so far, in which the main nodal point of the dis-
course is the symbolic equivalent of the Universal located in the ‘hegemonic chain’,1 
IAC discourse seems to centre on the main signifier or nodal point of its ‘antagonis-
tic chain’ of equivalence, corruption. Given this particular characteristic, I start my 
empirical analysis by looking at the ‘antagonistic chain’, which in this thesis I call 
chain C, the ‘corruption chain’. However, this will necessarily involve making some 
links to the ‘hegemonic chain’ or the ‘anticorruption chain’ (which I call ‘chain AC’) 
and also to wider discourses at certain points.  
The chapter shows how corruption is constructed as a very important and at the same 
time quite specific problem through being articulated in particular relations of 
equivalence, difference and contrariety with other specific concepts and attributes. 
Importantly, however, the chapter reveals how at the same time these articulations 
serve to construct particular modes of societal organisation as inadequate and highly 
problematic. 
Specifically, the chapter demonstrates how chain C constructs corruption as well as 
problematic modes of societal organisation by defining corruption in a particular 
way, locating it in particular parts of the world, and reasoning in specific ways about 
its causes and consequences. It also shows how the significance of corruption as a 
problem and thus the persuasiveness of the fight against corruption is expanded 
through giving it attributes and metaphors and thus equivalising it with threat, danger 
and damage. It highlights how, through contradictory discursive logics, IAC dis-
course substitutes potential subject positions in chain C with corruption itself, and 
how this serves to increase the number of potential supporters of the fight against 
corruption. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Nonhoff’s analysis of the social market economy as a hegemonic project (Nonhoff 2006), or 
Wullweber’s analysis of the Nanotechnology project (Wullweber 2010). 
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In revealing all these discursive moves, and while paying particular attention to the 
coherence or divergence of these logics, the chapter demonstrates the surprisingly 
coherent equivalisations of particular claims that are oriented against the Universal 
articulated in IAC discourse2 and draws out the political nature of these equivalisa-
tions;3 it traces how these equivalisations prepare the ground for stratagem II, the 
antagonistic division of the discursive space, and thus for a very particular kind of 
political intervention in the form of the international fight against corruption. It also 
distinguishes the first appearance of the stratagem of super-differential demarcation 
(IV), showing how it shields IAC discourse from dislocation due to criticisms re-
garding the proclamation of Western superiority.  
I will start my examination of how corruption is constructed by looking at how it is 
equivalised with particular definitions and manifestations before I discuss its causes 
and consequences as constructed in chain C and finally I investigate the existence of 
subject positions associated with corruption in the ‘antagonistic chain’ of IAC dis-
course.  
 
Definitions, manifestations and locations of corruption 
So what is corruption according to IAC discourse? What is this thing that needs to be 
fought so urgently? By tying it up in particular discursive relations with particular 
concepts and attributes in a chain of meaning, the IAC discourse makes corruption 
mean one thing and not another. The following sections will examine its meaning by 
examining how it is tied up with what could be regarded as a set of minor nodal 
points in chain C. When examining these equivalisations in chain C, looking at the 




                                                 
2 To be clear, the signifiers merged in chain C are equivalent in that they are all constructed as con-
tributing to the constitution of a hindrance to the realisation of the Universal as laid out in IAC dis-
course. 
3 Political nature refers here to the advancing of particular societal ideals. 
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Definitions of corruption 
At first glance, the three organisations use very similar definitions of corruption. 
When looking at them more closely, however, it turns out that there are important 
differences. The WB sticks to the definition of corruption as the “abuse of public of-
fice for private gain”4 which was originally used by all three organisations. It insists 
that any kind of corruption involving private sector actors needs to “interface with 
and affect public sector performance: for example, collusion among bidders to a pub-
lic procurement with the intent to defraud the state”,5 or consist of a situation where 
“an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe”.6 The bribe does not necessarily have 
to be monetary but can be “anything of value to influence improperly the action of 
another party”.7 Through conceiving it as necessarily having to do with public office 
(equivalisation between corruption and public office), the WB constructs corruption 
as a phenomenon of the public sector. For the WB, public office needs to be abused 
in order for corruption to happen. 
TI and the UNDP in turn seem to abstain from tying the signifier corruption to the 
public sector and thus the meaning of corruption in their discourse seems to remain 
more open. Thus, there is divergence in the discourse about the incorporation or not 
of the signifiers public office/public sector into the definition of corruption in chain 
C, and therefore about the exclusion or not from chain C of ‘corrupt’ activities that 
take place exclusively in the private sector.8  
Yet also within TI’s discourse there are divergences of understanding. TI has refor-
mulated the definition of corruption to the “abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain”9 or “the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit”10 – definitions which 
can also accommodate the abuse of power in the private sector. A TI interviewee ex-
plained that  
                                                 
4  For example WB (2007: 67) 
5  WB (2007: 67) 
6  WB (2007: 67) 
7  WB (2007) 
8 That the explicit construction of corruption as a phenomenon of the public sector in chain C has the 
effect of excluding private sector corruption is due to the established construction of public and pri-
vate spheres as mutually exclusive spheres of society. 
9  TI (o) 
10  TI (2000: 1) 
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yes, we have been broadening our definition of corruption, and I don’t 
think it’s just an imperialistic way, you know, that we try to broaden our 
mandate. I think it’s genuinely a growth of our understanding, that yes, we 
have misunderstood corruption to be only this much, and actually speaking 
corruption happens in up-stream processes, in state-capturing, and once 
you’re into state-capture, you know, everything is linked to corruption.11 
Yet, despite this broadened definition of corruption as existing in both the public and 
the private sector the ‘old’ public-office centred definition of corruption as “the 
abuse of public office for private gain” or the “misuse of offices and institutions for 
private advantage” can still be found in several locations in its website documenta-
tion.12 Also the famous CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and is based 
on a conception of corruption as the abuse of public power for private benefit, com-
prising political as well as administrative aspects. The CPI results are based most of 
all on experts’ opinions of the prevalence of phenomena like the bribery of public 
officials, kickbacks in public procurement, and the embezzlement of public funds, 
which clearly exclude activities that happen solely in the private sector, such as busi-
ness fraud or socially irresponsible behaviour of brokers.13  
Similarly, in 1998 the UNDP still defined corruption as “the misuse of public power, 
office or authority for private benefit” but then came to regard this definition as lim-
ited because “it considers corruption a sin of government and public servants, and 
does not take into account the fact that corruption also prevails in the private sector”. 
The definition was thus reworked towards the ‘misuse of entrusted power for private 
gain’14 which, as a UNDP interviewee explained, encompasses everything “from 
bribery to embezzlement, from corruption in private sector to public sector, to non-
governmental sector. It doesn’t matter whether you’re a media person or a public of-
ficial, or in private sector, business men or women – if you are misusing entrusted 
power for private gain, then you are corrupt”.15 Yet, despite this broadening the 
UNDP seems to maintain in its documents a focus on the public sector, stating for 
example that "[w]hen public money is stolen for private gain, it means fewer re-
                                                 
11  TI-S official 2 
12  TI (o); TI (j)  
13  TI (q); see also Andersson/Heywood (2009); De Maria (2008c) 
14  UNDP (2008c: 7) 
15  UNDP official 1 
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sources to build schools, hospitals, roads and water treatment facilities” or that cor-
ruption diverts “public resources to private gain”.16 Thus, it seems that the broaden-
ing of chain C through including private sector corruption has been fully accom-
plished neither in IAC discourse nor in the more specific parts of it that are associ-
ated with TI and the UNDP. 
These differences and contestations in regard to the inclusion of private sector cor-
ruption in the definitions of corruption blur the ‘edges’ of chain C to a certain extent 
and thus show that the consensus on corruption is not complete in IAC discourse. 
Yet, there are some elements which the three definitions share, and which will turn 
out to structure the discourse in important ways.  
All three definitions clearly target abusive and egoistic human behaviour; corruption 
is an act that is committed by human beings for their own benefit. This definition of 
corruption constructed in chain C excludes other possible constructions of corruption 
from IAC discourse and thus not only negates their significance for determining 
what should be fought in the fight against corruption; it also means that if chain C 
expands it will also work towards a marginalisation of such alternative conceptions 
more generally.17 Excluded, for example, is the republican conception referred to in 
chapter 1, of corruption as the destruction of individuals’ ability to seek the good and 
virtuous, as the decay of morals or customs in society, or as human contribution to 
such decay. Corruption in IAC discourse is not explicitly conceived as a violation of 
higher moral values, such as justice or virtue, but rather as the violation of rules (in 
the case of the public office) or some kind of a contract (in the case of entrusted 
power). Also excluded from these equivalisations are conceptions of corruption 
prevalent in some African societies, as discussed in chapter 1, which construct cor-
ruption not so much as a problem of morality but rather function as an expression of 
negative sentiment about the onlooker’s own disadvantaged social position.  
Furthermore, in all three definitions corruption serves private benefit, meaning the 
benefit of the corrupt person or their family and friends.18 As Philp has argued (see 
                                                 
16  UNDP (a) 
17 How far chain C has already expanded, and thus to what extent alternative conceptions of corrup-
tion have already been marginalised, cannot be determined in this study which focuses solely on a 
section of IAC discourse as defined in chapter 2. 
18  TI (2000: 1) 
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chapter 1), every definition of corruption that refers to an abuse for private gain 
thereby also introduces some notion of the public interest, since private gain or inter-
est can only be distinguished in relation to some public gain or interest.19 Moreover, 
as Philp argues, rules for public office or the law (as in the WB’s definition) do not 
provide an exhaustive definition of the public interest, which refers to more compre-
hensive conceptions of what constitutes a good society.20 This means that while all 
three definitions of corruption contained in chain C evade an explicit reference to 
ultimate values, we can still assume that they point to a conception of the public in-
terest, which is constructed as being subverted by the particular conception of cor-
ruption present in chain C. The question of what kind of conception of the public 
interest this is, and whether its normativity will then be more explicit and easier to 
recognise, remains to be addressed in chapters 4 to 6. 
Following from that, all three definitions of corruption are based on the distinction 
between a private and a public sphere as constitutive areas of a society – a distinct 
feature of modern Western liberal systems that emerged in the late 16th and early 17th 
century with contract and natural rights theories aiming to set limits to state power as 
well as with parallel developments in legal thought.21 These spheres are typically 
distinguished through an articulation of different rules or aims for each of them, and 
as we can see from the definitions of corruption in chain C, corruption is constructed 
as a breach of rules or a contract that have to do with the public sphere. Bratsis has 
argued that such constructions of corruption identify corruption mainly as a trans-
gression of the boundaries between those spheres; while the free pursuit of personal 
economic interests (often to the detriment of others) is accepted in the private realm, 
it becomes problematic when carried out in the public sector.22 IAC discourse can 
thus be regarded as drawing on wider discourses that have constructed and firmly 
established these two separate spheres as a normal feature of societies; at the same 
time it reinforces these categories through the way it defines corruption. 
We can now already recognise the normative and potentially political character of 
IAC discourse given that chain C has been found to construct corruption as a form of 
                                                 
19  Philp (1997) 
20  Philp (1997: 441)  
21  Horwitz (1982) 
22 See Bratsis (2003) on this paradoxical characteristic of the ‘modern conception of corruption’. 
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confusion of rules or norms which should not be confused and belong to two differ-
ent spheres of society. However, the effects of this construction will need to be fur-
ther investigated and will only become fully clear when we also look at the second 
chain of equivalence in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Manifestations of corruption  
The meaning of corruption in IAC discourse is further elaborated through the equiv-
alisation of corruption with a diverse range of phenomena that are articulated as its 
manifestations, telling us what it is that constitutes the norm-violations that are to be 
combated by IAC organisations. The latter provide long lists of forms of corruption, 
including bribery, fraud, money laundering, extortion, kickbacks, peddling influence, 
cronyism/clientelism, nepotism, patronage, insider trading, the provision of speed 
money, embezzlement, abuse of public property, and the looting of state resources23 
but also smuggling, treason, torture, false evidence, vote-rigging, the misuse of offi-
cial seals and stationery,24 just to mention a few out of approximately seventy exam-
ples of such manifestations. The relations and differences of these types of corrup-
tion are not clarified in the discourse and many of them seem to be used inter-
changeably.  
Surprisingly though, despite the long lists of such phenomena, which equivalise cor-
ruption with a vast array of illegitimate acts of individuals, IAC documents seem to 
treat corruption mainly as a synonym to bribery.25 Thus, one could wonder what the 
actual use of these listings is. From our theoretical perspective these lists provide for 
the equivalisation of a large number of activities in chain C, constructing corruption 
as manifesting itself in multiple practices and locations. This expansion of chain C 
contributes to the construction of corruption as a major hindrance (while at the same 
time sticking to a construction of it as the act of breaking the rules of the public 
sphere). 
 
                                                 
23  UNDP (2008c: 7-8) 
24  TI (2000: xviii); UNDP (2008c: 7-8) 
25 See e.g. TI (o); Broadman/Recanatini (2000) 
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Geographic locations of corruption  
The analysis of chain C also reveals that different geographic locations are linked to 
corruption in different ways, constructing it as an omnipresent threat but also as a 
problem that is particularly significant in certain places of the world, while at the 
same time articulating these places as particularly problematic with regards to cor-
ruption.  
Corruption is frequently portrayed in IAC discourse as a “global problem”26 perme-
ating the whole world27 and TI explains that “no region of the world is immune to 
the perils of corruption”.28 Corruption is a problem which is not geographically re-
stricted but invades all people, countries and regions on the globe – articulations 
which expand chain C considerably and thus construct corruption as a threat to be 
taken seriously.  
However, despite such affirmations we find many articulations in IAC discourse 
which construct corruption as being much more problematic in developing than in 
developed countries. While TI insists on the one hand that corruption “affects every 
sector, every bureaucracy, every country”, which is why “it cannot be approached as 
a developing country issue”,29 it argues on the other hand that a fruitful environment 
for corruption “is more likely in the emerging democracies of the South and East”.30 
Similarly, while corruption “thrives when economic policies are poorly designed, 
education levels are low, civil society is underdeveloped, and the accountability of 
public institutions is weak”, these are “conditions that exist in many settings but are 
particularly prevalent in some developing countries”.31 This is why corruption is 
“found in rich and poor, developing and developed countries alike, albeit in different 
forms and magnitude”.32 As proof the WB cites “economic research” which has 
proven that in developing countries the corruption problem is “endemic at every 
level”.33  
                                                 
26  WB (1997: 4) 
27 See also TI (v); TI (a) 
28  TI (y); see also WB (h) 
29  TI (l) 
30  TI (o) 
31  WB (1997: 5) 
32  UNDP (2008d); see also WB (1997: 4) 
33  UNDP (2008c: 10) 
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The prevalence of corruption in developing countries is certainly most prominently 
articulated by TI’s CPI which since 1995 annually ranks (now almost 200) countries 
according to their levels of corruption. It is the nature of a ranking system that some 
come out at the upper and some at the lower end, and in the case of the CPI the vast 
majority of the developing countries assessed usually scores in the lower half of the 
CPI, while Western countries tend to score in the upper half.34 While such articula-
tions serve to construct corruption as a problem that is particularly pressing in devel-
oping countries, these equivalisations also ‘do’ something to the signifiers that be-
come included into chain C – in this case, a wide range of countries in the Global 
South. De Maria has pointed out that while not actually being able to grasp the types 
and levels of corruption in the countries ranked, the CPI serves most of all as a 
means to stigmatise those countries ranging at the end of the scale, fostering “images 
of countries beyond salvation, or [in the case of the countries ranging at the top] so 
flawless that no further improvements are needed”.35 By presenting particular coun-
tries as more and others as less corrupt the CPI articulates them as more or less part 
of the problem that the discourse aims to overcome, as more or less of a hindrance to 
the Universal set out in the second chain of equivalence.  
Such criticisms like De Maria’s present a dislocation to TI’s discourse insofar as 
they associate (or equivalise) the organisation with stigmatising developing coun-
tries, instead of helping them, as TI portrays itself. The analysis of TI documentation 
reveals that the NGO has already made efforts to deal with such criticisms. In its 
Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption it explains with regards to the ques-
tion ‘Where is corruption most prevalent?’: 
At a first, indiscriminate glance, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
published annually by TI, seems to confirm the stereotypical notion that 
corruption is predominantly a problem of the South. (...) It would not only 
be wrong to conclude, however, that - according to the CPI 2008 - Somalia 
and Myanmar are the most corrupt countries in the world; it would also be 
counterproductive. The index is not intended to brand any one country or 
territory, or to pit the North against the South. Rather, it is a tool to raise 
                                                 
34 See CPI 2009. The CPI ranges from 1 to 10 – the lower, the ‘more corrupt’.  
35  De Maria (2008a: 782) 
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public awareness of the problem and promote better governance. Corrup-
tion is as much a problem of the North as it is of the South.36  
This presents a ‘super-differential demarcation’ (stratagem IV) in the sense that TI 
discourse is demarcated against discourses that articulate the West as superior and/or 
developing countries as particularly corrupt. While TI continues to publish the index, 
its defence strategy against dislocations of its discourse by criticism of the CPI is 
apparently to emphasise that the criticisms are wrong because the CPI does not actu-
ally brand countries and has nothing to do with such discourses. Such statements by 
a widely respected anticorruption NGO may well be capable of re-articulating the 
CPI as an unproblematic tool and thus legitimising its continued and widespread use 
by development practitioners, positivist academic scholars but also by the media 
which sometimes has very direct political consequences for the countries ranked.37 
This again strengthens the hegemonic project against further dislocations. 
When asked about the problematique concerning the interpretation of the CPI, a TI 
interviewee told me that “the weird thing or the funny thing is that then the other day 
you read the media coverage and they always go back to the rankings. So that seems 
to be part of human nature in a sense, using these kinds of numbers, and our re-
sponse here is to promote ‘do not rank countries’”.38 Rejecting responsibility by 
pointing to human inclinations to using figures, the interviewee touches on an impor-
tant reason for the continued prominence of the CPI and thus also TI, namely the au-
thority of statistical figures as particularly legitimate forms of knowledge – a point 
which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. While this authority has been 
established concomitantly with positivist science in other discourses over time, IAC 
discourse draws on this authority (by equivalising it into chain AC) through the CPI 
and its methodology, thus providing authenticity to its very particular findings about 
corruption and developing countries.  
The ranking of countries in the CPI is also justified with the alarm function of the 
CPI: “The CPI itself rings the bell”, as a TI interviewee explained.39 TI sticks to the 
index because its prominence and high media coverage gives the national chapters a 
                                                 
36  TI (o) 
37 For such political consequences of media coverage of the CPI see for example De Maria (2008a) 
38  TI-S official 8 
39  TI-S official 8 
131 
 
floor for voicing their anticorruption message, and “that’s the main point for us. It’s 
how we’re telling people, do something here”; yet after that “you need to go deeper 
to look up this problem”. So far, the TI interviewee argued, “the moment to drop the 
index altogether” has not come for TI.40 Thus, while being aware of the negative ef-
fects of the CPI that reify colonial notions of civilisation and barbarism in developed 
and developing countries, TI continues constructing them for the sake of its leverage; 
the latter, as we will see in chapters 5 and 6, is quite important for the achievement 
of the Universal set out in IAC discourse. The construction of developing countries 
as more corrupt, in turn, provides the ground for international intervention.  
Distancing itself from TI’s often-criticised use of the CPI (and thus protecting itself 
against potential dislocations) the WB states that it is “undesirable to rigidly classify 
countries in any way” and emphasises that “no lists or rankings of countries is being 
considered”;41 yet the conviction that the corruption situation is worse in developing 
countries is still confirmed and re-articulated by the numerous examples presented 
by the WB to illustrate the damaging effects of corruption, which are almost exclu-
sively from developing countries. On its homepage we find examples of corruption 
in Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Uganda, Mexico, ‘African countries’ in general, 
Albania, Bulgaria and ‘several Asian countries’, and also Russia, Ukraine, Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania.42 Despite Kaufmann and Gray 
stating in a WB article that “survey responses suggest that Botswana and Chile have 
less bribery than many fully industrialized countries”,43 the predominant impression 
created by these many examples is that corruption is worse in developing countries 
than in developed ones.  
This is reiterated by statements in IAC discourse that even Western, developed coun-
tries are not immune to the perils of corruption. TI reminds us for example that 
“[e]ven industrialised countries cannot be complacent”44 and that “even where po-
litical, economic, legal and social institutions are well entrenched” (which is suppos-
                                                 
40  TI-S official 8 
41  WB (2007: v); see however WB (s) for an example of how the WB nevertheless ranks countries 
according to their extent of bribery. 
42  WB (d); WB (e); WB (f); WB (g) 
43  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1) 
44  TI (y) 
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edly the case in the West) corruption is to be found.45 Such statements take up wide-
spread assumptions that so-called ‘developed’ countries are generally better off in all 
areas of life than developing countries; despite stating that this is not the case when it 
comes to corruption, such assumptions are still confirmed through the articulation of 
these findings as extraordinary and as an exception to the commonly-known rule of 
their superiority. 
In sum, while articulations of the ubiquity of corruption and of its “significant trans-
national dimensions”46 render corruption an omnipresent hindrance and enable IAC 
discourse to call for “collective solutions”47 in chain AC (see chapter 5), the articula-
tion of developing countries as more corrupt constructs the hindrances to the Univer-
sal as particularly prominent there and prepares the ground for IAC interventions in 
the Global South (set out in chain AC). While IAC organisations deal with (poten-
tial) dislocations by directly defending themselves against them, the discourse how-
ever also features other logics that are potentially able to ‘cover over’ dislocations 
and contradictions.  
 
Attributes for severeness and danger of corruption 
PDHT draws our attention to the multiple ways in which hindrances or dangerous 
‘enemies’ to the Universal are constructed in hegemonic projects, amongst others 
through negative attributes. In IAC discourse we find numerous articulations of the 
dangerous and destructive character of corruption as equivalisations in chain C. Cor-
ruption is linked up with different verbs with a negative connotation that most of the 
time refer to all sorts of ‘good’ elements belonging to chain AC which it hinders, 
paralyses,48 distorts,49 damages, drains,50 worsens,51 deters,52 impedes,53 destroys, 
endangers, threatens,54 sabotages,55 kills,56 violates,57 severely affects,58 under-
                                                 
45  TI (2009e); see also TI (o) and WB (1997: 4) 
46  WB (1997: 4) 
47  TI (2008b: 5) 
48  TI (p) 
49  TI (p) 
50  TI (o) 
51  UNDP (2008d) 
52  TI (o) 
53  UNDP (2008d) 
54  UNDP (2008d) 
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mines,59 erodes,60 impairs,61 devastates,62 blocks,63 deteriorates,64 and fractures.65 
Apart from that, corruption is linked up with many negative attributes and concepts, 
including the “seriousness of the corruption problem” as well as the “harm” done by 
it,66 its “devastating effects”67 and its “disastrous consequences”.68 Corruption is 
“particularly concerning”, a “major concern”, a “serious” or “significant” “problem” 
or “challenge”, and it is “rampant”.69 It gets easily ‘aggravated’,70 provides for a 
“bleak outlook”71 and causes enormous “scandals”72 as well as ‘immense dam-
age’.73 It can even be lethal, and leads to a “vicious cycle”74 or a “corrosive cycle”.75 
Corruption is “harmful”,76 “costly”,77 “pervasive”,78 a “menace”,79 an “obstacle”,80 
a “crime”81 and a “threat”;82 it is “complex”, “deep-seated” and “not fully under-
stood” – tackling it is “not easy”.83 Corruption makes bad things ‘normal’.84  
                                                                                                                                         
While these signifiers have obtained their negative meaning in articulation in other 
discourses they are now equivalised with corruption in chain C, conveying its danger 
and imminence in what can be understood as fantasmatic logic. More precisely, what 
seems to be at work here is the ‘horrific dimension’ of fantasy that presents an obsta-
 
55  WB (h) 
56  UNDP (a) 
57 Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, in the foreword to the United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption, cited in UNDP (2008a: 1). 
58  WB (c) 
59  TI (o) 
60  TI (p) 
61  TI (2009f) 
62  TI (n) 
63  TI (y) 
64  TI (p) 
65  TI (2008b: 4) 
66  TI (2000: xxiv) 
67  TI (n) 
68  WB (2007: i-ii) 
69  TI (2009d; TI (2009c); TI (2009e); TI (2009b); TI (2009f); TI (2009b); TI (2009f); TI (o) 
70  TI (2009g) 
71  TI (2009g) 
72  TI (2009f) 
73  TI (a) 
74  TI (2009f) 
75  TI (y) 
76  WB (h) 
77  TI (p) 
78  TI (o) 
79  TI (p) 
80  WB (c), WB (h) 
81  UNDP (a) 
82  TI (2000: xv); TI (y) 
83  WB (1997: 5) 
84  TI (y) 
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cle as threatening and “foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable”.85 
Accordingly, Peter Eigen, the founder of TI, calls the “explosion of corruption the 
world has witnessed (...) one of the greatest challenges of our age”86 and argues that 
doing nothing against it is “simply not an option”, since in this case corruption will 
grow, becoming even more threatening.87  
In addition to these equivalisations, IAC discourse also displays a vast array of fig-
ures to demonstrate the enormous costs with which corruption burdens the world’s 
societies.88 For example, the UNDP states that the bribes paid each year are esti-
mated at US$1,000 billion, that corruption can cost a country 17% of its GDP, and 
that the volume of illicit financial flows from Africa during the period 1970-2008 
has been US$1.8 trillion.89 
These articulations of corruption as a threat in chain C provide justifications for con-
fronting it. Together with the constructions of corruption as a particular problem re-
viewed earlier they function as an important logic that enables the construction of the 
fight against corruption (as outlined in chain AC) as an important enterprise worth 
supporting.  
TI pairs this with articulations of corruption as ever-present and impossible to com-
pletely eradicate. It insists that “the potentially corrupt” as well as “the scourge of 
corruption will, to some degree or another, always be with us”.90 The fight against 
corruption is thus articulated, on the one hand, as an important and necessary one, 
and, on the other, as one that can never be entirely won. Strikingly, this provides an-
ticorruption institutions with an eternal mandate – which requires that the issue is 
“kept at the forefront of national and international attention even after the battle may 
appear to have been won”.91 This reasoning even allows IAC organisations to con-
cede that the fight against corruption has not been very successful so far, that “the 
world on average has not made sufficient progress on governance and corruption 
                                                 
85  Glynos/Howarth (2007: 147) 
86  TI (2000: xv) 
87  TI (2000; TI (h) 
88 See for example WB (c) and subtopics; UNDP (a) 
89  UNDP (a) 
90  TI (2000: xv, 1) 
91  TI (2000: 1) 
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control”92 and that “corruption may actually be increasing”.93 Instead of evidencing 
the failure of IAC activities so far, such statements serve to underline the necessity 
of supporting ongoing efforts against a mighty enemy who is unlikely to ever finally 
capitulate.  
 
Causes of corruption  
Our efforts to get closer to the particular conception of corruption constructed in IAC 
discourse are also helped by examining the range of signifiers that are articulated in 
causal or consequential relations of equivalence to corruption in chain C. In addition 
to specifying the meaning of corruption, however, the articulation of these concepts 
in equivalence to corruption also articulates these concepts as problematic, thus ex-
panding chain C. As we will see in the course of the empirical chapters, crucially, the 
articulation of these particular causes and consequences of corruption in chain C 
gives rise to the articulation of particular ways of fighting corruption in chain AC. 
IAC measures are designed to remedy what is articulated as the causes of corruption 
and thus hindrances to the Universal in chain C.  
Partly, these causes and consequences are negatively connoted concepts, such as 
poverty or conflict. Yet for the greater part they take the form of negations or ab-
sences of something good – the ‘absence of integrity’, for example, is mentioned as a 
cause and consequence of corruption.94 These articulations of contrariety point to 
things which are desirable and should be present and which as such belong to chain 
AC. However, they are discussed in this chapter since it is through their absence that 
corruption acquires its meaning as a threat to a good society. In the following sec-
tions I will first discuss the signifiers that are articulated as causes of corruption, and 
then those that are articulated as consequences of corruption.  
 
 
                                                 
92  WB (2007: 3) 
93  TI (2000: 1) 
94  TI (2009h: 2) 
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Permissiveness, opportunities, incentives 
The causes of corruption articulated as such in the form of equivalents in chain C of 
IAC discourse can be and often are grouped into the three categories of ‘opportuni-
ties’, ‘permissiveness’ and ‘additional economic incentives’ in the discourse.  
According to TI, “the risk of corruption exists as soon as there is opportunity”. This 
is redolent of Lord Acton’s quote that “[a]ll power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely”.95 Indeed, numerous IAC documents point out that “un-
fettered personal power” of bureaucrats and politicians provides opportunities for 
corruption.96 More specifically, wide discretion, the allowed range of individual 
judgment regarding different decisions, and monopoly, the exclusive decision-
making power over particular policy or administrative areas, are articulated as foster-
ing corruption.97 In turn, these problems are brought about or exacerbated by the 
“excessive role of government in the economy and business sector”,98 a large state in 
general,99 protected markets,100 privatisation policies,101 the emergence of new and 
still unregulated markets,102 too lax, poorly defined but also inefficiently restrictive 
or excessive rules,103 and the “level of political stability or instability of a coun-
try”.104  In addition, opportunity in the private sector itself can bring about corrup-
tion and concomitant problems. TI claims for example that some responsibility for 
the current financial crisis “lies with the poor regulation of financial markets, includ-
ing inadequate rules and lax regulators” allowing for private sector corruption.105  
                                                
Another important cause of corruption articulated in chain C is permissiveness. It is 
mainly constructed as the absence of desirable things, such as accountability,106 con-
 
95 The complete quote says “All power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great 
men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more 
when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse her-
esy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it” (Figgis/Laurence 1907: appendix p. 504). 
96  TI (d); see also UNDP (2004), TI (2000: xx), TI (h) 
97  UNDP (2008c: 9); Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2) 
98  TI (2009g); UNDP (2004: 3) 
99  UNDP (2004: 3) 
100  UNDP (2004: 3) 
101  TI (l) 
102  TI (2009i: 2); Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2); UNDP (2004: 3) 
103  TI (2000: xx), UNDP (2004), WB (2007: ii), Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1) 
104  UNDP (2004: 3) 
105  TI (2009h) 
106  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2); UNDP (2008c: 9) 
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trol and oversight,107 adequate punishment and transparency108 (which are located in 
chain AC) but is also articulated in relation to secrecy,109 obscurity, opacity,110 and 
impunity. More specifically, these permitting factors include obscurity-related signi-
fiers like obscure decision-making,111 or “tax havens”;112 signifiers related to the 
absence of oversight such as weak watchdog and political institutions;113 “[s]oft so-
cial control systems”114 for example in the form of a weak or ‘thin’ civil society115 
or high tolerance levels among citizens with regard to corruption;116 a restrictive en-
vironment for journalists and the media;117 and signifiers relating to the absence of 
punishment such as low or weak enforcement, prosecution or exposure,118 and mild 
or inadequate punishments,119 to mention but a few. The logic of permissiveness, as 
articulated in IAC discourse thus conveys that if people’s actions are not constantly 
exposed and then checked, and eventually punished by different actors, people will 
engage in corrupt practices in order to advance their own interests against those of 
the public. Permissiveness is articulated in direct contrariety to the concept of ac-
countability, which will be discussed in chapter 4.  
In addition to opportunities and permitting factors, the three organisations also 
equivalise other hindrances in chain C as causes of corruption which can be regarded 
as additional economic incentives which make the occurrence of corruption particu-
larly likely. These include factors that foster the so-called ‘supply-side’ of corrup-
tion, like natural resources,120 bribes from multinational companies,121 and increased 
levels of aid,122 but also factors such as economic need123 and social insecurity,124 
                                                 
107  UNDP (2008c: 10), Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2), UNDP (2004), TI (o) 
108  UNDP (2004 TI (c); TI (2009d), UNDP (2008c: 9) 
109  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2) 
110  TI (y)  
111  TI (o) 
112  TI (p); see also TI (y); TI (c), TI (c); TI (2009d) 
113  TI (2009e); Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2), TI (2009b); TI (o) 
114  UNDP (2004) 
115  TI (o); TI (2009b); WB (1997: 5) 
116  TI (2009g); UNDP (2004) 
117  TI (2009b); TI (2009e), TI (2009g), Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2) 
118  UNDP (2004: 2-3); Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2), WB (2007: 53), TI (d) 
119  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2); UNDP (2004: 2-3) 
120  UNDP (2004: 3); UNDP (2008c: 11); see also TI (c); TI (2009d; Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2) 
121  TI (o), WB (2007: 53) 
122  TI (l);  
123  TI (2008b: 2); see also Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2) 
124  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2); see also TI (2009d 
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inequalities in society125 low pay of public officials126 and un-meritocratic salary 
structures127 that enhance the so-called ‘demand side’. Also a slow or overly-
complicated bureaucratic system can be an incentive for bribery in the form of so-
called ‘speed-money’.128 
One might now wonder what to make of these articulations of opportunities, permis-
siveness and additional economic incentives as causes of corruption. Why exactly 
are these things articulated as causing this enormous problem that corruption is ac-
cording to IAC discourse, and not for example the lack of moral education, a sense 
of responsibility, or empathy? What is the logic that links them together? 
Below I show that an even closer look at the discursive logics of IAC discourse 
makes clear that these ‘causes of corruption’ can be better understood as different 
conditions which allow corruption to ‘thrive’ in the logic of IAC discourse, as de-
termining the likelihood of people succumbing to the temptation of corruption. This 
is because the constructions of these causes of corruption centre themselves on a 
very particular conception of human nature; this conception has already been identi-
fied by the critical IAC literature as an important component of the IAC agenda, but 
will, in this thesis, be shown to be the principal logic structuring IAC discourse. De-
spite not being explicitly articulated in IAC discourse as a cause of corruption, it 




That IAC discourse articulates human nature as the original source of corruption is 
not that extraordinary, at least not in the context of Western conceptions of corrup-
tion. Republican conceptions of corruption as a loss of civic virtue129 and the Marx-
ist conception of corruption as the corruption of proletarians by the tempting wealth 
                                                 
125  TI (o) 
126  TI (o); see also UNDP (2004: 2); UNDP (2008c: 9), Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 2) 
127  WB (2007: 49), UNDP (2004: 2); UNDP (2008c: 9) 
128  TI-S official 1 
129  Euben (1989) 
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of the bourgeoisie130 seem compatible with such articulations, given that they seem 
to construct corruption as arising from the weakness of human character. Crucially, 
however, IAC discourse indirectly articulates all people as universally and irre-
deemably predisposed to act corruptly; it is in the nature of all people to seek their 
self-interest regardless of whether they violate that of others in the process.  
The conception of self-interested human nature as the original source of corruption 
can be drawn out from the articulations of causes of corruption but is made even 
clearer by countless other articulations in chain C. Let us first examine these other 
articulations in more detail, before we can gain a better understanding of the so-
called causes of corruption. 
On the basis of TI documents, something like morality does not seem to be present 
in people. Whenever an opportunity to abuse public resources or trust for personal 
gain arises, accompanied by a comparably low risk of detection, people, regardless 
of their socio-cultural background, will take it. They are “as corrupt as the system 
allows them to be”131 and accordingly, “every society is as corrupt as its institutions 
and practices allow”.132 The more opportunities or incentives there are for corrup-
tion, the more likely it is that people will succumb to the temptation. TI stresses that 
if some countries are “less corrupt” than others, it is only due to their “more devel-
oped and stronger institutions and practices to control the menace”, rather than due 
to any “moral superiority”;133 consequently, as we will see in the analysis of chain 
AC, such institutions and practices play a central role in governing the good, un-
corrupt society as envisioned in IAC discourse. Establishing them is articulated as 
difficult (but at the same time all the more necessary); as the TI Source Book re-
marks replete with fatalism, “[t]here seems to be no end to human ingenuity when it 
comes to circumventing systems designed to protect the integrity of institutions and 
processes”,134 which is why “[t]emptation remains a challenge anywhere”.135 Thus, 
human nature seems to be articulated in chain C as extremely easily corruptible and 
                                                 
130  Mayer (1993): Marx, Lenin and the Corruption of the Working Class 
131  TI (o) 
132  TI (p) 
133  TI (p); see also TI (o) 
134  TI (2000: xviii) 
135  TI (o) 
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thus fundamentally and universally problematic, and human behaviour is articulated 
as a function of external conditions which form incentive structures.  
Interestingly, several TI interviewees exhibited different views on human nature, 
which did not always seem to conform to the purely egoistic actor model set out in 
TI documents and thus seemed to contest this construction in chain C. One TI offi-
cial stated “I wouldn’t say that everybody would be equally corrupt” and expected 
differences, depending on “how people are socialized, and the way it’s actually im-
bued in the education in the very beginning”.136 Another interviewee was of the 
opinion that, if people were conceived as self-interested individuals who behave ac-
cording to incentives, this “misses out the whole ethical foundation – which is a bit 
strange, and I don’t think we’ve been very consistent”.137 Yet surprisingly, the same 
interviewees would a couple of sentences later resort to talking about human behav-
iour in terms of incentives and the “greedy individual interest (...) which every single 
person has”,138 thus demonstrating how deeply the logic of the rational self-
interested actor is embedded in the NGO, its operational culture and its staff’s think-
ing.  
In this respect one TI interviewee presented an interesting ‘theory of the human be-
ing’, which s/he had heard about, according to which people can be put into different 
groups: 25 percent are “absolutely honest”, 25 percent are “totally selfish” and cor-
rupt, and nothing can be done to change them. But the 50 percent of people in the 
middle are malleable and should be worked on – via incentives: “If you create the 
conditions and the environment and the correct incentives for them to behave to-
wards the law and not against it that can really make a difference”.139 Another TI 
interviewee nevertheless explained to me that conceiving corrupt behaviour in terms 
of incentives rather than individual or social morality, and to “talk about systems and 
structures, not about people”, is a tactical move by TI which does not really mean 
“that people cannot be blamed because it’s all structural”. Instead, “human agency is 
completely acknowledged as a (...) component of anticorruption”.140  
                                                 
136  TI-S official 1 
137  TI-S official 2 
138  TI-S official 5 
139  TI-S official 5 
140  TI-S official 6 
141 
 
Overall, whether tactical or not, the contestations revealed in the interviews of the 
rational actor model were only minor and did not indicate any dislocations to the of-
ficial discourse and to the constitution of chain C. While some TI members appar-
ently believe that some people are more corrupt than others, an investigation into the 
question of why some people might not feel tempted to try and ‘beat the system’ 
does not seem to be of interest to the organisation and is thus excluded from the dis-
course; instead, corruptness or non-corruptness are articulated almost as inalterable 
genetic conditions.141 The consequence is that despite minor contestations within 
chain C, TI’s work remains centred on a conception of human beings as naturally 
inclined to be corrupt.  
Although WB and UNDP anticorruption documents do not make their conception of 
human nature as evident as TI documents, a similar perspective is easy to recognise. 
A WB article on corruption uses “a framework based on the incentives for opportun-
istic behavior by public officials” and assumes that public officials will chose or ac-
cept corruption if the expected gains exceed the expected costs of undertaking a cor-
rupt act, reiterating TI’s articulation of human beings as rational and self-
interested.142 Also the WB constructs people as universally so, stating for example 
that “[c]orruption is widespread in developing and transition countries, not because 
their people are different from people elsewhere but because conditions are ripe for 
it”.143  
However, things are not that simple in the WB discourse either. In a WB article, 
Shah and Huther note that some public officials “may be motivated, in part, by a de-
sire to perform civic duties or a desire to help others”,144 which contests the rational 
self-interested actor model. Yet, the authors also assume that in developing countries 
the incentives to act corruptly are usually stronger145 and thus override people’s val-
ues of social responsibility. A WB interviewee answered the question whether s/he 
                                                 
141  TI-S official 5 
142  Shah/Huther (2000). The authors even provide a mathematical formula for their reasoning: E[B] = 
nxE[G] - prob [P] x [P] > 0 (E is the expectations operator, n is number of corrupt transactions, G is 
the gain from the corrupt transaction, prob [P] is the probability of paying a penalty, and P is the 
penalty for the corrupt activity).  
143  Broadman/Recanatini (2000); One of the authors of this World Bank paper, Daniel Kaufmann, 
was formerly director of the World Bank Institute, where he led the work on governance and anti-
corruption. 
144  Shah/Huther (2000) 
145  Shah/Huther (2000) 
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thinks that people follow mainly material incentives in their behaviour with “yes, 
I’m an economist [...] I’m cynical”. However, even in this interviewee’s view human 
behaviour also seemed to be somehow related to the social environment; s/he be-
lieved that not being corrupt is “very difficult when everybody else is doing it”.146 
Yet overall, while “up to a point”, human beings follow particular norms, while 
“there is a part of human behaviour that is not necessarily explainable with incen-
tives”, and while people “might have very high moral standards”, in the end mone-
tary incentives decide their behaviour. “There are some good souls”, but these people 
are “very few, maybe a handful of people, you know like Ghandi, Martin Luther 
King”. These statements show that the rational self-interested actor model is not 
completely uncontested in the WB discourse either, but also that external incentives 
are articulated as ultimately decisive for most people’s behaviour. 
While TI interviewees justified their attachment to the rational actor model as a tac-
tical move, WB interviewees explain this with reference to the WB’s organisational 
structures. One WB official was convinced that “people’s perceptions of what is ac-
ceptable matter hugely to how much corruption goes on”, but that it is not possible 
for the WB to work with a conception of corruption that takes this into account.147 
Similarly, another WB interviewee conceded that the mechanistic conception of hu-
man nature inherent in IAC efforts at the WB is a problem and contributes to their 
failure; yet, s/he also held fatalistically that nothing can be done about it. While, ac-
cording to the interviewee, corrupt behaviour may well be “the product of a culture 
in which it might be absolutely legitimate to reward your immediate family mem-
bers”, s/he remarked that “that’s a level of anthropological and philosophical reflec-
tion that doesn’t fit into a cost-benefit calculus on an excel spreadsheet” as the WB 
prefers. Big bureaucracies like the WB system “have to see people as midgets in a 
big production” and “can only understand mechanistic behaviour”.148 Thus, while 
partly, the social and cultural construction of corruption, norms and people’s behav-
iour is acknowledged, once again, there is no attempt by WB staff to modify the 
overall discursive logic according to these contestations of the rational actor model. 
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This keeps chain C rather coherent, centring on a conception of human nature ac-
cording to which “each of us has a price. It all depends on the price”.149 
The UNDP’s discourse is no exception to this. It draws on Robert Klitgaard, “a lead-
ing expert in this field”, and his “hugely influential, although not undisputed”150 cor-
ruption formula in order to explain corrupt behaviour.151 Based on rational choice 
assumptions, as discussed in chapter 1, Klitgaard identifies the causes of corruption 
as “monopoly control of public officials wielding discretionary powers in the ab-
sence of accountability systems”, resulting in C (Corruption) = M (Monopoly) + D 
(Discretion) – A (Accountability).152 As we can see from the formula, neither an in-
dividual’s moral values nor the socio-cultural processes of their formation in society 
play a role in this kind of thinking. In one of its more recent documents the UNDP 
has argued that – next to accountability – integrity and transparency are also impor-
tant to balance monopoly and discretion, and has thus amended the formula to Cor-
ruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) – (Accountability + Integrity + Transparency).153 
The inclusion of the concept of integrity could mean a modification of the rational 
actor model towards one that takes people’s values or social norms into account and 
thus reflect a re-articulation of chain C; yet such a reading is contradicted by the 
UNDP’s explanation that a “rational official” will balance the expected benefits from 
corruption against the expected costs. If the former outweigh the latter, the official 
will use his/her powers of office to create “concentrated gains for the private partner 
beyond those he/she could earn without state intervention”.154 This makes the con-
ception of human beings as rational and self-interested particularly clear, and as we 
will see in more detail in chapter 4, the concept of ‘integrity’, much like ‘ethics’ reit-
erates constructions of human beings as rational, self-interested actors.  
We can sum up this discussion by concluding that chain C of IAC discourse articu-
lates the irredeemable self-interest of rational human beings relatively coherently as 
the original source of corruption. As we have seen, there are certain contestations of 
this conception of human nature by staff of each of the three organisations, with no 
                                                 
149  WB official 4; Brown/Cloke (2004: e.g. 287) have come to similar conclusions, while Williams 
(1999) has shown the dominance of the concept of homo oeconomicus in the WB in general.  
150  UNDP (2008c: 9) 
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distinct organisation-related pattern being recognisable. While these contestations 
indicate that the consensus is not absolutely complete and that chain C is not com-
pletely consistent, overall these contestations do not seem to be translated into no-
ticeable dislocations of the discourse. Corruption is specified as corrupt behaviour, 
and it is relatively consistently equivalised with human self-interest which in turn, is 
constructed as a natural and unchangeable human character trait. However, as we 
will see later on in this chapter, interestingly, this equivalisation of human nature in 
chain C does not necessarily lead to an articulation of subject positions for all people 
as equivalents to corruption in chain C. 
Against the background of this conception of human nature, the assemblage of 
causes of corruption presented above now becomes much more intelligible. While 
‘inclination’ towards corruption is articulated as always existing in human beings 
already, ‘opportunities’, ‘permissiveness’ and ‘additional economic incentives’ will 
determine whether corruption does or does not happen, and whether the public inter-
est will or will not be abused for private gain. Imagine, for example, a rational, self-
interested public official: The power to decide on the allocation of money or services 
provides him/her with opportunities for corruption. If in addition to that s/he carries 
out transactions involving people either willing or needing to pay a bribe, thus pro-
viding an incentive for corruption, the likelihood of corruption to happen increases. 
If the transactions now happen in a permissive environment with low or no risk of 
detection and punishment, the public official will abuse his/her power for his/her 
own gain, i.e. the corrupt act is bound to take place, mechanistically. We can recog-
nise that the causes of corruption as articulated in IAC discourse are in fact struc-
tured quite coherently along what I call the ‘rational actor logic’, functioning as con-
ditions or incentives that influence the behaviour of the self-interested individual. 
However, based on this conception of human nature, the three categories of causes of 
corruption articulated in chain C not only specify the meaning of corruption but si-
multaneously, serve to construct as inadequate any societal system that is permissive 
(in the sense of not featuring efficient controls and heavy punishments), that allows 
its public officials and politicians a great amount of discretion, and that does not 
make sure to minimise additional economic incentives for corruption. Together with 
the articulations of corruption as a dangerous enemy discussed above, these articula-
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tions thus construct such systems as highly problematic and as hindrances to the 
Universal.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that the conception of human nature as naturally in-
clined to corruption serves still another particular strategic purpose in IAC dis-
course.155 As we have seen earlier, IAC organisations are quite eager to defend 
themselves against accusations of Western cultural imperialism.156 Larmour remarks 
in this respect that TI has from its beginning been “keen to deflate what it saw as 
Western claims to moral superiority in matters of corruption”.157 Articulating people 
all over the world as equally corrupt allows IAC discourse to deal with dislocations 
arising from charges of practising Western-centric moralisation or advancing any-
thing that could be interpreted as ‘Western values’. Yet, this does not eliminate 
Western-centricity from IAC discourse, as we will see in greater detail further in the 
thesis. Instead of claiming Western moral superiority IAC discourse insists that de-
veloping countries are more corrupt only because they do not set the right incentives 
and that Western liberal political systems (featuring better incentives) are only better 
equipped to achieve the ‘good’ organisation of society because Western experts 
know better how to deal with human nature. After all, corruption is a “symptom of 
unresolved governance problems, resulting from incompetence in the process of 
building an effective and accountable state (OECD 2006)”.158 This remedying of one 
universalism (‘Western people and culture are better’) with another (‘all people are 
naturally inclined to be corrupt’) of course does not solve the problem of Western 
cultural imperialism. The rational actor model structuring IAC discourse is clearly 
reflective of the liberal conception of human nature as rational and self-interested 
discussed in chapter 1 and thus must be regarded as the product of Western history 
and liberal political thinking. The same is valid for the (scientific/political) ideas 
about how this human nature can be ‘tamed’ and made to work for the public inter-
est. As will become clear in the following chapters these ideas drive IAC policies 
towards a particular liberal re-organisation of societies. 
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This reveals the great importance of constructions of human nature and the respec-
tive causes of corruption just discussed for understanding the structures of IAC dis-
course. The analytical focus on the two chains of equivalences taken in this thesis 
allows showing how both chains depend on and support each other, while each ful-
fils a distinct function.  
 
Social, political and economic consequences of corruption 
Chain C is further expanded by numerous negative consequences of corruption, and 
examining these is equally interesting since it is through these equivalents that the 
image of a corrupt society is constructed in IAC discourse.  
The status of society that results from corruption constitutes the very reason why the 
IAC project is necessary and stands in direct contrariety to the Universal that IAC 
discourse attempts to create. By condemning the corrupt society, IAC discourse not 
only articulates corruption as having terrible social, political and economic conse-
quences; by being equivalised with corruption, also the respective signifiers are con-
structed as problematic and as hindrances to the Universal. Through this simultane-
ous operation chain C not only works towards enhancing the desirability of fighting 
corruption, but it also prepares the ground for a particular Universal that claims to 
overcome all the deficits of corrupt societies so articulated, providing the reasons for 
its specific measures.  
 
Poverty and the absence of development 
Poverty forms a primary nodal point in chain C; the creation or aggravation of pov-
erty is articulated in the discourse of all three organisations as a particularly serious 
consequence of corruption.159 The WB even identifies corruption as “the greatest 
obstacle...to reducing poverty”.160 It is particularly frequently portrayed as affecting 
‘the poor’ (sometimes also the vulnerable, marginalised161 and disadvantaged162) 
                                                 
159  UNDP (2008d); UNDP (2008a: 6); UNDP (2008c: 11); UNDP (a); TI (o); TI (h); TI (p); TI 
(2008b); TI (k) 
160  WB (c) 
161  UNDP (a); WB (2007: i-ii); TI (2008b: 2) 
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particularly severely.163 Corruption for example “saps the resources of poor people 
by forcing them to offer bribes in exchange for access to basic goods and services — 
many of which may be ‘free’ by law”.164 Thus, the poor resort to corruption as a 
“survival strategy” or in order to go to school, get a job, buy a house, get healthcare, 
vote or “simply participate in their societies”.165 Apart from such direct extractions 
of bribes, IAC discourse explicitly articulates many more indirect consequential rela-
tions between corruption and poverty. However, poverty is a fuzzy concept the 
meaning of which oscillates between the common understanding of it as economic 
poverty (lack of money and, consequently, food, housing, insurance etc.) and a 
broader meaning of poverty as also encompassing social and political exclusion. TI 
and the WB for example argue that, in accordance with the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), “poverty is about more than inadequate income”;166 namely it 
also concerns a lack of access to public services, of voice and representation, of basic 
civil rights, of opportunities or empowerment in general and of human develop-
ment.167 In any case IAC discourse articulates “the level of poverty that still prevails 
in the world as unacceptably high”.168 
Moreover, the exact link between poverty and corruption is not articulated very co-
herently. While the WB states that “[c]orruption and poverty are linked through 
many indirect channels”,169 TI stresses that corruption is both “a cause and a conse-
quence of poverty”170 as well as a “barrier to overcoming it”,171 and that the “fight 
against poverty and corruption is only sustainable and successful when the two phe-
nomena are addressed together”.172 The UNDP explains that corruption’s correlation 
with poverty does not necessarily mean that corruption causes poverty, but that “cor-
ruption and poverty go hand in hand”.173 It explains that corruption causes poverty 
by reducing economic growth and worsening inequality, while at the same time re-
                                                                                                                                          
162  UNDP (2004); TI (y); WB (d); TI (e) 
163  WB (c); see also UNDP (2008d) 
164  TI (2008b: 3); TI (k); TI (k) 
165  TI (2008b: 3); WB (d); TI (k) 
166  WB (d) 
167  WB (d); TI (2008b: 2) 
168  TI (2008a: 2) 
169  WB (d) 
170  TI (2008b: 2) 
171  TI (o) 
172  TI (2008b: 3) 
173  UNDP (2008c: 12)  
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ducing governments’ capacity to respond to people’s needs. Poverty, in turn, is por-
trayed as reinforcing corruption.174 So while its actual meaning is not entirely clear, 
poverty nevertheless functions as an important hindrance to the Universal in chain C, 
underlining the necessity to fight corruption.  
However, the creation or aggravation of poverty is by no means the only negative 
consequence of corruption according to IAC discourse. Again, while some conse-
quences of corruption are articulated as actual hindrances to the Universal in them-
selves, such as poverty, many of the consequences of corruption appear in the form 
of absences or subversions of ‘desirable concepts’. As such, the latter are part of 
chain AC and will be discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. The articulations of their ab-
sences however belong to chain C which embodies the hindrances to the Universal; 
they symbolise the lack of the Universal and at the same time contribute to its con-
struction by pointing to desirable signifiers in chain AC.  
In this respect, chain C articulates the negative consequences of corruption on ‘de-
velopment’ particularly prominently.175 For example, the UNDP identifies corrup-
tion as “one of the biggest impediments to the world's efforts to reach the Millen-
nium Development Goals” and appeals “Don’t Let Corruption Kill Development”.176 
While corruption is articulated as enhancing poverty by inhibiting development, it is 
also articulated as inhibiting development by enhancing poverty and also by having 
all sorts of other negative effects, the relations of which to development and poverty 
are often not entirely clarified.  
Most of the following, more specific consequences of corruption, are articulated as 
damaging development or enhancing poverty in one way or another; these equivali-
sations reveal in interesting ways the political, social and economic constitution of 
the corrupt and thus highly problematic societies that the fight against corruption 
aims to improve, and at the same time serve to picture the magnitude of the threat 
that corruption poses, thus further developing the horrific fantasmatic logic referred 
to above.  
 
                                                 
174  UNDP (2008a: 1) 
175 See for example UNDP (a); WB (2007: i-ii); see also WB (2007: i-ii); TI (l) 
176  UNDP (a); see also UNDP (2008d); WB (h); TI (2008b) 
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Malfunctioning political processes and institutions, social consequences 
Corruption is articulated as causing different malfunctions of political institutions 
and processes, which in turn have negative social consequences. For example, in the 
judicial area, corruption leads to violations of the constitution and of human 
rights,177 it undermines the rule of law,178 breeds impunity179 and creates uncertainty 
and unpredictability for those who seek recourse to justice.180  
An important consequence of corruption with regards to the state is that it weakens 
political institutions,181 limits their efficiency,182 and reduces the state’s governance 
capacities in general.183 In doing so it skews decision-making, budgeting and im-
plementation processes, thereby affecting development initiatives, denying participa-
tion to citizens and limiting their access to political and economic decision-
making.184 This hurts the public interest185 and fosters an undemocratic environ-
ment.186 The latter is highlighted particularly by TI and the UNDP who accuse cor-
ruption of ‘striking at the heart of democracy’.187 
                                                
In the social sector, corruption denies citizens’ access to state services,188 increases 
the price of those services189 and lowers their quality,190 but in particular leads to a 
neglect of the poor’s basic needs.191 All three organisations denounce corruption as 
decreasing government revenues,192 increasing the costs of government procure-
ment,193 wasting or diverting state resources194 and aid195 and thus decreasing the 
 
177  TI (2009f); TI (2008b); UNDP (2004); UNDP (2008b); WB (d) 
178  UNDP (a); UNDP (2008a: 8); WB (d) 
179  TI (2009b; UNDP (2004: 2-3) 
180  UNDP (2004; TI (y); WB (d) 
181  UNDP (2008a: 2) 
182  WB (d); see also TI (2008b: 3) 
183  UNDP (2008a: 2) 
184  TI (2008b); UNDP (a), UNDP (2008a: 2) 
185  TI-S official 2 
186  UNDP (a); UNDP (2008a: 1); TI (2000: xv) 
187  UNDP (a); see also TI (o); TI (a), see also UNDP (2008b: 15). The WB, the ‘non-political’ man-
date of which does not allow mention of democracy, chooses to stick to more technically sounding 
terms like governance and accountability. 
188  UNDP (2008d); WB (d); UNDP (a); WB (2007: i-ii) 
189  UNDP (2008c: 11); WB (d) 
190  UNDP (2008a: 2); UNDP (2008c: 11); WB (d); TI (h) 
191  TI (h); TI (k); TI (2008b: 2); WB (c) 
192  UNDP (2004) 
193  TI (h) 
194  TI (h); TI (r); UNDP (2004); UNDP (2008a); WB (t); WB (2007; UNDP (a); UNDP (2008d); TI 
(r); UNDP (2008c: 11); WB (d); TI (k) 
195  UNDP (a); TI (l); TI (r); TI (2008b: 2); TI (k) 
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capacity of the state to provide services, such as the building of schools, hospitals, 
roads and water treatment facilities.196 Corruption also leads to the dumping of fake 
or substandard medicines on the market,197 and to hazardous waste being dumped in 
landfill sites and in oceans.198  
Both the undemocratic consequences of corruption and its tendency to infringe upon 
state service provision lead to social and economic inequalities,199 poverty, social 
cleavages, fractured communities, the marginalization of groups of citizens from so-
ciety,200 and the decline of moral values and disrespect for authority in society.201 
This in turn is regarded as undermining the state’s credibility and effectiveness;202 it 
erodes public confidence, corrodes citizens’ trust in their political leaders and institu-
tions, and deteriorates the legitimacy of governments as well as the whole state and 
its institutions.203 These effects are articulated as particularly dangerous since “large 
numbers of people in emerging democracies might become disillusioned with the 
democratic form of government and start to yearn for times of greater certainty”.204 
In new democracies, this lack of legitimacy will either cause “cynicism and apathy 
on the part of citizens” or, if things get worse, lead to the “questioning of the entire 
political system”.205  
Consequently, insecurity and instability figure among the major consequences of 
corruption articulated in chain C. The UNDP explains that corruption “contributes to 
instability”206 and “may play a key role in fomenting and prolonging conflicts, lead-
ing to an unstable and failed state”.207 This is because the disillusionment of citizens 
caused by corruption in the ways described above leads them to revolt against or ig-
nore the state, causing political unrest, instability208 and “ungovernability”,209 inse-
                                                 
196  UNDP (a) 
197  UNDP (a) 
198  UNDP (a) 
199  TI (2008b: 2); UNDP (2008a: 7); WB (d);  TI (l) 
200  TI (2008b: 3) 
201  TI (2009f); TI (2008b; UNDP (2004); UNDP (2008b); WB (d) 
202  TI (2008b 
203  TI (p); TI (f); TI (2000); Broadman/Recanatini (2000); WB (1997: 5); TI-S official 2; UNDP (a); 
UNDP (2008c: 12); WB (d) 
204  TI (2000: xv) 
205  TI (f) 
206  UNDP (a) 
207  UNDP (2008a: 8) 
208  UNDP (a); UNDP (2008c: 11); TI (o); UNDP (2008a: 1) 
209  TI (2008b) 
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curity, conflict, civil war210 and state failure.211 This endangers the development and 
existence of states as a whole and can even lead to death and violent conflict.212  
In sum, IAC discourse conveys that corruption’s damaging effects on democracy, 
equality and public service provision (and to a limited extent legal justice) ultimately 
have the worst possible consequence; corruption submerses societies into chaos and 
ungovernability.  
 
Economic malfunctions and failures in politico-economic relations  
Corruption is also articulated in equivalence to different negative outcomes in the 
realm of economics and politico-economic relations. TI, the WB and the UNDP 
agree that corruption imposes enormous economic costs on society,213 and that this 
has further negative consequences.  
The rationale is that corruption in the public sector promotes excessive and ineffi-
cient spending,214 wastes scarce resources and development aid215 and diverts in-
vestments from infrastructure, environmental protection, institutions and social ser-
vices towards unnecessary ‘white elephant’ projects.216 This not only disadvantages 
the poor, but it also increases a country’s debt burden and depletes national 
wealth.217 Here and there, references to the effect of corruption as deepening eco-
nomic inequalities are found,218 usually without an explanation as to why this is 
problematic or as to how much inequality is tolerable.  
In the private sector, public-private corruption impedes sustainable economic 
growth219 because it raises transaction costs and uncertainty220 and thus limits a 
                                                 
210  UNDP (2008a) 
211  UNDP (a) 
212  TI (o); TI (2009f); TI (2009d); TI (2009f); UNDP (2008c: 11) 
213  Broadman/Recanatini (2000); TI (h); TI (2000); TI (2000); TI (o); TI (h); UNDP (a); UNDP 
(2008d 
214  WB (d) 
215  TI (h); TI (r); UNDP (2004: 4) 
216  UNDP (2008a: 1); Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1); UNDP (2008d) 
217  TI (o); TI (p) 
218  WB (2000: 6); WB (d); TI (o); UNDP (2008a); TI (2008b) 
219  TI (2008b: 2), UNDP (2008c: 11); UNDP (2008a: 2); WB (2007: i-ii); WB (d) 
220  UNDP (2008a); Broadman/Recanatini (2000) 
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“country’s ability to attract investment”.221 It reduces growth through losses of time, 
and through maintaining high company costs and low economic output,222 imposes a 
regressive tax on small enterprises223 and thus decreases not only private profits but 
also government revenues.224 Corruption also damages economic growth by distort-
ing market principles, mainly through the purchase of monopoly rights to the detri-
ment of competition, leading to inefficiencies.225 TI argues that such a “market in 
sleaze” which is no longer ruled by “the arms-length pricing of goods and services” 
is “unlikely to produce what it should for the benefit of the wider community”.226 
Furthermore, the WB warns that corruption contributes to “financial and economic 
collapse, public alienation, and even violence and failed states”.227  
TI, which out of the three IAC organisations is particularly concerned with private 
sector corruption, points out that corruption can also intensify certain dangers that 
are inherent to the market.228 It claims that accounting fraud and other forms of pri-
vate sector corruption can cause sudden economic collapses.229 Yet also the WB 
warns that “obscure insider lending practices and improper financial schemes” can 
contribute to macroeconomic crises.230  
The main consequence of corruption that IAC discourse articulates here is obviously 
that it inhibits the efficient functioning of the economy and the public sector for sta-
ble economic development. Corruption in the public and the private sector renders 
the private sector unable to produce the desired level of economic growth. If the pri-
vate sector does not generate wealth, this also infringes upon the revenues of the 
public sector and will necessarily exacerbate the problem of the lack of state services 
and therefore create a security problem. What is more, these consequences can even 
lead to a collapse of the economy which again can lead the state on a whole to fail. 
                                                 
221  WB (d); TI (p); UNDP (2008a) 
222  TI (2009h) 
223  Broadman/Recanatini (2000); UNDP (2008c: 11) 
224  UNDP (2004); WB (d); WB (f); Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1) 
225  TI (o); TI (2000); TI (2009i: 1); TI (h); Broadman/Recanatini (2000); UNDP (a); UNDP (2008a: 
7) 
226  TI (2000: xxvi) 
227  WB (2007: i-ii) 
228  TI (2009h) 
229  TI (2009h: 5) 
230  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1) 
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In sum, although the WB seems to be less concerned with corruption’s consequences 
in the political realm than TI and the UNDP (which is likely due to its alleged non-
political mandate), the three organisations still share a rather strong consensus on the 
damaging consequences of corruption. All these rather consensual articulations of 
corruption’s appalling consequences seem to articulate corruption as endangering 
everything that is necessary for a good life. Corruption symbolises all the bad things 
which hinder the good things, as a TI interviewee confirmed.231 The signifiers pov-
erty and the absence of development concentrate all these equivalisations of power-
ful hindrances to the Universal in chain C. While poverty functions as the opposite 
of that good life, and while development fulfils an important function in signifying 
that life, both highlight the importance of fighting corruption. 
However, a closer look reveals that IAC discourse stresses two main causal explana-
tions for exactly how corruption committed by self-interested actors harms societies: 
On the one hand, corruption creates inefficiencies in the private sector. Such ineffi-
ciencies come about through the lack or distortion of market principles like competi-
tion and efficiency, thus they are negative because they hinder economic growth. 
This affects the economic capacity, development and the wealth of the country in 
general (which is problematic), but it also causes a lack of state revenues which is 
seen to affect particularly poor people who are dependent on state services and there-
fore vulnerable to an increase in their cost and/or a deterioration of their quality. This 
increases poverty and is capable of affecting the stability of a country. In the public 
sector, on the other hand, the self-interest of those in government leads them to set 
incorrect priorities for spending state money. By putting money that is supposed to 
benefit their fellow citizens (and especially ‘the poor’) into their own pockets or 
spending it on unnecessary prestige projects, they foster economic, political and so-
cial inequality and exclusion. This is articulated not only as undemocratic and unjust 
but also as a threat to stability. 
Thus, these articulations of consequences not only shape the meaning of corruption 
as a hindrance to the Universal and scale up its significance as an enemy even fur-
ther, but simultaneously serve to construct the ‘endangered’ society as desirable; the 
                                                 
231 The interviewee told me “I like the way you put it” after I had asked towards the end of an inter-
view whether that all meant that corruption was something like the bad thing that hinders all the 
good things (TI-S official 2). 
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logic of consequences of corruption in chain C conveys that corruption needs to be 
combated because it has all those damaging consequences. Thus, this analysis of 
constructions of the enemy in chain C already allows us to see a particular antagonis-
tic division of the discursive space emerging (stratagem II, the main political logic), 
and also to get a glimpse of the social logics structuring the Universal pursued in 
IAC discourse; this is possible despite the fact that we have not yet investigated the 
‘‘hegemonic chain’’, which would allow us to discern the equivalisation of differen-
tial claims oriented towards the Universal (stratagem I). This demonstrates how 
closely interrelated the construction of both chains of equivalence is in IAC dis-
course.  
Together with the definitions and the causes of corruption discussed above, these 
articulations of negative consequences point to a society that is stable, wealthy, 
peaceful, just, democratic, and safe; a society in which the state takes care of its citi-
zens, in which the poor are provided for by state services (at least to a certain extent) 
and where poverty is reduced (at least to a certain extent), and where there is equality 
(at least to a certain extent). It is a society where public and private sphere are sepa-
rated, where money is efficiently spent, where the state and its institutions function 
effectively, where markets are well-regulated and free, where the economy is con-
stantly growing and providing the state with revenues, and where international aid 
effectively helps development. What emerges is a society in which citizens are in-
cluded and participate, are engaged and believe in democracy, respect their govern-
ments and trust in them, and where the right moral values are in place and are given 
importance; but also a society where opportunities and incentives for corruption are 
minimised, and where people’s actions are made transparent, controlled and eventu-
ally punished if they happen to damage the public interest.  
This is the kind of good, uncorrupted society and the kind of public interest that 
these articulations of the consequences of corruption in chain C sketch out. It re-
mains a relatively vague picture, and the analysis of chain AC, which sets out the 
Universal pursued in the fight against corruption and the ways in which it is pursued, 
should not be prejudged, as the two chains need not necessarily be entirely consis-
tent. Nonetheless, and without having examined any articulations of actual anticor-
ruption measures in IAC discourse yet, we are already able to tell that the Universal 
pursued in the fight against corruption seems to be a market-liberal democracy with 
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participatory elements and social security systems that foster economic welfare, so-
cial cohesion and civic engagement and responsibility, but that also exerts a consid-
erable amount of control over the actions of its citizens.  
 
Subject positions 
If we want to know more about the ‘enemy’ constructed in IAC discourse, looking at 
the subject positions that are articulated as corrupt in chain C is particularly interest-
ing. As mentioned in chapter 2, the construction of an ‘antagonistic chain’ usually 
also involves the institution of subject positions as equivalents in that chain.  
Following the argument of Laclau and Mouffe,232  that social identity relies on that 
which it is not, the setting up of some subject positions in C might serve to define 
and strengthen the identity of the subject positions in chain AC, i.e. those that sup-
port the fight against corruption. However, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, all 
people are articulated as being equally inclined to corruption. In fact, apart from the 
articulation of human nature as naturally corrupt, also many other very general sub-
ject positions appear in chain C. Public servants are certainly at the forefront of the 
corrupt subject positions,233 but politicians234 or high public officials235 are also seen 
as engaging in grand corruption. Indeed, they are often aided by Northern corpora-
tions which pay “bribes around the world”,236 protected by “governments of the 
North”.237 Next to them, donors,238 trade unions,239 lobbyists240 and business peo-
ple241, for example “rogue employees” and managers “abusing the power that share-
holders have granted them”,242 are constructed as perpetrators of corruption. Apart 
from these subject positions in governments and the private sector, citizens in gener-
al243 and more specifically voters244 and poor people are also articulated as corrupt. 
                                                 
232  Laclau/Mouffe (2001[1985]) 
233  TI (q); TI (2000: xix) 
234  TI (l) 
235  TI (p) 
236  TI (p) 
237  TI (o) 
238  TI (l) 
239  TI (b) 
240  TI (c) 
241  TI (l) 
242  TI (2009h: 2) 
243  TI (2008b: 3) 
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In addition to this, and in accordance with the aforementioned articulations that cor-
ruption is worse in developing countries, there is a tendency in IAC discourse to ar-
ticulate specific corrupt subject positions for people from developing countries,245 
while Western subject positions are more frequently mentioned as only hindering the 
curing of the lack of the Universal by anticorruption efforts.246 Yet overall, all these 
articulations of subject positions in chain C serve to construct every one of us as a 
potential enemy, as inclined to endanger or destroy the Universal. 
While this certainly serves to deepen the antagonism between corruption on the one 
hand and the realisation of the Universal on the other, and to emphasise the impor-
tance of the fight against corruption, IAC discourse however seems to face a serious 
challenge. If every possible subject position was part of this enormous mass of ene-
mies, crucially, no one would be left to support the fight against corruption and bring 
about the Universal in chain AC. Yet, as we will see, IAC discourse is more compli-
cated and aptly prevents this from happening; through a series of discursive moves it 
avoids such a potential stalemate and re-articulates the mass of potentially corrupt 
subject positions into chain AC on the whole as supporters of the fight against cor-
ruption.  
This occurs because in IAC discourse, the articulation of all humans as equally prone 
to corruption simultaneously serves as a kind of absolution for everyone. In line with 
and supported by liberal political thought, people are not to blame for the self-
interest that is found in their nature.247 The resulting absolution for corrupt behav-
iour occurs in a number of ways. On the one hand the corrupt actions by different 
subject positions are re-articulated as a necessity. In the case of the poor for example 
corruption is “a survival strategy”,248 which makes them victims of corruption rather 
than perpetrators. Similarly, businesses ‘must pay’ and ‘have to pay’ bribes “to win 
or retain business”;249 thus, it is due to external incentives that they have no choice 
                                                                                                                                          
244  TI (e) 
245 See for example TI’s CPI 2009 Regional Highlights documents which articulate corrupt subject 
positions in developing countries (like the President of Niger, or the Azerbaijani society) much 
more clearly than in developed ones (TI 2009b; TI 2009c; TI 2009d; TI 2009e; TI 2009f; TI 
2009g). 
246 See for example TI (c) 
247 Hobbes did not see human self-interest as problematic per se. Instead, he reasoned that it is a per-
son’s natural right to pursue wealth, power and a save life. 
248  TI (2008b: 3) 
249  TI (p) 
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but to become corrupt. Not even most public officials are really corrupt: They “may 
be grossly underpaid and depend on small rents from the public to feed their families 
and pay school fees”;250 the fact that their corruption is also called ‘survival corrup-
tion’251 indicates that they have no option but to become corrupt if they wish to save 
their lives and the lives of their families. Overall, TI declares that it is rather a con-
cern for the world’s poorest, “rather than a distaste for the corrupt and their deeds, 
that rightly drives the global movement against corruption”,252 conveying a sense 
that acting corruptly is not distasteful. Secondly, corrupt individuals are also ab-
solved from blame through the articulations of the causes of corruption investigated 
earlier as opportunities, permitting factors and incentives, and thus as properties of 
the system. As all people simply respond to external incentives according to their 
nature, they cannot really be blamed for corruption; it is the system that makes them 
corrupt. However, there is also a third and quite interesting discursive strategy which 
absolves people from the charge of corruption and helps to re-articulate them as sub-
ject positions in chain AC. Like the causes of corruption, this discursive logic exter-
nalises corruption away from the subjects perpetrating corruption; it works through a 
metaphorical thingification, animalisation and even personification of corruption in 
IAC discourse.  
 
Metaphors 
Although IAC discourse officially defines corruption as particular abusive acts car-
ried out by human beings, and also articulates particular groups of people as possible 
or actual perpetrators of corrupt acts, corruption is nevertheless also articulated quite 
often as a phenomenon in itself in the discourses of all three organisations. Through 
equivalisation with particular metaphors in chain C, the signifier corruption assumes 
particular characteristics which demonstrate its evil nature. IAC discourse turns ‘cor-
ruption’ itself into the enemy, thus putting the persons committing it out of the focus 
of the fight against corruption. The most prominent example of this strategy is 
                                                 
250  TI (2000: xix) 
251  TI (2000: xix) 
252  TI (2000: 1) 
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probably Wolfensohn’s 1996 speech in which he portrays corruption as a ‘cancer’.253 
This metaphor is reiterated in other WB documents, which explain that “no country, 
rich or poor, is immune” against this ‘cancer’254 and insist that it needs to be “tack-
led aggressively”255 or ‘attacked vigorously’, given the “dreadful conditions most of 
the world's population endures”.256 Apart from this medical metaphor, corruption is 
also endowed with malicious intentions, for example in that it “sabotages policies 
and programs that aim to reduce poverty”.257 Hence, corruption here becomes a ma-
licious subject itself. 
While the UNDP also articulates corruption as a ‘killer’ of development,258 its pre-
ferred metaphor consists of two halves of an apple (see image below). While one, 
fresh and healthy-looking side of it symbolises “life and prosperity”, the other is rot-
ting, thus representing “the spoiling aspect of corruption”.259  
 
Figure 1 Rotten apple - rotten society Source: UNDP260 
                                                 
253 WB (u); see also James Wolfensohn, Foreword, in WB (1997: 2) 
254 WB (h) 
255 WB (u)  
256 WB (h) 
257 WB (h) 
258 UNDP (a) 
259 UNDP (2008d); Here, the UNDP draws on the concept’s etymological roots: the Latin word ‘cor-
rumpere’ which is the origin of today’s term ‘corruption’ and similar terms in European languages 
also meant ‘spoil, rot, taint’. 
260  UNDP (2008d) 
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Given that the “fresh apple at the top conveys the idea that it is possible for clean 
institutions to stand above corruption”,261 corruption is articulated not only as taint-
ing but also as something dirty.262 Some statements imply that if institutions are 
‘clean’, these can also “yield fruits such as healthy, educated, freer people”263 and 
thus articulate corruption as making a society not only rot, but also remain unedu-
cated, sick and unfree. The UNDP also cites Kofi Annan, who in the foreword to the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption operates with other biological and 
even chemical metaphors; he calls corruption an “insidious plague” which allows 
“organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish”, while 
having “corrosive effects” on societies.264  
However, TI is probably most adept in metaphorising corruption. The organization 
warns that “corruption continues to lurk where opacity rules”,265 making corruption 
appear like an aggressive animal lurking in the dark, waiting for an opportunity to 
strike at its victims. It is indeed “alive and well”, even in established democracies, 
and when it decides to show itself, it “scares away foreign investment”.266 Like a 
wild and dangerous animal it can be “rampant”267 and get “out of control”,268 which 
is why it needs to be curbed269 and kept in check.270 In other places in the discourse, 
the metaphors equivalised with corruption tend to convey images of a poisonous or 
pest plant. In a favourable environment, “corruption takes root on a wide scale”, it 
‘thrives’ and ‘flourishes’,271 and when “left alone and not contained, it is likely to 
increase”.272 This is why it must be ‘eradicated’,273 with TI lamenting that it cannot 
                                                 
261  UNDP (2008d, e.a.) 
262 This recalls very much Bratsis’ interpretation of the concept of corruption as serving to articulate 
certain things or acts as bad or ‘dirty’ in a particular environment; drawing on Douglas (1966) he 
explains that “dirt is best understood as something that is out of place”. Applying this to the concept 
of corruption, he argues that “[o]nce we have the contamination of the public by the private, politi-
cians and politics itself become dirty, tainted, infected, and thus corrupt. The opposite is equally 
true” Bratsis (2003: 15). 
263  UNDP (2008d) 
264  UNDP (2008a: 1) 
265  TI (y) 
266  TI (p) 
267  TI (2009f); WB (2007: 40) 
268  TI (y) 
269  TI (2009g) 
270  TI (o) 
271  TI (o) 
272  TI (2000: xviii) 
273  TI (2009c) 
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be “rooted out in one big sweep”.274 Another image brought up by TI is that of an 
iceberg.275 Due to the secrecy implicit in corruption, the organisation assumes that 
most of it remains hidden and goes undiscovered which, in turn, creates fear of the 
unknown extent of the threat we are facing. Not least, corruption in itself is also a 
‘temptation’,276 which, when coupled with permissiveness, seduces public officials 
to succumb to its advances. In other places TI emphasises the importance of tackling 
corruption with the right ‘tools’, thus conveying the image of an operation or of a 
technical problem.277  
Lastly, there is of course the phrase the ‘fight against corruption’, which is fre-
quently used by all three IAC organisations and conveys the impression of a fight 
against a very concrete threat, rather than of a lengthy process of changing people’s 
behaviour, attitudes, morals, or social systems. Much as the negative attributes re-
viewed earlier in this chapter, and in what could be seen as an important fantasmatic 
logic of the discourse, these metaphors present corruption as a dangerous and de-
structive threat humanity is facing. So while the metaphors used differ among the 
discourses of the three organisations, they work together quite nicely to constitute 
the fantasy of corruption as a monstrous enemy victimising the world, thus rendering 
the fight against corruption more persuasive.  
Quite aside from this, by transforming corruption into an illness, something animal-
istic, or subject-like, with its own personality and almost a will of its own, these ar-
ticulations in chain C contribute to a detachment of the concept of corruption from 
the actual persons or groups of people committing it. The blame no longer lies with a 
particular person or their actions, but rather with this wild and uncontrollable thing 
which spreads its poison out of the dark and secretly invades and eats away at the 
body of society. As a political logic this turns all people into victims rather than irre-
deemable perpetrators of corruption; anyone may fall victim to corruption at any 
time, and we are always in danger of suffering the consequences. This discursive 
logic has a very particular effect for the success of the hegemonic project under con-
cern: It undoes the articulation of the immense number of subject positions into 
                                                 
274  TI (o) 
275  TI (p) 
276  TI (o) 
277  TI (2009c) 
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chain C and enables their re-articulation into chain AC, as having a stake and a role 
in the IAC project. If one so wants, corruption itself, ‘monstrified’, remains as the 
only ‘subject position’ in chain C. At the same time, its fantasmatic monstrification 
‘covers over’ the contradiction between the simultaneous articulation of everyone as 
inclined to corruption and as a supporter of the fight against corruption. Closely in-
terrelated, the fantasmatic logic of monstrifying corruption and the powerful political 
logic of equivalising all potential subject positions in chain AC have the potential to 




This chapter has examined the construction of corruption and its equivalents in chain 
C of IAC discourse as hindrances to a Universal which will be further investigated in 
the following chapters. It was dedicated particularly to drawing out the different lo-
gics of the articulations that link different signifiers as equivalents of corruption in 
chain C. This analysis has produced important insights regarding the closely interre-
lated discursive stratagems and logics through which chain C serves the expansion of 
the IAC hegemonic project as well as the kind of system that is purported as a Uni-
versal by IAC discourse.  
The equivalisation of differential claims that are oriented against the Universal could 
be distinguished quite clearly and coherently in chain C. While this is not distin-
guished as a hegemonic stratagem by Nonhoff,278 the present analysis was able to 
show that the importance that these equivalisations in the ‘antagonistic chain’ have 
for the hegemonic project of IAC discourse is not to be underestimated; chain C has 
been shown to be quite important in terms of defining the Universal and advancing 
the expansion of IAC discourse as a hegemonic project.  
The extraordinary coherence of chain C is a very important finding of this chapter. 
While the chapter has pointed out minor contestations among and within the three 
                                                 
278 Nonhoff distinguishes only the ‘equivalisation of differential claims that are oriented towards the 
Universal’, which takes place in the ‘‘hegemonic chain’’, here chain AC, as a hegemonic stratagem 
(I) (see chapter 2). 
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organisations (as with regards to the conception of human nature and the location of 
corruption in sectors of society), it has become clear that the meaning of corruption 
in IAC discourse is constructed very coherently, forming one chain of equivalence 
with slight contestations rather than several ‘rivalling’ chains. Noticeably, the con-
testations of the conception of human nature emerging from the interviews stretch 
across organisational divides. However, in all cases they seem confined to the inter-
viewees thinking and speech without effecting on the strategic documents or overall 
conception of corruption of their organisations. The difference between the WB’s 
definition of corruption as necessarily involving the public sector and TI’s and the 
UNDP’s definition as including private sector corruption turned out to be the only 
contestation that can be found between the organisations and can partly be explained 
by organisational characteristics, namely the WB’s scepticism towards state in-
volvement into the economy. However, it did not seem to take any affect in the ar-
ticulations of causes and consequences of corruption. 
Furthermore, corruption could be quite easily recognised as the main nodal point of 
chain C. In the course of the analysis it emerged more and more clearly as the sym-
bol of all the hindrances to or the lack of the Universal. While Nonhoff does not ac-
count for such a function in his hegemonic stratagems, corruption can be regarded as 
the representative of chain C. The fact that the discourse is identifiable as such 
mainly because its articulations are about fighting corruption or doing something 
anti corruption suggests in fact that corruption fulfils an important representative 
function for the whole of IAC discourse.  
The investigation of logics of equivalisations in chain C showed how corruption is 
constructed as a powerful threat that requires to be fought. We have seen that IAC 
discourse articulates corruption as a geographically ubiquitous phenomenon (but one 
that is worse in developing countries), and that it links it with a range of negative 
attributes to demonstrate its severity and danger. The threatening and omnipresent 
nature of corruption is also conveyed through its construction as intrinsic to human 
nature. While articulating the fight against corruption as important and necessary, 
chain C constructs it at the same time as a fight that can never be entirely won and 
consequently will require endless support.  
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While the allocation of subject positions to the two chains is more complex than in 
the case of the other equivalents and is partly contradictory, it was important to draw 
out the contradictions and re-articulations which are at work here. While Nonhoff 
emphasises the necessity for the antagonistic boundaries to be impermeable,279 the 
chapter has shown that consistency is not necessarily the only successful strategy and 
that contradictory allocations of elements to both chains (or rather constantly across 
chains) can actually serve the hegemonic purpose; in the case of IAC discourse, as 
has been shown, it is precisely through holding them together that the hegemonic 
project is able to acquire strength. Through a triple discursive move, which involves 
the metaphorisation of corruption, the IAC project manages to articulate subject po-
sitions into chain AC, as supporters of the fight against corruption:  
On the one hand, through the construction of human nature as intrinsically corrupt, 
all possible subject positions are articulated into chain C, thus strengthening the seri-
ousness of the enemy and the importance of the project. At the same time, IAC dis-
course absolves everyone from bearing the seed of corruption by locating the causes 
of corruption outside any human subject and thus beyond the control of any individ-
ual, which serves to lift all corrupt subject positions out of chain C. In a third (and 
simultaneous) discursive move and what could be called a fantasmatic logic, the 
metaphorisation of corruption in chain C personifies corruption and transforms it 
into an external threat to mankind which substitutes all subject positions in chain C. 
All people are thus turned into victims of corruption and are articulated as having a 
stake and a role in the fight against corruption in chain AC. The power of this fan-
tasmatic logic is able to cover over the contradictions involved in the constant re-
articulation of subject positions across chains of equivalences. 
At the same time, both the articulation of humans as universally corrupt and the 
metaphorisation and detachment from human beings of corruption work as a discur-
sive strategy to deal with (potential) dislocations in that they defend IAC discourse 
against accusations of proclaiming Western moral superiority.280 Such accusations 
are also explicitly dealt with in TI discourse (and to a more limited extent also WB 
                                                 
279  Nonhoff (2006: 226) 
280 Actually, many interviewees were eager to emphasise that they are by no means claiming any kind 
of Western superiority, which indicated that they were aware of the criticism which has already 
been made of their organisations in this regard. 
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discourse) through stratagem IV, which demarcates a super-difference between IAC 
discourse and discourses that articulate Western superiority and thus works towards 
shielding IAC discourse from dislocation. At the same time however, developing 
countries are still articulated as being more corrupt than Western countries. This con-
tradiction has far-reaching discursive effects not only in that articulations about the 
corruptness of people and especially of politicians in developing countries (even if 
based on ‘technical’ explanations) certainly reinforce still existing stereotypical as-
sumptions about their backwardness, but also in that it helps to justify and advance 
Western-led intervention into those countries as conducted among others via IAC 
programmes, as we will see more clearly in the analysis of chain AC.  
Yet, the equivalisations in chain C reviewed in this chapter serve not only to justify 
the existence and convey the importance of IAC activities, thus rendering them per-
suasive. They also prepare the ground for the construction of a particular politico-
economic system as the desirable Universal; in fact they already open up a particular 
antagonistic division of the discursive space by pointing to different elements of 
chain AC, thus sketching what will be shown to be the defining political logic of the 
discourse.  
As the examination of definitions and manifestations of corruption has shown, while 
TI and the UNDP operate with the concept of private sector corruption, the WB 
sticks to the ‘traditional’ concept of corruption as necessarily involving the public 
sector. Given this contestation within chain C, it was an important finding that the 
organisations still share a conception of corruption which reinforces the modern lib-
eral distinction between public and private interests, and which, at the same time, 
conceals the political character of the concept of corruption by not making this obvi-
ous. But the analysis of chain C allowed us to get even more of a glimpse of the so-
cial logics that are to structure the Universal pursued in IAC discourse, and in that 
sense confirmed Philp’s hypothesis that conceptions of corruption are intrinsically 
linked to conceptions of a public interest.  
The investigation of the constructions of causes and consequences of corruption 
showed that in constructing corruption, chain C points to a number of signifiers (of-
ten through articulating their absence as equivalents of corruption) that are articu-
lated as desirable and thus form part of the Universal. Thus for example, corruption 
165 
 
is equivalised with poverty (belonging to chain C), but also with the lack of state 
services and growth (two concepts belonging to chain AC).  
Moreover, the analysis of the causes of corruption demonstrated that those causes 
(opportunities, permitting factors and additional economic incentives) are consensu-
ally constructed as failures in the design of societal systems, rather than as moral 
failures. The conception of human nature as irremediably self-interested and rational 
was revealed as the key logic structuring the articulation of causes of corruption, de-
personalising these causes and locating them in the social actors’ environment. In the 
following chapters we will come to see the important effects of these constructions 
of causes and human nature for the design of IAC measures. In chain C these con-
structions are also linked to explanations that corruption is worse in developing 
countries than in developed ones because of incorrect external incentives; at the 
same time, it conveys the impression that in developed countries (where corruption 
is allegedly less serious, or where it is an exception), such incentives are better set. 
This not only articulates Western societal systems as superior in design because they 
are better able to deal with human nature, but also negates the legitimate existence of 
societal systems that do not set the right incentives. In line with these findings, the 
review of the damaging consequences of corruption equivalised in chain C has fur-
thermore sketched out the contours of a market-liberal democracy that IAC discourse 
claims to rescue from the claws of corruption.  
Thus, chain C was found to sketch a particular politico-economic ideal as a Univer-
sal to strive for, which will be further specified through equivalisations in chain AC; 
in doing so it forecloses articulations of potential alternative politico-economic sys-
tems in IAC discourse, which can however only be further specified when the analy-
sis of chain AC is concluded. Having analysed the particular interrelated political, 
fantasmatic and social logics of equivalisations in chain C and having drawn out the 
contours of the particular antagonistic division of the discursive space that it 
sketches, the political nature of IAC discourse thus revealed forebodes its shape as a 
hegemonic project. In order to verify this finding, however, we will have to inquire 
in detail into chain AC; the analysis conducted in the following three chapters will 
draw out not only the political logics of how IAC discourse attempts to change what 





but also the social logics according to which the good, uncorrupted society (or the 
Universal) strived for is to function.  
 
 
4  Vagueness and specificity – aims of the fight against corrup-
tion and specifications of the uncorrupted society 
Having examined the rather coherent constitution of chain C of IAC discourse, we 
can now move on to investigate the second chain of equivalence of IAC discourse. 
Chain AC, the ‘anticorruption chain’, constructs the Universal, the imaginary ideal 
of a good, uncorrupted society.  
The analysis conducted in the following three chapters will not only demonstrate the 
impressive consensus within IAC discourse with regards to how corruption should 
be fought, but also clearly confirms that IAC discourse has the form of a hegemonic 
project attempting to advance a particular Universal. More precisely, in the course of 
this and the following two chapters, I will show that chain AC, the ‘hegemonic 
chain’, is constructed in an equally coherent manner as chain C, in what can be dis-
tinguished as the ‘equivalisation of differential claims oriented towards the Univer-
sal’ (stratagem I). Given that a coherent ‘antagonistic chain’ has already been distin-
guished in the last chapter, the finding of stratagem I allows us to confirm the exis-
tence of an antagonistic division of the discursive space within IAC discourse 
(stratagem II), which is the main political logic structuring IAC discourse. Further-
more, the stratagems ‘representation’ (III), ‘super-differential demarcation’ (IV), 
‘emergent openness of interpretation of the symbolic equivalent of the Universal’ 
(V) and ‘institution/perpetuation of subject positions for socio-political forces’ (VI) 
will be distinguished in the discourse.  
However, distinguishing these stratagems is only possible by tracing in detail the 
equivalisations in chain AC and the complex logics structuring them, and only these 
logics will, at the same time, reveal step by step the kind of Universal pursued in 
IAC discourse. To this end, this and the two following chapters will, on the one 
hand, employ the ‘analytical grid’ provided by Nonhoff (see chapter 2). According to 
Nonhoff, the equivalisations constituting ‘hegemonic chains’ of hegemonic projects 
typically articulate particular values or aims which form part of the realisation of the 
Universal, specifications of the Universal pursued, instrumental claims about how 
the Universal is to be achieved, and more concrete policy demands or measures that 
are to serve the attainment of the Universal. Yet in addition to distinguishing these 
elements in chain AC, the chapters will, on the other hand, investigate in detail the 
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more specific discursive logics involved in the construction of these elements in 
chain AC. This process, in turn, will allow us to recognise the interrelated function-
ing of political, fantasmatic and social logics in IAC discourse, explaining how they 
come together to make IAC discourse a hegemonic project that advances a particular 
societal ideal in a particular way.  
The present chapter examines the construction of particular aims of the fight against 
corruption and specifications of the Universal through equivalisations in chain AC, 
while instrumental claims and concrete demands will be subject to investigation in 
chapters 5 and 6.1 It reveals that the ‘fight against corruption’ functions as the repre-
sentative of chain AC (III) and demonstrates how it is rendered persuasive through a 
number of vaguely defined aims that serve the emergent openness of this representa-
tive (IV) and at the same time provide it with a beatific dimension. The second half 
of the chapter shows that, quite apart from the aims, the specifications of the Univer-
sal, in the form of the nodal points ‘competition’, ‘minimisation of discretion’, 
‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘integrity’, come to define in crucial ways the 
shape of the Universal. Importantly, the chapter demonstrates how the construction 
of these specifications heavily centres on the conception of human nature drawn out 
in the last chapter as the original source of corruption and reveals how this leads to a 




As mentioned previously, stratagems I and II are being unfolded in the course of the 
analysis of the three remaining empirical chapters and we will only know by the end 
of chapter 6 whether they are constituted coherently. Yet the third core stratagem of 
a hegemonic project, the ‘representation’ of the hegemonic chain by a particular sig-
nifier, should be much easier to identify. As will become clear shortly, it makes 
                                                 
1 In the construction of aims and specifications, linguistic ways of articulation are particularly 
prominent, while we will see that instrumental claims and concrete demands are articulated in 
linguistic and non-linguistic ways. Both the linguistic and non-linguistic articulations are accessed 
through the text material and interviews as described in chapter 2.  
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sense to inquire into the existence of this stratagem before dealing with the aims of 
the fight against corruption articulated in chain AC.  
‘Representation’, according to Nonhoff, is an important stratagem of hegemonic pro-
jects because the ‘representative’ or main hegemonic claim fulfils an important func-
tion in evoking the lack of an imaginary Universal and at the same time in claiming 
to address this lack by realising the Universal.2 In doing so, the stratagem ‘represen-
tation’ gives the hegemonic project direction, while the openness of interpretation of 
the ‘representative’ (the next stratagem, V) renders the project persuasive.3 Nonhoff 
seems to argue that the role of the ‘representative’ is usually carried out by the main 
nodal point in the discourse, which is at the same time the main nodal point in chain 
AC. As such, it should be easily identifiable because it gives the discourse its name, 
or makes it identifiable as a discourse in the first place. Yet the case of IAC dis-
course is somewhat different. In chapter 3 it became clear that corruption is the main 
nodal point in chain C; given that the anticorruption agenda clearly centres on fight-
ing corruption (which is what distinguishes it as a discourse), corruption also seems 
to function as the main nodal point of IAC discourse as a whole. However, corrup-
tion cannot fulfil the role of the ‘representative’ or the ‘symbolic equivalent of the 
Universal’ because it is articulated as the symbolic equivalent of the lack of the Uni-
versal in IAC discourse. What this points to is a negatively phrased hegemonic claim 
or ‘representative’ embodying everything that corruption is not or centring on elimi-
nating the ‘enemy’ corruption. In IAC discourse, this role is clearly fulfilled by the 
terms ‘anticorruption’ or the ‘fight against corruption’; the ‘fight against corruption’ 
functions as the main hegemonic claim and symbolises the Universal pursued in IAC 
discourse. This is in line with Nonhoff’s assumption that the role of the hegemonic 
claim is usually fulfilled by what he calls an instrumental claim, which links up the 
aims of a hegemonic project by claiming that they can only be fulfilled when the 
hegemonic claim is fulfilled.4 As we will see, in articulating all sorts of appealing 
aims IAC discourse conveys that they can only be fulfilled when corruption is com-
                                                 
).  
2  Nonhoff (2006: 214) 
3 Combining Nonhoff with Glynos and Howarth, this can be regarded as the “vector” of the hege-
monic project acquired through the fantasmatic dimension of the ‘representative’ (see 
Glynos/Howarth 2007: 147
4 See Nonhoff (2006: 119) 
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bated, and at the same time renders the signifier ‘fight against corruption’ extremely 
open to interpretation.  
 
Aims of the fight against corruption  
One may wonder why this chapter discusses separately the aims that form part of the 
realisation of the Universal according to IAC discourse and the specifications of that 
Universal. This is because they tend to fulfil quite different functions in the hege-
monic project. As we will see, while the aims primarily provide the hegemonic pro-
ject with appeal, the specifications do much more to clarify the social logics of the 
Universal pursued.  
In the following sections the articulations of aims of the fight against corruption by 
IAC discourse will be investigated in more detail, revealing how they contribute to 
stratagem V, the emergent openness of interpretation of the Universal. It will become 
clear that the three organisations articulate a wide range of aims that can be distin-
guished as nodal points in chain AC. However, their meanings and relations are 
rather vaguely and inconsistently articulated both within and among the three organi-
sations.  
 
A world free of corruption 
According to TI, the central aim of its anticorruption measures and its sole purpose 
as an NGO is “to create change towards a world free of corruption”.5 In turn, this 
official aim seems to concentrate a vast range of different signifiers within TI dis-
course, as the interviews revealed. There is no agreement on the signifiers that con-
stitute the “whole list”6 of components and TI does not seem to attempt to reach 
such an agreement.7 Overall the interviewees’ answers ranged from “development”8 
                                                 
5  TI (z) 
6  TI-S official 5 
7 One TI interviewee answered the question about what exactly constitutes the world without corrup-
tion thus: “This is a good question and something that I think we should discuss more often” (TI-S 
official 1). 
8  TI-S official 3 
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and “increased wellbeing for the population”9; “welfare for the good of the pub-
lic”,10 social change,11 fairness,12 and the keeping of promises by the people in 
power;13 “social justice”, poverty reduction and “that countries are able to develop as 
they choose”;14 to “integrity” as a “combination of elements that ensure the public 
good, at the end”.15 One interviewee explained that “we believe in cultural diversity, 
so definitely a world without corruption would look different in every single place” 
but still saw “justice” and “fairness” as well as “a world without poverty” as over-
arching concepts in this regard.16 This broad spectrum of concepts and the differ-
ences in the interviewees’ answers means that TI discourse articulates the world 
without corruption and consequently the fight against corruption as able to bring 
about a wide range of desirable things. This contributes to the openness of interpreta-
tion of this ‘representative’ and at the same time works towards rendering it persua-
sive. According to PDHT, this is not problematic; such a “broad” vision can have the 
capacity to “bring different people together”,17 in the sense of allowing the hege-
monic project to acquire new subject positions. A TI interviewee even implied that 
TI keeps the meaning of the ‘world free of corruption’ intentionally open: “I think 
the vision is defined as a world free of corruption. We are not saying a world free of 
corruption so that ‘bum-bum-bum-bum-bum’ can happen, and I think that’s fine, 
because it depends”.18  
arching mission of poverty reduction19 or of achieving ‘a world free of poverty’.20 
 
A world without poverty 
Both the WB and the UNDP do not seem to join in the articulation of a ‘world with-
out corruption’ as the highest aim of the fight against corruption. The WB claims 
instead to fight corruption because it is “the greatest obstacle” to the Bank's over-
                                                 
TI-S official 2 
9  TI-S official 3 
10  TI-S official 1 
11  TI-S official 6 
12  TI-S official 1, 
13  TI-S official 1 
14  TI-S official 4 
15  TI-S official 5 
16  TI-S official 2 
17  TI-S official 6 
18  TI-S official 6 
19  WB (k); see also WB (l); WB (2007: i-ii) 
172 
 
However, TI also articulates poverty eradication as an aim of the fight against cor-
ruption (even if not the aim) by claiming that “a world without corruption would be a 
world without poverty”.  In the analysis of chain C, we have already seen that pov-
erty is articulated as an important consequence of corruption and as a hindrance to 
the Universal. Equivalisations in chain AC now positivise these articulations by con-
structing poverty eradication as an explicit aim. However, much like the world with-
out corruption, the world without poverty is only very vaguely defined in IAC dis-
course – the nodal point of the world without poverty concentrates a diverse range of 
components.  
21
For example, the WB anticorruption website conceives the world without poverty (to 
be brought about by the fight against corruption amongst other efforts) as a world 
with economic and social development; this in turn includes the rule of law and “the 
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends”.22 Conceiving itself 
principally as an economic organisation,23 the WB is quite explicit about the eco-
nomic aspect of poverty and about the consequences of corruption on poverty reduc-
tion.24 However, the view that “poverty is a monetary issue”25 and that the world 
without poverty conceived by the WB is principally one without economic poverty is 
disputed by other WB articulations that “poverty reduction is about more than inade-
quate income” and economic growth, but also about equality, access to and quality 
of vital public services, opportunities, the absence of harassment, having one’s voice 
heard, representation, and access to information.26 The list of aims equivalised with 
‘the world without poverty’ is extended further by the webpage of the WB’s social 
development section (which also deals with anticorruption questions); stressing that 
ultimately ‘the world without poverty’ also means “more inclusive, cohesive, and 
accountable societies”.27 One WB interviewee emphasised that “eradicating poverty 
is entirely about economic justice”, which in turn includes “inclusion and cohesion”, 
extending to gender equality, religions equality, and ethnic equality.28 The meaning 
                                                                                                                                          
20 See the WB’s logo: ‘The World Bank – working for a world free of poverty’ 
21  TI-S official 2; see also TI (k); TI (k); TI-S official 5; TI (o) 
22  WB (k) 
23  WB (2007: 6) 
24 See e.g. WB (d) 
25  WB official 4 
26  WB (d) 
27  WB (j) 
28  WB official 2 
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of ‘the world without poverty’ – and thus of the aim of the WB’s fight against cor-
ruption – is broadened further by ambiguities with regard to the degree of poverty 
that is tolerable or not. While the WB and also the UNDP stress the importance of 
the MDGs,29 which concentrate on eradicating economic conditions of under a dollar 
a day,30 a WB interviewee told me that “I don’t think there’s a sort of official line 
(...) on what is the absolute right amount of money for everybody to have”.31 Thus, 
via the broadening of the meaning of ‘the world without poverty’ through multiple 
equivalisations in chain AC, the meaning of the fight against corruption is broadened 
quite substantively in WB discourse. Similarly, for TI, poverty eradication not only 
means the absence of economic poverty32 but also includes “access to essential ser-
vices (health, education, sanitation, etc.), basic civil rights, empowerment and human 
development” but also the “values of freedom, equality, solidarity and tolerance”33 
34
nguishable from each other and are used almost inter-
course.  
Development  
tion’ as an aim, the UNDP articulates ‘development’ as the principal aim of its IAC 
                                                
and a situation where people are not disadvantaged.  
As with the meaning of ‘the world without corruption’, the components of ‘the world 
without poverty’ are not coherently articulated in IAC discourse. Again, this can be 
understood as a reflection of the ‘absorbing’ capacity of the nodal points ‘world 
without poverty’ but also ‘fight against corruption’ in IAC discourse, which are able 
to concentrate a wide range of differential claims. We can also see that the high con-
centration of equivalisations around these nodal points blurs the differences and rela-
tions between the respective surrounding claims to a certain extent so that their 
meanings become hardly disti
changeably in the dis
 
While the achievement of a ‘world without poverty’ is constructed as the highest aim 
of the WB’s anticorruption efforts, and while TI holds up the ‘world without corrup-
 
29  WB (2007: i-ii); UNDP (2008d); UNDP (a); UNDP (2008a: 1, 3); UNDP (2008c: 12); see also TI 
(2008b: 1) 
30  United Nations (a) 
31  WB official 3 
32  TI (2008b) 
33  TI (2008b: 2) 
34  TI-S official 2 
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work.35 Tellingly, the UNDP’s anticorruption programme is called ‘Global Pro-
gramme on Anticorruption for Development Effectiveness’, and a UNDP inter-
viewee explained that this is because “we wanted to reflect (...) the UNDP’s needs, 
upfront. It’s a global (...) programme on anticorruption – but it’s for development 
effectiveness”.36 At the same time, development is articulated as an important aim of 
the fight against corruption by the two other organisations. Moreover, the WB aims 
to foster development and has identified corruption as “among the greatest obstacles 
to economic and social development”.37 TI, too, constructs corruption as “the main 
hindering factor for development”38 and the achievement of development as “one of 
the main reasons” for its work.39  
While chapter 3 has shown how countless condemnations of corruption’s damaging 
effects on development contribute to the desirability of the concept, countless articu-
lations in chain AC construct it as an explicit aim of the fight against corruption.40 
Yet again, its meaning is much less coherently articulated and seems to encompass 
an enormous range of values. The UNDP works with the concept of ‘human devel-
opment’, which is defined as “a process of enlarging people’s choices”.41 It involves, 
again, a wide range of concepts including economic growth, equality, governance, 
the quality of services such as health and education, human rights, gender equality 
and empowerment as well as environmental sustainability,42 which are all to be fos-
tered by fighting corruption. TI in turn articulates a rights-based and inclusion-
focused conception of development as providing “all citizens with a level playing 
field, regardless of income, race, gender, religion, education or ethnicity”,43 or links 
it to the “right of people to participate in decisions affecting their lives”.44 Further-
more, development is also articulated as consisting of several sub-categories, such as 
social development,45 political development,46 equitable and sustainable develop-
                                                 
35  UNDP (2008a) 
36  UNDP official 1; see also WB official 6 who stated that development effectiveness is the WB’s 
reason for combating corruption 
37  WB (k); see also WB official 3 
38  TI-S official 1, see also TI (2008b: 2) 
39  TI-S official 1; for similar articulations see TI (k); TI (k) 
40  TI (2009f); UNDP (2008d); TI (l); TI (2008a: 2); TI (y)  
41  UNDP (2008a: 6) 
42  UNDP (2008a: 6); UNDP (2008d), see also UNDP (a) 
43  TI (2008b: 5) 
44  TI-S official 2 
45  TI (r); TI (2009f) 
46  TI-S official 4 
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ment47 all of which are rarely defined and the meanings of which are hardly separa-
ble from each other. A WB interviewee explained that in WB discourse, develop-
ment and poverty eradication basically mean the same thing,48 demonstrating the 
fusion of meanings among all these equivalisations.  
These examples illustrate the immense amount of signifiers (which do not need to be 
summarised here) that are articulated in chain AC as aims of the fight against corrup-
tion. By being equivalised with the ‘world without corruption’, the ‘world without 
poverty’ and ‘development’ in the form of aims, the fight against corruption comes 
to represent the immense assemblage of desirable concepts that these concepts them-
selves already concentrate in the discourses of the three organisations.  
 
Other values and aims 
Next to or amongst these ‘sub-aims’ of the three concepts just discussed (the rela-
tions are inconsistently articulated or ‘blurred’ in the discourse), several values and 
ideals appear relatively frequently as societal aims in IAC discourse. They form 
smaller nodal points which work towards providing the discourse with positive ap-
peal and also serve to concretise the Universal to a certain (although still limited) 
extent.  
One such example is democracy, which is articulated as an aim of the fight against 
corruption by TI and the UNDP.49 Both organisations seem to conceive of it as a 
form of liberal democracy. TI articulates it as modern, representative, multiparty 
democracy50 with an element of social inclusion,51 also within the realm of “eco-
nomic decision-making”.52 The UNDP cites research showing that “highly devel-
oped, long established liberal democracies, with a free and widely-read press, a high 
share of women in government, and a history of openness to trade are perceived as 
less corrupt (Treisman 2007)”53 and links its aim of democracy with functioning 
                                                 
47  TI (l); TI (2009b); TI (2008b: 5); WB (c); UNDP (2008a: 3) 
48  TI-S official 1 
49  TI (o); UNDP (2008c: 26, 27, 29); UNDP (2008b: 6); UNDP (a); TI (2000: xv); UNDP (2008a: 5) 
50 See TI (2008b: 3); TI (2009f); TI (a); TI (b); TI (a); TI (o); TI (2009f) 
51  TI (2008b: 3) 
52  TI (2008b: 3) 
53  UNDP (2008c: 21) 
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institutions, participation, trust and stability, and the fulfilling of the public will.54 
While these equivalisations confirm the articulations in chain C of Western liberal 
systems of societal organisation as superior, they do little to clarify how such sys-
tems are supposed to function and how the fight against corruption contributes to 
their realisation. Such articulations mainly serve to enhance the persuasiveness of the 
fight against corruption, while only an inquiry into the specifications, instrumental 
claims and concrete demands of IAC discourse will help us understand the social 
logics of the Universal pursued.    
In addition, equality (or equity) is constructed as an important aim, as we have al-
ready seen in the discussions above.55 When it is ‘concretised’ in articulations in 
chain C, equality emerges as an “increase [of the] sharing between rich and poor”,56 
as “economic equality”57 and “distributive justice norms”,58 but also as political or 
social forms of equality such as “democratic equality”,59 equal participation and 
rights of citizens,60 equality of opportunities for poor people61 and equality of oppor-
tunity for women and minorities.62 While this stress on equality as an aim of the 
fight against corruption may make IAC discourse seem like a leftist project, such a 
concretisation is prevented because there is no explicit articulation in the discourse 
of how much of, or what kind of equality is the actual aim.  
Inclusion or inclusiveness is another signifier which frequently appears as an aim in 
IAC discourse,63 while we have already seen in chapter 3 that marginalisation and 
exclusion are denounced as negative consequences of corruption. It seems to be par-
ticularly important for TI but is also mentioned as an aim in the discourses of the 
other two organisations. Inclusion is articulated as “access to essential services 
                                                 
54 See e.g. UNDP (2008b: 12); UNDP (2008c: 12); UNDP (2008a: 1) 
55  UNDP (2008b: 15); TI (2008b: 2); see also WB official 3; WB official 2; WB (d) 
56  TI (2008a: 2) 
57  TI (2008a: 2); TI (2008b: 4) 
58  TI (2000: xxii) 
59  TI (2008b: 4) 
60  TI (2008b: 3) 
61  WB (2007: without page) see also WB (2007: 3); WB (d); UNDP (a) 
62  UNDP (a) 
63  TI (2008b: 2, 3, 4); TI (2008b: 3); WB (d); WB (j); WB (j) 
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(health, education, sanitation, etc.)”64 but also as citizens’ inclusion and participation 
in “political and economic decision-making” and social processes in general.65  
Economic growth clearly stands out as another important part of the Universal to be 
realised by the fight against corruption.66 Condemnations of the negative conse-
quences of corruption on economic growth in chain C are mirrored by articulations 
in chain AC as an important aim for which to strive. In addition, stability and secu-
rity are articulated as aims of the fight against corruption. While concern with stabil-
ity in IAC discourse is mainly expressed through the construction of the horrific con-
sequences of corruption in chain C, as we have seen in the last chapter, stability also 
appears among the aims. While TI calls for the right “infrastructure (governmental, 
social, economic and physical) that is seen as essential for achieving growth and sta-
bility”,67 the WB emphasises the importance of “macroeconomic stability”.68  
In sum, while a liberal, representative, inclusionary democratic system shines 
through these aims as a model of a good, uncorrupted society and thus confirms the 
societal contours of the Universal derived from the analysis of chain C in the previ-
ous chapter, these aims still only rather vaguely define the Universal. Often, they are 
articulated in inconsistent ways both within and among the organisational discourses, 
leaving their meanings unclear and blurring the relations and differences between 
them. This not only prevents us from establishing a clearer picture of the Universal 
strived for, but could also be regarded as problematic for the hegemonic project. Can 
a hegemonic project be successful if its final aims are not clear? As the next section 
shows, PDHT allows us to interpret the amount of vague aims as a hegemonic 





                                                 
64  TI (2008b: 2); see also WB (d); UNDP (a); UNDP (2008a: 9, 16); UNDP (2008b: 6) 
65  TI (2008b: 3, 4); WB official 3; UNDP (2008d); UNDP (2008b: 6); UNDP (a)  
66  WB (2007: iii-iv, 1, 3, 4); TI (2009h: 2); UNDP (2008b: 6); WB (g); WB (o); UNDP (2008a: 1, 8)  
67  TI (2008a: 2) 
68  WB (2007: 2) 
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‘Emergent openness of interpretation of the ‘representative’’ 
In chapter 3 we saw that IAC discourse already endows the fight against corruption 
with persuasiveness via the construction of corruption itself as an enormous, mon-
strous threat that will cause all sorts of other horrific things to occur if it is not 
fought. 
Yet chain AC builds up the persuasiveness of the ‘representative’ even more, this 
time from the ‘other side’ of the antagonistic divide, providing the fight against cor-
ruption with a beatific dimension. Development, democracy, equality, inclusion, 
health, education, stable economic welfare and security for everyone are the prom-
ises of IAC discourse if only the fight against corruption is supported by us all. 
These equivalisations of the fight against corruption with such a broad range of con-
cepts that are already positively connoted and open to a variety of interpretations 
render the ‘representative’ of IAC discourse extremely open to interpretation. Thus, 
they constitute the fifth hegemonic stratagem, the ‘emergent openness of interpreta-
tion of the symbolic equivalent of the Universal’.69 This stratagem, which can also 
be regarded as a fantasmatic logic, serves the expansion of IAC discourse by facili-
tating the acquisition of new subject positions in chain C as supporters of the fight 
against corruption. It does so by allowing the discourse to accommodate very diverse 
and diffuse expectations regarding the Universal;70 anyone who strives for any one 
of the values constructed as aims of the fight against corruption can be ‘gripped’ by 
the fight against corruption and its promises of the “fullness-to-come” once corrup-
tion is contained.71  
If we try to evaluate the ‘representative’ of the Universal in IAC discourse with re-
gards to its potential ‘qualification’ for advancing the hegemonic project, the signi-
fier ‘fight against corruption’ seems particularly ‘suitable’. Due to its negative for-
mulation which does not include any already connoted and politically contested con-
cept but which refers solely to the elimination of something widely considered as 
detrimental, it is able to unite a particularly wide range of positively connoted signi-
                                                 
69 This openness can be understood as ‘emergent’ because it becomes more distinct in the course of 
the expansion of the hegemonic project. Yet, given that this is also the case with all other stratagems 
distinguished by Nonhoff, the significance of the adjective ‘emergent’ for this particular stratagem is 
left slightly unclear.  
70  Nonhoff (2006: 233) 
71 Cf. Glynos/Howarth (2007: 145, 147) 
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fiers. Sustainable development discourse, for example, runs the risk of excluding all 
that is already constructed as unsustainable as well as anyone who is critical of de-
velopment efforts. In contrast, and at first glance at least, the fight against corruption 
only excludes corruption, which seems to be universally regarded as detrimental (see 
chapter 1).  
Thus, with regards to the questions of consensus in, and advancing of IAC discourse 
we can conclude that although the aims of the fight against corruption are not consis-
tently articulated, paradoxically, this serves rather than deranges the expansion of the 
hegemonic project. The reason for this paradox is that the differences of these aims 
are so blurred by equivalisations that they do not actually exclude but rather com-
plement each other in rendering the ‘representative’ persuasive.  
Having understood how the fight against corruption is rendered persuasive through 
the vagueness of its aims and its subsequent openness to interpretation, we can now 
start to investigate the nature of the Universal, or the ideal of the good, uncorrupted 
society that the fight against corruption attempts to bring about and through which 
all those aims are supposed to be fulfilled.  
 
Specifications of the Universal: The social as a space in which interests 
are governed in the ‘right’ ways 
While the ‘fight against corruption’ functions as the symbolic equivalent of the Uni-
versal, the shape of this Universal is not immediately intelligible and can only be 
comprehended by reconstructing in detail the logics that structure its articulation in 
IAC discourse. In a first step in this enterprise the following sections investigate a set 
of specifications that characterise the Universal or the good, uncorrupted society 
according to IAC discourse and that render the governing logics of this society much 
more concrete. These specifications comprise five important nodal points in IAC 
discourse: competition, the minimisation of discretion (or: clear rules), transparency, 
accountability, and integrity, and we will see that the consensus on these specifica-
tions contrasts heavily with the vagueness of the aims discussed above. 
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Yet let us first examine how the focus on these concepts as nodal points comes about 
in IAC discourse. The rational actor logic discerned in chain C re-emerges in chain 
AC and plays a crucial role in constructing the specifications of the Universal, yet it 
does so in a particular way. While chain C constructs human beings as naturally in-
clined to corruption and unable to change in this regard, chain AC suggests that their 
behaviour can still be made serve the ‘public interest’ – through particular societal 
designs. As the TI Source Book emphasises, the “primary emphasis” of IAC efforts 
should be on the “prevention of future corruption and on changing systems (rather 
than indulging in witch-hunts)”.72 Thus, in line with the ‘rehabilitation’ of self-
interested individuals through their re-articulation from chain C to chain AC dis-
cussed in the last chapter, individuals’ self-interest is put to work for the creation of a 
good society. The logic is that societal structures need to be designed in a way which 
does not rely on people’s ability to work for the public good (since they will be un-
able to fulfil such expectations); rather, the ‘insight’ that they will always try to fulfil 
their own (economic) interests needs to be used to construct societal institutions (in a 
broad sense) in a way which merges the individual interest with the ‘public interest’.  
This way of organising societies, which in IAC discourse is sometimes also equiv-
alised as synonymous with the term ‘good governance’,73 relies on setting the ‘right’ 
external incentives to individuals’ self-interest. Following what I call the ‘incentives 
logic’, the articulations of this mode of societal organisation specify the uncorrupted 
society as a society in which people’s interests are governed in the ‘right’ ways, 
namely so as to align the interests of social actors with the rules they are supposed to 
follow for both their own and everyone else’s good. 
According to the WB, the strategy to institute good governance (and thus prevent 
corruption) is “to align the incentives of state officials with these goals, through an 
appropriate combination of rules, restraints, and rewards; competitive pressures; and 
voice and partnership”. Yet the “incentives of nonstate actors, too, need to be aligned 
with these goals, especially those of businesses and other nongovernmental entities 
that often play a pivotal role in undermining governance”.74 Finally, incentives for 
                                                 
72  TI (2000: xx-xxi) 
73 See e.g. TI (f); WB (2007: 1, 3, 67); WB (d); TI (y); UNDP (2008b: 6); TI (2009d); TI (n); UNDP 
(2004: 3); UNDP (2008a: 1); UNDP (2008c: 5); TI (2009j: 22) 
74  WB (2007: 47); see also WB (2007: 44, 45, 54) 
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an “entrepreneurial citizenry” are also needed.75 In its 2007 Governance and Anti-
corruption (GAC) strategy the WB particularly stresses the importance of creating 
“positive incentives for change”76 as a balance to the “enforcement culture” fostered 
so far,77 and thus signals a new concentration on institutional and possibly other 
positive incentives (also termed corruption ‘prevention’78) as an amendment to the 
concentration on legal and judicial reform that characterised early phases of the IAC 
enterprise. Similarly, the UNDP stresses the necessity of “powerful disincentives for 
the would-be corrupt”,79 and TI also articulates the incentives logic as structuring its 
IAC efforts; in the private sector for example it “considers strong corporate govern-
ance systems a vital component of company efforts to reinforce the right incentives 
and practices and to address the corrupt practices they confront”.80 By way of the 
example of public water supply, one TI interviewee articulated incentives as being 
able to align the “greedy interests” of individuals to achieve positive outcomes.81 
Another interviewee told me, “I do think that systems could create incentives for 
people to be corrupt, or could create disincentives for them to be corrupt (...) if you 
don’t have the systems in place, it can be just going wild, so yes, I do think that sys-
tems are important in that sense, and systems can create very powerful incentives”.82  
As with the rationalist conception of human nature, the dominance of the incentives 
logic is not completely uncontested in IAC discourse, at least not in the cases of TI 
and the WB. One WB interviewee explained that what anticorruption measures need 
to bring about is only “partly an incentive and partly a cultural change”,83 and an-
other claimed that “you have to both work on values and behaviours. (...) We work 
on both obviously”.84 Yet, as Shah and Huther argue in a WB study, “[p]olicies 
which promote altruistic behavior face significant hurdles” and are “unlikely to be 
successful by themselves”; in contrast, they hold that much can be done to improve 
external incentives.85 As we shall see, this is what the WB attempts to do. The domi-
                                                 
75  WB (2007: 45) 
76  WB (2007: 30); see also Kaufmann/Gray (1998: 3, 7) 
77  WB (2007: 30), see also Kaufmann/Gray (1998: 3) 
78  WB (2007: 30); see also Kaufmann/Gray (1998: 3, 7); TI-S official 3 
79  UNDP (2004: 11, see also 10) 
80  TI (2009h: 2) 
81 See TI-S official 4 
82  TI-S official 1 
83  WB official 5 
84  WB official 2 
85  Shah/Huther (2000: 6-7) 
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nance of the incentives logic at the WB was also confirmed in interesting ways by 
the fact that, in the interviews, WB interviewees articulated WB staff themselves as 
following particular (adequate and less adequate) incentives in their anticorruption 
work.86 Also a TI interviewee articulated the incentives focus of his/her organisation 
as somewhat problematic, conceding that “ethics is an important feature which we 
have not paid enough attention to”. Yet again TI’s “more technocratic and institu-
tional approach” and its avoidance of “this issue of morals and values” was justified 
by articulating it as less imposing than an approach that concentrates on fostering 
values within people and their cultures or societies. As the interviewee explained, TI 
is keen to avoid preaching Western values, and this is particularly important for an 
organisation that has its Secretariat in Berlin.87 This statement re-iterates the ‘super-
differential demarcation’ (IV) drawn between IAC discourse and claims about West-
ern superiority discerned in chapter 3, this time in form of claims about the superior-
ity of Western values. While the slightly contested relationship between values and 
incentives within IAC discourse may thus be due to inconsistencies regarding the 
relationship between ‘values’ and ‘the West’ in the discourse, in any case these mi-
nor contestations in TI and WB discourse do not seem to translate into any disloca-
tions regarding the specifications of the Universal, as we will see.  
The incentives logic in which the Universal is constructed in IAC discourse means 
that this Universal is characterised by positive and negative incentives. While posi-
tive incentives appeal to people’s self-interest by dangling rewards, negative incen-
tives appeal to the individual by threatening it with damage to its self-interest. 
Through the combination of both types of incentives individuals’ behaviour is to be 
channelled in ways that benefit a particular conception of the ‘public interest’ which 
will be fully comprehendible only by the end of chapter 6. Five concepts in chain AC 
form important nodal points concentrating the articulations of these incentives: com-
petition, minimisation of discretion (what I call clear rules), transparency, account-
ability, and integrity. These nodal points are articulated in contrariety to the causes 
of corruption discussed in chapter 3. However, as will become clear in the analysis 
                                                 
86 See e.g. WB official 3; WB official 4; WB official 5; see also the WB’s GAC strategy for similar 
statements WB (2007: v, x, 10, 38, 43, 57, 72) 
87  TI-S official 5 
183 
 
below, they are linked in different and complex ways amongst each other and to the 
setting of positive and negative incentives.  
One may wonder why I present these concepts as specifications of the Universal in 
IAC discourse and perhaps not as instruments leading to the higher goals drawn out 
previously. As we will see, the answer is that the installation of these concepts in 
societies is indeed the main preoccupation of IAC discourse – which is why a TI 
interviewee called them the “means to an end as well as an end in itself”. While the 
discourse conveys that they “have positive effects for social change, development, 
inequality, democracy, trust among people, (...) economic growth” and so on, at the 
same time they are articulated as making societies in general “better societies” if 
they are put in place.88 The good, uncorrupted society is one that features transpar-
ency, accountability, competition and clear rules, nothing less and nothing more. 
While this may appear as a strangely technical, hollow, value-empty and procedural 
specification of a good society, we will see that it is in line with what has been inter-
preted as contemporary neoliberal notions of societal organisation, in which the 
safeguarding of particular governing mechanisms has become more important than 
the long-term realisation of particular grand societal visions.89  
The following sections investigate how the meaning of competition, clear rules, 
transparency, accountability and integrity is constructed in IAC discourse, and how 
these constructions concretises the nature of the Universal, structuring it according to 
the incentives logic. 
  
Clear rules of the game  
In chain AC, the clarification of rules and tasks functions as a precondition for the 
working of positive and negative incentives. There is no one handy term in IAC dis-
course that would represent this specification of the Universal; chain AC merely 
calls for the ‘minimisation of discretion’ or the introduction of things like ‘clear rules 
                                                 
88  TI-S official 6 
89 Cf. Dean (2010)  
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of the game’.90 As the UNDP states, for example, “clear rules of the game are less 
susceptible to corruption than are systems where official discretion is paramount”.91  
As we have seen, according to chain C, discretion provides opportunities for corrup-
tion. Obviously, the logic here is that as soon as individuals have some freedom in 
decisions that concern the fate of others, they will be tempted to take those decisions 
in their own interest to the detriment of the interests of others – which is why this 
freedom must be diminished by providing clear rules. The minimisation of discretion 
is advocated for both the public sector92 and the private sector,93 albeit in differing 
intensities, as we will see.  
However, the installation of clear rules not only takes away opportunities for corrup-
tion but it also sets the rules according to which the system is to function, which in 
turn prepares the ground for the ‘right incentives’ to be effectively set and to get 
their grip on the self-interested actors. Interestingly, in order to be enforceable by 
incentives, the rules of the game need not only specify the tasks of public officials, 
but also institute the game. As is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, it is those 
clear rules themselves that posit that society is to be structured according to incen-
tives that in turn will enforce those rules. The following sections will discuss how, 
according to the incentives logic in chain AC, the rules are enforced in the uncor-
rupted society via competition, transparency, and accountability, thus ensuring what 
IAC discourse also articulates as the ‘rule of law’.94  
 
Rewards through competition  
The market principle ‘competition’ is articulated as a particularly important nodal 
point of the uncorrupted society in chain AC, concentrating the articulation of posi-
tive incentives in different areas of society. Originally a principle associated with the 
private sector, competition is also advocated for the public sector, in order to align 
                                                 
90 See e.g. TI (2009h: 2)   
91  UNDP (2008c: 9); see also WB (f) 
92  TI (f); TI (2000: xxiii); UNDP (2008c: 31); WB (g); WB (2001); WB (i); WB (n) 
93 See e.g. TI (2009h: 2)   
94 See for example UNDP (2008a: 8, 15); WB (2007: 30, 31, 34); WB (o); WB (f); 
Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1); TI (o); UNDP (2008c: 29, 31); UNDP (a); TI (2000: xxiv) 
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the interests of assumedly egoistic politicians and other public officials with the pub-
lic interest.  
In accordance with Klitgaard’s corruption formula,95 competition is advocated as the 
main remedy against monopoly which is articulated as the main source of temptation 
for the abuse of power: “Regardless of whether it is in the private sector or public 
sector, competition is less vulnerable to corruption than monopoly”.96 Concerns in 
IAC discourse about monopoly, cartels and collusion in the private sector convey the 
damaging nature of monopoly for economic growth and reflect worries that monopo-
lies and the inhibition of competition that they bring with them will lead to rising 
prices, lower business volume, less pressure for innovation and lower quality goods. 
However, also in the public sector, monopoly is articulated as a problem by IAC 
discourse. Following the rational actor logic, a self-interested public official will use 
the power deriving from his/her monopoly not for the good of others but solely for 
the satisfaction of his/her own short-term economic interest. Consequently, the qual-
ity of public services will suffer and bring about all the negative consequences ar-
ticulated in chain C. 
Thus, in the uncorrupted society, monopoly needs to be ruled out by the institution 
and safeguarding of competition. IAC discourse claims that the private sector needs 
to be “thriving, open and competitive”97 and also the public sector is to be structured 
by the “principles of merit and competition”.98 The logic structuring articulations of 
competition conveys that through the provision of rewards for sticking to the rules, 
self-interested actors will be made to compete for rule-compliance and corruption 
will disappear. Apart from that, competition is articulated as leading to a more effi-
cient allocation of resources in both the public and the private sector and thus to be 
able to help societies provide better or more for people than other systems.99 Fur-
thermore, competition is also supposed to automatically insert a control element – as 
                                                 
95 C (Corruption) = M (Monopoly) + D (Discretion) – A (Accountability); UNDP’s modified version 
of it: Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) – (Accountability + Integrity + Transparency) (see 
chapter 3) 
96  UNDP (2008c: 9) 
97  WB (2007: 9); see also WB (2007: iii-iv, 40, 56); WB (i); Broadman/Recanatini (2000); WB (i); 
UNDP (2008a: 34); TI (2000: 259-268) 
98  UNDP (2008c: 8); see also WB (2007: 17, 47); UNDP (2008a: 19); WB (n); TI (2000: xxii-xxiv); 
TI (h) 
99  TI (h) 
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IAC discourse tells us, competitors will expose whoever tries to circumvent the rules 
of the competitive struggle, fleecing them of their rewards.100  
Yet according to IAC discourse, a society full of rational actors does not only need 
positive incentives. For example, the WB warns that excessive political competition 
“can become a destabilizing factor” if not properly regulated.101 While positive in-
centives direct self-interested actors by encouraging them to improve over others by 
sticking to the rules of the game, negative incentives are needed that threaten to 
damage individuals’ self-interest if they try to circumvent the rules. 
 
Transparency 
According to the logic of incentives, transparency is articulated as a crucial precon-
dition for negative incentives to be put in place. As the WB explains, transparency is 
“a system-wide feature that helps to make accountability relationships work”.102  
Statements abound in IAC discourse about the necessity of introducing transparency 
into the public sector and the realm of politics,103 the private sector,104 or just gener-
ally. The UNDP, for example, articulates transparency as one of the “indispensable 
pillars of democratic governance”,105 and TI, named after the concept of transpar-
ency, claims that “across the globe, transparency and accountability are critical to 
restoring trust and turning back the tide of corruption”.106 The NGO defines trans-
parency as the “[c]haracteristic of governments, companies, organisations and indi-
viduals of being open in the clear disclosure of information, rules, plans, processes 
and actions”.107 While it suggests that the 2008 financial crisis has been “precipitated 
by transparency and integrity deficits”108 amongst other failures, it claims that “pub-
lic officials, civil servants, the managers and directors of companies and organisa-
tions, and board trustees have a duty to act visibly, predictably and understanda-
                                                 
100 See e.g. WB (m); also WB (2007: 30) 
101  WB (m) 
102  WB (2007: 40) 
103  TI (2000: xxii-xxiv); UNDP (2008b: 37); TI (y); TI (b); TI (2009j: 44); WB (2007: 18) 
104 See e.g. TI (p); TI (2009i: 1); UNDP (2008b: 37) 
105  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
106  TI (w)  
107  TI (2009j: 44); see also UNDP (2008b: 37) 
108  TI (w) 
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bly”.109 However, transparency is not only articulated as the visibility of actions but, 
importantly, as the accessibility of information. For example, the UNDP defines 
transparency measures as comprising “all means of facilitating citizens’ access to 
information and their understanding of decision-making mechanisms”.110 The logic 
that emerges very coherently from the articulations of transparency in chain AC is 
that the visibility and the accessibility of information about the actions of self-
interested individuals in the public and private sectors will facilitate the discovery of 
rule-breaking. However, such discovery will only serve to threaten the would-be 
corrupt actors into compliance with the rules if they are sure that they will face dam-
age to their self-interest.  
 
Accountability:  oversight and sanctions 
Following the incentives logic, self-interested actors will only be sufficiently afraid 
of detection if they can be sure that someone actually looks at the information that 
has become available about their actions through transparency measures. Thus, in 
order to incentivise rational actors to stick to the rules of the uncorrupted society, 
transparency needs to be combined with oversight (also under the names of monitor-
ing or checks). Most regularly, the two concepts are advocated together in IAC dis-
course; for example when the WB recommends “[s]trengthening transparency and 
oversight over the use of budgetary resources”.111 While all three IAC organisations 
frequently articulate oversight as necessary within the public sector,112 TI seems to 
articulate the importance of oversight mechanisms for the private sector slightly 
more prominently than the other two organisations, for example, articulating the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008 as a result of failures in “policy, regulations, oversight and 
enforcement” that allowed for corruption.113 
Yet again, clear rules, transparency and oversight will only have the capacity to re-
strain rational actors from becoming corrupt if they can be sure that they will be fol-
                                                 
109  TI (2009j: 44) 
110  UNDP (2008b: 37); see also WB (2007: 18) 
111  WB (2007: 19, v) 
112  WB (2007: v, 6); Kaufmann/Gray (1998: 4); UNDP (2008c: 5); UNDP (2008b: 12, 37); UNDP 
(2008a: 9); UNDP official 1; TI (y), TI (2000: xxii-xxiv)  
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lowed by actual sanctions in the case of detected rule-breaking. The establishment of 
a combination of oversight and sanctioning mechanisms, which guarantee cuts for 
individuals’ self-interest in the case of rule-breaking, signifies in chain AC that ac-
countability is in place. As the UNDP puts it, accountability exists “when a power 
holder must explain or justify his or her behaviour to another actor, and/or face the 
threat of sanctions”.114 The WB makes the incentive logic behind the concept very 
explicit: “As political accountability increases, the costs to public officials of taking 
decisions that benefit their private interests at the expense of the broader public in-
terest also increase, thus working as a deterrent/disincentive to corrupt practices”.115  
Accountability is an immensely prominent nodal point in IAC discourse; it is articu-
lated in different forms, such as political,116 financial, administrative, and social,117 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal accountability,118 and is frequently advocated as an 
important societal principle by all three organisations.119 One TI interviewee for ex-
ample claimed that the “need for creating the accountability mechanisms is every-
where”.120 Another explained that “[w]e are saying that values of integrity and ac-
countability should be mainstreamed into all policies and regulations”121 and yet 
another called the “core message” of TI “the need for transparency and accountabil-
ity, participation, integrity”.122 Like transparency, accountability is most frequently 
articulated in chain AC as an important structuring principle for the public sector; 
however, attention should be drawn to divergences in IAC discourse here. The WB 
mentions the concept of accountability exclusively with regards to the public realm, 
for example as political accountability, which refers “to the constraints placed on the 
behavior of public officials by organizations and constituencies with the power to 
apply sanctions on them”.123 However, TI argues that the private sector also needs 
accountability;124 and the NGO defines accountability as “[t]he concept that indi-
                                                 
114  UNDP (2008b: 37); see also WB (m) 
115  WB (m); see also WB official 4; UNDP (2008b: 37) 
116  WB (m); UNDP (2008b: 37) 
117  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
118  TI (2009j: 2); UNDP (2004: 19) and UNDP (2008b: 37) 
119  UNDP (2008c: 9, 12, 13, 21, 25, 29); TI (f); TI (b); TI (y); TI (2000: xv); TI (2009f); WB (2007: 
40)  
120  TI-S official 1; see also TI-S official 2 
121  TI-S official 3 
122  TI-S official 4; see also TI-S official 1; TI-S official 7; TI-S official 6 
123  WB (m) 
124  TI (2009d) 
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viduals, agencies and organisations (public, private and civil society) are held re-
sponsible for executing their powers properly”.125 A TI interviewee highlighted how 
important it is that companies are also “transparent and accountable in their actions, 
to stakeholders, not just their shareholders”.126 Yet surprisingly, as we will see in 
chapter 6, this divergence does not have any consequences on the concrete policies 
articulated for the uncorrupted society and thus does not affect the advancement of 
the Universal. 
Importantly, instituting accountability is also articulated as less political and contro-
versial than promoting democracy or talking about the public interest,127 and as 
something on which people can agree despite political differences.128 One TI inter-
viewee explained for example, that within TI country teams, “you often find people 
from completely different political backgrounds and political tendencies working 
together – since the focus is in how to make more transparent and accountable gov-
ernment, and not whether the actors are or are not the ones that should be [in gov-
ernment]”.129 Much like corruption, “the values of accountability, transparency and 
integrity” are assumed to contain “a common core which is understood the same way 
across countries”. This is why a TI interviewee believed that “this whole cultural 
relativity will be less of a problem than people would think”.130 Next to the mecha-
nistic construction of the concepts discussed above, such articulations of these con-
cepts as uncontroversial serve to hide their political potential, in the sense of the 
ways in which their articulation may rearrange social structures to orient them to-
wards the realisation of a very particular Universal.   
From the discussion of the previous sections we can conclude that, according to the 
incentives logic discerned in chain AC, only when the rules are clear and when com-
petition, transparency, oversight and sanctions are in place to ensure those rules, will 
self-interested individuals be ‘steered’ in the ‘right’ ways, and will society be free 
from corruption.  
 
                                                 
125  TI (2009j: 2) 
126  TI-S official 4 
127 Cf. TI-S official 4; TI-S official 1 
128  See also TI-S official 6; UNDP official 1 
129  TI-S official 5 
130  TI-S official 6 
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Integrity and ethics 
One last, quite curious but also very important specification of the Universal in IAC 
discourse still requires discussion: integrity. Over the last decade, concepts like in-
tegrity, ethics and honesty were articulated into IAC discourse and now form an im-
portant nodal point in the articulation of incentives in chain AC.  
That integrity is an important concept for the UNDP is clear from its modification of 
the Klitgaardian formula to include integrity.131 It is confirmed by the frequently 
used abbreviation ATI (accountability, transparency, integrity) in the UNDP’s dis-
course132 and is also stipulated in UNCAC, which serves as the basis for UNDP’s 
IAC work.133 The UNDP demands that “corruption should also be looked at as a 
moral and ethical issue”134 and warns that it implies “declining moral and ethical 
values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority”.135 Furthermore, it 
frequently demands “strong measures of ethics and integrity”.136 TI’s emphasis on 
the concept of integrity is most clearly embodied in its concept of the National Integ-
rity System (NIS); this concept functions both as a grid for assessing how well socie-
ties are organised and as blueprints for reforming them accordingly.137 TI also gives 
out ‘integrity awards’ to “remarkable individuals and organisations” who have un-
dertaken “an action that is likely to significantly influence, or to have had significant 
impact on existing levels of corruption in his, her or their respective country, region 
or globally”.138 Although for the WB, the terms integrity and ethics are not as impor-
tant as for TI and the UNDP, nevertheless the organisation suggests the strategic 
promotion of “ethical behaviour by government, private sector, and civil society ac-
tors” in its governance and anticorruption strategy.139  
One might wonder how the articulation of such concepts with a moral-ethical conno-
tation as an important feature of the uncorrupted society fits with the rational actor 
                                                 
131 Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) – (Accountability + Integrity + Transparency) (UNDP 
2008c: 9) 
132  UNDP (2008a); UNDP (2008b: 12, 13, 21, 25, 29) 
133 Article 8 of UNCAC emphasises the „Promotion of integrity, honesty and responsibility among 
public officials” (UNDP 2008a: 9). 
134  UNDP (2008c: 9) 
135  UNDP (2008c: 12) 
136  UNDP (2008c: 9, see also 12) 
137 See e.g. TI (2000); TI (2001); TI (E); TI (2010a; TI (f); TI (p) 
138  TI (F) 
139  WB (2007: 18); see also  WB official 5 
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and the incentives logic structuring the discourse. In fact, one could be inclined to 
believe that articulations of integrity indicate that IAC discourse operates with a dif-
ferent and in fact more ‘moral’ and less mechanistic conception of human nature 
than the one I have discerned in the discourse so far. When the UNDP defines integ-
rity as “incorruptibility, an unimpaired condition or soundness” and as “synonymous 
with Honesty [sic]”140 this sounds indeed as if integrity was about someone’s charac-
ter or moral values rather than about external incentives. Yet, a closer analysis of 
these concepts in their discursive context renders surprising insights. 
The TI Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide defines ethics as “[b]ased on core 
values, a set of standards for conduct in government, companies and society that 
guides decisions, choices and actions”.141 While the kinds of values or moral princi-
ples on which this set of standards is to be based or the way in which they are to be 
determined are not mentioned, integrity is in turn defined by TI as behaviour and 
actions consistent with such ethical standards, thus creating a “barrier to corrup-
tion”.142 The ‘examples in practice’ that the Plain Language Guide gives for ‘integ-
rity’ reveal that an public official with integrity is one who complies with “relevant 
national laws”, and that ‘islands of integrity’ can be achieved through “community-
based oversight mechanisms”.143 Noticeably, also, the definition of integrity makes 
reference to people’s ‘behaviour’, rather than to their ‘conviction’. Thus, people’s 
internally held moral values have nothing to do with integrity; while law is indirectly 
articulated as constituting ‘ethics’, ethical behaviour or integrity is to be ensured 
through oversight.  
Such interpretations of integrity as part of the incentives logic are confirmed by the 
fact that TI and the UNDP present the incorporation of integrity as part of their more 
recent focus on ‘prevention’, which is in turn articulated as an improvement of their 
former law enforcement strategy. The Source Book, for example, argues that 
“[i]mportant though enforcement undoubtedly is, a strategy that focuses only on en-
forcement is almost certain to fail and is unlikely to yield a sustained ethical envi-
                                                 
140  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
141  TI (2009j: 18) 
142  TI (2009j: 24) 
143  TI (2009j: 24); see also UNODC (2004) 
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ronment that is alien to corruption”.144 Already the next sentence tells us that 
“[c]arrots are needed as well as sticks” and thus is paradigmatic for the incentives 
logic that also characterises the meaning of ethics and integrity in IAC discourse.145 
Similarly, the UNDP explains that while “[i]n the 1990s, technical assistance fo-
cused on law enforcement and public administration reforms designed to enhance 
transparency, reduce discretion and strengthen systems of oversight and control,” the 
perspective has now changed. To the UNDP “it became increasingly clear that such 
approaches were inadequate”, which is why it started to focus on “promoting ATI 
and improving ethics”, thus undertaking a shift “towards prevention”.146  
Yet it seems that this shift does not imply the equivalisation into chain AC of claims 
for such things as social solidarity, civic virtue or the commitment of public officials 
to fostering the well-being of their fellow citizens. A UNDP official clarified the 
meaning of integrity to me: “No, we do not define in a moral sense, we define more 
about the complying, you know, with the rules and regulations and the reputation 
and objectives. (...) It’s not moral. (...) If you’re going to be moral, then who’s moral, 
what moral, it’s very contradictory”.147 Rather than being “an end in itself”, the 
UNDP suggests, integrity is “better viewed as a path leading to the effective delivery 
of the services and performance of functions, which the public is entitled to receive 
from those who govern them”.148 Thus, the UNDP explicitly excludes from chain 
AC any arguments about integrity as a moral value and instead equivalises the con-
cept with effective public service delivery and the rule-conforming performance of 
public offices. Equally, TI conceives “the term integrity not in a moral – so far – not 
very much in a moral [sense], but really as an institutional feature, as transparency, 
as technocratic”.149 Accordingly, asked whether integrity meant something like 
‘rule-conforming behaviour’ or anything beyond that, two TI interviewees and a 
UNDP official responded that this was “a good definition”.150 In fact, through incen-
tives, individuals can actually be forced into integrity or morality: “Knowing that 
they’re accountable and that they might lose their job, they will not cheat, they will 
                                                 
144  TI (2000: xxii); see also TI (p) 
145  TI (2000: xxii) 
146  UNDP (2008b: 12) 
147  UNDP official 1 
148  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
149  TI-S official 6 
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actually hold on to the moral standards”.151 Political institutions are articulated as 
setting “incentives for those in office to be honest as well as to punish the misbehav-
iour of those who are not”.152  
                                                
Thus, we can conclude that through their equivalisations in chain AC of IAC dis-
course, concepts like integrity, morality, honesty and ethics are rearticulated in ac-
cordance to the incentives logic in a way that seeks to untie their presumable discur-
sive links to different social norms and values. They are ‘made to fit’ the rationalist, 
technical approach to IAC reform articulated in chain AC. Indeed, integrity is articu-
lated as the very fact that a self-interested individual follows the ‘right’ incentives 
that have been ‘successfully’ set for its rule compliance. ‘Ethics’ in turn are rearticu-
lated as those very rules and thus become a synonym for the ‘clear rules’ discussed 
above. With regards to the question of coherence or consensus this means that, again, 
while there is some divergence about the concept of integrity among TI and the 
UNDP on the one hand and the WB on the other (because the WB does not articulate 
the concept of integrity particularly prominently), this divergence does not lead to a 
dislocation of chain AC. This is because the concept, as articulated by the UNDP and 
TI, perfectly follows the incentives logic which coherently structures the discourses 
of all three organisations.  
A clarification can now be made regarding the confusion of the critical literature 
regarding the role of morality or normativity in IAC discourse. By being structured 
according to the incentives logic, IAC discourse does not lose its normative charac-
ter; as is increasingly becoming clear through the analysis, it strives for a particular 
Universal. The main norm that dominates and structures the good society according 
to IAC discourse articulates that people’s self-interest must be manipulated accord-
ing to the values of competition, transparency, and accountability. 
Thus, one could interpret the equivalisation of the concepts of integrity and ethics in 
IAC discourse as nothing more than simply a broadening out of the incentives logic 
via what could be interpreted as a redundant additive to accountability and transpar-
ency. A TI-interviewee actually problematised the mechanistic use of the term integ-
rity: “I think it’s been our weakness not to make the link between integrity and val-
 
151  WB official 4 
152  UNDP (2008c: 21) 
194 
 
ues more strongly. (...) I think we’ve missed out. (...) It’s been more a mechanistic 
term”.153 Yet, the integration of integrity and ethics into chain AC can still serve to 
render the fight against corruption persuasive by expanding the chain via these signi-
fiers. While their rearticulation in chain AC works towards untying the discursive 
links between integrity and ethics on the one hand, and signifiers such as a ‘good or 
virtuous character’ and a ‘preoccupation for the welfare of others’ on the other, IAC 
discourse can still draw on the positive connotation of these nodal points. This con-
notation extends far beyond IAC discourse and facilitates the acquisition in chain AC 
of subject positions preferring a more ‘morally’ connoted fight against corruption 
than the ‘technical’ enterprise of the ‘early’ IAC discourse seemed to be, with its 
focus on legal reform. At the same time, the discourse defends itself against potential 
dislocations that the support of explicit moral values in the fight against corruption 
might bring about, by redefining integrity and ethics according to its seemingly un-
controversial and ‘simply technical’ incentives logic.  
While this insight adds to our understanding of how the IAC project advances, the 
examination of specifications has rendered many interesting findings on the social 
logics of the uncorrupted society, the Universal pursued in IAC discourse. The un-
corrupted society pursued in IAC discourse consists of individuals that behave with 
integrity i.e. according to the rules due to being governed by the incentives set to 
their self-interest by competition, transparency, oversight and sanctions. 
While the main aim of this thesis lies on drawing out the discursive logics that struc-
ture IAC discourse, rather than on discussing the existence or otherwise of different 
aspects of (neo)liberalism in IAC discourse, it should be noted here however, that the 
logics operating in these specifications of the good, uncorrupted society seem to be 
reflective of what has been interpreted as neoliberal logics of government in the 
Foucauldian governmentality literature.154 Considering these interpretations here 
allows us to add another layer to the interpretation of social logics emerging from 
chain AC (see also chapter 6), rendering them even more intelligible. Moreover, re-
ferring these logics to what Dean interprets as wider logics of government character-
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ising the evolution of Western liberal systems of societal organisation allows us to 
contextualise the political nature of IAC discourse.  
How can this ideal of the uncorrupted society be neoliberal, one might ask, if it is 
simply concerned with getting the mechanisms right? The answer is that it can be 
interpreted as neoliberal because it is about getting the mechanisms right – the 
mechanisms that allow self-interested individuals to be free. This requires some ex-
planation. In liberalism generally, as Dean argues, people’s ‘natural’ self-interest 
must be respected in the sense that they should be provided with the freedom to pur-
sue it. Failing to respect this freedom, in liberal political thought, is “above all igno-
rance of how to govern properly”.155 A crucial precondition for the rational individ-
ual to be able to freely pursue its self-interest (without the interference of others), 
and in fact the sole justification of the state’s existence in liberal theory, is security – 
a preoccupation with which we could already identify among the negative conse-
quences of corruption in chain C.  
The neoliberal approach to government takes up this liberal key problematic, yet is 
distinct in that it aims no longer at the “security of processes considered external to 
the formal apparatuses of government” rather, what is at stake is “the security of 
governmental mechanisms themselves”.156 This chapter has shown that the articula-
tion of security risks posed by self-interested, corrupt individuals (in chain C of IAC 
discourse) is countered by a construction of the good, uncorrupted society (in chain 
AC) as principally one in which governing mechanisms are designed in a way that 
prevents them from being corrupted and thus destabilised. The good, uncorrupted 
society as specified by IAC discourse thus reflects this neoliberal preoccupation with 
governmental mechanisms, and interestingly its ‘representative’, the ‘fight against 
corruption’ evidences its processual character. It is a society that constantly fights 
against the corruption of its governing mechanisms, and it does so in a way that is 
again reflective of neoliberal logics of governing. As Dean explains, neoliberalism 
articulates individual choice as “no longer the rational response of the economic ac-
tor to the calculation of one’s natural interest” (as earlier liberalisms do) but instead 
conceives it as a “fundamental human faculty that can be made calculable and ma-
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nipulated by working on the environment and spaces within which it is 
exercised”.157 In neoliberalism more generally, and in IAC discourse more 
specifically, as we have seen, the behaviour of rational actors becomes the effect of a 
modification of variables in its environment, reflected in the incentives logic as a 
governing mechanism.158 Thus, we can not only interpret what the discourse 
constructs as corruption as wrongly conceived governmental mechanisms 
themselves; also, the good, uncorrupted society can be interpreted as one which 
constantly secures the right mechanisms for the governing of self-interested 
individuals, thus enabling them to be free. By focussing on governing mechanisms 
rather than grand societal visions, however, IAC discourse comes across as a rather 
technical enterprise, concealing its normative and potentially political nature.  
                                                
 
Conclusion 
This first part of the analysis of chain AC, the ‘anticorruption chain’ of IAC dis-
course has rendered different insights into the logics structuring IAC discourse, the 
ways in which the discourse constructs and advances a particular Universal, and the 
political nature of that Universal.  
The equivalisation of different signifiers in the forms of aims and specifications of 
the Universal in chain AC revealed by this chapter indicates the existence of strata-
gem I, the ‘equivalisation of differential claims which are oriented against the Uni-
versal’ (I). This stratagem can only be fully confirmed after the following chapters 
have investigated its coherence further. Consequently, the same is valid for strata-
gem II, the antagonistic division of the discursive space; while the existence of a 
coherent chain of equivalence oriented against the Universal has been demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, the stratagem can only be confirmed when the existence of a 
second, coherent chain has been distinguished. So while the chapter worked towards 
revealing the political nature of IAC discourse, no concluding statements can be 
made about its status as a hegemonic project. 
 
157  Dean (2010: 186), drawing on Foucault (2008: 270-271) 
158  Dean (2010: 186) 
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The third core stratagem, ‘representation’, however could be clearly distinguished. 
While corruption (in chain C) forms the main nodal point of the discourse, the ‘fight 
against corruption’ was found to fulfil the function of the symbolic equivalent of the 
Universal (or representative) in chain AC, giving the discourse its name.  
In a next step, the chapter showed how this ‘representative’ is rendered extremely 
open to interpretation through the equivalisations of a wide range of signifiers into 
chain C as aims of the fight against corruption. These aims, such as development, a 
‘world without poverty’, a ‘world without corruption’ but also equality, inclusion, 
democracy, economic growth, stability and so on were identified as only vaguely 
defined concepts which are again articulated to embody a range of other desirable 
concepts. By demonstrating this, the chapter was able to distinguish the fifth strata-
gem, the ‘emergent openness of interpretation’ (V) of the fight against corruption, 
which can be interpreted as endowing the fight against corruption with a beatific 
dimension, rendering it persuasive and thus facilitating the acquisition of new subject 
positions in chain AC as supporters of the fight against corruption. 
The second part of the chapter investigated several concepts that function as specifi-
cations of the Universal pursued in IAC discourse. Unlike the aims, these concepts 
were found to be very coherently articulated and their analysis was able to render the 
Universal, or the uncorrupted society, more intelligible. The analysis revealed that 
the rational actor logic discerned in chain C re-emerged in a particular way in the 
articulation of the five nodal points: minimisation of discretion (clear rules of the 
game), competition, transparency, accountability and integrity in chain AC. While 
internally held values of individuals were shown to be excluded from the articulation 
of these concepts, the five concepts were shown to be structured by what was called 
the ‘incentives logic’. According to this social logic, the uncorrupted society is one 
in which positive and negative incentives are combined in a way as to manipulate the 
behaviour of self-interested individuals towards rule compliance; this manipulation 
is to happen via the setting of incentives to what are conceived fixed self-interests of 
rational actors.  
Importantly, the chapter showed that also the concepts of integrity and ethics are 
rearticulated according to the incentives logic in chain AC, which constructs integ-





and ethics as the rules of the incentives game. At the same time, it was argued, the 
equivalisations of these concepts however, can serve to facilitate the acquisition of 
subject positions in chain AC, thus aiding the expansion of the hegemonic project 
through articulating it as not only a technical but also an ethical enterprise. 
At the time the analysis of specifications showed how the incentives logic articulates 
the fight against corruption as a technical and uncontroversial enterprise, camouflag-
ing its political nature. However, with regards to that political nature it was argued 
that this particular social logic distinguished in the specifications of the uncorrupted 
society (the Universal pursued by IAC discourse) can be regarded as suggestive of 
neoliberal logics of government as distinguished in particular by Dean.  
The next chapter will reveal the instruments with which this Universal is to be im-
plemented in societies around the globe according to IAC discourse.  
5  Instrumental claims – how to realise the uncorrupted society 
The last chapter revealed the basic social logic structuring the Universal that is ad-
vanced in the fight against corruption, and it investigated how the fight against cor-
ruption is rendered persuasive through a particular fantasmatic logic, namely the 
(mainly linguistic) construction of aims in chain AC, thus constructing stratagem V 
and facilitating the advancement of the Universal. Yet IAC discourse works in many 
more articulations and logics towards dividing the discursive space and advancing 
that particular Universal, constituting its discursive nature as a hegemonic project. 
Some very important political logics are comprised, following Nonhoff, in what can 
be distinguished as ‘instrumental claims’ in chain AC of IAC discourse. These 
claims or articulations comprise what the discourse articulates as instrumental for 
fighting corruption and refer mainly (though not solely) to the more ‘material’ i.e. 
non-linguistic ways in which the Universal is being advanced through the discourse.1  
Investigating those claims is the aim of this chapter, thus forming the second part of 
the analysis of chain AC, the ‘anticorruption chain’ of IAC discourse. Analysing 
those claims is important because only by understanding their logics can we come to 
better understand the political nature of IAC discourse as a hegemonic project that 
aims to transform existing societal structures in order to realise a particular Univer-
sal.  
The chapter reveals how IAC discourse attempts to advance the institution of the 
right incentives through different instruments which work on two levels of equivali-
sations. The first level consists in the instrumental claims for the societal re-
organisation of the target countries in which corruption is to be fought, which I call 
‘reform strategies’. This level of instrumental claims includes legal reforms, institu-
tional reforms, and active involvement of citizens, and will only be briefly discussed 
given that we will see its operations again and quite clearly in chapter 6. However, 
the chapter distinguishes in these reform strategies another appearance of the strata-
gem of ‘super-differential demarcation’ with regards to the scope of the anticorrup-
tion reforms in IAC discourse.  
                                                 
1 These non-linguistic articulations of instruments however are accessed in this thesis through the 
linguistic articulations in the text and interview material analysed. 
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The second level of instrumental claims in chain AC consists of articulations of what 
I call ‘instruments’; this refers to the manifold ways in which the reform strategies 
(and therefore also the Universal) are in turn pursued and put in practice in IAC dis-
course. As the chapter shows, this level comprises, on the one hand, equivalisations 
in chain AC of IAC actors but also other socio-political forces as implementers and 
supporters of the fight against corruption; by demonstrating this, the chapter distin-
guishes the stratagem ‘institution/ perpetuation of subject positions for socio-
political forces’ (VI) and explains how it aids the expansion of the hegemonic pro-
ject. On the other hand, the levels of ‘instruments’ comprises equivalisations of pro-
vision and production of expertise for the design of the reform processes; support in 
the form of advocacy, awareness-raising and civil society capacity building; the 
lending of financial resources; and technical support to target countries. The chapter 
discusses the logic structuring these ‘instruments’ and shows how the reform strate-
gies set out in the first part of the chapter are pursued via these ‘instruments’, paying 
particular attention to the question of consensus among the discourses of the three 
actors.  
The last part of the chapter deals with linguistic articulations in chain AC that con-
struct the previously discussed reform strategies and instruments as context-
sensitive, consensual and unpolitical. In doing so, it reveals further articulations of 
super-differential demarcations (stratagem IV), which work to defend IAC discourse 
against potential dislocations and facilitate the acquisition of subject positions in 
chain AC. 
  
Societal reform in the target countries  
Having outlined that this chapter will show us more about the political nature of IAC 
discourse, an explanation may be helpful here of why exactly the articulations of 
these reform strategies and instruments to pursue them are to be interpreted as politi-
cal articulations. In chapter 2, political practices or articulations and hegemonic ar-
ticulations more specifically, were defined as involving an element of force and re-
pression, as necessarily negating identity. While other types of articulations may 
simply reiterate social practices within sedimented structures, political articulations 
work against such structures; they attempt to dislocate and transform them. If this 
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transformation is oriented towards a new Universal and occurs through the division 
of the discursive space into two new chains of equivalences, then political practices 
are hegemonic practices. Following from these explanations it can be established that 
the question whether a practice is political or not depends on the discursive context 
in which it takes place. The question is then how I can interpret these articulations of 
reform strategies in chain AC of IAC discourse as political practices, if by way of the 
empirical focus of this thesis I do not look at the discursive context of these articula-
tions. The political character of IAC discourse however has become quite obvious in 
the course of the previous two chapters and will become even clearer in the present 
one. While chain C articulates corruption as an enormous problem caused by inade-
quate societal structures and locates it at the same time in all countries around the 
world but especially in developing countries, chain AC constructs a different form of 
societal organisation as better able to deal with this threat and therefore as superior. 
These (linguistic) articulations not only convey that existing societal systems all over 
the world and particularly those in developing countries need to be changed in order 
to conform to the social logic set out in chapter 4 (which would orient them towards 
a new Universal), but in fact are already working towards doing so. Thus, the (partly 
more ‘material’) articulations of particular reform strategies and ‘instruments’ for the 
fight against corruption investigated in this chapter simply extend these political and 
in fact hegemonic articulations (in the sense of further expanding a chain of equiva-
lence and thus the antagonistic division of the discursive space) that attempt to 
change existing social structures identified as inadequate. These articulations very 
likely involve the negation of identity in the societal systems to be reformed, both in 
the sense of the negation of social practices and the negation of those subjects who 
identify with these practices and structures. At the same time, chain AC constructs 
these particular reform strategies and ‘instruments’ as the correct methods of dealing 
with corruption, which is quite important for the IAC project, as we will see in the 
second part of this chapter. 
The three main reform strategies through which corruption is to be fought are legal 
reform, institutional reform, and civil society reform. Although IAC discourse does 
not directly articulate these three categories as such, they can be distinguished as 
major nodal points in chain AC. Changing laws, institutions and civil society is co-
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herently articulated as vital for the fight against corruption and thus for the realisa-
tion of the uncorrupted society as set out in chapter 4.  
 
Legal reform  
The reform of legal frameworks is an important ‘instrumental claim’ in IAC dis-
course2 and directly linked to the importance of clear rules of the game in the uncor-
rupted society (see chapter 4). According to IAC discourse, legal frameworks in the 
target countries need to be revised, amended and refined in order to minimise discre-
tion and suit the aim of corruption prevention in both the public and private spheres. 
The most important guidelines for the right design of laws are international legal 
frameworks designed to prevent corruption.3 The most prominent of them is UN-
CAC, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which the UNDP calls a 
“major landmark in the fight against corruption”,4 followed by the OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, also called the OECD anti-bribery convention.5 Such universal legal 
frameworks include quite wide-ranging provisions for the restructuring of adopting 
countries. UNCAC for example recommends the promotion, facilitation and support 
of “integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public 
property” as well as “international cooperation and technical assistance in the pre-
vention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery”.6 These recom-
mendations are in line with the specifications of the Universal discussed in the last 
chapter as well as with the ‘instruments’ articulated in IAC discourse. The rules to be 
implemented not only refer to the instituting of integrity and accountability, drawn 
out in chapter 4 as two key concepts in the incentives logic of the uncorrupted soci-
ety, they also include international co-operation and assistance, which is the princi-
pal activity of IAC actors, as this chapter will demonstrate. Such and other similar 
recommendations are interpreted and amended by IAC organisations in order to be 
instituted in the legal catalogue of target countries.  
                                                 
2  TI (2000); TI (d); TI (2009h: 4); TI (b); TI (f); TI (a); WB (v); UNDP (2008c: 27); OECD (1997) 
3 See e.g. UNDP (2008a: 3, 3, 5, 9); UNDP (2008c: 6); TI (v) 
4  UNDP (2008c: 27); see also WB (2007: 73) 
5 TI also lists a large number of other conventions and instruments which it regards useful in the fight 
against corruption, see TI (v). 
6  United Nations (2005), Chapter 1, General Provisions, Article 1, Statement of Purpose (a-c)  
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Institutional reform  
In addition to legal reform, institutional reform is articulated as another important 
reform strategy for the realisation of the Universal in IAC discourse.7 As TI knows, 
“corruption continues to lurk where opacity rules, where institutions still need 
strengthening and where governments have not implemented anti-corruption legal 
frameworks”.8 There is agreement in the discourse that economic institutions (in-
cluding markets and their regulatory institutions such as the banking system) as well 
as public institutions (including state agencies and political institutions) need to be 
reformed according to the incentives logic set out in the last chapter, in order to bring 
the interests of egoistic individuals in line with the rules. 
Developing “capable and accountable states and institutions” is particularly impor-
tant.9 For example, WB staff argues that public sector reforms should “involve 
changing government structures and procedures, placing greater emphasis on compe-
tition and incentives”.10 Similarly, the UNDP articulates the institution of electoral 
competitiveness and balance of power in the political institutional structure as “likely 
to determine the incentives for those in office to be honest as well as to punish the 
misbehaviour of those who are not”.11 However, companies must also make “efforts 
to reinforce the right incentives and practices”, which makes private sector reform 
necessary.12 Thus, through institutional reform, the incentives logic discerned in 
chapter 4 is to be translated into rational institutional designs in order to change ex-
isting, corruption-prone structures in both private and public realms.  
The right institutional structures to be brought about by this kind of institutional re-
form require the existence of a public-private divide. The realm of society needs to 
consist of a public sphere of the state which is separate from a private sphere of eco-
nomic relations and other ‘private’ activities; it contains different state institutions 
that are separate from market and civil society institutions. The fact that such a dis-
tinction is commonly accepted and in fact is more or less prevalent in many countries 
                                                 
7  WB (2007 mentions institutions on almost every page; see also TI (2009i: 2); TI (2008a: 3); TI 
(2009c); TI (2009g); TI (f); UNDP (2008b: 23) 
8  TI (y) 
9  WB (2007: ii) 
10  Kaufmann/Gray (1998: 4) 
11  UNDP (2008c: 21) 
12  TI (2009h: 2) 
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around the globe means that IAC discourse need not explicitly mention it as part of 
its institutional reform strategy. The public-private divide is instead articulated indi-
rectly through frequent mention of both spheres or related concepts (such as ‘public 
servant’, ‘public office’, ‘private sector’), thus reifying them as normal or even 
‘natural’ areas within nation states.  
One consequence of this division into spheres is that the tasks and rules of organisa-
tion for the two spheres differ, at least in part. As we will see, IAC discourse articu-
lates the application of the institutional incentives in public and private sector institu-
tions necessary to enable individuals to work for the public interest, rather than en-
dangering the welfare and lives of their fellow citizens, as the main task of the state. 
Furthermore, the incentives to be set within the respective spheres are weighted dif-
ferently, as will be shown. Yet, in spite of these differences between the two realms, 
at the same time the division between the two spheres as conceived in IAC discourse 
is blurred, as we will see more clearly in chapter 6. This blurring happens, first, 
through the articulation of the incentives logic as the universal principle for the or-
ganisation of both spheres, and, second, through the articulation of similar mecha-
nisms for setting these incentives.  
 
Civil society reform  
The third important reform strategy that chain AC articulates to realise the uncor-
rupted society concerns making civil society actors in the ‘private’ sphere actively 
participate in the abatement of corruption. What is needed is the participatory in-
volvement of politically active, constantly vigilant and informed citizens who re-
sponsibly use and safeguard their freedoms. All three IAC organisations never grow 
tired of emphasising the “key role” of civil society and the media for the fight 
against corruption both in the public and in the private sector.13 As we have seen in 
chapter 3, “[f]rustration and general apathy among a disillusioned public” and a con-
sequently “weak civil society”14 is regarded as fatal for the security of societies – 
                                                 
13  TI (2009b); see also TI (n); TI (2009i: 4); TI (v); TI (s); TI-S official 2; TI-S official 5;TI (2000: 
xxv); TI (2008b: 4, 5); TI (2009l: 6); TI (a); TI (2009f); TI (2009k); TI (n); UNDP (2008b: 10, 20); 
UNDP (2008a: 5, 9); UNDP (2008c: 29); UNDP (2004: 5, 16); WB (2007: iv, vii, 9, 17, 18, 20); 
Shah (2007: 242); WB (2009a: 23) 
14  TI (o) 
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instead, civil society needs to be “active, inventive, determined and decisive”.15 The 
founder of TI, Peter Eigen, even conceives civil society and private sector action as 
the decisive components of anticorruption reform: 
TI believes that for too long the role of civil society and the private sector 
has been understated, and it will be working with its national chapters to-
wards achieving progress in this area. When today’s developed economies 
were themselves in the stage of evolving, and had features that resembled 
those of many of today’s third world economies and economies in transi-
tion, it was just such action by civil society and the private sector that con-
fronted and successfully contained the corruption that was then threatening 
their economic development. We believe that history can, and must, repeat 
itself in this regard.16  
 
Apart from articulating the evolution of the Western developed economies rather 
clearly as the universally right path to a good society, this statement reifies other 
articulations by TI that demand that “those affected by corruption become in-
volved”17 in order to “ensure that real change is put into effect”.18 Similarly, the 
UNDP is convinced that the “fight against corruption in developing countries re-
quires an engaged and informed public and an increased demand for good govern-
ance”19 and accountability;20 and it demands that civil society groups engage in ad-
vocacy work21 in order to raise “public awareness about the seriousness of the cor-
ruption problem”.22 Both the UNDP and TI support their claims by citing UNCAC, 
which lists “inclusive participation” as a factor to be enhanced for the sake of in-
creasing the “demand for anti-corruption efforts”.23 Yet also the WB holds that 
“more proactive engagement of society is (...) vital”; the fight against corruption 
requires “[e]ngaged local communities” and a “proactive” and “vibrant civil society” 
which “support poverty reduction by helping to hold governments accountable for 
delivering better services, creating jobs, and improving living standards”. Especially 
                                                 
15  TI (2000: 1) 
16  TI (2000: xvi); see also WB (m) for a similar statement 
17  TI (2008b: 5) 
18  TI (n) 
19  UNDP (2004: 11) 
20  UNDP (2008c: 42) 
21  UNDP (2008b: 3) 
22  UNDP (2004: 11) 
23  UNDP (2008a: 9); see also UNDP (2008b: 10); TI-S official 2 
206 
 
in countries with deep-seated corruption, “traditional public sector management in-
terventions need to be supplemented with transparency and related reforms as well as 
wider engagement with multinationals, the domestic private sector, the financial sec-
tor, and civil society”.24  
This construction of participatory processes as important elements of an anticorrup-
tion reform strategy in chain AC may seem surprising given the specification of the 
Universal as a society which is structured by incentives to self-interested individuals 
in order to ensure the rule of law as the only legitimate form of coercion. It becomes 
less surprising on closer inspection (as provided by next chapter) of the articulations 
of civil society involvement in the discourse and by the realisation that it is mainly 
constructed as a mechanism to enhance transparency, accountability and integrity of 
actors in the public and private sector – and not so much as a means to introduce 
public deliberation or to increase the formal decision-making rights of citizens in the 
public or private arena.  
Thus, legal reform, institutional reform and the enhancement of a very particular 
form of civil society participation are the main reform strategies articulated in chain 
AC for the creation of an uncorrupted society. The next chapter will shed more light 
on how the incentives logic, these reform strategies and the ‘instruments’ discussed 
below play out in the concrete policy measures that are advocated in IAC discourse 
to ensure the right design of institutions and rules, the right kind of participation to 
safeguard these rules, and how this gives rise to a very particular kind of society. 
However, before we can come to the discussion of the ‘instruments’,  one final as-
pect regarding IAC reform strategies still requires consideration, and that is the 
scope of these reform interventions.  
 
Scope of reform 
As chapter 3 has demonstrated, corruption is coherently constructed as a problem 
that is present in all societies around the globe, and yet that is particularly prevalent 
in developing countries. Nonetheless, while TI’s national chapters are active in the 
fight against corruption in countries of both the Global North and the South, the WB 
                                                 
24  WB (2007: iv) 
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and the UNDP are development institutions that focus their IAC efforts on countries 
of the Global South. TI constructs most country systems as “in need of repair” and 
advances a “holistic approach to any anticorruption reform programme”, in form of 
the NIS,25 which includes elements that should be “common to every society”.26 The 
UNDP and the WB in turn articulate their IAC efforts most of all as part of their 
mandates to reduce poverty and advance development in developing countries, as the 
discussion of aims in chapter 4 revealed. This means an incoherent articulation of the 
basic stratagem of ‘super-differential demarcation’ (IV); while the discourses of the 
UNDP and the WB draw a line between developed and developing countries and 
claim to fight corruption i.e. divide the discursive space only in the former, TI’s re-
form or hegemonic claim is global.  
This appears as a rather striking divergence between the discourses of the three or-
ganisations. Yet when we evaluate this divergence in the light of the question of 
hegemonic expansion or dislocation, it actually seems rather unproblematic for the 
expansion of the hegemonic project for different reasons. The most important reason 
is that according to all three discourses developing countries are most in need of re-
form (see chapter 3) and thus should form the central targets of reform. In addition, 
neither the UNDP nor the WB explicitly contests TI’s activities in Western countries 
but rather backs them up, which means that TI’s discourse is not actually being dis-
located (discussed further below). Moreover, all three discourses articulate the fight 
against corruption as requiring global reform efforts in terms of common legal 
frameworks27 and the harmonisation of anticorruption policies of different anticor-
ruption actors28 – which automatically also widens the scope of the discourses of the 
WB and the UNDP. So while the scope of reform efforts in IAC discourse is still 
somewhat incoherently demarcated, there is great coherence on the logics that are to 
structure uncorrupted societies and on the ways in which they are to be advanced. 
The remaining part of this chapter focuses on the ways in which the reform strategies 
discussed above are advanced in IAC discourse through the articulation of particular 
‘instruments’.  
                                                 
25  TI (2000: vii) 
26  TI (2000: xx) 
27  TI (2009i: 4); WB (2007: vii-ix, 73); WB (v); UNDP (2008c: 27) 
28  WB (2007: vii-ix) 
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Anticorruption support through global intervention  
On what could be regarded as a second level of instrumental claims, several major 
‘instruments’ are equivalised in chain AC as advancing the fight against corruption 
by expediting the reform strategies above. The first and most prominent ‘instrument’ 
consists of the three IAC organisations themselves, as prominent subject positions in 
chain AC. Closely related to this, in turn, are articulations of the ‘instruments’ mone-
tary and technical support; advocacy, awareness raising and civil society capacity 
building; and the creation and provision of expertise for the design of IAC measures.  
The construction of these interventions by international organisations as necessary 
for the fight against corruption in target countries reiterates and amends previously 
discussed constructions in chain C of developing countries as particularly plagued by 
corruption and as less able to deal with corrupt human nature. The articulations of 
‘instruments’ in chain AC convey now that developing countries will not be able to 
shake off their corruption alone, which is why they need help. Implicitly, the people 
in the target countries are articulated as lacking the theoretical expertise, technical 
knowledge and/or monetary resources needed to carry out the necessary societal re-
forms (in the case of governments), but also the necessary awareness and capacity 
(in the case of civil society organisations and other private sector actors). They are 
articulated as requiring help from organisations like TI, UNDP and the WB (but also 
other actors), who are at the same time presented as the appropriate ones to under-
take these interventions. As the WB explains, “[g]overnments around the world are 
trying to improve governance and tackle corruption, and they are seeking support 
and learning from international experience to craft and implement complex programs 
of reform, build supporting coalitions, and monitor their impact. Development insti-
tutions have the opportunity and responsibility to help them”.29 
Thus, IAC discourse is not only a discourse about the threat of corruption, the inade-
quacy of societal systems in the developing world, about what good, uncorrupted 
societies are like, and how they should be brought about; it is also a discourse about 
the important role of international organisations in helping countries all over the 
world to bring about this Universal and become uncorrupted societies. 
                                                 
29  WB (2007: ii) 
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The following sections will discuss the different ‘instruments’ regarding the interna-
tional interventions against corruption; in particular, they will draw out how these 
articulations of international anticorruption intervention in IAC discourse contribute 
in important ways to the reform strategies set out earlier. As we will see, these ar-
ticulations of ‘instruments’ in chain AC not only comprise textual statements but 
also other, non-linguistic articulations such as co-operations of IAC organisations 
with each other or with other actors; the acquisition, lending and spending of re-
sources; the provision of technical expertise; the use of particular kinds of knowl-
edge etc. Additionally, this chapter will focus on an overarching logic in form of a 
particular super-differential demarcation that characterises the articulation of these 
‘instruments’, which serves to shield IAC interventions from controversy and dislo-
cation.  
 
Subject positions – international supporters of the fight against corruption 
The analysis of chain C has shown that IAC discourse separates all subject positions 
from their potentially corrupt human nature and articulates them as (potential) vic-
tims of corruption and thus as stakeholders in the fight against corruption. Moreover, 
chapter 4 has revealed that people in all areas of society can be made to serve the 
public interest, and thus to work towards the Universal if only the right incentives 
are in place. Both these discursive moves serve to institute a huge number of subject 
positions for social actors in chain AC, such as public officials, politicians, govern-
ments, business people, the ‘poor’, people from developing countries, citizens, civil 
society and so on. Chain AC however, also includes other subject positions that form 
particularly prominent nodal points, namely subject positions for IAC organisations 
as well as for other socio-political forces. The following sections reveal the logics in 
which these subject positions become instituted in chain AC and discuss what this 
means for IAC as a hegemonic project. 
Following Nonhoff, the antagonistic divide of IAC discourse as a hegemonic project 
is constituted ‘from one side’ of the divide, namely from the side of the ‘hegemonic 
chain’ AC. In the case of IAC discourse, this entails the construction of important 
subject positions for IAC actors in the advancement of this hegemonic project, 
through both linguistic and non-linguistic articulations. These articulations not only 
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secure a ‘place’ for the three organisations in the expanding hegemonic project; they 
also work towards advancing that hegemonic project through equivalising three or-
ganisations which form particularly powerful nodal points as subject positions in 
chain AC. A closer look at these articulations of subject positions not only enables us 
to distinguish the hegemonic stratagem ‘institution/ perpetuation of subject positions 
for socio-political forces’ (VI), but also allows us to discuss the existence of the 
stratagem of the ‘actual advocate’ (VIII) and the question of consensus among the 
discourses of the three IAC actors.  
 
Subject positions for IAC organisations 
TI portrays itself as “the global civil society organisation leading the global fight 
against corruption”,30 through awareness raising and the work with “partners in gov-
ernment, business and civil society”.31 It points out its “remarkable success at the 
international level”, its role in making “the issue of corruption” an internationally 
important topic,32 and the fact that it has “managed to generate political pressures for 
substantive reforms around the globe”.33 It articulates itself as a key actor in advanc-
ing the Universal through emphasising its cracking of the “taboo against discussing 
corruption in international gatherings” and especially at the WB, and by stressing its 
successful support of the OECD anti-bribery convention “which when it was signed 
was described by the New York Times and the Washington Post as being a triumph 
for Transparency International”. Overall, it constructs itself as “a serious player in 
the anti-corruption struggle”, whose CPI is “is quoted throughout the world on a 
daily basis”.34  
The NGO also makes sure to frequently stress the importance of the growing number 
of national chapters of which the “TI-network” consists.35 They play an important 
role in carrying out the fight against corruption in that they regularly facilitate coun-
try-internal discussions in order to promote the finding of problem-specific solu-
                                                 
30  TI (z) 
31  TI (2009i) 
32  TI (p) 
33  TI (n) 
34  TI (p); see also TI (n) 
35  TI (a) 
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tions,36 for example through National Integrity Workshops.37 Moreover, they play 
“an important role in promoting conventions from the negotiation phase through to 
monitoring their transformation into law and their application in practice”.38 The 
growing number of chapters is articulated as a “clear signal of the importance the 
issue of corruption has gained”.39 
TI’s 2011 donor income of around €20 million,40 which originates largely from 
Western European governments/aid agencies and transnational companies, is not 
only a sign of the success of its institution as an important subject position in the 
IAC hegemonic project; it also allows TI to continue building up that position by 
expanding chain AC through incorporating more actors and co-operation partners, 
and thus works towards advancing the hegemonic project.  
Similarly, the UNDP articulates itself as an experienced and well-established actor in 
the field of IAC, as “a leading provider of anti-corruption technical assistance”41 for 
whom the fight against corruption is “a major priority”.42 While anticorruption 
measures are articulated as a “long-standing component of UNDP country Pro-
grammes”43 at least since the mid-1990s, the UNDP highlights its “holistic approach 
to fighting corruption”, which engages a “range of national stakeholders” – most 
importantly government institutions and civil society organisations.44 Reifying its 
prominent position as an IAC actor, the UNDP allocates great parts of its budget to 
IAC measures; in 2010, for example, the total amount of money spent by UNDP on 
anti-corruption interventions was US$80 million.45 At the time of my interviews in 
late 2010, the UNDP had “more than 112 projects going on currently at the country 
level” in the area of anticorruption.46 
The WB equally highlights its role as an important player in the area of governance 
and anticorruption reform, mainly by emphasising the role of IAC work in its overall 
                                                 
36  TI (p) 
37  TI (p) 
38  TI (v) 
39  TI (p) 
40  TI (2011: 39) 
41  UNDP (2008b: 7) 
42  UNDP (2008b: 7) 
43  UNDP (2008a: 5) 
44  UNDP (2008c: 30) 
45 UNDP (2012a)  
46  UNDP official 1 
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portfolio. The adoption of a new Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy in 
2007, which was updated in 2012, has “made GAC an integral part of Bank opera-
tions across sectors and countries”.47 The organisation articulates “governance re-
form including anti-corruption strategies” as a “priority in its work”48 and points to 
its “[h]undreds of governance and anti-corruption activities” taking place “through-
out the World Bank”.49  Besides regulating bank-internal conduct, these efforts tar-
get corruption in WB funded projects and corruption in the target countries and also 
include work at the global level, namely “partnerships with multilateral and bilateral 
development institutions, civil society, the private sector, and other actors in joint 
initiatives to address corruption”.50 According to the WB, “[t]he question is not 
whether but how the WBG can be a useful partner for GAC reform under different 
circumstances”.51 
 
Co-operations between IAC organisations 
In addition to these articulations of TI, the UNDP and the WB as important socio-
political forces for advancing the fight against corruption we also find in the dis-
courses of these three organisations mutual articulations of the respective other or-
ganisations as important forces in the fight against corruption.  Such articulations not 
only strengthen the important subject positions constructed for the three IAC actors 
but also demonstrate the consensus between them. 
On TI’s homepage and in its documents we find countless links and references to the 
WB and the UNDP, in the form of suggestions for ‘further reading’ on different top-
ics,52 citations of sources of knowledge53 or they are mentioned as partners in the 
fight against corruption. For example, both are mentioned as displaying “Best prac-
tice in anti-corruption strategies for development programmes”.54 TI co-operations 
with the other two IAC organisations also take the form of using WB data in the 
                                                 
47  WB (2009b) 
48  WB (g) 
49  WB (h) 
50  WB (h) 
51  WB (2007: 1, e.i.o.) 
52 See for example: TI (G); TI (H); TI (J) 
53 TI (2008c: 3, 7); TI (2008a: 5); TI (2008b: 2, 3, 23); TI (p); TI (K);  TI (x); TI (m); TI (L);TI (M); 
TI (N);  TI (O);   
54  TI (P)  
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preparation of the famous CPI,55 of mutual commenting on papers between TI and 
the WB,56 executive training workshops held jointly by TI and the WB Institute,57 
the inclusion of TI in various UN and WB forums on anticorruption58 such as “advi-
sory committees on their governance and anticorruption strategies”59 and other kinds 
of co-operations with the WB institute.60  
Similarly, TI and the WB are mentioned as UNDP’s partners.61 For example, the 
UNDP discourse refers to a wide range of WB research62 to demonstrate extent,63 
causes and consequences of corruption64 as well as for other indicators.65 It also ar-
ticulates TI as “the leading NGO in the area of anti-corruption” and the UNDP 
quotes from CPI documents,66 TI Global Corruption Report results67 and from TI 
press releases.68 The overlap in ‘knowledge’ even goes as far as that the UNDP cop-
ies whole passages from the TI Source Book into its own documents.69 While the 
UNDP already undertakes harmonisation efforts with the WB,70 UNDP staff would 
like to see the co-operation go even further; given that the co-operation with the WB 
and TI is “more about knowledge sharing” a UNDP interviewee told me that “at the 
country level, you know, I wish that we had more collaboration among different or-
ganisations there”.71  
Also the WB discourse articulates TI and the UNDP as important actors in the IAC 
project.72 It cites UNDP documents73 and calls the organisation an ‘external partner’ 
in its governance programme,74 stating that “if possible we try to collaborate – either 
                                                 
55  TI-S official 8 
56  TI-S official 1 
57  TI (h) 
58  Sampson (2010: 274); see also TI-S official 5 
59  TI-S official 4; see also TI-S official 5 
60  TI-S official 1; TI-S official 5 
61  UNDP (2008c: 41); see also UNDP (2008d) 
62  UNDP (2008c: 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21) 
63  UNDP (2008a: 7) 
64  UNDP (a) 
65  UNDP (2008a: 8) 
66  UNDP (2008c: 10, 16, 25) 
67  UNDP (2008c: 19) 
68  UNDP (2008c: 13, 24) 
69  UNDP (2004: 11); cf. TI (2000: xxiv) 
70  UNDP official 1 
71  UNDP official 1 
72 See e.g. WB (w) 
73 See e.g. WB (d); WB (q) 
74  WB (x) 
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by implementing jointly some of this work, or to bring support”.75 For example, this 
involves joint data collection enterprises in target countries.76 The WB also recog-
nises “the important role played by international NGOs such as Transparency Inter-
national” and declares that the “Bank and TI have collaborated in many ways”, for 
example through the WBI’s input to TI’s Source Book,77 WB funding of activities 
carried out by TI national chapters78 or through the contribution to WB working pa-
pers by TI’s Director of Research. Another example of mutual articulation of subject 
positions is TI’s collaboration with the WB Institute “in the design and delivery of 
workshops and seminars that bring together civil society representatives, often with 
government officials, to help develop and monitor national anti-corruption strategies 
and programs”.79 Such co-operation is to be expanded in the future; the WB GAC 
strategy entails “forging stronger alliances with global civil society organizations 
such as Transparency International (particularly their country-based chapters)”.80 
However the WB already uses Transparency International’s National Integrity Sys-
tem Country Studies to design the WB’s country assistance strategies81 and coun-
tries’ CPI ranking to decide on whether “more sophisticated” projects can or cannot 
be done in a particular country.82 Apart from that, the WB also presents TI’s Integ-
rity Pacts as a good method to curb corruption in procurement,83 references its Bribe 
Payers and Corruption Perception Indices,84 and lists numerous other TI publications 
on its anticorruption publication list.85  
In addition to these intense co-operations and linguistic articulations that reify each 
other’s subject positions as important corruption fighters there is a high level of in-
terchange of staff between TI, UNDP and WB personnel.86 This not only means that 
the three organisations articulate the respective staff of the others as qualified per-
                                                 
75  WB official 4 
76  WB official 4 
77  WB (z) 
78 See e.g. WB (y) regarding the WB funding of the Zambian TI chapter 
79  WB (z) 
80  WB (2007: 30) 
81  WB (2007: 15) 
82  WB official 6. According to this interviewee, the CPI ranking helps country strategists to “get a 
better feeling of the environment” for a particular project. 
83  WB (e); see also WB (A) 
84  WB (B) 
85  WB (q) 
86 This was obvious from the staff profiles on the TI website, access via TI (Q), which however have 
now been removed.  
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sonnel; this ‘rotation’ of capacity and the concomitant exchange of knowledge about 
how to best fight corruption can also be interpreted as enhancing the consensus be-
tween the three actors on the ‘right’ anticorruption approaches and thus the nature of 
the uncorrupted society.  
The articulations of subject positions discussed here certainly allow distinguishing 
the stratagem of the ‘institution/ perpetuation of subject positions for socio-political 
forces’ (VI). Although some of the self-praise may be exaggerated, it is still clear 
that all three are world-renowned social actors endowed with a considerable amount 
of monetary resources, expert authority and a large network with other socio-
political forces. Equivalising these prominent positions in the discursive structure 
into chain AC considerably enhances the hegemonic potential of IAC discourse i.e. 
its ability to expand further.  
It is particularly noticeable that although all three organisations praise themselves as 
important subject positions in the fight against corruption, there seem to be no con-
flicts about the ‘actual advocate’ (which would be the eighth hegemonic stratagem 
but cannot be distinguished here). No one organisation is attempting to elevate itself 
to the position of the only right and ‘actual advocate’ of the fight against corruption. 
Rather, an impressive extent of consensus and co-operation could be detected in the 
analysis, which strengthens the positions of IAC actors as key actors (or ‘instru-
ments’) in the fight against corruption. 
According to Nonhoff, the stratagem of the ‘actual advocate’ is a secondary strata-
gem which can only be detected when the hegemonic project has expanded consid-
erably and acquired relative stability.87 In light of this, the absence of the stratagem 
would mean that IAC discourse is still in the process of acquiring strength – before 
the time comes when one or more organisations will try to articulate themselves as 
the ‘actual advocate’ of this project and attempt to establish the ‘actual meaning’.88 
Maybe at some point TI will attempt to outstrip the powerful WB in its anticorrup-
tion engagement and claim to be the only real corruption fighter? However, given 
that according to IAC discourse the fight against corruption can never be won, and 
given that the prominent role of the corruption fighters actually depends on the con-
                                                 
87  Nonhoff (2006: 234) 
88 See Nonhoff (2006: 234) 
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tinued presence of corruption, this interpretation does not seem very convincing. It 
rather seems that articulations of consensus and mutual co-operation of IAC organi-
sations work as a strategy to secure the long-term institution of important (even if 
not solely prominent) subject positions of IAC actors in the great global coalition 
against corruption.  
 
Subject positions for other political-societal forces 
However, besides instituting subject positions for our three IAC actors, chain AC 
also includes manifold subject positions for other important socio-political actors, 
articulating them as having a role in the fight against corruption and thus attempting 
to expand the hegemonic project even further. 
In line with TI’s coalition building approach, an enormous number of co-operation 
partners and external sources of knowledge are articulated in its discourse, of which 
only some illustrations can be given here. For example, TI works with “leading in-
ternational organisations in articulating anti-corruption policies”, lobbies the “gov-
ernments of industrialised countries”,89 pursues “policy dialogues with individual 
donors and multilateral institutions” and has links to the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD.90 Other partners include the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource 
Centre,91 Action Aid, the Revenue Watch Institute, the International Budget Partner-
ship and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), to mention but a 
few.92 Its Business Principles are “the product of a collaborative effort involving 
companies, academia, trade unions and non-governmental bodies”93 and TI also co-
operates with the government development agencies of Canada, Germany, Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (in the U4 anticorruption resource 
centre),94 as well as with a number of universities and research institutes in the anti-
corruption research network platform ACRN.95 Apart from those co-operations it 
also positively mentions numerous important national and international organisations 
                                                 
89  TI (p) 
90  TI (l) 
91  TI (l) 
92  TI-S official 7 
93  TI (2009h: 8) 
94  TI (R)  
95  ACRN 
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for their engagement in the fight against corruption96 and web sources for anticor-
ruption knowledge.97 Similarly, the UNDP and the WB co-operate with many other 
important partners in the fight against corruption. UNDP’s “key partners in the area 
of anticorruption” include UNODC98 and numerous other UN agencies, the OECD, 
international finance institutions such as the Asia Development Bank, academic in-
stitutions such as the Basel Centre, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute and the U4 Anti-
corruption Resource Centre,99 international organisations such as the WHO,100 and 
bilateral aid agencies such as GIZ.101 The WB states in its GAC strategy that “[t]he 
WBG will work with donors, international institutions, and other actors at the coun-
try and global levels to ensure a harmonized approach and coordination”.102 Such 
actors include for example the UNODC with which the WB co-operates in the StAR 
Initiative for the recovery of stolen assets.103 However, co-operations are also in 
place with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative (EITI), the IMF, the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Australian Govern-
ment Overseas Aid Program (AUSAID), the UK Department for International De-
velopment (DFID), the OECD-DAC Governance Network, the Global Integrity Alli-
ance, Publish What You Pay, the Global Organization of Parliamentarians against 
Corruption, The Access Initiative, the UN, other donors, regional development banks 
as well as export credit agencies.104  
One does not have to go into any more detail to recognise the power that IAC dis-
course acquires via the three IAC actors and their immense network of influential 
societal actors that support their IAC efforts. All these and many more prominent 
political-societal actors are articulated into chain AC by the three organisations in 
question, as part of the fight against corruption and the enterprise of realising the 
incentive-structured Universal. The fact that the co-operation partners of the three 
                                                 
96 See TI (f), TI (2009g) 
97  TI (G); TI (m)  
98  UNDP (2008c: 41) 
99  UNDP (2008c: 41) 
100  UNDP official 1 
101  UNDP (2008b: 2), see also UNDP official 1 
102  WB (2007: iii) 
103  WB (v); UNODC (2007)  
104  WB (2007) 
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organisations seem to differ, at least in part, does not pose a problem for the coher-
ence of chain AC. Rather, it facilitates its expansion via an immense network of 
socio-political forces many of which are themselves networks which again consist of 
a number of actors. The fact that co-operations are in place with many means that 
these subject positions have not just been offered by IAC discourse but actually 
taken up by the respective actors. According to the Nonhoffian framework, this again 
indicates that IAC discourse has already been rather successful in expanding as a 
hegemonic project and is enhancing its ability to expand even further via the mani-
fold discursive links that these socio-political forces concentrate.105 
Given this concentration of powerful nodal points (in the form of subject positions of 
societal forces) in IAC discourse, it is immensely important to investigate, in the 
next section, the exact instruments through which the fight against corruption is pur-
sued in the target countries, where it is likely to have an impact. The articulation of 
subject positions for IAC actors (as the most important ‘instrument’ for instituting 
the Universal) has given rise to the application of more specific ‘instruments’ linked 
to the discourses of the three organisations, and the following analysis will reveal the 
particular logics that structure them. 
 
Expertise – the provision of the ‘right’ knowledge 
The main ways in which IAC interventions in IAC discourse take place are through 
the provision of knowledge about corruption and anticorruption, through monetary 
and technical aid, and through advocacy and awareness raising activities by the three 
IAC actors. All these kinds of ‘instruments’ work (to differing degrees) towards the 
implementation of the three reform strategies discussed above (legal reform, institu-
tional reform, and civil society reform) and thus towards the restructuring of socie-
ties in the target countries according to the incentive-based Universal.  
                                                 
105 Given the operationalisation of IAC discourse for the purposes of this thesis, the analysis can only 
reveal institutions of subject positions on the strategic policy level. Furthermore, nothing can be said 
about how ‘smooth’ the institution of subject positions works in IAC discourse, and about whether 
or not there is resistance from different actors such as governments of Third World countries but 
also other actors against being articulated into chain AC. 
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Due to the different history, legal form and different organisational structures of the 
three organisations, their discourses emphasise different ‘instruments’. While WB 
discourse centres on lending and technical assistance, UNDP discourse emphasises 
technical assistance and to a lesser extent civil society capacity building, and the 
focus of TI discourse is on advocacy and awareness raising. The provision of knowl-
edge however, is an important ‘instrument’ in all three discourses. This means that 
they advance the Universal in differing but also common ways and we will see how 
these combine.  
The identification and provision of the ‘right’ knowledge about how to fight corrup-
tion is central to IAC discourse. This knowledge is not only integral to the design of 
the more material IAC ‘instruments’ such as lending and technical assistance and 
civil society capacity building but is also much more widely disseminated through 
IAC policy documents, advocacy campaigns, awareness raising events, trainings and 
diverse other knowledge sharing and awareness raising practices. 
The ‘right’ knowledge consists of academic studies and of research conducted by 
IAC organisations themselves. While both TI and the WB are quite active in the pro-
duction and dissemination of knowledge in the area of anticorruption, the UNDP’s 
focus is more on dissemination and knowledge exchange. However, there is striking 
consensus on the kinds of knowledge used and produced. As a WB interviewee told 
me, “we [WB, TI and UNDP] have a similar approach in methodology, we share 
indices” and also collaborate with regards to publications “on methodology to evalu-
ate corruption”.106  
This shared knowledge is a very particular kind of knowledge. The most prominent 
example of academic literature used in IAC discourse has already been mentioned in 
the previous two chapters – Klitgaard’s study about the causes of corruption, sum-
marised in the corruption formula, and based on the definition of corruption as ‘the 
misuse of office for unofficial ends’.107  
Klitgaard summarises the assumptions and main argument of his approach in an arti-
cle written for the IMF:  
                                                 
106  WB official 4 
107  Klitgaard (1998) 
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Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. 
Whether the activity is public, private, or nonprofit, and whether it 
is carried on in Ouagadougou or Washington, one will tend to find 
corruption when an organization or person has monopoly power 
over a good or service, has the discretion to decide who will re-
ceive it and how much that person will get, and is not accountable. 
Second, corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion. True, 
there are both saints who resist all temptations and honest officials 
who resist most. But when bribes are large, the chances of being 
caught small, and the penalties if caught meager, many officials 
will succumb. Combating corruption, therefore, begins with de-
signing better systems. Monopolies must be reduced or carefully 
regulated. Official discretion must be clarified. Transparency must 
be enhanced. The probability of being caught, as well as the penal-
ties for corruption (for both givers and takers), must increase.108 
This quote reflects quite accurately the articulations of corruption, its causes and 
human nature in chain C and the incentives logic revealed in the specifications of 
corruption in chain AC, which in turn translates into the three reform strategies men-
tioned above which will be pursued with the help of particular ‘instruments’. Klit-
gaard’s approach relies on a universal conception of corruption which is replicated 
everywhere and responds to the same remedies everywhere. Rather than involving 
the violation of social norms and values, corruption is based on rational calculation 
in the name of self-interest, independent of the social context. Honest officials exist 
but this is not of any interest to the strategies to be applied to combat corruption. It is 
assumed that it is more useful to sketch human behaviour in a mathematically in-
spired formula. Those in focus are the potentially corrupt, and those need to be re-
strained through the design of ‘better systems’ which set the right incentives.109 Ac-
cordingly, his recipe against corruption consists of the reduction of monopoly and 
discretion as well as the increase of transparency, oversight and punishment.  
This clearly exposes the immensely strong influence that the rational choice inspired 
corruption research discussed in chapter 1 (which continues to dominate the research 
landscape on corruption) has had on the structures of IAC discourse discerned so far. 
                                                 
108  Klitgaard (1998: 4), drawing on his research on corruption from 1991 
109  Klitgaard (1998: 6)  
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It shapes the constructions of corruption, of human nature, of the specifications of 
the uncorrupted society, and of the ways in which it is pursued. This shared knowl-
edge that IAC discourse coherently equivalises as an ‘instrument’ to help construct 
the ways in which corruption should be combated in fact comes to determine the 
meaning of the uncorrupted society, the Universal, itself.  
The trained economist Klitgaard, whose works are cited by the UNDP and even pub-
lished by the WB and TI,110 is in good company in IAC discourse, which is replete 
with references to institutional economics literature111 and similar studies that repli-
cate the pre-social, rational actor logic and partly also undertake assessments of cor-
ruption and its causes and consequences through quantitative statistical analysis.112 
There is great overlap between the authors of positivist, rational choice based publi-
cations on corruption in academic journals mentioned in chapter 1 and those of pub-
lications in journals, research papers and edited volumes published by IAC organisa-
tions, reflecting manifold co-operations between IAC actors and positivist scholars 
since the very inception of IAC discourse.113  
For its anticorruption corporate governance strategy, the UNDP uses pertinent stud-
ies by Treisman,114 Lederman et al.,115 Mauro,116 Le Billon,117 and Svensson (a Sen-
ior Economist at the WB in 2005),118 which are all incentive-based corruption ex-
planations and quantitative assessments.119 Lederman and others use “a cross-
country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention 
                                                 
110  UNDP (2008c: 9); Klitgaard (1998) 
111 In IAC discourse this institutional economics literature is also called political economics or politi-
cal economy literature (see e.g. WB C). However, it should be clear that the present positivist ap-
proach taken, for example, by studies of Rose-Ackerman reflects only one of many different theo-
retical perspectives one can assume in order to analyse the political economic nature of a particular 
research object. 
112 See WB (q); WB (D) 
113 The authors who have published specifically for the WB or the IMF include for example 
Coolidge/Rose-Ackerman (1997); Rose-Ackerman (1996); Rose-Ackerman (1996a); Klitgaard 
(1995); Klitgaard et al (2000); McLaren et al (2003); La Porta et al (1997); Lederman et al (2001), to 
mention but a few. Mauro published several papers for the IMF (where he worked as an economist), 
such as Mauro (2004); Mauro (1997). In the foreword to the TI Source Book, the author Jeremy 
Pope thanks Daniel Kaufmann from the WB for his help and also records his “gratitude to Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, the founder of the recent political-economic literature on corruption, who with 
infinite patience helped see the original edition through from vague outline to finality” (TI 2000: 8).  
114  Treisman (2007) 
115  Lederman et al (2005) 
116  Mauro (1998) 
117  Le Billon (2008) 
118  Svensson (2005) 
119  UNDP (2008c) 
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to political institutions that increase accountability”. They conclude that their results 
“confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. 
Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all 
associated with lower corruption”.120 Svensson in turn provides a table which lists 
“the bottom 10 percent most corrupt countries” from four different data sets.121 From 
these examples we can see how this kind of research is reflected in IAC discourse 
both in terms of its focus on institutions, stability and incentives but also in terms of 
the emphasis that is placed on quantitative assessments of corruption.  
The most famous quantitative dataset used for such studies is even produced by an 
IAC organisation itself: TI’s CPI.122 TI is quite active in both the production and the 
use of statistics for articulating corruption problems, thus enhancing the dominance 
of positivist research in IAC discourse. While the organisation explains that “[t]here 
simply are no hard-and-fast figures about corruption”, that existing figures “tend to 
be grossly misleading” and that it is impossible to calculate the amount of and the 
damage done by corruption,123 it currently publishes three different indices on cor-
ruption on a regular basis: The Corruption Perceptions Index, the Bribe Payers In-
dex, and the Global Corruption Barometer. They are articulated as tools to raise 
awareness especially within civil society and to inspire reforms124 but at the same 
time reinforce constructions of corruption as something that can be objectively as-
sessed. Through the articulation of statistical figures TI renders its arguments more 
persuasive, drawing on the authoritative status of quantitative research,125 and at the 
same time facilitates the kind of quantitative, rational choice inspired corruption re-
search that then again informs IAC reform strategies and ‘instruments’ and rein-
forces the incentives logic in IAC discourse.  
Apart from these indices, TI also produces a wide range of ‘tools’ that are to serve 
better the assessment and consequent address of corruption problems both by its na-
tional chapters but also other actors active in the fight against corruption. These in-
                                                 
120  Lederman et al (2005) 
121  Svensson (2005) 
122 See also chapter 1  
123  TI (p) 
124  TI-S official 7; TI-S official 8 
125 See also TI-S official 8. A look into its FAQs indicates that the NGO indeed gets frequently asked 
for “hard figures” on corruption, demonstrating the widespread belief in numbers as an 
incorporation of reliable scientific knowledge (TI p). 
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clude National Integrity Assessments, in which a country’s institutional structure is 
evaluated against TI’s ideal blueprint of the National Integrity System (NIS). Other 
examples include the production of risk maps for corruption risks in particular sec-
tors of a given country (e.g. the water sector, the industry sector,126 the area of aid 
delivery or of basic service delivery127) which are primarily about assessing oppor-
tunities for corruption and control mechanisms against them.128 These articulations 
rely on and at the same time serve to advance constructions of mechanistic human 
nature on the one hand and on the other institutional incentives and civil society ac-
tivity as the adequate remedy against corruption. Additionally, TI produces a series 
of reports, research and policy papers analysing corruption problems and giving fur-
ther policy recommendations for the design and implementation of anticorruption 
measures. 
WB discourse also includes the production of a wide range of positivist, economistic 
research of corruption and anticorruption measures, which is disseminated via the 
WB website and WB publication series. The most prominent and productive subject 
positions related to the articulation of the ‘right’ knowledge at the WB are Kauf-
mann, Kraay, Lederman, Shah and Keefer.129 As a WBI director, Daniel Kaufmann 
led the research agenda on governance and corruption for many years, guiding the 
WB’s anticorruption approach. During this time he developed several quantitative 
governance indicators, published countless studies and spoke and advised on the 
fight against corruption in innumerable fora.130 The following is an example of his 
articulations of causes of corruption in developing countries:  
 “First, the motivation to earn income is extremely strong, exacer-
bated by poverty and by low and declining civil service salaries 
and the absence of risk-spreading mechanisms (including insur-
ance and a well-developed labor market). Second, opportunities to 
engage in corruption are numerous. Monopoly rents can be very 
large in highly regulated economies—and in transition economies, 
where property is essentially up for grabs. The discretion of many 
                                                 
126 See e.g. TI (i) 
127  TI-S official 7 
128 I have myself participated in the production of such a risk map for Panamanian public institutions 
during an internship at the TI chapter in Panama.  
129  WB (q) 
130  The Brookings Institution 
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public officials is broad in developing and transition economies, 
and this systemic weakness is exacerbated by poorly defined, ever-
changing, and poorly disseminated rules and regulations. Third, 
accountability is typically weak. Political competition and civil 
liberties are often restricted.”131 
Based on the rational actor logic, Kaufmann’s knowledge guided and still guides the 
WB’s constructions of corruption, specifications of the Universal, reform strategies 
and anticorruption ‘instruments’. Also for Anwar Shah, Lead Economist and Pro-
gram Leader of the Governance Program at the World Bank Institute, only positivist 
research counts as valuable for designing the WB’s anticorruption instruments. For 
him, “interesting ideas” for understanding corruption “can be broadly grouped into 
three categories: principal-agent models, New Public Management perspectives, and 
neoinstitutional economics frameworks”.132 All three approaches work with a ra-
tional choice conception of people as rational and narrowly self-interested actors, the 
only difference being that they have different conceptions of who should be regarded 
as the ‘principal’, of how lack of information might limit their rationality, and of the 
kind of accountability relations principal and agent should be implicated in to pre-
vent corruption. These kinds of knowledge inform the more ‘material’ IAC interven-
tions of all three IAC actors while their dissemination at the same time serves to ad-
vance conceptions of corruption as a mechanistic act that must be dealt with through 
the setting of the right incentives.  
Examples of other kinds of research exist in WB discourse but are very rare and so 
far have no influence on IAC ‘instruments’, reform strategies or specifications of 
uncorrupted societies – which is also related to the dominance of economists com-
pared to staff from other disciplines in the WB.133 In this respect, one WB inter-
viewee told me about an innovative corruption-related project called ‘Justice for the 
Poor’, which entails 50 researchers conducting anthropological (amongst other) re-
search in different countries in Africa and Asia.134 The programme states to be 
“[g]rounded in evidence-based approaches focused on the perspective of the poor 
and marginalized” and aims to “improve the delivery of justice services and to sup-
                                                 
131  Kaufmann/Gray (1998: no page) 
132  Shah (2007: 236) 
133  WB official 5; WB official 6 
134  WB official 5 
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port sustainable and equitable development processes” by taking into account the 
values and norms of the local population.135 Yet so far this programme consists only 
as a single and rather extraordinary research programme at the WB and has not yet 
been translated into concrete project work.136 This difficulty in equivalising different 
kinds of knowledge into chain AC is likely to be due to the exclusionary prominence 
of positivist research, which is closely related to the WB’s overall social engineering 
approach which “rewards easily measurable things”.137 As the WB interviewee 
pointed out, the lack of linearity and predictability and the long duration of projects 
involving country-specific anthropological research and taking local social norms 
into account in the project design pose a problem; it consists in selling this “to the 
vice President of the World Bank” who evaluates its accordance with the question of 
“how can you make this function in a way that people can see that their resources 
poured into this channel produce results coming out that end?”.138 Under its new 
GAC strategy, the WB declares that it will “continue to support research on causes 
and effects of governance and corruption and their links to growth and develop-
ment”.139 This is most likely to continue reinforcing the exclusive articulation of 
positivist, quantitative, institutional economics research on corruption as an ‘instru-
ment’ for the fight against corruption, while other approaches are marginalised.140  
Chapter 1 explained the positivist claim that models need to simplify the world in 
order to enable research, and that positivist research functions on the ‘as-if’ proposi-
tion. We can now see, however, how the kind of research that results from this 
proposition structures IAC discourse. Although a WB interviewee conceded that “we 
know that some of the stuff that we consider as corruption going on in some coun-
tries is not considered as corruption in those very countries”, s/he explained that “it’s 
unhelpful for the World Bank to think about corruption as a moral issue itself”;141 
the WB thus repeats the positivist stress on usefulness, with respect to its own social 
engineering approach. Based on the rational actor model of human nature and on 
incentive-based research on the causes, consequences and remedies of corruption, 
                                                 
135  WB (E) 
136  WB official 5 
137  WB official 5 
138  WB official 5 
139  WB (2007: x) 
140 Cf. Bukovansky (2006: 183) 
141  WB official 3 
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IAC discourse on a whole very coherently and comprehensively specifies the good, 
uncorrupted society, as we have seen in chapter 4, and articulates reform strategies 
and ‘instruments’ to change target societies accordingly. Positivist research as the 
‘right’ knowledge in chain AC thus defines the political logic of IAC discourse, the 
way in which it divides the discursive space, in crucial ways. 
This extraordinarily prominent structuring function of positivist research on corrup-
tion as a nodal point in IAC discourse also explains why contestations of the rational 
actor logic or the incentives logic were only minor in IAC discourse and did not af-
fect the overall structures of the discourse – via the ‘scientific’ knowledge used and 
produced in IAC discourse as an ‘instrument’ in the fight against corruption, these 
logics have been established as the only way to conceive corruption and the uncor-
rupted society.  
 
Advocacy, awareness raising and civil society capacity building 
Advocacy and awareness raising activities and civil society capacity building are 
articulated as other ‘instruments’ for the reform of corrupt target societies.  
While the UNDP is also active in the areas of advocacy and capacity building142 and 
while in the last number of years the WB made civil society a more important topic 
in its anticorruption work143 (see also chapter 6), advocacy and civil society work is 
most prominently articulated as an ‘instrument’ in TI’s discursive ‘territory’. TI does 
not have the financial resources and the status to run big programmes for institu-
tional incentive-setting and thus confines itself to advocating them, raising aware-
ness about their importance and building the capacity of other civil society organisa-
tions not only to do the same but also to play their role in the incentives framework.  
TI discourse articulates two main ‘instruments’ through which to advance IAC re-
forms: The first regards “assisting developing nations and countries in transition in 
mobilising efforts to confront their corruption problems”, mainly by engaging civil 
society and feeding knowledge and experience from elsewhere “into national discus-
sions”. The second consists of working “with leading international organisations in 
                                                 
142  UNDP official 1 
143  WB (2007: 52) 
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articulating anti-corruption policies and also lobby the governments of industrialised 
countries so that they prevent their corporations from paying bribes around the 
world”.144 TI’s ‘instrumental’ approach thus consists mainly of advocacy regarding 
the ‘right’ ways of fighting corruption and of civil society mobilisation for this pur-
pose and in doing so contributes to all three reform strategies. The kind of knowl-
edge about how to fight corruption that is used in these activities has been discussed 
above. TI’s explicitly non-confrontational approach, aimed at building  “coalitions 
with stakeholders from all sectors of society”,145 is particularly important for this 
strategy to succeed and facilitates the advancement of the ‘right’ knowledge about 
incentive structures across wide segments of the more than 100 countries that cur-
rently have active TI chapters.146  
The TI Secretariat in Berlin (which, as TI emphasises, does not function as a head-
quarters of this allegedly decentralised organisation) occupies a particularly impor-
tant position in this regard since it is here where knowledge production is concen-
trated. The production of country-specific knowledge for national advocacy and civil 
society work happens in research projects funded sometimes by the Secretariat but 
mostly by its national chapters which acquire their funds independently.147 However, 
the Secretariat often coordinates data collection and knowledge production activities 
for the purposes of the quantitative indices mentioned above, provides guidance re-
garding approach and methodology in the form of the strategic policy documents 
used in this thesis and facilitates the creation of ‘best practice’ documents and the 
exchange of knowledge among the chapters.148 The Secretariat also widely dissemi-
nates TI’s concentrated knowledge via its website, the media, and again via the na-
tional chapters to governments, companies, international organisations, and civil 
society members and organisations.149 
Despite this nodal point function of the Secretariat in chain AC, the work of the na-
tional chapters is crucial for advancing the ‘instruments’ for fighting corruption. 
While TI discourse stresses the independence of TI chapters (from the Secretariat as 
                                                 
144  TI (p) 
145  TI (S)  
146  TI (A) 
147  TI-S official 7 
148  TI-S official 7; TI-S official 6 
149 See also Larmour (2005: 7) 
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well as from any political strands), the accreditation requirements and procedures for 
chapters150 make sure that only organisations with a particular understanding of the 
right way to combat corruption get the chance to become part of the global TI 
movement against corruption.151 If for example a branch of EZLN, the Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation, applied as the Mexican national chapter of TI and 
promoted for example a conception of corruption as the subversion of socialist val-
ues of social solidarity, it would most likely not succeed to be accredited. For ac-
creditation purposes, organisations that wish to become a TI chapter have to conduct 
a self-evaluation, answering questions about how they will help to fulfil TI’s mis-
sion, what their activities have been so far to help draft or monitor the enforcement 
of anticorruption laws and regulations in their country, to raise awareness about cor-
ruption, to work with the media, to lobby in order to influence public policy, as well 
as questions about the kinds of projects that they aim to implement in the coming 
years.152 If a chapter manages to answer these questions in line with TI’s overall 
strategy and to be accredited, it then gets further socialised into TI’s organisational 
as well as knowledge structures.  
Therefore, by tying both knowledge production and accreditation procedures of TI 
national chapters to the nodal point Secretariat, the construction and application of 
the right ‘instruments’ to fight corruption in TI discourse is defined in crucial ways 
which also define constructions of the uncorrupted society, as we have seen above. 
Through advocacy, awareness raising and civil society work TI’s discourse works 
towards expanding chain AC mainly via acquiring new subject positions that in turn 
perpetuate and advance the conceptions of corruption, specifications of the uncor-
rupted society and reform strategies articulated in the discourse. 
 
Lending 
Besides advocacy and civil society work, the lending of financial resources for anti-
corruption reforms and the provision of technical assistance to target countries are 
the two remaining major ‘instruments’ for IAC reform in chain AC. 
                                                 
150 See TI (T)  
151 See also De Sousa (2005) 
152  TI (2009a) 
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Being a bank, the lending of money is the WB’s main activity. Its concrete ways of 
engagement against corruption in the target countries vary according to the respec-
tive country assistance strategy,153 but they consist for the biggest part of project-
related or conditional lending to country governments mainly for institutional and 
legal reform. WB loans are particularly attractive for countries that have difficulties 
securing loans from private Banks because the WB has lower requirements regarding 
the financial standing of the borrowing country and also lends with better conditions. 
As for the UNDP, a “country’s government remains the principal counterpart for the 
WBG”.154 Country-specific anticorruption measures are usually not implemented as 
self-contained projects. The WB’s country assistance involves improving govern-
ance through mainstreaming governance and anticorruption measures into its lending 
conditions. Thus, anticorruption measures usually form part of other projects and 
their implementation (project level),155 or of country assistance strategies (country 
level)156.157 Furthermore, they also form part of the work done in co-operations at 
the international level.158  
                                                
Most of the WB loans directly support the purchase of material or expertise related 
to concrete development projects, (the so-called ‘investment operations’,) while oth-
ers are given out as financial loans, credits and grants supporting the target country’s 
budget for the carrying out of particular development policies (the so-called ‘devel-
opment policy operations’). Both however come with ‘strings attached’.159 This 
means that the money is never untied, for the country’s free disposition, as it would 
be if lent by a private bank; rather, it is disbursed only conditionally, either for poli-
cies or other expenses that the WB deems necessary or useful for development, pov-
erty reduction or to fight corruption. As the WB explains, “[a]ll Bank strategies link 
levels of financial assistance and modes of engagement to progress on key obstacles 
to development effectiveness, which frequently include weak governance and cor-
ruption”.160  
 
153  WB (2007: iii) 
154  WB (2007: 4) 
155  WB official 3 
156  WB official 1; WB (2007: 4) 
157  WB (2007: 4); WB official 6  
158  WB official 1 
159 See for example WB (p) 
160  WB (2007: 15) 
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Through different mechanisms, the WB ensures that money intended for governance 
and anticorruption is actually used for these purposes. For example for IDA-eligible 
countries, “good governance is rewarded through the performance-based allocation 
system (PBA), which is based on (a) the Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), where heavy weight is given to governance, and (b) portfolio 
performance”.161 So in the logic of the WB’s conditional lending,162 those countries’ 
performance in the area of governance and anticorruption is actually a condition for 
the attainment of further funds for other development projects.163 Development pol-
icy operations are “predominantly used in stronger governance systems”,164 while 
investment loans (which are also used for institution building)165 are obviously eas-
ier to secure for ‘more corrupt’ countries. However, even in settings with stronger 
governance, the WB makes sure to disburse funds only annually and “against a mu-
tually agreed set of policy and institutional actions”.166 Thus, WB lending provides 
governments with the financial power to transform country systems, but this power 
is always tied to particular ways of doing the transforming or to particular precondi-
tions for it. These preconditions in the form of governance and anticorruption meas-
ures entail mainly legal and institutional reform, which in turn are constructed ac-
cording to the kinds of knowledge discussed above, thus instituting the incentives 
logic mainly via these two reform strategies. In 2010, the WB spent “10 percent of 
its lending or approximately US$6.0 billion to help countries improve the perform-
ance and accountability of their core public sector institutions and rule of law”.167 
This legal and institutional reform lending however is only a part of the money spent 
on anticorruption efforts since due to their mainstreaming they also fall in the areas 
of other WB sections like for example the Social Development Group or the WB 
Institute. While the latter, as we have seen above, produces the rational choice in-
spired knowledge, the former uses it for the design of social development pro-
grammes, which also includes civil society work and thus contributes to the third 
reform strategy.168 Thus WB discourse contributes to the expansion of chain AC 
                                                 
161  WB (2007: 15) 
162  WB (2007: 16) 
163 See also WB (2007: 16) 
164  WB (2007: 16) 
165  WB (p) 
166  WB (p) 
167  WB (b) 
168  WB (j) 
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(and thus of the antagonistic divide) mainly by advancing particular institutional and 
legal designs in the target countries, and to a lesser extent through acquiring new 
subject positions for the fight against corruption. 
 
Technical support 
The principal ‘instruments’ articulated in the UNDP’s discourse are technical assis-
tance for legal and institutional reform and to a lesser extent civil society capacity 
building; all three reform strategies are thus pursued in UNDP’s discourse. As a mul-
tilateral development organisation founded by the member countries of the UNO, 
UNDP works via country offices in many UN member states and all its activities 
within a country require approval by that country’s government.169 Unlike the WB’s 
lending, “UNDP support is not conditional”.170 Its anticorruption work, which is 
based on the implementation of UNCAC, takes places in the country offices and in 
its head office in New York. The UNDP explains that, overall, its activities in the 
IAC area have evolved from mainly “awareness-raising activities” to include the 
provision of “technical advisory services to national governments, coupled with the 
development of internally developed tools and methodologies”.171  
The UNDP’s anticorruption work has a decentralised character in the sense that the 
country offices raise their own funding for anticorruption projects from bilateral and 
sometimes multilateral donors, but also in the sense that “cross-cutting” anticorrup-
tion measures are “mainstreamed into other service areas (governance, environment, 
poverty reduction) at the country level”.172 Currently, the main activities of country 
offices in the area of anticorruption involve technical support for institution-building 
and policy-reform in order to increase states’ capacity to respond to UNCAC and to 
improve governance and to a lesser degree also for increasing the involvement of 
civil society into anticorruption activities.173 Yet while the UNDP country offices 
operate relatively independently in terms of funding, the head office exerts an impor-
tant kind of influence. In order to ensure coherence among the ‘technical’ anticorrup-
                                                 
169  UNDP official 1 
170  UNDP (2004: 5) 
171  UNDP (2008b: 7) 
172  UNDP (2012a)  
173  UNDP official 1; see also UNDP (2008b); UNDP (c) 
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tion efforts of the country offices, the anticorruption unit in the head office leads and 
supports their activities under the name of the ‘UNDP Global Thematic Programme 
on Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness’ (PADCE),174 which has re-
placed the 1997 “Programme for Accountability and Transparency (PACT)”.175 In 
particular, it provides the country offices with a corporate policy, ‘knowledge prod-
ucts’ and ‘tools’ on which their technical interventions should be based. Also, there 
are mechanisms in place for the concentration and assimilation of this knowledge 
across UNDP offices in different countries, such as the exchange of ideas, ‘best prac-
tices’ and “lessons learned” between the country offices.176 Thus, similar to the case 
of TI discourse, the construction and application of the ‘instruments’ of technical 
assistance by the country offices is defined in crucial ways by its tying to the head-
office as a nodal point, and to the strategic policy documents centring on the rational 
choice research discussed above. Apart from that, the UNDP head office itself also 
engages in “global advocacy (...) and awareness raising” on corruption and anticor-
ruption177 and also in the “coordination and harmonisation of the global anticorrup-
tion interventions”.178  Such activities advance the incentive-based anticorruption 
knowledge globally via the immense network of influential subject positions dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. Overall, UNDP discourse works towards expanding 
chain AC and advancing the IAC hegemonic project by instituting the incentives 
logic via technical support for institutional and legal reform and to a lesser extent by 
acquiring new subject positions as multiplicators for its knowledge about the uncor-
                                                
rupted society. 
While one aspect of the articulation of ‘instruments’ still merits discussion, we can 
already conclude here that there are major divergences between the discourses of the 
three organisations with regards to the articulations of the main ‘instrument’ for how 
to advance the reform strategies and thus the fight against corruption. While the WB 
operates most of all (though not exclusively, see also chapter 6) via the conditional 
lending of financial resources to governments, the UNDP mainly applies the strate-
gies of providing governments with technical support and expertise and the strategy 
 
174  UNDP official 1 
175  UNDP (2008c: 30) 
176  UNDP official 1 
177  UNDP official 1 
178  UNDP official 1 
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of global advocacy, while TI’s work towards the Universal occurs principally 
through advocacy and awareness raising activities. Now, are these differences in 
strategies between the three organisations to be understood as dislocations of the 
hegemonic project? Given that these ‘instruments’ are all structured very coherently 
according to the shared rational choice knowledge discussed previously, and that 
they all contribute to the same reform strategies (albeit in different ways), the answer 
is no. Moreover, we have seen earlier in this chapter that IAC organisations articu-
late each others’ work as very important and valuable. For example, TI, while not 
providing countries with substantive monetary or technical support itself, still deems 
development and anticorruption aid from organisations like the WB and the UNDP 
necessary.179 A UNDP interviewee pointed out that there are work areas in which TI 
and the WB are better than his/her own organisation.180 And the WB suggests coor-
dinated action and “a division of labor among donors (...) with others taking a lead in 
areas that are outside the Bank’s mandate or comparative advantage”.181 Thus, these 
differences in ‘instruments’ are to be interpreted as a division of labour in a rather 
coherent fight against corruption; theoretically speaking, the different instruments 
combine to an overall ‘instrumental logic’ that rather consistently advances the ‘re-
form logic’ outlined at the beginning of this chapter, thus contributing to the overall 
political logic of advancing the antagonistic division of the discursive space. Given 
the function of rational choice research as a crucial nodal point for the construction 
of the ‘instruments’, the political logic of IAC discourse is heavily defined by this 
ns of IAC interventions as unpolitical, 
context-sensitive, and consensual 
                                                
knowledge.  
 
Avoiding dislocation – articulatio
One important logic is integral to the articulation of reform strategies and ‘instru-
ments’ in chain AC. IAC discourse articulates them not only as the right reform 
strategies and instruments; it also articulates them (in linguistic ways) as sensitive to 
other cultural contexts, as unpolitical and as otherwise uncontroversial or consensual, 
 
179 See e.g. TI (l) 
180 See e.g. UNDP official 1  
181  WB (2007: ix) 
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thus aiming to shield the discourse against political and cultural controversy in what 
can be interpreted as ‘superdifferential demarcations’ (IV). While this can contribute 
to explaining the uncontroversial nature of IAC discourse it also has the potential to 
ly to the expansion of IAC as a hegemonic project. 
tion state”189 and can neither be “off-the-shelf solutions”190 nor “forced upon them 




In chapter 3 we have seen that TI discourse draws a super-differential demarcation 
between the discourse and claims about Western moral superiority. This demarcation 
is reiterated in the WB and the UNDP but also TI discourse through assertions of the 
importance to take local circumstances into account when designing anticorruption 
instruments and reform strategies. For example, Shaw and Schacter from the WB 
suggest self-critically that the lack of significant progress in eradicating corruption 
could be “attributed to the fact that many programs are simply folk remedies or one-
size-fits-all approaches”.182 Accordingly, the WB’s GAC strategy states that the 
“form of WBG engagement on GAC will vary from country to country, depending 
on specific circumstances”; we learn that “there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’”183 and that 
reforms should be ‘tailored’ to the country context.184 Furthermore it suggests that 
“the Bank should be open to involvement with a broad range of domestic institutions 
taking into account the specificities of each country”.185 Articulations that stress the 
importance of “supporting a country’s own priorities”,186 of local ownership and 
leadership with regards to the implementation of anticorruption projects also con-
tribute to articulating this demarcation.187 They are replicated in UNDP articulations 
that “localisation and contextualisation is important” and the “country-specific con-
text” needs to be taken into account.188 Also TI discourse stresses that anticorruption 
reforms “must be geared to the particular needs and problems of each individual na-
 
182  Shah/Schacter (2004: 40); see also Shah (2007: 236) 
183  WB (2007: 5, 17) 
184 See e.g. WB (2007: 7) 
185  WB (2007: 20) 
186  WB (2007: 4) 
187 See e.g. Shah (2007: 236); WB (2007: 4, v) 
188  UNDP official 1 
189  TI (2000: xx) 
190  TI (p) 
235 
 
[the countries] from the outside”.191 IAC discourse is thus demarcated against dis-
courses advocating one-size-fits-all measures without considering local contexts. 
While such linguistic articulations stand in stark contradiction to Eigen’s quote about 
the necessity to repeat Western history, they still have the potential to shield IAC 
discourse against dislocation by anthropological or ethnographic research that points 
to the differences in conceptions of corruption world-wide as well as to the inappli-
cability of Western societal models to non-Western contexts.192  
 
Insinuations of a consensus – or ‘corruption is the same everywhere’ 
Simultaneously, however, and in stark contradiction to claims about context-
sensitivity of IAC measures, IAC discourse is also defended against such dislocation 
through articulations that there is a global consensus with regards to corruption 
which actually makes context-relativisation of IAC instruments unnecessary. 
According to TI discourse, corruption involves “a moral element – one which cuts 
across all major religions and societies throughout the world”193 and argues that 
people the world over are demanding absolute probity of their political leaders”, re-
flecting a “world-wide concern” with corruption194 but also a “growing global con-
sensus” over how to combat it.195 It defends itself against accusations of “trying to 
inflict a "first world" view of corruption on the rest of the world” by arguing that 
“every country in the world has laws which criminalise corruption” and that “there is 
no culture, anywhere and at any time in history, that anyone has been able to point 
to, where it has been accepted by society as a whole that their leaders are entitled as 
of right to make decisions in their own favour and against the group interest”. Even 
if it is “true that in different cultures the lines between the acceptable and the unac-
ceptable are drawn differently”, these differences are “marginal rather than funda-
mental”.196  
                                                 
191  TI (p) 
192 See e.g. Harrison (2006); Sissener (2001); Ruud (2000); Price (1999); Szeftel (1998); Gupta 
(1995); De Sardan (1999) 
193  TI (2000: 1) 
194  TI (a); see also TI (l); see also UNDP official 1 
195  TI (k); see also TI (2000: 1, xv, xvii); TI (p), WB (2007: 4) 
196  TI (p) 
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Also the existence of UNCAC is – in particular in UNDP discourse – articulated as a 
reflection of the “growing global consensus on how corruption impedes develop-
ment”.197 A UNDP interviewee explained to this end that “every culture has a capac-
ity to distinguish what is gift and what is bribing” and gave the example of a choco-
late and a Rolex watch which would be rightly distinguished in every society.198 
Similarly, a TI interviewee explained with regards to the NIS that “there is a bit of a 
universalist199 set of standards of (...) what an organisation with integrity is, an or-
ganisation with transparency and accountability”.200 A WB interviewee conceded 
that things are a bit different in every country but that, having worked on the issue of 
corruption for a long time, one knows what it is all about and can thus easily work 
on it in any country.201  
Thus, these articulations reiterate the super-differential demarcation between TI dis-
course and claims of Western moral superiority, conveying that IAC discourse does 
not impose any Western values. However it relies on an argument that stands in con-
tradiction to the former, claiming that such imposition does not happen because there 
are hardly any differences in values and norms regarding corruption around the 
world. Such contradictions need not necessarily pose a problem but may combine to 
strengthen the super-differential demarcation, if IAC discourse is able to ‘hold them 
together’. In doing so, it applies still another, and very important, super-differential 
demarcation, which articulates IAC discourse as unpolitical and thus uncontroversial 
in nature.  
 
The ‘unpolitical’ nature of anticorruption interventions 
TI discourse presents TI as “politically non-partisan”, having as its “primary func-
tion” the “raising of awareness about corruption on a global level”,202 and is there-
fore articulated as unpolitical. Different TI officials reiterated this articulation, stat-
ing for example that “we are not a political organisation with a political posture in 
                                                 
197  TI (2008a: 2); see also UNDP (2008a: 9); TI (2009h: 4); TI (k) 
198  UNDP official 1; see WB official 1 for a similar example 
199 From the context it was clear that what was meant here instead of ‘universalist’ was ‘universal’. 
200  TI-S official 6 
201  WB official 1 (unrecorded conversation before interview) 
202  TI (n) 
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anything really. We would never, I guess, go and tell [the TI chapter in] Venezuela if 
they should or should not take a position vis-a-vis the Chavez government”.203 Apart 
from reifying the construction of TI as an unpolitical actor, statements like this also 
construct politics as necessarily involving parties and governments. TI discourse 
makes rather clear that the alleged ‘unpoliticalness’ of its IAC activities, and thus the 
dissociation from any particular societal system, allows it to incorporate a diverse 
range of subject positions in chain AC; its alleged non-partisan viewpoint is praised 
for allowing for “constructive dialogue with both governments and big corporations” 
while maintaining the freedom to criticise those institutions publicly.204 Closely re-
lated to this is its ‘coalition-building approach’, which consists of “proceeding in-
crementally, and remaining non-confrontational”205 and is able to “get all relevant 
parties around the table”,206 thus serving the expansion of chain AC via these actors.  
Similarly, the UNDP portrays itself as being politically impartial,207 a construction 
that may well facilitate its engagement with different governments. A UNDP inter-
viewee explained that the UNDP is “neutral but not value-neutral”, thus dissociating 
values from politics. According to him, “politically impartial means we do not asso-
ciate with one political party”; this, again, refers politicalness to the support of po-
litical parties. Moreover, the UNDP interviewee also claimed that through the focus 
on “democratic governance, not democracy per se” in its IAC measures the UNDP 
avoids having to decide between different systems: “We do not bother with a par-
ticular form of democracy”. At the same time, the range of potential democratic op-
tions in UNDP discourse is very restricted, “you know, whether it is parliamentary 
democracy, or presidential system, or hybrid, or whatever”.208 
The WB constructs all its activities, including IAC efforts, as unpolitical via its Arti-
cles of Agreement, which state that the WB is not allowed to interfere in the internal 
political affairs of the countries in which it operates. Interestingly, while both UNDP 
and TI interviewees emphasised the ‘unpolitical’ character of their IAC work, WB 
interviewees conceded that “the idea that development isn’t political is a fiction”. 
                                                 
203  TI-S official 5 
204  TI (n) 
205  TI (p) 
206  TI (o), see also TI (p); TI (n) 
207  UNDP (2008a: 10) 
208  UNDP official 1 
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One interviewee made clear that “when you are thinking about accountability meas-
ures you are actually interfering into the internal political affairs of the country in 
one way or another”.209 S/he explained however that “in some ways it’s a convenient 
fiction under which to operate”.210 
Whether out of conviction or strategic considerations, IAC discourse is defended 
against potential dislocations through criticisms of its political nature by drawing a 
‘super-differential demarcation’ between the discourse and any discourses that in-
clude what is constructed as politics in IAC discourse. The demarcation between the 
territory of politics and political relations on the one hand and IAC discourse on the 
other hand suggests that IAC discourse has nothing to do with struggles about ad-
vancing a particular societal vision that usually take place in political institutions. 
Such articulations have the potential to secure the persuasiveness of the fight against 
corruption for supporters of all sorts of different political camps. 
They are very much in line with the overall good governance discourse which typi-
cally presents reforms as merely technical adjustments (thereby also resembling the 
structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s). According to Abrahamsen, good 
governance defines itself as “both politically and culturally neutral, calling simply 
for the efficient and optimal management of a nation’s resources and not prescribing 
a particular system of rule”.211  
This super-differential articulation in IAC discourse is surely enhanced by the 
prominent role that the positivist, rational choice inspired research discussed earlier 
plays in structuring the discourse. Through being equivalised in chain AC and struc-
turing IAC discourse in important ways, the seemingly ‘technical’, objective and 
thus uncontroversial character of this kind of research endows the discourse with an 
equally ‘technical’ character. At the same time, the positivist approach to fighting 
corruption is in turn defended with the need for value-neutrality and abstinence from 
Western hyperbole in the same way as the focus on incentives instead of values was 
defended by a TI interviewee (see chapter 4). As a WB interviewee explained, “it’s 
unhelpful for the World Bank to think about corruption as a moral issue itself”, be-
                                                 
209  WB official 3 
210  WB official 3, see also WB official 5; WB official 7 
211  Abrahamsen (2000: 11) 
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cause the WB has very limited legitimacy to “try and change people’s perceptions of 
how bad corruption is or what corruption is”.212 Thus, while ‘normative’ research 
considering people’s values is articulated as problematic, ‘objective’ positivist re-
search methods are constructed as legitimate.213 This way, the different ‘super-
differential demarcations’ just outlined come to enhance each other in IAC dis-
course; they defend the discourse against dislocations by constructing it as uncontro-
versial and self-evidently positive. This camouflaging of the political nature of IAC 
discourse works towards its expansion by facilitating the acquisition of subject posi-
tions with diverse expectations as to societal organisation and cultural sensitivity.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the ‘instrumental claims’ in IAC discourse, both on the 
levels of ‘reform strategies’ and ‘instruments’.  
Apart from demonstrating the further expansion of chain AC in form of the ‘equival-
isation of differential claims which are oriented against the universal’ (I) with signi-
fiers such as legal and institutional reform, civil society reform, advocacy, project 
lending, technical co-operation, scientific knowledge etc., this second part of the 
analysis of chain AC, the anticorruption chain of IAC discourse, has rendered differ-
ent findings on further hegemonic stratagems and political logics. 
It has shown that IAC discourse articulates three main reform strategies, namely le-
gal reform, institutional reform and civil society reform. While the next chapter will 
reveal how exactly these reform strategies play out in the construction of the Univer-
sal, the chapter has shown that they aim at quite deep political interventions into the 
‘corrupt’ target countries; through three different modes of reform, the respective 
societies are to be transformed according to the Universal as specified in chapter 4, 
featuring the ‘right’ incentives for rational actors. Divergences were discovered 
among the three IAC discourses of TI, the UNDP and the WB with regard to the 
                                                 
212  WB official 3 
213  WB official 3; This happens despite the interviewee’s conviction that “some of the most effective 
tools of dealing with corruption are methods to change perceptions”, and that “a huge amount of 
donors’ technical assistance and other stuff is wasted because we deal 99 percent with the de jure, 
and ignore the de facto which is 99 percent of what goes on”. 
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‘super-differential demarcation’ that demarcates the geographical scope of IAC re-
form. However, this was not identified as a dislocation of the hegemonic project and 
was in fact contrasted by the consensus revealed by the analysis of ‘instrumental 
claims’ conducted in the rest of the chapter.  
It showed how the articulation of ‘instruments’ in chain AC relies on articulations in 
chain C about societal actors in developing countries as unable to deal with self-
interested human nature and implement reforms on their own and at the same time 
constructs IAC organisations as the bearers of the right knowledge and the adequate 
resources and tools to help those developing countries in their fight against corrup-
tion. Revealing the stratagem of ‘institution/perpetuation of subject positions for 
socio-political forces’ (VI), the chapter traced the ways in which IAC discourse insti-
tutes important subject positions for the three IAC actors as implementers of the 
fight against corruption and showed how these were mutually enhanced by the three 
actors; but it also showed the institution of subject positions for a wide range of other 
societal-political forces as important anticorruption stakeholders or activists. As was 
demonstrated, the fact that co-operations already take place between IAC actors and 
most of those influential subject positions means that IAC discourse is already rather 
successful in expanding chain AC via these subject positions. Therefore, this strata-
gem (VI) is particularly salient.  
Moreover, the chapter revealed the crucial function of rational choice inspired posi-
tivist research on corruption, an ‘instrument’ in chain AC, for the structuring of IAC 
discourse. It showed how by drawing on, producing and disseminating such re-
search, IAC discourse ties its articulations of corruption, specifications of the Uni-
versal, reform strategies and instruments to the rational actor and incentives logics 
arising from this research, thus forming a particular kind of instrumental logic.  
The investigation of the ‘instruments’ of advocacy, awareness raising and civil soci-
ety capacity building; lending; and technical support showed how the articulations of 
all three ‘instruments’ are closely tied to the rational choice based (anti)corruption 
knowledge and work towards the institution of the ‘right’ incentives in ‘corrupt’ tar-
get countries via the three reform strategies. Considerable differences were revealed 
between the discourses of the three IAC actors as to the main ‘instrument’ applied 
for pursuing the ‘reform strategies’; while TI works mainly in the area of advocacy 
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and civil society awareness raising, the WB is more active in the provision of mone-
tary resources, and the UNDP mainly provides technical support and raises aware-
ness. However, the chapter argued that there is a division of labour between the dis-
courses of the three IAC actors on the way toward the uncorrupted society rather 
than a divergence that could be problematic for the expansion of the IAC project.  
In the course of the investigation of ‘instruments’ it also became quite evident that 
the stratagem of the actual advocate does not exist within IAC discourse. The dis-
courses of all three IAC organisations emphasise co-operations between the actors, 
abstain from critique and undertake no attempts to articulate specific actors as ‘actual 
advocates’ and others as ‘non-actual’ ones. However, the chapter argued that this 
stratagem may not actually benefit the hegemonic success of any of the three dis-
courses anyway, given the division of labour among IAC organisations for the at-
tainment of the Universal and the articulation of the fight against corruption as a 
never-ending one.  
Important super-differential demarcations (IV) were also distinguished with regards 
to the ways in which IAC discourse shields itself against (potential) dislocations by 
criticism regarding its imposition of Western values on developing countries. The 
chapter showed how, in a contradictory logic, IAC reform strategies and ‘instru-
ments’ are articulated as context-sensitive and flexible, consensual and unpolitical, 
thus camouflaging the political nature of IAC discourse. By emphasising its sensitiv-
ity and adaption to local contexts, the discourse is able to address (potential) criti-
cisms about its neo-imperial agenda, while at the same time to justify its universalist 
measures through allegations of a global consensus and claims about its unpolitical-
ness. The chapter argued that this camouflaging and shielding effect is enhanced by 
the prominent structuring function of rational choice based knowledge in the dis-
course, which renders an aura of objectivity to the discourse and endows it with sci-
entific authority. These articulations can in turn serve the persuasion of a broad range 
of actors from different political camps as supporters of IAC discourse.  
Overall, the analysis of instrumental claims conducted in this chapter confirmed the 
great consensus distinguished by the previous two chapters in interesting ways. It 
showed how, based on the division of labour between the three IAC discourses, re-





coherently further advances the ‘antagonistic division of the discursive space’ (II) 
that adumbrated over the course of the previous two chapters. It demonstrated that 
IAC discourse is a very powerful attempt for a substantive political intervention into 
a wide range of target countries, mainly in the Global South, to restructure their so-
cieties through instruments that are defined in important ways by the findings of ra-
tional choice inspired research on corruption. 
What is left to be answered is exactly how the instrumental claims analysed translate 
into concrete socio-politico-economic policy demands and policies, and how this 
shapes the fight against corruption and the ideal of a good, uncorrupted society that 
is advanced by IAC discourse. Who is supposed to incentivise whom and how, and 
how do the ‘instruments’ discussed above implement these concrete measures? The 
last chapter of this thesis will reveal how the specifications of the Universal, reform 
strategies and instruments play out in the construction of a Universal that follows 
very particular social logics. 
6 Concrete socio-politico-economic claims: the nature of the un-
corrupted society 
Through the examination in the previous two chapters of values and aims, their 
specifications, and instrumental claims contained in chain AC we have come closer 
to an understanding of how IAC discourse advances a particular Universal. This 
happens through international intervention by powerful organisations in the target 
countries according to the specification of the uncorrupted society as one in which 
the ‘right’ incentives are set for self-interested, rational individuals. It is the aim of 
the present chapter to investigate how the specifications of the Universal, the reform 
strategies and the instrumental logics combine in concrete socio-politico-economic 
claims in chain AC of IAC discourse, thus forming a particular social logic and ar-
ticulating a very particular societal ideal.1 
In doing so, the chapter will further investigate the ‘equivalisation of differential 
claims oriented toward the Universal’ (I), confirm the coherence of this stratagem 
and further specify its logics. At the same time, this allows the final confirmation of 
the coherent ‘antagonistic division of the discursive space’ (II), given that chain C, 
on the ‘other side’ of this divide, has already been distinguished and examined (see 
chapter 3). Together with the other stratagems that have been discerned in the dis-
course so far (in particular the stratagem of ‘representation’ [III] in form of the ‘fight 
against corruption’) this allows the chapter to confirm the interpretation of IAC dis-
course as a hegemonic project in the Nonhoffian sense.  
However, the emphasis in this chapter is on the particular socio-politico-economic 
ideal of the good, uncorrupted society that is put in place and the concrete shape and 
social logics that this already specified Universal acquires in being advanced by the 
‘instruments’ of IAC discourse. While a superficial look at the detailed measures per 
se might not reveal too much about the kind of society advocated, the analysis con-
ducted in the previous chapters now helps us to trace the ways in which these meas-
ures bring about a particular societal ideal. 
                                                 
1 Again, I must emphasise that the term ‘social logic’ here refers to the ways in which the envisioned 




This chapter restricts its focus to what the discourse constructs as the main constitu-
tive areas of the uncorrupted society.2 Thus, the present analysis of IAC measures 
will concentrate on the (re)organisation of the public sphere or the ‘state’, consisting 
of the public sector and the realm of politics, and the (re)organisation of the private 
sphere, comprising economic actors and civil society actors more generally, in that 
order. These categories are internal to the discourse i.e. my analysis follows this di-
vision because the discourse itself constructs these two spheres and their subcatego-
ries as important societal realms. Having drawn out the incentives logic as the ruling 
principle for social relations in general, in chapter 4 we will see that the division into 
these spheres arises not so much from the articulation of different organising princi-
ples but from the different weighting of incentives and from articulations of different 
subject positions with different incentivising tasks in each sphere.  
In the course of this analysis, the Universal that IAC discourse works towards shows 
itself more and more clearly in the net of claims, allowing for a comprehensive in-
terpretation of the political nature of IAC discourse against the background of the 
previous chapters. The social logics structuring the Universal, as we will see, turn 
out to be reflective of many of the characteristics of advanced liberal regimes as dis-
tinguished by Dean.3 It thus proves helpful to draw on his work and, to a more lim-
ited extent, also on that of Hindess for a further interpretation of these logics.4  
The conclusion at the end of the chapter will summarise the findings on the social 
logics but also refer them back to the findings of the previous chapters, in particular 
about the aims of the fight against corruption and the claims of context-sensitivity. It 
will also discuss their implications with regards to other societal systems that are be-
ing negated by this Universal and summarise their implications regarding the politi-
cal nature of IAC discourse.  
 
                                                 
2 It should however be noted that IAC discourse also deals with the concrete organisation of discur-
sive areas such as the environment, natural resources, human rights, gender, health, water and edu-
cation and so on. 
3 Dean (2010). While Dean’s work forms part of the so-called ‘governmentality literature’, which 
works with or on an analytical approach for drawing out governing mechanisms broadly based on 
the work of Foucault, this thesis uses Dean’s work (and to a more limited extent also Hindess’ 
work) not so much as a methodological tool but rather as a theoretical interpretation of contempo-
rary forms of neoliberalism. 
4  Hindess (2004) 
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Sphere of the state / public sphere 
Taxing as the basis for a functioning state 
Let us first examine the ideal form of the state envisioned in IAC discourse.  
It builds to a considerable extent on articulations of the damaging consequences of 
corruption on taxation. The preoccupation with taxing in IAC discourse relies on its 
conception of the public-private divide which entails a state that relies on its en-
dowment with funds from the individuals it is supposed to protect; these funds are to 
be raised via customs and the taxing of individuals who otherwise pursue their eco-
nomic self-interests in the private sphere. Reflecting liberal contract theories, this 
divide is based on the assumption that the existence and survival of the state is in the 
self-interest of these individuals and that therefore they agree to cede their right to a 
certain limited part of their income.  
Yet if not properly incentivised, individual self-interests cause problems according to 
IAC discourse. As we have seen in chapter 3, inefficiencies in the public sector and 
bad functioning of the economy, both due to corruption, are the biggest hindrances 
for the state’s task to protect and provide for its citizens. Corruption “reduces the 
amount of public money in state coffers by decreasing state revenue (through losses 
in tax and customs income)”,5 thus “limiting the state's capability of investing in 
education, health, infrastructure, harming the country's social and economic devel-
opment”6 and ultimately leading to the worst of consequences. 
IAC discourse envisions two important sets of measures to be taken by the state in 
order to deal with these problems. First, it needs to keep taxing and the mechanisms 
of public service provision effective and efficient by acting upon its own constitu-
tion. Second, it must regulate the economy, namely in ways which guarantee that the 
“tax base”7 is broad and strong, guaranteeing the generation of economic growth in 
the private sector. In line with the incentives logic and the logic of institutional re-
form drawn out in the past chapter, both tasks are to be achieved through the setting 
of the right institutional incentives in the public and the private sector.   
                                                 
5  WB (d); see also WB (f); see also Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1) 
6  WB (f) 
7  WB (d) 
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A state structured according to incentives 
IAC measures advocated for and applied in order to improve the organisation of the 
public sector so as to ensure the “reasonably efficient and effective provision of pub-
lic services”8 are designed in a way as to minimise discretion, eliminate monopoly 
and increase transparency and accountability.9 As the UNDP argues, what is most 
important to institute in the public sector are “institutions/legal/policy frameworks to 
promote and enforce accountability, transparency and integrity in public service”.10 
Similarly TI advocates a “strategic coordination of legislative and institutional anti-
corruption measures”11 for the public sector. Thus, public sector reform is a combi-
nation of rule-making, legislation and enforcement in addition to the insertion of 
competition and control into social interactions. Yet the WB sees public sector re-
form as “a combination of voice and participation,12 competition, and internal rules 
and restraints”13 and thus already points to the element of civil society participation 
that also comes to play an important role in the incentivisation framework, as we will 
see in the second half of this chapter.  
 
Legal reform and the minimising of discretion 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, IAC discourse advocates the minimisation of discre-
tion and clear rules of the game in order to reduce opportunities for corruption and at 
the same time institute the right incentives.  
The “comprehensive anti-corruption legislation”14 which is demanded by IAC dis-
course thus consists of rules that introduce “basic principles for decision-making in 
public administration (objectivity, impartiality, equality, obligation to justification, 
right to appeal)”.15 Objectivity and impartiality can only be achieved through proper 
incentivisation (for example through the obligation to justification and the right to 
                                                 
8  WB (2007: 3) 
9  UNDP (2008c: 21) 
10  UNDP (2008a: 14) 
11  TI (2009e) 
12 This aspect will be discussed further on in the chapter. 
13  WB (2007: 38) 
14  TI (2000: xx-xxi) 
15  UNDP (2004: 27) 
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appeal) and lack of opportunity for corruption. With regards to the minimisation IAC 
documents recommend, for example, codes of conduct that “tell parliamentarians in 
clear terms what is expected of them and what constitutes a violation of public eth-
ics”.16 But also bureaucratic discretion needs to be minimised, despite the recogni-
tion that such discretion “may continue to be necessary for effective administra-
tion”.17 The recommendations include for example, so-called ‘bright-line rules’; 
such rules are “easy to understand and apply but come at the cost of reduced flexibil-
ity”.18 Examples include recommendations to drop “extensive nonsalary benefits that 
provide broad scope for discretion and corruption”19 or to “minimis[e] face-to-face 
contact by introducing random elements (such as staff rotation) so that users cannot 
predict the officials with whom they may be dealing”.20 The introduction of e-
procurement21 reflects a similar direction. Apart from this, IAC discourse suggests 
lobbying regulations,22 regulations about gifts and hospitality, conflict of interest 
laws and regulations,23 political finance regulations24, legal restrictions on post-
public employment in the private sector,25 and legislation against international brib-
ery and for the repatriation (or recovery) of stolen assets and the co-operation of the 
respective countries.26 But also economic liberalisation can help to reduce the discre-
tionary power of politicians and bureaucrats27 – namely by taking away their deci-
sion-making powers and transferring them to the market. 
Thus, all sorts of acts in the public sector and the realm of politics need to be illegal-
ised in order to be able to deal properly with human nature; flexibility and personal 
assistance in dealing with the cases of citizens as well as non-monetary benefits, in 
turn, are aspects that need to be compromised on. 
                                                 
16  TI (f); see also See e.g. TI (y); TI (2009j: 11) 
17  TI (2000: xix) 
18 “Examples include a ban on hiring of relatives or friends regardless of qualification; a ban on re-
ceiving any gift in excess of a small set value or a mandatory declaration of assets” (WB g); see 
also WB (2001) 
19  WB (n) 
20  TI (2000: xxiii) 
21  WB (2007: 42) 
22  TI (c) 
23  TI (y); WB official 1; UNDP (2008c: 31) 
24  TI (b) 
25  TI (2000: xxii-xxiv); TI (a); see for example TI (2010b) for TI’s work on the ‘revolving door’ be-
tween business and politics  
26  TI (d); OECD (1997); United Nations (2005); TI (2009h: 4); UNODC (2007); WB (v); WB official 
1; see also WB (2007: vi); UNDP (2008a: 9, 14) for more general calls for legal reform 
27  WB (i) 
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Capacity building  
These measures need to be accompanied by capacity building so as to enable public 
officials to actually understand these new and concise rules and to act accordingly. 
The WB argues that “[i]mproving governance requires interventions to strengthen 
capacity”.28 For example, this consists in the building of “skills and organizational 
capabilities”29 of public officials in areas such as procurement, so as to enable them 
to “effectively provide public goods.30 For this purpose, the Democratic Governance 
group in the UNDP cooperates with the UNDP Capacity Development Group in the 
area of “Procurement capacity development related to service delivery and public 
private partnership” in order to provide such capacity building to respective state in-
stitutions in target countries.31 Also “the capacity of accountability institutions to 
monitor the actions, decisions, and private interests of public officials” is particularly 
important32 and a target for reform in IAC discourse, which already points to the 
next point, the setting of the right incentices. Capacity building within civil society is 
also advocated, but this point will be discussed later in the chapter. 
 
Control - negative incentives 
While legal reform measures have the longest standing in IAC interventions, the em-
bedding of people especially in the public sector in “skilfully designed”33 institutions 
which fulfil control and incentivising tasks has become a major focus of IAC efforts, 
in addition to civil society reforms. In line with the nodal points distinguished in 
chapter 4, skilful institutional design means that these institutions need to make as 
much information regarding as many activities in the public sector available as pos-
sible to provide for transparency,34 they need to feature control and sanction mecha-
nisms to guarantee accountability, and they need to feature positive, competition-
related incentives.  
                                                 
28  WB (2007: 40) 
29  WB (2007: 18) 
30  WB (2007: 40); see also WB (2007: iv, 18, 20)  
31  UNDP (2008a: 12) 
32 WB (m) 
33  WB (2007: 42) 
34 As we will see further on in the chapter, transparency is even more important for another and rather 




In the uncorrupted society, the state in general must become “more transparent”35 
and make “most official information accessible to the public” and to the press.36 Ac-
cording to the WB, transparency is a “key cross-cutting priority that has increasingly 
been emphasized in Bank work over the past decade”.37 IAC measures for the public 
sector include; regulations to make campaign financing,38 public policymaking and 
service provision39 and public budgets, aid flows40 and elections41 more transparent; 
freedom of (or right to) information laws;42 measures for financial transparency i.e. 
transparency of “the intended and actual use of the resources or of the designated 
office”;43 publicly monitorable systems of public procurement,44 measures for “ac-
cess to state records and reports, and the state’s active dissemination of information 
on its operations and performance including through e-government”;45 in addition to 
regulations regarding income and asset disclosure of public officials46 in which the 
WB is “helping countries to establish programs to require senior officials to disclose 
either to the anticorruption agency or to the public generally their income and assets 
so that people can see whether they’re in conflict of interest or whether they’re get-
ting wealthy in suspicious ways”.47 Similarly, TI demands that high-level govern-
ment officials, for example, “disclose on a public website their financial and property 
holdings, as well as positions they hold in associations and businesses, any paid pro-
fessional activities and their investments in companies”.48 The UNDP stresses that 
transparency measures should not only include making “processes, institutions and 
                                                 
35  WB (2007: 17) 
36  TI (2000: xxii-xxiv), see also UNDP (2008a: 9); UNDP (2008b: 10, 12); WB (2007: v, 1, 6); 
UNDP (2008b: 37); UNDP (2008c: 26) 
37  WB (2007: 18) 
38  TI (b) 
39  WB (2007: 18) 
40  TI (y) 
41  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
42  WB official 1; WB (2007: 42) 
43  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
44  TI (2000) 
45  WB (2007: 18) 
46  WB (2007: v, 18, 42) 
47  WB official 1 
48  TI (2009j: 44) 
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information (...) directly accessible to those concerned”, but also providing “enough 
information (...) to understand and monitor them”.49   
Yet, as we know, transparency alone is not enough. It is simply the precondition for 
control in a system that relies heavily on the institution of actual oversight activities 
and mechanisms to ensure accountability in self-interested individuals. 
 
Oversight 
According to IAC discourse, globally and nationally, institutions of oversight are 
necessary to ensure lower levels of corruption by actually monitoring all the trans-
parent information50 such as the “assets, incomes, and liabilities of officials with de-
cision-making powers”.51 For example, the WB reports that the institution of moni-
toring public financial management systems in HIPC countries has been “a powerful 
spur to improving these systems in at least some countries”.52 Oversight mechanisms 
can and should be instituted within institutions but also externally to them, thus insti-
tuting “internal and external checks and balances”.53  
 
Self-monitoring  
The work on accountable institutions forms part of the UNDP’s focus on the ‘supply 
side’ of governance,54 meaning on the actors and institutions that are supposed to 
work for the public good; on the other side it envisions the ‘demand side’ of govern-
ance, which consists of civil society or businesses, the receivers of the services of the 
state. Internal mechanisms for administrative accountability tackle the ‘supply side’ 
of governance and mean putting “critical systems of control internal to the govern-
ment”55 in place; they for example include internal mechanisms for “oversight over 
                                                 
49  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
50 (CPI PR 2009)  
51  TI (2000: xxii-xxiv); UNDP (2008b: 12) 
52  WB (2007: 42) 
53  Kaufmann/Gray (1998: 4); see also UNDP (2008b: 37) 
54  UNDP (2008c: 29); see also UNDP official 1  
55  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
251 
 
the use of budgetary resources”56 and for the “speedy and effective review of conten-
tious decisions”. Supervision of staff by their superiors is to be increased and made 
more effective through surprise checks by superiors and increased responsibility for 
their inferiors’ actions.57  
One might think that measures that focus on hierarchisation and control are not ex-
actly suited to the task of generating co-operation and trust in a working environ-
ment. Indeed, Power has argued in reference to audit measures more generally that, 
by presupposing a general lack of trust and risk of abuse of trust in institutions, “they 
themselves will contribute to, produce and intensify” that mistrust.58 Yet in a society 
already full of self-interested individuals, as IAC discourse articulates it, increasing 
oversight is the only way to enhance trust.59 
 
External monitoring 
Like the internal mechanisms of control,  external mechanisms are also part of what 
TI calls ‘horizontal accountability’, it “subjects public officials to restraint and over-
sight, or ‘checks and balances’ by other government agencies (i.e. courts, ombuds-
man, auditing agencies, central banks) that can call into question, and eventually 
punish, an official for improper conduct”.60 Among such external oversight institu-
tions that are recommended to be strengthened or set up in the course of anticorrup-
tion reform in order to contribute to transparency, accountability and integrity are: 
Financial Audit Departments, independent watchdog/investigative agencies, special 
anticorruption institutions, supreme audit institutions,61 parliamentary oversight 
committees, electoral management boards, human rights commissions,62 ombuds-
man institutions, elections commissions, public accounts committees, the judiciary63 
and law enforcement agencies, parties, elections, and independent regulatory agen-
                                                 
2) 
cited in Dean (2010:229) 
DP (2004: 15) 
56  WB (2007: 19) 
57  TI (2000: xxii-xxiv); see also UNDP (2008b: 1
58  Power (1994), 
59 See e.g. TI (y) 
60  TI (2009j: 2) 
61  WB (2007: 42); UN
62  UNDP (2004: 15) 
63  WB (2007: 42); TI (2000: xxii-xxiv); UNDP (2008b: 12) 
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cies.64 Apart from this, “the proper functioning of checks and balance”65 or the “bal-
ance of powers”66 between state institutions is an important mechanism in order to 
curb corruption.67 According to the incentives logic, setting self-interested and thus 
equally corruptible actors in different institutions in relations of mutual oversight 
places them in competition with each other. In the pursuit of their own professional 
interests they will then hold the respective others accountable while at the same time 
being held accountable themselves. 
The WB and the UNDP particularly emphasise their experience and successes in the 
building of such institutions and also stress that this includes not just putting them in 
place but also “building the capacity of formal oversight institutions”.68 For exam-
ple, such “Capacity building of accountability, transparency and integrity (ATI) bod-
ies and national integrity institutions”69 is a major focus of the anticorruption work 
of the UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States of the former Soviet Union (CIS).70 Next to the establishment of a “Forum for 
Anti-Corruption Agencies” and an “Anti-Corruption Practitioners Network 
(ACPN)”, the office in Bratislava provides “knowledge sharing and capacity devel-
opment services to anticorruption agencies and practitioners”; for example, these 
services have taken the form of “the development of a Methodology for Assessing 
the Capacities of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) to perform preventive functions; 
the administration of capacity assessments of ACAs; guidance and advice to COs 
[country offices] on programming in support of ACAs; and the organization of re-
gional specialized trainings for the ACAs and CO staff”.71 In these efforts, the 
UNDP co-operates with UNODC, the OECD, regional initiatives like RAI (Western 
Balkans), and the Oslo Governance Centre.72 
                                                 
64  TI (y); TI (e); TI (2000); UNDP (2008b); UNDP (2008a: 9); WB (2007: 17, 18, 10) 
65  UNDP (2008b: 37) 
66  UNDP (2008c: 21) 
67  WB (2007: 42) 
68  WB (2007: 6); see also UNDP (2004: 15) 
69  UNDP (2004: 15) 
70 For an overview see UNDP (c) 
71  UNDP (d: 2) 
72  UNDP (d: 3) 
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External control is also exerted by civil society, for example in so-called integrity 
ed at instituting mutual control and increasing the risk of 
etection for self-interested rational public officials but are also aimed at generating 
ong officials with similar responsibilities for doing a better job than 
the others.  
requires the establishment of meritocratic 
                                                
pacts and other mechanisms instituted by IAC actors; this will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter.   
Competition within public sector and in public-private contracts 
As the analysis of specifications of the uncorrupted society has shown, negative in-
centives set through transparency and oversight are not enough to prevent self-
interested actors from becoming corrupt. The market principle ‘competition’ must be 
introduced into the public realm in order to eliminate monopoly powers (and thus the 
risk of corruption), encourage adherence to the rules and increase efficiency.73 Such 
competition for integrity among “peers” in the public sector needs to be “managed 
well”, but if done so, it can be “healthy”.74 For example, the respective institutional 
engineering in the public sector consists of providing “rival sources of supply” of 
public services and creating “overlapping jurisdictions”.75 These measures do away 





The incentives logic however tells us that self-interested individuals in the public 
sector will only be willing to compete if they can be sure that their efforts will actu-
ally lead to respective outcomes in the form of monetary rewards. In the private sec-
tor, where economic efforts are expected to directly yield fruits in the form of profits 
for the best competitors, this is assumed to be working automatically. Yet in the 
realm of politics and the public sector it 
structures76 for the incentive mechanisms to work – whoever does a better job than 
 
73 See e.g. WB (2007: 17) on the need for “competitive pressures” 
74  UNDP (2008a: 19) 
75  TI (2000: xxii) 
76  TI (2000); UNDP (2008c); WB (2007); UNDP (2008a); WB (g); UNDP (2004: 20) 
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others in playing by the rules of the game should get more money and power than 
others, just as in the market.  
Of course, even following the incentives logic one could argue that the more public 
officials stick to the rules and work for the public interest, the more they will benefit 
themselves since their individual interest is part of the public interest. Yet, according 
to the model of human nature on which IAC discourse bases its policy recommenda-
tions, people seem to be rather short-sighted with regards to their interests and lack 
that kind of long-term vision. Much like actors in the private realm, public officials 
ts and politicians” is important – since 
to enable an honest career in the public sector.83 Adequate pay is thus not a matter of 
social justice but of preventing corruption. However, the WB adds that salary struc-
                                                
need immediate and direct rewards for their efforts to outstrip their peers; otherwise 
they will lack motivation to do their job well. Given these incurable egoistic and 
short-sighted competitive inclinations, introducing market principles into the public 
sector is articulated as a good way to get people working for the public interest.  
While paying “a living wage to civil servan
otherwise “an honest career in government” would not be a “reasonable choice for 
qualified people”77 – it is insufficient in order to establish a good, corruption-free 
public administration and to “reform public servants’ behaviour” towards less cor-
ruption.78  
As IAC documents tell us, wages also need to be competitive and meritocratic. A 
good, “meritoric civil service with monetized, adequate pay” features meritocratic 
systems for “appointment, promotion and performance evaluation”79 – something 
that is also stipulated in UNCAC.80  
It also ensures “that salaries of civil servants and political leaders adequately reflect 
the responsibilities of their posts” 81 as well as their skills.82 Salaries in the public 




 UNDP (2008c: 8) 
: xxi) 
77  TI (2000: xxii-xx
78  WB (2007: 49) 
79 WB (n); see also WB (2007: 32); TI (2
80  UNDP (2008a: 9);
81  TI (2000
82  WB (n) 
83  TI (2000: xxi) 
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tures need not only be competitive, but progressively competitive,84 meaning that the 
higher the “skill requirements and levels of responsibility”, the higher remuneration 
should be in comparison with lower posts.85 The logic here is that inveterately self-
interested public officials who already hold a lot of power will only abstain from 
abusing this power if they see the possibility to gain considerably more money than 
most of their colleagues by sticking to the rules. Apparently the problem mentioned 
by Lord Acton that ‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ is to be 
a deeply political (re-)organisation of social 
d”.87 This 
                                                
solved by IAC discourse through increasing competition even more than power is 
being increased. 
The WB argues that such incentive-based “meritocratic human resource management 
practices” should come as a “package to reform public servants’ behaviour” in target 
countries.86 Presenting them as scientifically proven “key human resource manage-
ment determinants of lower bureaucratic corruption”, the implementation of such 
measures is not so much articulated as 
structures, but rather as a merely technical and politically neutral adjustment to tech-
nically designed institutional systems.  
IAC discourse advocates meritocracy not only for the public sector but also interna-
tional aid relations should be managed accordingly; while the WB is eager to stress 
that ‘the poor’ should not be punished twice (first by the corruption in their own 
countries and second by the lack of aid), overall it holds that “less aid should be 
given to countries with high levels of corruption”. In turn, “countries with good gov-
ernance, where aid is more effective” should be given more aid as a “rewar
reflects Klitgaardian visions of an ‘international anticorruption contest’ for aid by 
developing countries in order to incentivise them away from corruption.88  
But IAC discourse also advances the institution of competition in the public sphere 
in other ways. Decentralisation, i.e. the “shifting [of] resources and accountability 
 
85
y significant with bribe-
rage salaries are not (WB 2007: 49). 
7: 49) 
 
84  WB (2007: 49) 
 The WB talks here about “careful, multivariate statistical analysis” (however without citing any 
literature) which has shown that competitiveness of salaries is statisticall
taking, while ave
86  WB (200
87  WB (g) 
88  Klitgaard (1998)
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downwards to local governments and their constituents”,89 can also be included in 
this incentives category. The logic behind it is not so much that power-holders or 
decision-makers are moved closer to those whose interests they are supposed to 
serve (rather this would have to be judged as dangerous), but that power is distrib-
uted downwards because this will reduce monopoly, increase competition and thus 
remove opportunities for corruption. In addition, it puts the diverse power-holders 
into a position of (at least potential) mutual control. In line with the rational actor 
logic, if people can, they will monitor others closely and ‘ring the alarm’ if they feel 
 
arded only through “competitive ten-
91
litical parties that expose each 
                                                
that their interests are being hurt or that others are violating the rules of competition.
Overall, such measures are to create interdependence structures that are similar to 
those of the markets.  
Similarly, also the relations between the public and the private sector require the in-
sertion of competition. Procurement needs to be “open, genuinely competitive and 
transparent”,90 ensuring that contracts are aw
dering”.  Inserting competition into the public sector can even mean the privatiza-
tion of government services,92 thus handing public services over to the regime of the 
market in order to make them more efficient.  
In the realm of politics, “electoral competitiveness” is demanded as a determining 
factor for the right external incentives in the “political structure”.93 While political 
competition can be regarded as providing positive incentives that encourages politi-
cians to adhere to the rules, elections also embody a constraining element. The ideal 
of an electoral democracy as articulated in IAC discourse provides people with “a 
regular, open method for sanctioning or rewarding those who hold positions of pub-
lic trust”.94 This works best through broad-based po
others’ corrupt behaviour, “influence voters’ decisions considerably” and thus func-
 
7: 42) 
xiv); see also WB (n) 
008c: 21); see also WB (m) 
see also WB (m) 
89  WB (200
90  TI (2000: xxii-x
91  WB (e)  
92  TI (2000: xxii) 
93  UNDP (2
94  UNDP (2008b: 37); 
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tion as an “effective deterrent to corrupt behaviour” by politicians95 – which is why 
IAC measures work to enhance party competition.96 
Given that according to IAC discourse people are ‘naturally’ corrupt anyway and 
of reasons other than self-
interest, the further encouragement of these interests through enhancing competition 
 
. They consist mainly of transparency 
                                                
unable to act more co-operatively or show solidarity out 
is not regarded as problematic. The task is instead to manage these self-interests and 
the related corruption risks well by setting the right incentives. 
 
Integrity measures – ethics programmes 
As discussed in chapter 4, integrity is conceived mainly as the compliance of self-
interested individuals with the rules, and is a result of the successful institution of the 
‘right’ incentives. What an interviewee called the “ethical foundation” necessary for 
the public and private sectors was conceived in terms of “an incentive element” for
motivating people “to be performing better to their constituency, to your customers, 
to your citizens’”.97 The measures advocated by IAC discourse for improving ethics 
and integrity (which are not particularly numerous) are designed to support the insti-
tutional incentive structures discussed above
and oversight measures but also of training for risk-avoidance and better rule-
observance as well as punishments in the case of non-observance. This forms a mix-
ture of enforcement elements and responsibilisation practices, both of which rein-
force the incentive-based conceptions of ethics and integrity as discussed in chapter 
4. 
The required “firm ethical basis for public administration” is to be achieved through 
the promotion and ‘enforcement’98 of “ethics programmes”;99 through “training pro-
grammes to create positive behavioural change of civil servants”;100 the promotion 
 
 (2004: 7); see also WB official 2 who mentioned “courses about ethics” 
95  WB (m) 
96  WB (2007: 40, 47) 
97  TI-S official 2 
98  UNDP (2008a: 2) 




of “civil service standards and incentives, ethics codes,”101 capacity building;102 and 
conflict of interest regulations.103 In line with the incentives logic, such measures 
need to be combined with proper control elements. According to TI, tools for integ-
rity enhancement, “for instance codes of conduct, need to be enforced and well pub-
 
estioning of the entire political system”. 
licised” if they are to “improve the accountability of Members of Parliament (MPs)
to parliament and to the general public”.104 Similar enforcement of the integrity of 
administrative public officials can happen through measures such as “integrity test-
ing”.105  
The UNDP declares that public sector managers at all levels need to adhere to “Self-
lessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Transparency, Honesty and Leader-
ship excellence through leading by example”; in this regard it points to UNPAN, the 
UN Public administration programme, which brings these things back to the incen-
tives logic. It suggests “putting into place an "ethics infrastructure" that not only 
provides guidance for good conduct but also administratively and legally punishes 
misconduct”, for example through “access to information that promotes transparency 
and accountability, and oversight by independent institutions and the public at 
large”.106 In a similar line, the WB aims to enhance “ethical behavior by govern-
ment, private sector, and civil society actors” by scaling up “its work with interested 
governments to strengthen transparency in public policymaking and service provi-
sion”.107 Ultimately, integrity is a stability factor in the uncorrupted society. If public 
officials do not act with integrity, this can actually lead “to cynicism and apathy on 
the part of citizens. At worst, it leads to a qu
Thus, it is “crucial (...) that elected members of government act, and are seen to act, 
in an ethical manner”,108 making the visibility of ‘integrity’ clearly more important 
than people’s internal values. Citizens’ trust in the government, which IAC discourse 
values very highly for a good society, comes about exclusively through checking 
upon the visible actions of public officials.  
                                                 
101  UNDP (2004: 19) 
102  UNDP (2008a: 2) 
v) 
007: 18) 
103  TI (f) 
104  TI (f) 
105  TI (2000: 
106  UNPAN 
107  WB (2
108  TI (f) 
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In the uncorrupted society, ethics and integrity in the public sector are an outcome of 
successful efforts to “make corruption a ‘high risk’ and ‘low return’ undertaking”.109 
They are not the outcome of public or private deliberation and individual or social 
norm formation but rather of external incentives to individual self-interest. While 
these incentives for ‘integrity’ are mainly set by institutional transparency and ac-
countability measures, there is also an element of cultural responsibilisation at work, 
gment, 
s ensuring that such mecha-
nisms “take a form which is consistent with the objectives of government and which 
                      
which will be further discussed below; for example in ethics courses and trainings 
which induce public servants of the responsibility to be informed about the rules 
(‘ethics’), the controls and the punishments and so render them responsible for man-
aging their own corruption risk. This element is enhanced by civil society action 
which includes “putting values upfront in (...) the demand of accountability (...) from 
the authorities”.110  
Quite aside from practical problems such as the impossibility of full transparency 
and complete control, such reforms can obviously have a heavy impact on the social 
relations of the actors involved. The building of values like mutual trust, willingness 
to work and care for others, equality, solidarity with fellow citizens, good character, 
civic virtue, altruism, truthfulness to ones convictions, independence of jud
convictions of social justice, love for your neighbour and so on does not play a role 
in the organisation of the public sector; at least not in a form that is not mediated by 
self-interest and thus presupposes the re-articulation of these concepts according to 
the incentives logic. Rather, for the sake of corruption eradication, effectiveness and 
efficiency the public sector is to be dominated by hierarchy, constant control, compe-
tition, outrivaling, wage inequalities, and everyone’s individual self-interest.  
This introduction of market principles and other incentives into the state is in line 
with contemporary neoliberal politico-economic ideals according to which “the task 
of national government is less to govern social and economic processes external to 
itself and more to secure the institutions and mechanisms of social and economic 
government themselves”.111 As Dean notes, this entail
                           
109  TI (2000: vii) 
110  TI-S official 1 
111  Dean (2010: 201) 
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promotes individual and institutional conduct that is consistent with those objec-
112 113
a-
le of law, in the 
ple via their self-interest in order to ensure the stable pur-
ore dependent 
                              
tives”  which Dean calls ‘reflexive government’.  This is clearly the case insofar 
as transparency, accountability and integrity are advocated (both through institu-
tional as well as cultural-behavioural reform) as ultimate governing principles for the 
whole of society including the state apparatus itself.114  
A state that effectively and efficiently provides basic public services 
This restructuring of the state according to incentives is supposed to facilitate a m
jor task that the state needs to fulfil, next to the safeguarding of the ru
realisation of the Universal: the provision of public services. Although the provision 
of state services does not directly incentivise rational individuals, it is in line with the 
overall logic of ruling peo
suit of wealth; by providing them with particular services it ensures the conditions 
under which people can pursue their interests in the first place.  
While this task is constructed as dangerously hindered by corruption, it is to be fa-
cilitated mainly by the restructuring of state institutions according to the ‘right’ in-
centives discussed above. 
As we have already seen in the analysis of chain C, IAC discourse is particularly 
concerned about the damaging effect of corruption on the capacity of the state to 
provide services to its citizens but particularly ‘the poor’, who are “m
upon public services than the rich. The poor simply cannot afford using private hos-
pitals or private schools”.115 IAC discourse takes a strong stance that the effective 
and efficient provision of public services needs to be ensured for the good, uncor-
rupted society to be realised, and that corruption in service provision should not 
force poor people to pay more for state services of lower quality.116  
Yet with regards to the extent of social services that the state needs to provide in IAC 
discourse, it is striking that mainly ‘basic’ services are demanded which consist in 
                   
11  205-227) 
(2008b: 24); WB (c); WB (2007: 4, 20) 
112  Dean (2010: 201) 
3 See particularly Dean (2010:
114  Dean (2010: 201) 
115  WB (d)  
116  TI (o); TI (p); UNDP 
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satisfying ‘basic needs’. Governments are called to “deliver basic social services”,117 
run programmes related to the poor’s “basic needs” like sanitation, education, 
healthcare and water,118 create the respective infrastructures such as power supply, 
schools and roads119 and secure the poor’s access to those “basic goods and services 
– many of which may be ‘free’ by law”.120 IAC discourse clearly aims at the provi-
sion of limited social services covering ‘basic needs’ rather than at a comprehensive 
redistribution of wealth within societies, leaving the uncorrupted society far from an 
equality of opportunities, not to mention the achievement of equality of outcomes.121 
The economic and consequently also social inequalities that the competitive econ-
ite 
 
omy must create (as we will see in the next section) are to be balanced only very 
sparsely with redistribution measures for social service provision. The acceptance of 
economic and social inequalities by IAC discourse is also demonstrated by the fact 
that the unequal dependence on public services by poor and rich people in a society 
is not regarded as a problem but rather as a simple fact.122  
Limited state services can be justified by the argument that the high redistribution 
that more comprehensive state services would entail runs the risk of depriving com-
peting self-interested actors in the market of their earnings to such an extent that will 
render them unproductive and aggressive. Yet, we must note that the liberal rational 
actor logic does not necessarily have to lead to such minimal social services. Desp
great differences, contemporary neoliberal regimes, which IAC discourse seems oth-
erwise reflective of, feature for the most part social systems that exceed the concep-
tions of public service provision articulated in IAC discourse – in part very much so
– while still being eager to remain below the Rawlsian equilibrium line above which 
redistribution is expected to seriously distort the productivity of economic actors.  
Hindess’ intervention into the analysis of liberalism and his case for an understand-
ing of liberalism as both a political theory and a concrete programme of government, 
not only in domestic but also international contexts, may be enlightening with re-
                                                 
117  UNDP (2008c: 19, 20); see also TI (2009f); WB (2007: 67); TI (2008b); Broadman/Recanatini 
(2000: 1); UNDP (2004: 11) 
118  TI (k); see also UNDP (2008a: 6); UNDP (2008c: 8); TI (2009f;  WB (2007: 67); TI (2008b) 
119  TI (o) 
ial 5 
120  TI (2008b: 3); TI (k) 
121 See also WB offic
122 See e.g. WB (d)  
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gards to the limited conception of public service provision in IAC discourse.123 The 
first of two important points he makes is that liberalism is not just about governing 
via freedom, but has always been linked to concrete governmental decisions in 
which liberals distinguished between areas where governing autonomous individuals 
via freedom (according to the logic of incentives) made sense and others where it did 
not; the second point is that liberalism has conceived and continues to conceive non-
Western people as less able to be governed (and consequently also to govern) via 
freedom (or rational self-interest). With regards to post-colonial international liberal 
rule Hindess observes that “where liberal theory once openly acknowledged that the 
greater part of humanity was not yet able to cope with the demands of self-
government”, the focus of contemporary liberal governmental projects of improve-
ment now lies on the “less obviously offensive problem of dealing with troublesome 
citizens; yet this cannot be expected from either the governments or the citizens of 
developing countries.126 Given that public service provision in IAC discourse is con-
                                                
structural factors: transforming cultures and values, creating infrastructures, promot-
ing civil society, removing political obstacles to development, combating corruption, 
etc”.124 This shift towards “more politically congenial discourses” entails what 
Hindess calls the “Western version of liberalism’s civilising mission [that] now has 
to treat those who it sees as most in need of improvement as if they were in fact 
autonomous agents”, insisting that “given suitably conducive external conditions, we 
are all of us capable of autonomous conduct”.125  
The analysis of chain C of IAC discourse has shown that while the discourse insists 
that all people are equally rational and prone to corruption, at the same time it indeed 
articulates developing countries as more prone to corruption and less able to deal 
with human nature. Western liberal rule has advanced from Benthamian conceptions 
of fairness towards neoliberal regimes that provide more than just basic poverty re-
lief and that are assumed to be able to handle and deal with the concomitant risks to 
efficiency and market functioning by setting the right incentives for their rational 
 
also Hindess (2001) 
12
12 e South is highly sug-
123  Hindess (2004); see 
124  Hindess (2004: 12) 
5  Hindess (2004: 13) 
6 Rose-Ackerman’s account of corruption in African and other countries of th
gestive of this view (Rose-Ackerman 1999). See also Hindess’ account of liberal conceptions of 
people in developing countries as being ‘behind in history’ (Hindess 2007).  
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structed as the number one source of temptations for corruption, developing coun-




 precisely this conception of corruption that makes the ideal of the uncor-
to basic service provision.  While IAC discourse claims to reform institutions and
culture in non-Western countries according to a Universal conception of human na-
ture (as shown in chapter 4), it seems that the “patronising liberal view that the peo-
ple of these domains cannot yet be trusted to govern themselves”128 is still perpetu-
ated in the advocacy of merely basic social service provision.129  
Patronising views are also expressed in the articulations of the basic needs of the tar-
get population. Despite the UNDP’s emphasis that policy advice of I
tions should be provided in a way that is “responsive to the needs of the poor”,
IAC discourse defines basic needs as consisting in water, sanitation, healthcare, edu-
cation and housing and argues that these services should be provided by the state, 
thus precluding the possibility for the people concerned to determine their own basic 
needs and the way in which and by whom they should be provided.131  
Overall, it is notable that IAC discourse is actually much more concerned with im-
proving the ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ of state services132 than with the question 
of how these services could be used to create equality and inclusion, which are the 
declared aims of the discourse (as shown in chapter 4). This focus on the functioning 
of state mechanisms (rather than on their social impact) can be attributed to the fact 
that the discourse is about corruption conceived as a distortion of these mechanisms. 
In turn, it is
rupted society be more about securing these mechanisms of governing, rather than 
about the achievement of a comprehensive social ideal with a predetermined and fi-
nal shape (such as, for example, a world in which people are equal with regards to 
material wealth); and to this end all it needs is a limited conception of public service 
provision.  
                                                 
127 See also Weaver (2008: 96) who states with regards to development interventions that the basic 
needs approach of the 1970s demonstrated an “object gap between the two worlds”. 
128  Hindess (2004: 13) 
129 See also Harrison (2006: 17), who notes that “[f]or Africa especially, where the state has been seen 
as the greatest force for corruption”, there is still a concern to “reduce state power”. 
130  UNDP (2004: 14) 
131 As we will see, however, local communities are called to participate and take responsibility for 
managing the corruption risks inherent in state service provision. 
132 See for example TI (2009f); WB (2007: 1, 3); UNDP (2004: 3, 9, 19) 
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This concentration on mechanisms causes the discourse to display several character-
istics that Hindess distinguishes as typical for “many late twentieth century projects 
of neoliberal reform, both within particular states and in the international arena”. 
These concern the introduction of “market and quasi-market arrangements into areas 
of social life which had hitherto been organised in other ways – the corporatisation 
and privatisation of state agencies, the promotion of competition and individual 
choice in health, education and other areas of what Western states once regarded as 
the proper sphere of social policy, the use of financial markets (and credit-rating 
agencies) to regulate the conduct of states, etc”.133 While IAC discourse does not 
advocate the corporatisation of state agencies as a principal tool to improve govern-
ing mechanisms and service provision in the public sector,134 the recently updated 
version of the WB’s GAC strategy however recommends “Pro-competition initia-
tives which foster institutionally pluralistic arrangements for service provision (via, 
for example, contracting-out and other arrangements for private participation, or 
community provision)”. It praises such initiatives for “providing users with choice, 
and pressuring poor performers to improve or exit”,135 thus pointing to their benefi-
 
state-owned enterprises or public services can be privatised in order to expose them 
                                                
cial effects for the enhancement of service quality through competition and the 
power of informed consumers. Furthermore, the UNDP suggests with reference to its 
technical anticorruption support in the water sectors of different countries that
“[p]ro-market reforms (...) might curb corruption” and could include “privatization 
of service provision, subcontracting of services, public-private partnerships, and ten-
dering of concessions, operation and water use licenses”.136 
Apart from market-like arrangements in state service provision, we have seen in an 
earlier section that the discourse advocates privatisations of state services and their 
competitive restructuring as one possible anticorruption measure next to the incen-
tive-restructuring of state agencies. Given that “the public sector doesn’t tend to be 
good at producing things”,137 it is suggested that corrupt or otherwise inefficient 
 
13 4: 14); see also Dean (2010: 201) who conceives this as a feature of ‘advanced liberal 




134 The question whet
135  WB (2012: 71) 
136  UNDP (2011a:
137  WB official 2 
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to the market logic of (foreign) competition and thus “reduce the power of insiders”, 
cut down on opportunities for corruption, and make those institutions more effi-
138
arkets”.   
entioned privatisations is the private sector’s “increasing 
role in providing essential goods and services”, which led the UNDP to call for “im-
ate sector transparency” as a “powerful tool in 
140  
ave largely failed”, there is an ex-
pectation “in many developing countries”, that “the private sector, through the mar-
ket-place, may be able to achieve that which governments have not”, namely devel-
                  
cient.  Thus, competition and efficiency, the values of the market, are deemed 
beneficial for the improvement of service provision in both the public and private 
sectors, instituting the market-like arrangements mentioned by Hindess. As Dean 
puts it, “[i]f the market is the embodiment of rules of conduct that guarantee free-
dom, then the reconfiguration of the social must take the form of m 139
Associated with the aforem
proved corporate governance and priv
fighting corruption”.  The concrete claims of IAC discourse for the organisation of
the private sector will be discussed in the following sections.  
  
A state that regulates the economy 
According to the logic of the public-private divide the private sphere is where indi-
viduals can freely follow their private interests (or make use of their ‘natural rights’) 
which in the case of the liberal conception of human nature consist of material 
wealth and power. In striving for these goals, they need to be restricted by the state 
via the ‘rule of law’ in order to prevent them from harming each other.  
However, according to IAC discourse, the task of the state does not end with guard-
ing the rule of law in the public and private spheres; it also needs to regulate eco-
nomic relations in the private sphere. Given that the private sector is the space where 
people pursue their natural interests and given that the state, their protector, is fi-
nanced through taxing economic transactions, the private sector assumes a huge im-
portance in IAC discourse, especially for the generation of economic growth. TI 
even reasons that after “[g]overnment-led efforts h
                               
); see also TI (2000: xxii) 
1) 
138  WB (2007: ii, 50
139  Dean (2010: 201) 
140  UNDP (2004: 1
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opment.141 However, if left alone and without the ‘right’ incentives, the private sec-
tor is unable to work properly towards these aims, is not immune to corruption142 
and thus unable to serve “the best interests of all”.143  
This is why the ideal state not only functions according to the ‘right’ incentives itself 
and protects the rule of law; it also takes care of the proper functioning of the econ-
omy. In the context of institutional reform in both sectors, IAC discourse articulates 
regulation, i.e. state intervention in the economy, as important for the creation of a 
good society. The WB lauds regulatory reform for being “a successful instrument for 
reducing opportunities for corruption”,
s 
ents have a “responsibility to ensure the effective 
gulation of markets, protection of citizens and enforcement of laws”.145 Unsurpris-
e to be reformed is the in-
 
 integrity of private sector activities”,148 and the WB is convinced that a 
144 and TI explains that a “comprehensive 
regulatory framework for the private sector is a prerequisite for a transparent, honest 
and just society”, and that governm
re
ingly, the logic according to which economic relations ar
centives logic.  
 
Enhancing competition in the private sector 
While we have seen that the market principle competition is an important structuring 
principle for social relations in the public realm, it is even more important in the pri-
vate sector and in fact is constructed as the main ruling principle here.146 In a rela-
tionship of direct contrariety, corruption is articulated as undermining competition, 
whereas more competition is needed to eliminate corruption in the form of monop-
oly, collusion, bribery and cartels in the economy.147 TI sees competition policy as
“an essential tool to protect and promote economic activity, and to ensure and to un-
derwrite the
“thriving, open and competitive private sector” can even be a “strong source of sup-
                                                 
141  TI (2000: xxvi) 
 (2009i: 1) 
 
3) 
14 B (2007: 40) 
 the TI Source Book even dedicates a whole chapter (26) to competition policy TI 
142  TI (2000: xviii); TI
143  TI (2000: 260)
144  WB (2007: 41, 
145  TI (2009i: 1) 
146  WB (2007: 9) 
7  TI (y); TI (r); W




port for better governance” and improved service delivery149 – that is, if helped by 
the state. 
The main measure to enhance competition and to decrease monopoly150 is economic 
liberalisation.151 TI claims that an “ope ll-regulated economy” is necessary 




tate s easures “lowering barriers to 
 It 
inister law on competition policy, anti-
                                                
152 Markets need to be “thriving, 
open and competitive”153 because “[e]xcessive regulation” is seen to provide oppor-
tunities for corruption and inefficiencies. A market should be “ruled by the arms-
length pricing of goods and services”.154 Proper regulation means most of all that 
state intervention in the economy needs to be rather cautious, concentrating on the 
enhancement of competition and leaving it mainly to this market principle to make 
the economy work efficiently. In this spirit, the WB calls for regulatory “reforms that 
clarify the role of the state, reduce excessive regulatory burden, and promote com e-
tition” in order to strengthen the private sector.155 Instead of creating “obstacles to
business” and thus “invitations for corrupt behavior by both government officials 
and private sector individuals”, the s hould take m
entry, requiring competitive restructuring, and clarifying ownership structures”.156
should create “[c]ompetent agencies to adm
monopoly laws, and unfair trade practices”.157 Prices and production decisions 
should be “systemically liberalized” 158 or ‘deregulated’159 and state subsidies should 
be “eliminated or significantly reduced (...) in a uniform, transparent manner”,160 
thus minimising opportunities for corruption.161  
Only this kind of restructuring of the economy provides for “opportunities to make 
money honestly” and thus “commensurately reduces the pressure on individuals to 
 
149  WB (2007: 9) 
6); WB (e); WB (i); Broadman/Recanatini (2000) 
 
07: ii); see also TI (2000: 260) 
 3); see also WB (e); WB (i); WB (2007: 56) 
150  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 1); TI (2000: 260) 
151  WB (2007: 40, 5
152  TI (2000: 260) 
153  WB (2007: 9); WB (i)
154  TI (2000: xxvi, 260) 
155  WB (20
156  WB (i) 
157  WB (i); TI (2000: 260) 
158  Broadman/Recanatini (2000: 3); see also  WB (e) 
159  WB (i); see also Broadman/Recanatini (2000) and WB (2007: 56) 
160  Broadman/Recanatini (2000:
161  WB (e) 
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seek corrupt avenues”.162 These recommendations are evidently grounded in the 
logic of the self-interested rational individuals, according to which economic actors 
will inevitably pursue their self-interest, either corruptly or honestly, depending on 
their institutional and legal environment; the only thing that can be done in the face 
of this natural self-interest is to let them pursue it in a free market with no ‘obstacles’ 
which could render them corrupt.  
Differences between IAC organisation exist insofar as the WB sees bad and uncom
petitive market structuring as due solely to too much, wrong or corrupt state inter-
vention in the economy; consequently, it argues for the enhancement of competition 
because it is necessary against corruption caused by state intervention, arguing that a 
thriving private sector will be a supporter of good governance by the public sector. 
TI, on the other hand, regards “price-fixing, predatory pricing designed to drive a 




ple, it reasons that “the ability of an offi-
e protection in some domestic market will 
                                                
163
as part of what it calls ‘private sector corruption’ and thus locates the blame for cor-
ruption in the private sector itself. Yet, as we have seen, the policy measures advo-
cated are the same: the state needs to enhance competition in the economy in order to 
do away with these hindrances to the Universal. While the UNDP does not give very 
concrete policy recommendations for private sector regulation by the state, neverthe-
less in more general statements it also constructs open, competitiv kets as a use-
ful mechanism against corruption. For exam
cial to provide a private partner profitabl
depend upon how open the market is to external competition from imports”.164 It 
also cites “evidence that highly developed, long established liberal democracies, with 
a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a history of 
openness to trade are perceived as less corrupt (Treisman 2007)”.165 Consequently, it 
also recommends an “[e]ffective competition policy” as part of “[e]conomic regula-
tion” measures against corruption.166  
 
162  WB (2007: 54) 
163  TI (2000: 260) 
164  UNDP (2004: 3) 
165  UNDP (2008c: 21); see also UNDP (2004: 3); TI (2000: 260) 
166  UNDP (2004: 34). Also in documents not directly related to anticorruption, it states that it works 
to “[p]rovide policy advice to governments that wish to establish legal and regulatory frameworks 
for rule based and non-discriminatory markets” (UNDP (2008e). 
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Thus, competition is seen as the main principle to rule economic relations between 
actors in the private sector, and as the best remedy against the inefficiencies, the loss 
of money, and the insecurity caused by corruption. Thus, in the uncorrupted society, 
the state needs to do away with all the hindrances to free international competition 
that it might have created, in order to let self-interested individuals run free. Yet 
while competition lies in the nature of rational actors, nonetheless they are seen as 
utually beneficial competition in the state of nature that is the 
arket by themselves. In order to unfold its full beneficial potential in enhancing the 
to be guaranteed in the 
as we will see in the next section, is then restricted to facilitating the work of these 
supports countries in the implementation of anti-money laundering and asset restitu-
                     
unable to uphold the m
m
productivity of self-interested individuals, competition needs 
market by anchoring it in competition policy and antimonopoly law, and instituting 
agencies to safeguard the compliance of businesses. The regulatory role of the state, 
agencies.  
 
Transparency, rule of law and stability in the private sector 
Negative incentives also play a role in the regulation the state needs to undertake in 
the private sector in order for the economy to function well and without corruption.  
One claim made in this regard is that the state also needs to introduce transparency, 
oversight and other restrictive regulatory mechanisms into the private sector, or at 
least parts of it, and most particularly in the realm of finances. Through what the WB 
calls financial sector governance, financial markets are to be made “sound and trans-
parent”.167 The organisation demands that a financial system be free from “obscure 
insider lending practices and improper financial schemes”168 and instead “reach out 
to the underserved (and not only to a few insiders)”.169 This is why it helps to de-
velop “tools for assessing and improving Bank governance and transparency prac-
tices, including financial reporting and disclosure” and co-operates with the UNDP’s 
‘sister organisation’ UNODC in StAR, the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative170 which 
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167  WB (2007: 23) 
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tion policies.171 Responding to current preoccupations resulting from the financial 
crisis, the WB hopes that through measures such as this, financial systems can be 
regulated in such a way that they function as “a source of discipline on public and 
private agents”.172 This is despite the fact that the measures are most of all about the 
creation of transparency and the state is given no enforcement rights other than for 
the restitution of stolen assets. Moreover, the WB argues that transparency will also 
support “greater competition if introduced in ownership structure and operations of 
firms” more generally, for example in the form of requirements on “financial disclo-
sure and arm’s-length relationships, efficient registries, and better supervision of 
173
tions and pension funds)”.177 This kind of 
engagement is particularly emphasised with regards to the global financial crisis. 
                                                
their operations by independent regulatory bodies”.  Similarly, the UNDP recom-
mends the “[p]romotion of transparency in the private water sector and performance 
benchmarking”.174 According to the incentives logic, if they are sure their data will 
be made public, firms and banks will compete in order to have better records and end 
up being less corrupt and more efficient than they would otherwise be – even without 
any other form of state regulation apart from competition and transparency policy.  
TI discourse is particularly strict against the secrecy in the financial sector. Espe-
cially “off-shore financial centres” which do not comply with “international stan-
dards of supervision, transparency and assistance in investigations”175 should be ex-
cluded from the international financial system. It claims that “about a third of the 
wealth of the world’s wealthiest is held offshore” instead of being taxed by the re-
spective state authorities.176 TI demands that, in order to protect citizens from the 
negative consequences of market failure, states must provide “protection (through 
regulating the activities of financial institu
Constructing the crisis as an effect of both a “lack of transparency” and an “overem-
phasis on profit maximisation” with a concomitant neglect of the “centrality of eth-
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176  TI (p) 
177  TI (2000: 261)
178  TI (2009l: 2) 
271 
 
strong ethical principles, so that all action will be founded in transparency, account-
ability and integrity from the start”.179  
While this sounds more radical than the discourses of UNDP and the WB, TI’s cri-
tique of the “[u]nbridled support for free markets” and the false “belief that markets 
will curb excesses on their own”180 however does not lead to the advocacy of heavy 
restrictions of financial markets through the state. Instead, this “moral crisis”181 
needs to be addressed through “prudent risk management”182 including a great deal 
of transparency (within corporations, in markets, in rescue packages, and in interna-
tional cooperation against the crisis), efficient government oversight and governmen-
tal participation of developing countries in the governance of the international finan-
cial institutions.183 Specifically, governments’ role is to ensure that the budgets of 
investigative and judiciary authorities engaged in the prevention of financial crime 
eir anticorruption systems, and including 
and of “regulatory bodies of financial institutions and financial markets” are ade-
quate; that those bodies report regularly on “complaints – including corruption cases 
– brought to their attention” and to “explain how they have dealt with these”; and to 
sentence companies in a way that ensures “corporations would be incentivised to 
adopt strong anticorruption systems”.  
There is clearly no advocacy for a particularly strong role of the state as a response 
to the crisis. Rather, TI sticks to the well-known ‘rules of the game’; all the emphasis 
is placed on transparency measures, such as creating opportunities for whistle-
blowers, publishing full compensation packages of the most highly compensated ex-
ecutives, adequate disclosure of funds and financial institutions registered at offshore 
financial centres, publication of companies’ key financial and legal data, reporting of 
the beneficiaries of rescue packages on th
international NGOs into the Financial Stability Board, to mention but a few. Such 
IAC measures for institutional reform are reflective of the withdrawal of contempo-
rary neoliberal states from the actual government of economic processes and the 
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concomitant shift of their field of activity towards the government of incentive-
setting governmental mechanisms.184  
It fits this role that next to enhancing competition and ensuring transparency in mar-
kets and especially the financial sector, the state is also responsible for safeguarding 
stability and investment security in the private sector. As the WB explains, the 
“business environment among others is a function of the rule of law, in particular the 
stability of rules and regulations governing business transactions, political stability 
and transparency”.185 Foreign direct investments count as “most beneficial” for eco-
nomic growth,186 but as we have seen, corruption tends to scare away foreign inves-
tors because it distorts competition and market structures, thus putting the security of 
their investments at risk.187 In addition it creates “uncertainty in the market through 
discretion and continuous change of rules”.188 Yet, in line with the rational actor 
logic, “companies are likely only to invest where the returns are extremely high and 
very reliable in being realised”;189 this is why a “sound investment climate” is a 
main aim of the state’s task of “sound macroeconomic policy-making”.190  
Investor confidence is to be secured most of all through the safeguarding of the rule 
of law191 including (intellectual) property rights192 which creates the stability of 
rules and security of property that is necessary for long-term investments. In addi-
tion, transparency in the markets helps companies invest and also reassures them. 
And strict competition policies combined with the state’s self-structuring according 
to incentives reassure businesses that other companies will not win a contract due to 
their contacts with public officials but rather that the contest is solely concerned with 
economic efficiency and the quality of the easures, states 
are to “secure investor confidence, enhance access to capital markets, prom
offer. By applying these m
ote 
growth and strengthen economies” as well as “to lower company costs (for capital 
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and production) and increase economic output”.193 This is perfectly in line with the 
characteristics of national governments in the neoliberal global economy whose task 
it is to “reform those kinds of individual and institutional conduct that are considered 
likely to affect economic performance compared with that of the members of other 
national and even regional populations”.194 Through these measures, governments 
not only combat corruption – they also enhance “country competitiveness”.195 
From this analysis of the kind of state regulation of the economy called for by IAC 
discourse it should be clear that the discourse envisions only limited regulation of the 
economy. Market facilitation is clearly emphasised over market restriction, and both 
are to be carried out for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the stable running of open 
and competitive markets. In line with the liberal tradition, the private sector remains 
the realm where individuals compete rather freely in order to directly satisfy their 
economic interests, with the only restraint being that competition is not subverted. 
As is particularly conspicuous with regards to TI’s suggestions for dealing with the 
financial crisis, state regulation here is not so much about the governing of macro-
economic processes, but rather about the securing of governmental mechanisms. As
Dean notes, econom
 
ic security in contemporary neoliberalism becomes “more about 
e security of tax-raising measures, of national budgets, of systems and styles of 
entation of micro-
 of “uncompetitive public sec-
                                                
th
public management, of privatization plans, and of the implem
economic reform”, the latter comprising the reform
tors”.196 Crucially, to this role of the state in the governing of mechanisms, IAC dis-
course adds an element of citizen participation, as will be discussed in one of the fol-
lowing sections.  
 
Private sector – responsible economic actors  
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State institutions and legal regulations have been the main target of anticorruption 
reform by IAC organisations for quite some time before the governance of the pri-
vate sector also became an object of their interest.197  
According to IAC discourse, this new interest has arisen partly because, as a result of 
the increasing privatization of public assets, there is now a “growing public expecta-
tion of accountability and probity in the corporate sector”.198 Thus, apart from the 
responsibility of the state to regulate the market, the private sector also has a respon-
sibility to regulate itself and manage its own corruption risks in the uncorrupted so-
ciety, ensuring that the right incentives are set to themselves. This responsibility is 
linked to concepts like good corporate governance, corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), corporate citizenship and private sector integrity. While the state is also in-
volved in good corporate governance in that it sets the legal framework for how 
businesses should ‘behave’ (in IAC discourse mainly through competition and trans-
arency requirements, as we have seen), businesses contribute to good corporate 
le of the game into more specific rules and guide-
lines that guide the conduct and define the roles of managers, staff and shareholders / 
                                                
p
governance by translating these ru
stakeholders. However, they can also design and adopt voluntary measures that ex-
ceed the compliance with these legally binding rules and which partly go under the 
name of ‘corporate social responsibility’ or corporate citizenship. Overall, corporate 
governance measures are “necessary, beneficial and useful for all sectors and types 
of companies whether they are multinationals, state-owned enterprises, domestic 
firms, small businesses or family-owned operations”.199 
 
Corporate governance 
The UNDP explains that the private sector is part of “what is called the ‘supply side’ 
of corruption” and that “Article 12 of UNCAC calls on State Parties to strengthen 
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came to occupy itself more with the private sector.201 While the WB is clearly more 
concerned than the UNDP with the topic of private sector integrity, TI is the most 
active of the three in this area, linking its engagement directly to its concept of pri-
vate sector corruption.202 It explains that poor corporate governance – conceived as 
compromising transparency, accountability and integrity in the private sector – re-
sults in abuses like corporate mismanagement and employee misconduct going un-
checked, and is one of the forces to blame for the collapse of the global financial 
markets in 2008.203 Good corporate governance measures in turn “define clearly the 
rights, responsibilities and behaviours that are required of a company’s owners (the 
‘principals’) and managers (the ‘agents’) for the business to operate successfully”.204 
port policies and governance practices that will 
207
They are expected to “manage and reduce financial and operational risks by building 
the integrity, transparency and accountability of a company’s management toward 
different actors at varying levels within a company”. These actors comprise “board 
members, managers, employees and shareholders” but also stakeholders in general, 
who have extended their consent to companies “to operate in their communities” and 
who comprise also customers, suppliers, communities, government and society at 
large.205 Building integrity, transparency and accountability is therefore a form of 
risk management that responsible companies need to undertake and where they re-
ceive guidance from the state but also importantly from IAC organisations. 
Next to being instrumental for the management of financial and operational risks, the 
concept of private sector integrity itself is conceived in a mechanistic way – despite 
statements that might lead one to think otherwise, such as those about corporate re-
sponsibility meaning that “companies (...) articulate and live up to more ethical busi-
ness practices”,206 or declarations that “[r]esponsible business leaders believe that 
there is a moral imperative to sup
help to alleviate world poverty”.  The “practical business reasons for supporting 
good governance reforms”208 clearly have primacy in defining the conception of in-
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tegrity. In line with the conception of integrity as discussed in chapter 4, corporate or 
private sector integrity indicates compliance with a set of rules or standards (some-
times called ‘ethics’) which is defined partly by law and partly by the company’s 
board or other institutions in the private sector such as audit and remuneration com-
mittees.209 This compliance is in turn induced by different negative incentives in-
cluding legal regulations, transparency and accountability measures and by positive 
incentives in the form of rewards.  
Although TI’s definition makes it appear as if corruption would automatically result 
in financial risks and thus negative economic incentives to companies, we know that 
Western businesses are able to make huge profits from bribing foreign public offi-
ials for contracts (especially while the bribes were still tax-exempted by their gov-
 
bribing (that are expected to arise for businesses via enhanced competition and a 
rnance is not an official denotation of 
risks.210 With regards to the private sector, UNCAC recommends to “disallow the 
                                                
c
ernments, as was the case in the OECD before 1997). The beneficial effects of not
generally more thriving economy) thus reach businesses only very indirectly and are 
not able to function as a positive incentive to short-sighted rational actors in busi-
ness. Therefore, just as in the public sector, the ‘right’ incentives to companies need 
to be set by other actors (as listed in the definition above) and also consist in a mix 
of legal regulations, transparency, sector-internal oversight as well as, very impor-
tantly, civil society involvement. Claims for direct control by state agencies are ab-
sent.  
 
Incentives for good corporate governance 
In the last section we have already seen that what the state needs to introduce most of 
all into the private sector is competition and transparency, and it also needs to safe-
guard the rule of law. While corporate gove
any legal content, the kind of law that IAC discourse advocates in this area com-
prises for example the provisions of UNCAC and the OECD anti-bribery convention 
that states should ratify in order to ‘help’ their businesses manage their corruption 
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tax deductibility of expenses that constitute bribes”,211 prohibit the “establishment of 
off-the-books accounts”, promote “transparency among private entities”; it also 
stipulates the promotion of “codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper 
performance of the activities of business and all relevant professions and the preven-
tion of conflicts of interest”, and ensuring “that private enterprises (...) have suffi-
cient internal auditing controls”.212  
Yet in addition to achieving merely compliance with the legal regulations, responsi-
ble companies are called to do m re in order to manage their corruption risk; after 
all, “integrity in business practices is reinforced not only by written regulations, but 
also by moral standards of business ethics and by responsible corporate behaviour”. 
However, these moral standards and behaviours are conceived perfectly mechanisti-
cally and are to be achieved through transparency and internal “training, monitoring, 
and enforcement activities”
o
uption’ codes of conduct”
                                                
213 which companies are to undertake under the name of 
‘integrity standards’. These standards serve to implement but also go beyond legal 
requirements214 and are articulated by IAC discourse as a “vital component of com-
pany efforts to reinforce the right incentives and practices”.215 Those measures in-
clude disclosure requirements,216 auditing standards,217 ‘ethical policies’218 and 
“‘zero tolerance for corr 219 as well as “effective, verifiable 
internal programs of implementation and compliance”.220 They are almost exclu-
sively concerned with minimising corruption risks (and most of all with the risk of 
engaging in “the specific issue of bribery, which is one of the most significant cor-
ruption-related risks facing business today”221) through internal control mechanisms 
and increases in transparency. Some measures are also about ensuring the stability of 
businesses, their investments and their economic growth in general by preventing 
risky behaviour, for example through obligatory internal participatory mechanisms 
 
portant provision of the OECD antibribery convention. 
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such as shareholder ballots for nomination, approval and compensation of members 
of boards of directors.222 Next to these more institutional reform measures, the cul-
tural reform logic, which will be further discussed below, also demands a “suppor-
tive corporate culture” for whistle-blowing in corruption cases223 so that the mutual 
control of employees in companies can actually result in punishment of the corrupt.  
In the name of advocacy and knowledge provision, TI is particularly prolific in the 
area of company-internal anticorruption restructuring and has produced a range of 
guidelines and tools that are supposed to help companies improve their “level of 
business integrity”,224 partly by implementing legal regulations, and partly by sur-
passing them. For example in 2003, the NGO published the Business Principles for 
Countering Bribery which according to TI have already been used “by many leading 
companies around the world to benchmark their own anti-bribery policies and proce-
dures” and have also “served as a solid basis for the development of other anti-
bribery codes and voluntary initiatives”.225 The UN Global Compact, “the world's 
largest voluntary corporate citizenship initiative”226 recommends the TI Business 
Principles as a tool for implementing its 10th principle which addresses anticorrup-
tion in businesses.227 TI has also drafted a “Framework for Voluntary Independent 
Assurance of Corporate Anti-Bribery Programmes” which advises companies on 
how to prepare for independent assurance and “[m]ost importantly (...) proposes
benchmarks, in the form of control objectives” to be used by entities and their assur-
ance providers “in evaluating and assuring an entity’s anti-bribery programme”.
 
 
                                                
228
Furthermore, there is “Transparency International’s Self-Evaluation Tool (TI SET)”, 
a checklist for companies to monitor and improve the design and effectiveness of 
their anti-bribery programme,229 and “RESIST (Resisting Extortions and Solicita-
tions in International Transactions)”, which is advertised as a “training tool to help 
employees counter solicitation and extortion demands in the most efficient and ethi-
cal manner” and has been created in collaboration with different companies and in-
 





223  TI (200
224  TI (200
225  TI (i) 
226  TI (i) 
227  TI (U)
228  TI (201
229  TI (i) 
279 
 
ternational organisations like the World Economic Forum Partnering Against Cor-
ruption Initiative (PACI) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).230 In 
 
es (among other things) and simulta-
                                                
addition to these tools for companies, TI also publishes TRAC, a report on the re-
porting of “close to 500 leading listed companies” about the “strategies, policies and 
management systems they have in place for combating bribery and corruption”.231
Thus, these ‘tools’ are to help companies set the right incentives internally to manage 
their bribery risk, through transparency and mainly internal oversight measures. At 
the same time, TI itself operates as a provider of such incentives in that it uses the 
information made transparent to report on the quality of companies’ incentive-setting 
– which is already part of the second set of anticorruption measures that companies 
need to adopt.  
Following the rational actor logic, such internal incentive-setting mechanisms can 
only work properly if they are being supervised and enforced externally; enforce-
ment in this case can occur either by law or by the market, while the crucial precon-
ditions are, again, transparency and consequent oversight. Therefore, more steps are 
necessary for responsible companies to manage their corruption risk, which consists 
in joining a public-private or a private sector initiative against corruption. Examples 
of such voluntary sector-internal control and enforcement mechanisms are the “Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Publish What You Pay, and the 
regional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance regional Ministerial initiatives 
(FLEG)”232 and also the UN Global Compact233 – initiatives in which the signatories 
or members commit to anticorruption principl
neously obligate themselves to publish all sorts of data and to report on exactly what 
they have done to reach those principles. For example, the UNDP “facilitates Global 
Compact local networks in 52 developing countries and countries with transitional 
economies” and in these voluntary networks brings together “the local private sector, 
civil society groups, labour organizations and academia to discuss corporate con-
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sues”.234 Next to transparency and reporting requirements, these initiatives also fea-
ture explicit mutual enforcement measures such as ‘ethical blacklisting’, in the event 
that “companies do not ‘play by the rules’”.235 
While one might wonder why companies need to join initiatives in which they sign 
up to commitments that are at least partly already established as legal stipulations in 
their countries and internationally, it is now clear that the purpose is to create greater 
                                                
transparency and mutual control of competing private entities;236 this is particularly 
necessary given that, due to its limited role in the economy, the oversight functions 
of the state are very limited here. Yet, given that companies cannot be trusted to do 
the work of controlling each other on their own, given that they also cannot exert 
power over each other by any other means but reporting other companies to legal 
agencies in the case of actual legal breaches, and given that the possibility to control 
other businesses is not enough of an incentive to join these initiatives in the first 
place, the additional participation of the general public or civil society is crucial for 
these IAC measures to work.237  
The incentives to be set by civil society for companies’ transparency, accountability 
and integrity appeal directly to companies’ economic interests and make their eco-
nomic success depend on whether and how well they comply with the anticorruption 
standards stipulated in legal and voluntary frameworks for corporate integrity.238 
This way of holding businesses accountable works via “growing stakeholder expec-
tations that enterprises should be open and transparent about the ways in which they 
manage a range of non-financial issues, including bribery and corruption.”239 Civil 
society is to use its market power as consumers to force businesses to stick to the 
rules of transparency, fair competition and abstinence from bribery. While corporate 
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ner”,240 a “weak compliance programme that leads to a bribery incident can have 
major financial and reputational consequences” and endanger a company’s sustain-
ability, thus posing “serious and costly risks”.241 Thus, while failing to adopt and 
comply with these measures plays out as negative economic incentives for busi-
nesses, the chance to present oneself as a particularly ‘honest’ enterprise and the 
consequent prospect to increase economic profit conversely functions as a positive 
incentive for companies to join corporate governance initiatives and stick to the 
rules.  
Economic interest is to function as an “incentive (...) for private firms to avoid cor-
ruption” in the uncorrupted society.242 This is why the WB’s work on “ethical corpo-
rate practices” includes “advocating that integrity is ‘good for business’”.243 The In-
ternational Finance Corporation, which is a member of the World Bank Group, has 
for example the mandate to build “the ‘business case’ for private sector engagement 
on environmental and social issues”,244 and the UNDP constructs corporate social 
responsibility as opening up “new business opportunities for the private sector” and 
praises this in its work on “multi-stakeholder partnerships which engage the private 
sector in support of the MDGs”.245 It reasons that such incentivisation can even
bring the private sector to monitor and provide “counterweight to government by 
helping to resist corrupt 
 
practices” or by “lobbying in coalition for legislative and 
other reforms”.246 Of course, in order for the incentivisation of companies by civil 
society to be possible, transparency and access to information is key and partly en-
sured through the organisations’ membership in respective private sector initiatives. 
Companies must “report on key aspects of compliance and adherence to laws and 
regulations in a transparent and publicly available manner”247 so that civil society 
members can monitor their anticorruption efforts and help enforce them via their 
power as consumers. In fact, transparency becomes the way to send “a strong signal 
to employees, investors and consumers, that a company is serious about clean busi-
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ness”,248 making the visibility of ‘ethical behaviour’ the currency of economic suc-
cess.  
Overall, the case for corporate governance mechanisms is consensually made in IAC 
 
th
                                                
discourse via appeals and incentives to economic interests, thus following the speci-
fication of the Universal as outlined in chapter 4. Ethical standards are constructed as 
regulations and mechanisms against bribery and for fair competition while corporate 
integrity is conceived as compliance with these standards which is in turn induced by 
economic incentive-setting via the market. Integrity itself needs to be visible in the 
form of transparency and reporting and is in turn instrumental for the achievement of 
profit in the private sector. The demanded responsibility of businesses to undertake 
active corruption ‘risk management’ is thus due solely to the allegedly natural pur-
suit of their economic interest according to the incentives set by other actors. An ac-
tive civil society is a particularly important condition in order for this private sector 
integrity to work.  
Given that many of the large corporations which are the main targets of these kinds
of IAC measures operate on a global scale, this construction of civil society in-
volvement as a corruption control factor for the private sector adds the need for a 
globally active civil society at feels responsible for managing the corruption risks 
of globally active private entities to the need for global legal frameworks. This 
automatically expands the scope of IAC reform globally, even if the UNDP and the 
WB explicitly restrict their mandates to the developing world, as we have seen in 
chapter 5. While some time back it was considered generally legitimate that Western 
corporations used opportunities for corruption in developing countries in order to 
raise their short-term profits, IAC discourse now envisions a globally responsible 
civil society that punishes such illegitimate distortions of proper global economic 
processes that endanger the global economic system over the longer term. This ne-
cessitates that these “targeted populations”, which in this case are all citizens, recog-
nise their linked self-interests and engage in joint political mobilisation and man-
agement of corruption risks.249 This presupposes a culture in which a company’s ad-
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fair competition in liberal markets is highly regarded, and in which citizens feel re-
sponsible to actively safeguard these values via consciously employing their power 
as consumers. As befits contemporary neoliberal government, IAC discourse aids 
these formations of interest groups, as we will see in the next section. 
Again we can note that this kind of involvement requires constant monitoring efforts 
and conscious consumer behaviour by civil society members, while simultaneously 
limiting their opportunities to participate in companies’ decisions to naming and 
shaming activities and the influence of their economic decisions. Instead of an in-
crease in direct democracy, IAC discourse fosters a transferral of ‘ethical’ decision-
making to the market. Yet, while Philp recognises in IAC discourse a “shift from 
politics to the market, so as to make fewer demands on self-restraint”,250 we see 
more clearly now that this market is equipped with all sorts of restraints (and also 
positive incentives); namely by laws and regulations, sector-internal control initia-
tives, in addition to an active civil society which exercises its consumer-power to 
 
ere additional control 
enforce businesses’ self-restructuring according to transparency, efficiency, control 
and competition. At the same time the market itself works as a restraint or an incen-
tive for the conduct of governments (who need to carefully ensure its smooth and 
corruption-free running) and citizens (who need to adapt their behaviour to manage 
its corruption risks), a characteristic that leads Hindess to term it “that fundamental 
liberal instrument of civilization” and to suggest that it is a major mechanism of the 
indirect rule of Western liberal states over post-colonial countries.251 These insights 
indicate an important revision of the arguments of the critical IAC literature in that 
they show that far from being neglected and untouched by IAC discourse the market 
is both an important target and instrument in the construction of the good, uncor-
rupted society. 
Although in IAC discourse both the market and the public sector feature restraints, 
there are also differences between the kinds of incentivisation evident in the public
and private sectors. In the public sector incentivisation works mainly via institutional 
structures that reward or punish, with civil society being a m
element; whereas incentivisation in the private sector (despite also working via insti-
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tutions, namely legal regulations and private sector initiatives) casts a more decisive 
role for civil society. We have also seen in one of the previous sections that actors in 
the public sector, next to being incentivised via their public interest, are also respon-
sibilised via ethics training where they learn about their responsibility to be informed 
about the rules and accountability structures with the purpose of being better incen-
tivised by them. This kind of responsibilisation via social norms (or culture, as Dean 
prefers to call it), which is a main claim for the organisation of civil society, as will 
be shown, is hardly found in the claims for the organisation of the private sector. 
Here the logic works almost solely via incentives set to the assumed ‘natural’ self-
s’ inclination to corruption, while the WB empha-
sises the opportunity to make profit out of behaving ‘with integrity’ somewhat more; 
yet, both organisations stress the need for both kinds of measures to include the role 
also see that the WB’s definition of corruption as nec-
essarily involving the public sector (see chapter 3) does not prevent it from engaging 
private sector actors accountable for managing their corruption risks, 
the means through which civil society is to be induced to carry out these tasks will 
The previous chapter has already shown the importance that IAC discourse attributes 
to the active involvement of civil society in the fight against corruption, in the form 
eform. The following section will inquire into the kind of participa-
ated by IAC discourse. It will also look in greater detail at the par-
interest of economic actors striving for profit.  
With regards to differences between the organisations, we have seen that TI puts par-
ticular emphasis in its work on the institution of (partly voluntary) regulations and 
initiatives that restrain companie
of civil society here. We can 
in private sector work in the context of its IAC efforts. The UNDP seems to be active 
only with regards to the Global Compact but joins in with calls for the rest of the 
measures. So again, we can recognise a consensus on the kind of Universal con-
structed, combined with a form of labour division between the three organisations.  
While we have discussed here the mechanisms through which civil society is sup-
posed to hold 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
Responsible civil society  
of civil society r
tion that is advoc
285 
 
ticipatory activities that are expected from civil society by IAC discourse in order to 
set the right incentives and at the ways in which they are supposed to be facilitated 
and ensured.  
The kind of engagement that the WB expects from civil society is very specific. The 
organisation calls for “participation and oversight by civil society, media, and com-
munities”252 as well as by “civic organisations”253 in target countries, demanding 
that these ‘stakeholders’ “play constructively their development role”254 and help 
enhance states’ “development effectiveness”.255 Next to “formal institutions of ex-
ecutive oversight” it also wants to strengthen “civil society efforts for better govern-
ance”,256 constructing the activities of civil society as an instrument next to institu-
tions to put the ‘right’ incentives in place. Similarly, TI emphasises how important it 
is to “[e]xtend civil society’s watchdog functions” to the area of corruption257 and 
explains that its involvement can “add an element of control and participation” to the 
fight against corruption.258 This instrumental view of civil society engagement was 
confirmed by interviewees who stressed the need to create a “robust form of en-
gagement from civil society” in form of a civil society “force base”259 for achieving 
accountability. Also the UNDP, which determined the “[e]ngagement of civil society 
organizations in ATI programming and policies”260 as one of its IAC ‘entry 
points’,261 calls for “increasing civil society and media participation in policy formu-
rs, businesses and courts,264 thus functioning as one of the “factors” that 
may contribute to increasing the “risk of exposure (probability of being caught) and 
                                                
lation and international representation” as a means for strengthening the ability of 
these groups “to provide anti-corruption oversight”,262 rendering the connection be-
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the consequences for officials if they do get caught”;265 this in turn contributes to 
 
 
                                                
greater “congruence among public policy, its implementation and the efficient allo-
cation of resources”.266  
In addition to civil society members religious leaders, business organisations, profes-
sional associations, ad hoc groups,267 public interest groups and investigative jour-
nalists are also counted among those “with a mission and the right to expose 
abuses”.268 
 
A civil society that monitors the public sector 
Civil society participation with regards to the actions of state actors and institutions 
is particularly important. It “assumes critical importance in combating corruption, 
because it may have a significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials 
to be responsive to public interest”.269 Citizens are called to “control the actions of 
their governments” and to “hold those which come to power accountable.270 To-
gether with the media, civil society is called “to be involved in a continuous process 
of government review”271 but citizens can also act as consultants, voice dissent and
criticise the government.272 They should also be “active in pressing their govern-
ments and holding them accountable” to the standards of international anticorruption 
conventions.273 IAC discourse supports initiatives that “involve beneficiaries and 
other stakeholders in policymaking and oversight”.274 “[L]egitimate social groups” 
should be included in the “participatory development of policies and public spending 
priorities”,275 participate in election monitoring processes276 or in designing political
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tors with those regulations.277 This kind of citizen involvement will partly involve a 
localisation of IAC activities; as the UNDP explains, “[t]argeting local accountabil-
ity” through “bottom-up approaches (...) could help promote accountability and 
transparency in the public sector”.278 Thus, “[p]articipatory initiatives” are advocated 
“which involve users (via, for example, parents in school committees, or farmers in 
                 
water users associations) in the delivery and oversight of service provision at the 
front-line, including participation and oversight of procurement”.279 Citizens’ com-
mittees should also organise themselves in sectors such as health and the environ-
ment.280 However, when the UNDP demands that civil society be more “involved in 
the policy dialogue” this also refers to “the development of national strategies and 
policies for strengthening accountability and transparency in public and corporate 
governance”,281 leaving it open as to who exactly is to be involved and how this is to 
happen. Furthermore, in the area of the judiciary, civil society is called to speak out 
against impunity, and to “create public demand for justice” and for a judicial system 
that “frightens the crooks”,282 through “building coalitions of court users”.283 
The participation of ‘the poor’ is regarded as particularly important for the success of 
development and anticorruption efforts. According to TI, ‘the poor’284 are to partici-
pate in “determining key integrity cracks and in formulating anticorruption initiatives 
that are integrated into the national development strategy”.285 TI suggests linking 
anticorruption initiatives to development projects with a pro-poor focus, and to in-
clude ‘the poor’ “as key actors during the policy formulation stage” next to the legis-
lators. It also demands participatory budgeting exercises,286 and corruption mapping, 
electoral pacts and participation in election monitoring.287 While the rights that ‘the 
poor’ should have in this participatory exercise remain unclear, the reason given for 
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their participation is in order to raise accountability.288 Similarly, the UNDP calls for 
“inclusive participation”289 and announces that it explicitly wants to “ensure that 
civil society is truly engaged as a development partner, and not only called upon to 
validate and monitor government anticorruption policies and programmes”.290 Yet, 
the recommendations in this regard are restricted to oversight and lobbying meas-
s of accountability: “Di-
agonal accountability is when citizens use government institutions to elicit better 
                                                
ures: “One strategy is to have citizens’ oversight bodies that are involved in social 
audits and budget tracking, and citizens’ committees organized in sectors such as 
education, health and the environment”.291 There is no doubt that oversight of public 
sector activities is of utmost importance for the success of IAC efforts. The discourse 
calls for citizens and the media to monitor public policymaking and implementa-
tion,292 the performance of institutions and officials,293  the procurement or public 
expenditure in general,294 and “income and asset declarations”;295 it demands citi-
zens’ involvement in social audits and budget tracking,296 in public reporting297 and 
in the “third-party monitoring” that the WB uses to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of its own operations.298  
Strong media are usually demanded together with citizen engagement,299 making it 
even clearer that the aim of this involvement is not so much to ensure political delib-
eration, but to use civil society participation as a tool to monitor, expose and report 
and to ring the bell as soon as public and private sector actors are suspected to be 
violating the rules. In this way, actors are to be kept in check so that they do not 
break the rules. That citizens’ engagement is part of the mechanisms to enhance ac-
countability for IAC discourse is demonstrated for example by TI’s explanation of 
how citizens’ involvement contributes to two different form
 
288  TI (2008b: 4); Very interestingly, TI points to the insufficient accountability and citizen participa-
opment frameworks” and concludes that “a consensus on how to strengthen these 
as remained elusive within development cooperation circles” (TI (2008b: 3). 
) 
6) 
ee also UNDP (2008b: 10); TI-S official 2 
8); UNDP (2008b: 27); UNDP (2004: 2) 
tion in “key devel
elements in practice h
289  UNDP (2008c: 29) 
290  UNDP (2004: 16
291  UNDP (2008b: 20) 
292  WB (2007: vii) 
293  UNDP (2008b: 3
294  WB (2007 : 19, 20) 
295  WB (2007: 52) 
296  UNDP (2008b: 20) 
297  UNDP (2008a: 9); s
298  WB (2007 : iii) 
299 See e.g. WB (2007: 1
289 
 
oversight of the state’s actions, and in the process engage in policy-making, budget-
ing, expenditure tracking and other activities”. Vertical accountability in turn “holds 
a public official accountable to the electorate or citizenry through elections, a free 
press, an active civil society and other similar channels”.300 Similarly, while ac-
countable institutions form part of the UNDP’s focus on the ‘supply side’ of good 
governance,301 “civic engagement” enhances the “demand side of good govern-
ance”.302 It functions as “informal institutional systems”303 that enhance and ‘com-
plement’ the incentives set by institutions in the public and private sector and thus 
“ensures the proper functioning of checks and balance”.304  
While the measures to be undertaken for the purpose of “citizen empowerment” can 
in rare cases comprise “devolution, citizens’ charters, bills of rights, elections”305 
and thus result in a real increase in citizens’ decision-making power, it is rather clear 
from the analysis that the main rationale for enhancing citizen involvement is to sup-
port the incentive-setting mechanisms foreseen by IAC discourse. Their participation 
gives citizens opportunities to check the actions of the other actors involved; it “ex-
erts pressure on government and the private sector for greater transparency and ac-
countability”306 and for adherence to the (predefined) rules. This pressure can be ex-
by addressing corrupt 
public officials through the law. Yet, if the combination of oversight and elections 
                                                
pressed mainly through the institution of regular elections and 
fails to bind representatives to the rules, we know from chapter 3 that the worst can 
happen – citizens might lose trust in their government and make use of their right to 
revolt, which should serve as a last powerful disincentive to public sector actors to 
act corruptly. However, given that this endangers the stability of the whole system 
including the rule of law itself, it is not advocated in IAC discourse as a means of 
citizen participation; nevertheless it is mentioned as a warning.  
 
A civil society that monitors the private sector 
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While civil society involvement in the public sector is advocated as ‘participation’, it 
is notable that this term is not used in reference to the private sector, where oversight 
or the inclusion of the stakeholders’ interests is the primary demand. While this ar-
ticulates citizen participation as legitimate in the public but not legitimate in the pri-
vate sector, the rationale of both kinds of citizen engagement is the same. Citizens 
and the media are also responsible for promoting transparency,307 “accountability 
and greater corporate responsibility in the private sector”308 and thus “must: Monitor 
companies’ anti-corruption efforts”. Most of all, it needs to “demand transparent and 
understandable reporting from companies and regulators”,309 advocate for corporate 
integrity systems310 and monitor compliance and regulatory efforts.311 Furthermore 
it must “[a]dvocate adoption of complaints systems and whistleblower protections” 
within companies and generally “encourage companies and legislators to create an 
enabling environment to internally report abuses”.312 The WB itself uses “giving 
‘voice’ to civil society as a means of reducing the risks of corruption”313 in its own 
financing operations.314 Regarding the question how the so-called stakeholders can 
actually take part in or influence what businesses do a TI interviewee told me that 
the population “can ask questions, ask for the use of some share of the value, (...) for 
their developing benefits, like education, health, infrastructure”;315 its activities hap-
pen “through press campaigns, mobilisation of the tools of civil society organisa-
tions, which are very diverse. (...) You have a lot of consequences of this information 
316being known”.  So despite the stakeholder concept and TI’s insistence that compa-
nies activities also need to benefit the stakeholders,317 corporate governance is not 
about any rights of the citizens to direct involvement in corporate actions. Thus, 
what the concept adds to the demands for better regulation of the economy through 
the state and to the claims for private sector integrity is not participation but an in-
crease in transparency and oversight. Therefore, civil society involvement in the pri-
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vate sector means observing business, ringing a fire-alarm in the government’s ear 
when corporate misdeeds are detected, and using consumer power to hold businesses 
accountable.  
TI’s ‘integrity pacts’, which are also advocated by the WB,318 are a prominent ex-
ample of the IAC strategy of civil society participation in order to enhance account-
ability. Conceived as a “tool aimed at preventing corruption in public contracting” 
and ensuring “increased accountability of public resources”, those pacts are agree-
ments between a government department and “all bidders for a public contract” 
which are facilitated by civil society organisations. The pact “stipulates rights and 
obligations to the effect that neither side will: pay, offer, demand or accept bribes; 
collude with competitors to obtain the contract; or engage in such abuses while exe-
cuting the contract”. The participatory element consists in the fact that the “content 
of the integrity pact should be agreed upon by the civil society organisations and the 
government”, a process which is to be led by civil society organisations from the tar-
get countries. Those civil society organisations then select one or more independent 
monitors, who should “review the tender documents, the evaluation reports, the 
award selection decision and the implementation supervision reports (technical as 
well as financial)” and inform the government of possible irregularities or corruption
risks and possible measures. Importantly, “[w]here any corruption risks or possible 
irregularities are reported by the monitor to the government office and no steps have 
been taken (or such steps are inadequate) within a reasonable period of time, then the 
Monitor is entitled to inform the public and/or the public prosecutor’s office about 
this situation”.
 
hen promoting integrity pacts, 
idders are told that “what we want is to have you sitting here reinforcing your 
 the transparency of the procurement process from 
importance of ensuring the competition, com-
                                                
319 A TI interviewee described integrity pacts as “an ethical rein-
forcement for something that is already in the law”. W
b
commitment with the defence of
an ethical perspective. Because of the 
petition for everybody, getting the best possible contractors out of this pot, and creat-
ing legitimacy for what the government does”.320 While this may be interpreted as a 
social responsibilisation tool for economic actors to manage their own corruption 
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risk for the sake of competition and stability (and would thus be an exception to the 
purely economic logic of private sector integrity reviewed earlier), it is also quite 
likely to assure the bidders of the enhanced oversight that is in place; in both cases it 
will contribute to their incentivisation for integrity.  
 
A responsible civil society... 
Thus, overall, participation in IAC discourse is conceived neither as a deliberative 
mechanism aimed at ensuring consensual decisions nor as the introduction of direct 
democratic decision-making. Rather it is presented as mainly an informal “preven-
tive corruption measure”321 working through oversight. Yet, considering the short-
sighted economistic perspective of self-interested individuals (including civil society 
members); the extremely high ‘transaction costs’ involved in monitoring public and 
private sector actors; and the rather indirect powers of civil society members to hold 
these actors accountable,322 the pressing question is how civil society itself can be 
made to undertake all those efforts. In the rational actor logic, how can civil society 
actors themselves be incentivised for this task? 
It can be argued that, rather than being a badly designed incentive-instrument, the 
claims for this kind of ‘toothless’ participation of citizens in the fight against corrup-
tion with hardly any formal decision-making rights rely on another incentive setting 
mechanism that works on the level of culture and that was already touched upon in 
the section on public servants’ ethics courses and the business culture of whistle 
blowing: It is about a form of responsibilisation of individuals for ensuring their own 
freedom (the freedom to pursue their interests without the interference of others) in 
the good, uncorrupted society. While in early liberalism, freedom is articulated as a 
“natural attribute of Homo oeconomicus, the tional subject of interest”, in neoliber-
alism it becomes “an artefact”, something that needs to be created through particular 
ways of societal organisation.323 Yet Dean adverts to differences between neoliberal-
 ra
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isms with regards to the ways in which this artefact is to be constructed. He explains 
that, in German ordoliberalism, Foucault finds a dichotomous division between peo-
ple’s ‘natural’ self-interested drives and the rational designs of government which 
are supposed to promote “the conditions of the free, entrepreneurial conduct of eco-
nomically rational individuals” in order to allow them to be free.324 In what he calls 
the contemporarily dominant Hayekian version of neoliberalism however, Dean sees 
this dichotomy outflanked by Hayek’s introduction of culture as “an intermediate 
and key layer between nature and reason”.325 Human interests are to be channelled in 
the right ways not only through “the ‘thin layer of deliberately adopted or modified 
rules’” like the rule of law and institutional designs but also through the cultural tra-
ditions that restrain them; these cultural rules of conduct are now in fact regarded as 
that which gives rise to “rationally constructed institutions” in the first place, and the 
“development of civilization is thus dependent on the capacity to learn and pass on 
these rules of conduct”.326 These cultural rules of conduct can be learnt and deduced 
from the orders of the market, language, morals and law327 and it is people’s respon-
sibility to do so. Thus, contemporary neoliberal regimes are organised according to 
the importance and the “disciplining effect of social orders” in teaching people how 
to practice their freedom.328 In this spirit, the chapter on civil society in the TI 
Source Book quotes Woodrow Wilson with the claim that “Liberty has never come 
from the government. Liberty has always come from the subjects of it”.329 Participa-
tion of the (potential) victims of corruption in monitoring the behaviour of public 
and private sector actors and in advocating rule-conformity, greater transparency and 
greater participation means that they are actively engaged in the pursuit of their own 
interests and thus in the responsible safeguarding of their own freedoms. It is a “cul-
ture change”330 that IAC discourse advocates insofar as individuals are no longer 
                                                
assumed to be simply pursuing their own ‘natural’ interests – instead they must be 
taught what their interests are and become responsible for pursuing them in a way 
that manages the risk that may be posed to them by the irresponsible and corrupt be-
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haviour of others. So culture enters the picture of the good, uncorrupted society in 
the form of a cultural change that mediates individual interests and that aims at be-
havioural changes through the refinement of the incentive structure for rational self-
interested actors. The ideal and responsible citizens are “stakeholders who care about 
the outcome” of anticorruption reform,331 who actively safeguard their interests 
through constant monitoring of other actors, and who utter a constant “clamour for 
political reform”. 332  
While corporate ‘responsibility’ is obviously mainly an outcome of economic (and 
not cultural) incentivisation (as we have seen in this chapter), responsibilisation via 
culture is heavily at work in civil society involvement against corruption and in pub-
lic sector reform. In the latter, ethics courses support the incentivisation for integrity 
that is put in place by institutional meritocratic and accountability mechanisms. 
While both kinds of incentivisation in the public sector are to be undertaken by the
states in the target countries in co-operation with IAC organisations (who provide 
 
nowledge, money and may also organise ethics courses), similarly co-operation is 
in the realm of civil society, as IAC dis-
tion consists of two principal mechanisms: One is 
n the WB 
                                                
k
necessary for the incentivisation of citizens 
course suggests. This incentivisa
the putting in place of institutional incentives and is usually denominated with the 
signifier ‘enabling environment’ in IAC discourse. The other mechanism, in which 
IAC organisations have a particularly important role, is the (cultural) responsibilisa-
tion of citizens in target countries that goes under the name of ‘capacity building’. 
These mechanisms are almost always advocated together; for example whe
declares that it will “strengthen the enabling environment and capacity of civil soci-
ety and the media to monitor public policymaking and implementation”.333 
 
.... in an enabling environment 
The creation of an enabling environment that enables citizens to fulfil their role in 
the fight against corruption also comprises the guaranteeing of transparency and ac-
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cess of information by both public sector institutions and companies that has already 
been mentioned and does not need repeating here. It is the most important precondi-
tion for the kind of civil society involvement advocated in IAC discourse.  
In addition, other measures are necessary in order to ensure that civil society will be 
able to fulfil its role in the fight against corruption. Although citizens are assumed to 
be self-interested in IAC discourse, their short-sighted self-interest does not lead 
them to become active in the fight against corruption and to m oni-
tor other actors if ‘transaction costs’ are too high. As with public and private sector 
actors, their self-interest needs to be channelled via changes to the institutional envi-
ronment that favour their responsible behaviour. This implies that target states need 
to crea al and regulatory framework for civil society and media ac-
tivities,334 which is something that not only TI lobbies f
ake the effort to m
te an enabling leg
or, but is also one of the 
B’s entry points335 as well as an aspect that the “UNDP can capitalize on”.336 
r revise anti-
defamation laws and ‘insult’ laws to ensure that these cannot be used to threaten the 
hat the “[r]egistration of a civil society group should be a right, not a privi-
338
A capable civil society, or a ‘culture of integrity’ 
                 
W
States are encouraged to “pass Freedom of Information laws; repeal o
press; and removing press and media censorship; (...) end government discrimination 
against certain media; and ensure that state-owned media employees can maintain 
professional standards of independence and responsibility”.337 In addition to this, 
“[n]ongovernmental organisations and other civil society institutions should be easy 
to establish, (...) and registration provisions should be simple and inexpensive”, 
meaning t
lege”.  Such arrangements provide for the possibility of a responsibilised civil so-
ciety to fulfil its tasks in minimising corruption risks.  
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However, the institution of a culture of integrity and the creation of citizens that are 
capable to fulfil their responsibilities in the good, uncorrupted society is equally im-
portant – “specifically in countries where other oversight (governmental, parliamen-
tary) is weak”.339 IAC activities under the name of ‘capacity building’ contribute to 
that goal and provide another very important ‘entry point’340 for IAC organisa-
341
trainers to CSOs to scale up capacity”, as the UNDP suggests.350 IAC organisations 
                                                
tions.   
The three organisations recognise that even with the right freedoms and rights, with 
access to information and other institutional incentives in place in the public and pri-
vate sectors, it may still prove difficult to motivate citizens for their ‘duties’342 to 
monitor and to participate. TI’s founder Peter Eigen remarks that “developing a vi-
brant civil society willing and able to play a meaningful role in shaping its environ-
ment” in many countries is “the most difficult element in the equation” resulting in 
the hoped-for crackdown on corruption.343 If there is no demand for accountability 
and transparency from the general public, it needs to be generated by IAC organisa-
tions.344  
Civil society needs to be aware of the problems caused by corruption, and educated 
enough to be able to do the right things against it.345 Thus, its “capacity (...) to per-
form watchdog functions” needs to be built,346 “their understanding of decision-
making mechanisms”347 needs to be developed and they need to receive “training 
(...) on anti-corruption”.348 While “innovative activities of CSOs and the media” 
need to be funded,349 the capacity of civil society organisations needs to be built “not 
only in advocacy but also in the implementation and monitoring of national or local 
anti-corruption strategies and programmes”, for example by offering “training of 
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also facilitate “coalition building for South-South exchange of knowledge and exper-
tise”351 and enhance “knowledge management” and “knowledge networks” more 
generally, such as “producing guidelines, manuals, comparative experiences and 
primers”.352 For example, in Yemen, the UNDP conducted a project that “aimed to 
promote the exchange of information on corruption issues, methodologies to monitor 
public expenditure and awareness-raising among NGOs”,353 while TI in turn pro-
vides ‘ethics trainings’ or ‘anticorruption education’ for school-kids and students.354  
In addition, the media as an “important opinion former”355 needs to be “informed on 
causes, effects and magnitude of corruption as well as internationa ti-corruption 
norms and standards”.
l an
onitor and provide feedback on government perform-
mation that was published weekly by its print media members”;360 in Yemen, the 
UNDP supported a “media project advocating for greater transparency through ca-
odes of conduct for journalists at 
361
356 Professional standards, the independence, competitiveness 
and the investigative capacity of journalists and the media need to be raised357 so 
that they “can investigate, m
ance, including corruption”358 and live up to their “responsibility”.359 The UNDP 
gives illustrations of its work in this area, for example citing its support in providing 
resources to the Peruvian Press Council for contributing “significantly to the debate 
and drafting of the Transparency and Access to Public Information law” and for 
conducting a “year-long public education campaign for citizens’ right to public in-
for
pacity strengthening, networking, and promoting c
the national level”.  
Through these measures, IAC organisations inform civil society members not only 
about corruption and its causes and consequences as constructed by IAC discourse, 
they also persuade them that they should do something about it and teach them what 
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A civil society that is aware of corruption risks 
Yet, this is not the only mechanism through which civil society is to contribute to the 
fight against corruption. As the UNDP explains, civil society has a “vital role in re-
shaping attitudes” and in reversing “public apathy and tolerance for corruption”.362 
While it counts among the tasks of civil society to ensure “that reform measures to 
combat corruption match the perceptions and expectations of the people”,363 it is 
these very perceptions and expectations of the people that need to be moulded in the 
first place. IAC discourse works towards a general change in interests of citizens in 
developing countries and a subsequent responsibilisation of these citizens to take 
part in the fight against corruption and make their contribution to the safeguarding of 
their freedom in the ‘right’ way. 
UNDP emphasises that it is also “crucial that awareness campaigns include activities 
Thus, civil society groups and the media are also called upon to raise general “public 
awareness about the seriousness of the corruption problem”364 and of the “impor-
tance of regulation and effective enforcement”365 and to create an “engaged and in-
formed public” and to generate the “increased demand for good governance” that 
“the fight against corruption in developing countries requires”.366 This can occur by 
“producing flyers, fact sheets and posters on topical issues”,367 through raising of 
public awareness about the reform or adoption of a particular piece of legislation,368 
and through youth education and ethics training about corruption and “the values that 
underpin good governance”, as the UNDP does in Lebanon for example.369 The 
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on promoting the goals and objectives of UNCAC and other relevant instru-
ments”.370 
Civil society networks are to “mobilise the rest of the population for zero tolerance 
against corruption”371 by appealing to and changing their interests. People need to 
“understand that actually the public money is their taxpayers’ money, that they’re 
paying taxes and that is this money that is being (...) involved in corruption, that it 
has everything to do with them, that it has to do with the bad water service that you 
get in your house, and it has to do with that your kids can’t go to school”.372 While 
the UNDP is convinced that “[p]eople generally understand the seriousness of the 
corruption problem”, nevertheless it claims that they still “need to be convinced that 
something can be done about it”.373 Thus, next to raising this awareness in civil soci-
ety by appealing to its interests it is necessary to give it “specific tools that it can use 
to report instances of corruption, or to seek remedies”.374  
IAC discourse confirms the importance of cultural reform and the responsibilisation 





                                                
5 in order to implant “the 
norms and values of the market and the forms of conduct to be derived from it in all 
spheres, including the institutions and instruments of government themselves”.376 
While IAC organisations are usually eage  robe their work in technical and ‘neu-
tral’ terms, as we have already seen, indeed some articulations make it quite clear 
that the measures on the level of civil society are not concerned with teaching some
technical skills alone. Rather, they are about “educating the society”377 in question
and building into it a “culture of integrity”.378 In any “society which perceives some 
kind of (...) corruption acceptable”,379 IAC reforms need to generate “sustained ef-
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kind of thinking itself”.382 Therefore, the “ultimate goal” of civil society involve-
ment is to generate “demand for anticorruption (...) in a society”,383 and this in turn 
is to be achieved through a “shift towards increased reliance on shared norms and 
values”.384 Anti-corruption reforms “need to transform values and ethical frame-
 
effect of civilisation as embedded in culture: “Rea-
son is the consequence of those learnt rules of conduct by which humans become 
works (...) in order to be imbedded in public culture”.385 Against the background of 
the analysis conducted in this thesis, we know that this cultural change in norms and 
values will be a change in interests (or a redirecting of interests) which is to make 
individuals safeguard their freedom in the ways foreseen by IAC discourse. Contem-
porary neoliberalism does not so much deny “that there can be such things as collec-
tive beliefs and desires; rather, these things exist only in so far as they are mediated 
by individual choice”.386 The mechanistic conception of integrity revealed in chapter 
4 re-emerges as the outcome of an incentive-setting culture that is supposed to create
citizens with integrity, who are conceived as individuals who responsibly safeguard 
their freedom in the liberal state. 
This discursive move reflects the Hayekian re-conceptualisation of reason from that 
which leads to civilisation to an 
intelligent and it is by submitting to their discipline that humans can become 
free”.387 This re-conceptualisation reconciles the tension between moral and mecha-
nistic conceptions of corruption and integrity and cancels out what was earlier pre-
sented as contestations of the mechanistic conception of human nature, or as tensions 
between moral values and egoistic interests. It is not only that values, norms and mo-
rality can now be conceived as an outcome of cultural incentivisation – also over-
sight and control measures can now be about morality, as a WB interviewee indeed 
claimed: “All these things are moral. All these things are about values that one can or 
cannot have, that a country can or cannot have. So I’m not sure how you would dis-
tinguish between moral and not moral”.388  
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As Dean argues, the aim of contemporary neoliberalism is nothing less than a “cul-
tural revolution that will restore the responsible autonomy of the citizenry” and that 
becomes possible through the “deployment of the culturally acquired rules of con-
duct to safeguard our civilization and the freedom it secures”.389 The cultural shap-
ing of these rules and their deployment is heavily aided through IAC interventions in 
the realm of civil society. Next to their support for institutional and legal incentivisa-
tion, this form of intervention fosters the socio-cultural incentivisation of self-
interested actors for the safeguarding of their freedom. This conception of freedom 
through social control was put in words by a TI interviewee whom I asked whether 
in the world without corruption as conceived by TI there would not be a lot of con-
trol. The interviewee answered that “yes, we’re talking about social control, (...) if 
you define it as such, it’s more control – and more freedom”.390  
Ultimately, we can note that IAC discourse itself works as a mechanism of responsi-
re 
                                                
bilisation and social control for the governments of (sovereign) target states, trying 
to create the necessary “political will”391 for anticorruption and governance reform 
by appealing to the necessity for development and poverty reduction and trying to 
change perceptions accordingly. The CPI can be regarded as a particularly successful 
‘instrument’ in that regard. It is used by TI but also the media and all sorts of other 
civil society organisations to responsibilise governments around the world for the 
task of corruption fighting. Thus, the concept of ‘political will’ in IAC discourse 
embodies states’ acceptance of the responsibility for the proper management of their 
governing mechanisms. After all, international legal frameworks, loans and expert 
advice for IAC reforms could not serve as incentives to target states if the lack of 
development of their societies and the damaging effects of corruption were not rec-
ognised as a problem.  
This cultural change advocated by IAC discourse also brings with it another featu
of neoliberal government. The mechanism of putting different social actors (public 
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stakeholders, victims, beneficiaries) in the ‘right’ relations in order to enable them to 
control each other and hold each other responsible in order to manage corruption 
risks, leads to a proliferation of locations and actors of government.392 Whereas in 
the “welfarist version of the social, a unitary apparatus sought to act through and 
upon ‘the social’ to secure society”, it is now a multitude of actors that are set into 
t also 




sions to play against each other are examples of such activities and indicative of the 
sessments happen again on the basis of the “neutral methodologies”  discussed in 
                                                
play in the different mechanisms of government, as partners and facilitators bu
clearly recognised in IAC discourse is that by responsibilising other actors for the
functioning of IAC mechanisms the “national state takes on less of a directive and 
distributive role, and more of a coordinative, arbitratory and preventive one”.394
While these aggregations of actors are “resisting and opposing the decisions of au-
thorities, claiming rights, contesting the claims of expert knowledge, and demanding 
consultation over planning and services tailored to their needs”395 the corruption-
fighting state acts “as a neutralized and neutralizing referee in this contest”,396 while 
managing its own risk. 
 
Benchmarking, reflexive government and cultural responsibilisation 
In co-operation with other (international) authorities such as different IAC organisa-
tions, the task of the state becomes more that of assessing and controlling the gov-
erning processes taking place between the new plurality of governing agents. Anti-
corruption impact397 or baseline assessments,398 benchmarking and progress moni-
toring399 that are to be carried out by the multiple agents that I
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chapters 1 and 5. Indirect surveillance by regulatory authorities like IAC organisa-
tions, private sector institutions, cartel authorities or financial regulatory agencies 
makes the performance or the capacity of these many agents “calculable and compa-
rable so that they might be optimized”; at the same time it allows for the “indirect 
regulation and surveillance of these entities”402 in order to manage “the risks that all 
types of governmental institutions – whether public, newly privatized, or contractual-
ized – pose to both taxpayers and customers”.403 Government in neoliberalism, as 
Dean puts it, “has become more multiple, diffuse, facilitative and empowering. It is 
also, however, strangely more disciplinary, stringent and punitive”.404 
Both the incentive-setting measures for the governing of institutional processes and 
the incentive-setting through civil society responsibilisation advocated in IAC dis-
course can be distinguished as characteristics of a reflexive liberal government that 
exceeds the Hayekian version of neoliberalism and that is reflexive in the sense that 
it folds its ends back onto itself.405 The former set of measures is concerned with the 
safeguarding of the security of governmental mechanisms themselves in both the 
public and the private sphere, reflecting the task of neoliberal reflexive governments 
to manage “the risks to taxpayers, shareholders and governments of the activities of 
public servants, state professionals, community organizations and their workers, 
state-owned enterprises, and private companies and their management”.406 Thus, it 
aims to manage the risk to society in that it manages the risk of its own governing 
processes through the right incentive-setting. The second set of measures indicates a 
“form of government that can only govern through existing or potential ‘indigenous’ 
mechanisms of government”, such as of communities and civil society groups. The 
fostering of civil society capacities for active participation in the fight against cor-
ruption that is necessary for this kind of government might be regarded as “con-
structing the conditions of reflexive government by establishing local sites of self-
government that can be indirectly managed” by authorities such as governments, 
IAC organisations and other international organisations through the use of evaluation 
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and control mechanisms like benchmarking and anticorruption assessments.407 Put 
simply, it is the end of this way of governing to make civil society govern itself and 
in order to reach this aim it already relies on self-governing mechanisms of civil so-
ciety which it only supervises, assesses and thus indirectly directs.  
exive liberal government distinguished by Dean as well 
408 consists in the contrivance and active construction of “markets 
ted in previous chapters we can con-
A third characteristic of refl
as by Hindess
where they do not exist”, namely in the mechanisms of national government itself, 
for example by reconfiguring public service provision as “a set of markets in ser-
vices, provision and expertise” and the reconstruction of citizens as “consumers in 
these markets”.409 As the analysis has shown, this is not a particularly pronounced 
feature of IAC discourse; yet, the first elements of this kind of reflexive government 
are present in IAC discourse, for example in recommendations and support for the 
subcontracting of social services and thus their outsourcing to private agencies oper-
ating as entrepreneurs in the free market.  
 
Conclusion 
Against the background of the analysis conduc
clude that IAC discourse represents an advanced liberal hegemonic project in that it 
displays the core hegemonic stratagems410 as well as four additional hegemonic 
stratagems411 (as discussed in chapters 3-5, see also conclusion of the thesis) through 
which it seeks to advance a very comprehensive Universal of a good, uncorrupted 
society that bears the social logics discussed throughout this chapter. Through the 
equivalisations discussed in chapters 3 and 4 to 6 respectively the discourse divides 
the discursive space very clearly into two antagonistic chains (hegemonic stratagem 
II). In short, while chain AC constructs the Universal with its very particular social 
logics, the construction of corruption in chain C serves to render these particular 
                                                 
407  Dean (2010: 225) 
408  Hindess (2004) 
409  Dean (2010: 189) 
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the symbolic equivalent of the Universal’ (V); ‘Institution/ perpetuation of subject positions for po-
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governing mechanisms important and necessary. In this chapter we have seen in de-
tail what these mechanisms entail. 
They are based on a model of human nature as self-interested and rational and con-
sist in the manipulation of individuals’ behaviour through the setting of incentives to 
their self-interest in a way that makes them stick to the rules. The rules to which self-
interested actors are made to stick are preconceived and geared at securing what IAC 
discourse constructs as the ‘public interest’ – which consists in the freedom of the 
also in the public sector) it is to happen 
anaging the corruption risk in the two 
ediator between 
self-interested individuals in society to pursue their interests with neither others nor 
themselves endangering them. This freedom is best secured by guaranteeing compe-
tition for material rewards amongst individuals in both the public and the private sec-
tor while restraining their temptations to distort this very competition by clear rules, 
transparency, oversight and sanctions.  
In the public sector this incentivisation is to happen via institutional engineering (by 
the state itself) as well as via civil society oversight and elections. In the private sec-
tor it is to happen via institutional engineering (in the form of state regulation) as 
well as via civil society oversight and conscious consumer behaviour. Finally, in the 
realm of civil society (and to a limited extent 
via cultural responsibilisation for the task of m
sectors.  
This preoccupation of IAC discourse with securing processes of government (rather 
than, for example, governing politico-economic processes conceived as external to 
government) indicates the structuring of the discourse according to contemporary 
neoliberal logics of government. More specifically, in that they fold the ends of gov-
ernment back on themselves in different ways, these structures of IAC discourse are 
suggestive of reflexive liberal forms of governing. In line with the Hayekian version 
of neoliberalism, culture, in IAC discourse, becomes an important m
human natural drives and rational institutional designs in the achievement of an un-
corrupted society. Far from indicating a shift away from the incentives logic, culture 
itself is conceived as the field in which interests are moulded to manage corruption 
risks and thus realise the societal ideal.  
We have seen in illustrations in this chapter that IAC organisations actively advance 
the installation of incentivisation mechanisms in all three areas, through technical 
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and monetary support for institutional engineering, the provision of expert knowl-
edge on how to do that, and through the advocacy and awareness raising among civil 
society groups for the task of holding public and private sector actors accountable 
(i.e. via the instrumental and reform logic traced in chapter 5). They do this in a very 
coherent and consensual way in which organisational divides become relevant only 
in terms of the division of labour regarding the instruments used.  
While chapter 4 showed that one way to advance this Universal is through linguistic 
articulation of all sorts of vague and appealing aims of the fight against corruption, 
we can now set them in relation to the very particular logics traced here in the lin-
guistic and non-linguistic articulations of concrete policy demands. Economic 
growth and productivity, which figure among the aims, are ensured by the insertion 
and protection of competition through liberalisation, privatisation, reduction of sub-
sidies, the rule of law, transparency and property rights.  Economic and social equal-
ity and inclusion as well as the prominent aim of the reduction of poverty (articulated 
as economic and social exclusion) can only be achieved to the limited extent pro-
vided for by basic services which prevent poor people from suffering hunger and 
thirst, becoming ill and going uneducated, while others will have many more oppor-
n 
to 
local contexts only to the extent that the interests of the people in the target countries 
are to be taken into account. Yet we have seen that, first, these interests are assumed 
tunities in society. The aims of democracy and political inclusion and of the reduc-
tion of poverty as social and political exclusion set out in IAC discourse come down 
to a procedural representative democracy in which citizens sanction or reward politi-
cians for either sticking to or foregoing the rules. Next to that, as we have seen, civil 
society assumes a strong role in monitoring public and private sector actors; how-
ever, this responsibility is not rewarded with an increase in direct or representative 
democratic decision-making powers as we know them. The increase in participatio
and inclusion simply means that all citizens use their existing liberal freedoms more 
‘responsibly’. Accordingly, in the private sector, citizens participate in economic de-
cision-making via conscious consumerist behaviour, sanctioning or rewarding pri-
vate sector actors in light of their adherence to the rules. With regards to the public 
sector, they support state institutions in their monitoring tasks.  
For the claim of context-sensitivity, which is important for the persuasiveness of the 
hegemonic project as we have seen, this means that IAC discourse is able to adapt 
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to be universally egoistic, and second, they are to be embedded in a particular cul-
ture; a culture which directs them in such ways as to make other actors stick to rules 
which are already defined by international legal frameworks and IAC experts. 
This makes the space for adaptation of IAC efforts to local contexts extremely lim-
ited if not non-existent. By fostering the homogenisation of institutional structures 
and cultural norms in the adopting countries, IAC efforts work to negate other con-
ceptions of social norms such as those outlined in the studies of Olivier de Sardan 
and Gupta discussed in chapter 1. But this construction of the fight against corrup-
tion as a hegemonic project that advances a neoliberal society actually disallows the 
realisation of any political project that differs from the good, uncorrupted society.  
Republican models of the state which put an emphasis on civic virtues and conceive 
the pursuit of self-interest itself as corruption412 are obviously not reconcilable with 
a societal ideal based on the regulation (rather than the restriction) of self-interest. As 
Philp argues, the “tactical attitude to law-keeping/breaking” that the rational actor 
logic entails would “on republican theories of politics (and others), (...) itself be seen 
as an indication of corruption”.413 Socialist or social democratic states which foresee 
a large public sector with an important role in the provision of matching social ser-
vices and also provide extensive and fixed welfare provisions for public officials fail 
to encourage competition and provide too much discretion for their public officials. 
They may also be unwilling to restructure their whole state apparatus according to 
the principles of transparency and control, thus failing to provide the right incentives 
and to guarantee efficiency in the use of taxes and in the provision of services. 
Moreover, the high levels of redistribution in social democratic or socialist states, the 
heavy role of the state in regulating or even running them as well as workers’ un-
ions’ rights are irreconcilable with the primacy of competition and growth in the 
neoliberal economy of the uncorrupted society. Not least, ‘welfare-state citizens’ 
 
IAC Universal of communist states in which the desire to belong to the wealthy 
                    
with ideologies of social solidarity and expectations of service provision by the state 
are not able to pursue their interests in the right ways and hold public and private
sector actors accountable as IAC discourse envisions. The incompatibility with the 
                             
 412 See Philp (1997)
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bourgeoisie is regarded as corruption414 and which feature complete control over the 
economy by the proletariat need not even be mentioned. Furthermore, participatory 
democracies which constantly subject free citizens to the will of their fellows and 
conceive corruption as ‘duplicitous exclusion’ from society and participatory proc-
esses415 are rendered invalid in the face of a liberal procedural conception of democ-
ratic decision-making as regular elections and self-interested naming and shaming. 
While the comprehensiveness of its Universal and its concomitant negation of all 
sorts of other societal ideals has the potential to render IAC discourse a very con-
tested and resisted project, we have already seen in the previous chapters that the 
discourse employs a variety of discursive logics that defend it from such external 
contestations. Having identified the comprehensive Universal that the ‘fight against 
corruption’ symbolises, we can see another and very important logic through which 
the IAC project shields itself against potential dislocation. This logic relies on its pe-
culiar composition which features a negatively formulated symbolic equivalent of 
the Universal (the ‘fight against corruption’), which appears to be a type 2 claim but 
is in fact a type 3 claim. This needs some explanation. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
Nonhoff distinguishes between different claims to the Universal, namely type 1 
claims that articulate a necessary condition for the curing of the lack of the Universal 
(cumulative claims), type 2 claims that articulate a necessary condition for the curing 
of the lack of the Universal that is at the same time a sufficient condition for the ful-
filment of other claims that are oriented towards the Universal (subsumptive claims), 
and type 3 claims that articulate a sufficient condition for the curing of the lack of 
the Universal (comprehensive claims).416 The fight against corruption comes across 
s a project which does not seem to impose a substantive political good but merely 
aims to combat a particular behaviour (corruption) and to get some processes right. 
While this would make it a type 2 claim, the analysis has shown that it in fact details 
the ways of societal organisation to such a comprehensive extent that it renders all 
claims oriented towards another Universal invalid (type 3 claim). Thus, the fight 
against corruption emerges as a comprehensive claim towards the Universal which is 
concealed by its modestly-sounding ‘representative’, the fight against corruption, 
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and thus does not easily arouse the interest and criticism of politically differently-
minded actors.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of the thesis was to investigate the societal ideals that are implicit in the 
IAC agenda, and to examine the ways in which they are constructed and advanced, 
with a particular focus on the coherence of these constructions. Adopting a poststruc-
turalist hegemony theoretical perspective, the thesis inquired into the structures of 
IAC discourse. It examined whether it constitutes one hegemonic project or whether 
different politico-economic ideals contest each other in the discourse and investi-
gated the discursive logics through which the ideal(s) was/were constructed and ad-
vanced. The analysis was based on a set of strategic policy documents and interviews 
with the staff of three main IAC actors; TI, the UNDP and the World Bank.  
Summing up the contribution of the thesis in a nutshell, it revealed, on the one hand, 
that the IAC agenda strives to realise what can be interpreted as an advanced liberal 
ideal of a good society. On the other hand, it showed how the discourses of the three 
powerful IAC actors construct this society surprisingly coherently as the ‘right’ one, 
while other societal systems are presented as inadequate, and it demonstrated how 
they combine forces to transform these ‘inadequate’ societies. In the course of this, 
the thesis was able to offer a number of reasons why this enterprise is rarely scruti-
nised and disputed, thus facilitating its advancement. 
The thesis was presented in two parts. The first part, consisting of chapters 1 and 2, 
dealt with the existing literature on corruption and anticorruption efforts and set out 
post-Marxist discourse and hegemony theory as an alternative approach to research-
ing IAC efforts; and the second part of the thesis comprised the empirical analysis of 
IAC discourse. 
More specifically, the first chapter drew attention to the potentially normative and 
political nature of the IAC agenda and to the lack of political controversy surround-
ing it but also the lack of academic inquiry into this topic. It argued that the domi-
nant positivist approach to researching corruption is unable to examine the ways in 
which corruption and anticorruption activities are socially constructed and poten-
tially related to social norms and societal ideals. It showed how a broadly post-
positivist perspective allows investigation of the normative and historically and cul-
turally contingent nature of conceptions of corruption and also shifts the focus onto 
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IAC efforts as a site where meanings of corruption and potentially also the meaning 
of ideals of uncorrupted societies are constructed. By way of giving an overview of 
the findings of existing critical studies of IAC efforts, the chapter identified an ex-
tensive need for further investigation of different but closely related aspects of the 
IAC agenda. While the critical literature claimed that the IAC agenda constitutes a 
consensual neoliberal undertaking, the chapter found both the consensus claim and 
the neoliberal interpretation to be insufficiently proven. It showed that much re-
mained to be investigated with regards to the political ideals purported through the 
IAC agenda, the consensus on these by different IAC actors, and the ways in which 
these ideals are constructed and advanced.  
For an investigation of these aspects, chapter 2 set out a post-Marxist discourse and 
hegemony theoretical approach to IAC discourse. It explained the ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions of PDHT as elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe. 
Moreover, it introduced further theoretical tools, namely the concept of the hege-
monic project as developed by Nonhoff and a conception of more detailed discursive 
logics. The analytical tool of the hegemonic stratagems distinguished by Nonhoff as 
the general (political and fantasmatic) discursive logics of hegemonic projects was 
amended by an analytical perspective on more specific discursive logics. Following 
Glynos and Howarth, these can be referred to the categories of political, fantasmatic 
and social logics. As the chapter explained, combining both analytical tools allowed 
tracing of how, in IAC discourse, hegemonic stratagems and more specific logics 
combine to construct corruption and societal ideals and to advance these ideals in 
specific (consensual or conflictive) ways. Thus, the chapter provided an analytical 
grid specifically suited to examine the gaps in the literature by addressing the re-
search question that asked (1) to what extent IAC discourse constitutes one coherent 
hegemonic project, (2) how hegemonic stratagems and/or other discursive logics 
structuring the discourse construct and advance particular societal ideals, or (3) how 
they diverge and dislocate each other. 
The second part of the thesis contained the empirical analysis of IAC discourse. In 
line with the chosen theoretical approach, the empirical chapters were structured first 
and foremost according to the main political logic of IAC discourse, the antagonistic 
division of the discursive space into a Universal or a sought after societal ideal and 
an ‘antagonist’ threatening that Universal. While chapter 3 primarily analysed the 
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construction of corruption as an ‘enemy’ to the Universal (in chain C of IAC dis-
course), chapters 4, 5 and 6 investigated the aims of the fight against corruption, the 
specifications of the Universal, the reform strategies and instruments to realise that 
Universal, and the concrete shape of that Universal as constructed in IAC discourse. 
By tracing the deeply interconnected, general and specific, logics of these construc-
tions, the empirical chapters simultaneously addressed the questions of the societal 
ideal inherent in IAC discourse, the logics of its construction and advancement and 
their coherence i.e. the extent of consensus surrounding them. 
 
Findings and argument 
The empirical analysis showed that IAC discourse constitutes a coherent hegemonic 
project, displaying the three core stratagems ‘equivalisation of differential claims 
oriented toward the Universal’ (I), ‘antagonistic division of the discursive space’ (II) 
and ‘representation’ (III) in a clear and coherent manner. In addition, four additional 
hegemonic stratagems were distinguished, namely the basic stratagem of ‘super-
differential demarcation’ (IV), the ‘emergent openness of interpretation of the repre-
sentative’ (V), and the ‘institution/ perpetuation of subject positions for socio-
political forces’ (VI), demonstrating additional ways in which the hegemonic project 
seeks to advance the two chains and expand. Given that the discourse was assessed 
as an entirety and without explicitly focussing on changes over time, it was not the 
aim of the thesis to delineate in detail stratagem VII, the ‘targeted and sporadic 
breaking of the antagonistic frontier’.  
As one of the main purposes of employing the hegemonic stratagems as a theoretical 
tool was to examine the hypothesis of a political consensus within the IAC agenda 
and to evaluate to what extent such a consensus exists, this consensus could be con-
firmed to exist to a very high degree, thus answering the first research question. Ad-
dressing the third research question, divergences were discerned in the constitution 
of the two chains of equivalence, yet they were found to serve rather than dislocate 
the hegemonic project (see discussion of findings on coherence below).  
However, these two questions could only be answered by addressing the second re-
search question which asked how hegemonic stratagems and/or other discursive lo-
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gics structuring the discourse construct and advance particular societal ideals. Thus, 
addressing this question constituted the main focus of the analysis and in turn led to 
what can be categorised as three sets of findings.   
The first set of findings speaks to the question of the nature of the societal ideal and 
consists of the findings on what has been termed the ‘social’ logics structuring the 
ideal of the uncorrupted society. The second (and closely related) set of findings of 
the thesis speaks to the questions of how IAC discourse constructs corruption and a 
particular societal ideal, and how it advances that ideal. This set of contributions 
consists of the findings on the political logics of IAC discourse and on two specific 
fantasmatic logics which enhance these political logics. The third set of findings 
speaks to the cross-cutting question of consensus and coherence but also divergence 
and contradiction in these constructions of corruption and societal ideals. Together, 
they provide a comprehensive picture of the political nature of IAC discourse as op-
erationalised in the thesis. Let me first summarise the first set of findings.  
 
Social logics 
As the analysis revealed, IAC discourse constructs and advances a particular Univer-
sal, an imaginary ideal of how societies should be organised. According to PDHT, 
the necessary incompleteness of any social structure will ultimately prevent the full 
realisation of this ideal; yet its ‘social logics’, the ways in which this ideal is to func-
tion according to IAC discourse or to a certain extent may already function in IAC 
target countries could be drawn out from the discourse (particularly in chapters 4 and 
6).1  
The Universal or the uncorrupted society constructed in IAC discourse relies on the 
rational actor logic discerned in chapter 3, which posits that people are universally 
self-interested and rationally follow their (economic, or material) interests. As chap-
                                                 
1 Again, it must be stressed that given the way IAC discourse was accessed in this thesis no state-
ments can be made about the actual extent to which these logics are actually ‘social’ in the sense of 
constituting normalised workings in the target societies or still ‘political’ in the sense that they take 
place as hegemonic articulations in an antagonistic environment. The term ‘social logics’ is thus to 
be understood as pointing to what IAC discourse seeks to institute as the normal ways of societal 
organisation in target countries – a process which happens according to different political logics.  
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ter 4 revealed, it is structured according to the incentives logic, which is closely re-
lated to the rational actor logic. This logic posits that, rather than condemning human 
self-interest or attempting to forcefully contain it, this unchangeable human character 
trait needs to be respected, allowing people to freely pursue their self-interest. Gov-
erning processes then must be organised in a way that guarantees people’s free pur-
suit of their self-interests but at the same time also secures these governing processes 
themselves from subversion, destabilisation and destruction by self-interested indi-
viduals. The incentives logic makes the securing of governing processes the highest 
principle of the uncorrupted society. Good societies are those organised in such a 
way that they set particular positive and negative external incentives to the self-
interest of rational actors, allowing individuals to pursue their self-interest while at 
the same time safeguarding the stability of these processes by incentivising the mul-
tiplication and maximisation of these individual interests. These incentives are or-
ganised around the nodal points of minimisation of discretion (or: clear rules of the 
game), competition, transparency, accountability and integrity. The ‘clear rules’ set 
up the rules of the uncorrupted society that are concerned with regulating social rela-
tions according to the ‘right’ incentives. The compliance with those rules is ensured 
via rewards attainable through competition as a positive incentive for individual self-
interest, and through a combination of transparency and accountability as setting 
constraints or negative incentives. If the incentives are ‘well set’, rational actors will 
stick to the rules, thus displaying integrity.  
Inquiring into the concrete policy demands of IAC discourse, chapter 6 further speci-
fied the concrete logics structuring social, political and economic relations in the un-
corrupted society. It highlighted the advanced liberal logic structuring these rela-
tions, which posits that both institutional and cultural incentivisation is needed for 
the uncorrupted society to function in the right ways. In the uncorrupted society, in-
dividual self-interests are incentivised not only by rationally designed institutions but 
also by particular cultural designs, which make them responsibly pursue their inter-
ests and thus manage the corruption risk of public and private sector actors. This 
gives rise to a set of institutional arrangements and cultural requirements for the or-
ganisation of the public and private sectors as well as for civil society. These include 
that the public sector is extensively structured by market principles, transparency and 
interdependent institutional control mechanisms; the economy is based on liberal, 
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competitive and transparent markets; the rule of law is secured by the state; minimal 
social services are provided for citizens; corporations act responsibly in the sense of 
ensuring their own competitive behaviour, transparency and internal accountability; 
and active civil society members responsibly pursue their interests by ensuring the 
successful incentivisation of public and private sector actors through oversight and 
control (the latter takes the form of ‘ringing the bell’ of oversight institutions; elec-
tions; and responsible consumer behaviour).  
Moreover, the uncorrupted society is characterised by the logic of reflexive govern-
ment that folds back onto itself in the sense that the state manages the risk of society 
to an important extent by managing the corruption risk of its own governing proc-
esses through the right incentive-setting and in the sense that civil society and the 
private sector develop towards self-management and responsibility, by taking over 
processes of governing, which always entail the channelling of self-interests. States, 
international organisations and other regulatory entities exert an indirect supervision 
over these self-governing processes via evaluating their performance through 
mechanisms such as benchmarking. While the thesis has revealed this particular so-
cietal ideal to be inherent in IAC discourse, it has also, and equally importantly, 
traced the ways in which this ideal and its social logics are advanced in the discur-
sive space.  
 
Political and fantasmatic logics 
These insights constitute the second set of findings and refer to the ways in which 
IAC discourse attempts to change and restructure the discursive space to orient it to-
ward this (ultimately unattainable) Universal2 and which are, in the language of 
PDHT, the political logics of IAC discourse.  
Throughout the empirical chapters, by tracing how the discourse constructs two 
chains of equivalence, one containing corruption and the other containing the fight 
against corruption as their main nodal points, the thesis was able to reveal the main 
political logic that structures IAC discourse and thus aids the advancement of its 
                                                 
2 The extent to which IAC discourse has already expanded in the discursive space was not an object of 
the investigation conducted in this thesis.  
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Universal: the ‘antagonistic division of the discursive space’ (stratagem II), which, 
according to PDHT, is the main logic of hegemonic projects. The existence and na-
ture of this division and the ways in which it is expanded, thus advancing the Uni-
versal discussed above, were in turn revealed by tracing a number of other, more 
specific discursive logics within the discourse. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated how, crucially for the hegemonic project, IAC discourse sets 
up corruption as a dangerous ‘enemy’ or antagonist to the Universal. It is this con-
struction that gives rise to the antagonistic divide of the discursive space and sets up 
the uncorrupted society discussed above as an endangered and at the same time de-
sirable Universal. The linguistic equivalisations of corruption with a number of nega-
tively connoted signifiers in this ‘corruption chain’, or chain C, construct corruption 
on the one hand, as an immense threat to societies which needs to be overcome, as a 
symbol of lack and destruction, and on the other, as a very particular problem, 
namely the absence of the particular Universal outlined in chain AC and discussed 
above.  
Importantly, the chapter demonstrated how IAC discourse renders the enterprise of 
fighting corruption persuasive through what was identified as a particular fantas-
matic logic with a horrific dimension. By equivalising corruption with a great num-
ber of negative attributes and through the use of metaphors which ‘monstrify’ it, IAC 
discourse articulates it as an enormous threat to all people, which will grow if not 
contained; in doing so it enhances the energy and direction of the main political logic 
of the antagonistic division of the discursive space. The discursive logic that turns 
corruption itself into the only ‘subject position’ in chain C, as an ubiquitous potential 
threat to everyone, also constructs everyone as a potential victim of corruption and 
thus facilitates the articulation of subject positions into chain AC, as supporters of 
the fight against corruption. This in turn serves the expansion of chain AC, contain-
ing the Universal.  
While these articulations convey the necessity to fight corruption and to support the 
IAC enterprise, chain C was also shown to construct corruption as a very particular 
problem (namely the absence of the particular Universal). Chapter 3 revealed that, 
much like the Universal, the construction of corruption is underpinned by the ra-
tional actor logic. In line with this, corruption is defined not so much as a violation 
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of higher moral values, but rather as an act of breaking the rules defining the public 
interest for one’s own interest. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the causes of cor-
ruption are constructed as particular failures in societal structures external to indi-
viduals, negating the legitimate existence of systems allowing for discretion and mo-
nopoly and failing to control individuals. By way of articulations of its conse-
quences, corruption is furthermore constructed as an immense threat to economic 
welfare and stability but also to a vague market-liberal democratic societal ideal. 
This articulates as desirable a society in which structures are designed to deal with 
self-interested individuals and in which stability and economic growth are safe-
guarded. In such a society, IAC discourse conveys, all the horrible consequences of 
corruption are avoided. While this prepares the ground for the articulation of the 
Universal in chain AC as a society in which these conditions are fulfilled, other ar-
ticulations construct developing countries as particularly far away from such a soci-
ety. While corruption on the one hand, is presented as an omnipresent threat, on the 
other it is articulated as particularly prominent in developing countries. This conveys 
that it is here where societal structures are most problematic and where corruption 
needs to be fought most urgently, instituting the Universal. 
While the analysis of chain C made a central contribution to the understanding of 
how IAC discourse works towards advancing the Universal through particular con-
structions of corruption, the analysis of ‘equivalisations of differential claims ori-
ented toward the Universal’ (stratagem I) contained in the ‘anticorruption chain’ or 
chain AC yielded many more insights into the political logics in which IAC dis-
course constructs and advances this particular societal ideal and into the ‘social’ lo-
gics governing that ideal.  
As chapter 4 demonstrated, different articulations on the other side of the antagonis-
tic divide, in chain AC, also work in fantasmatic logics that contribute to the persua-
siveness of the fight against corruption. As was shown, the ‘fight against corruption’ 
not only functions as the ‘representative’ of chain AC (stratagem III), thus giving the 
hegemonic project its name and assuming the role of the ‘symbolic equivalent of the 
Universal’; it is also rendered extremely open to interpretation through the equivali-
sations of a wide range of positively connoted but only very vaguely or diversely 
defined aims, which provides it with a beatific dimension and therefore constructing 
it as desirable. This ‘emergent openness of interpretation of the symbolic equivalent 
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of the Universal’ (stratagem V) has the potential to enhance the persuasiveness of the 
discourse for a wide range of supporters because it can accommodate quite diverse 
expectations regarding the lacking Universal, thus energising the political logic of 
IAC discourse and serving to advance the hegemonic project. The discussion showed 
that the declared aims of the fight against corruption hardly clarify the Universal 
pursued and function mainly as ‘vectors’3 for the political logic of expanding chain 
AC. While many of the signifiers figuring as aims – such as equality, fairness, de-
mocracy, social justice etc – did not play any other role in the discourse apart from 
rendering it persuasive, some of them – such as inclusion, participation and eco-
nomic growth – turned out to function as important nodal points in the social logics 
of the Universal. 
In stark contrast to the vague and broad aims of the fight against corruption, the sig-
nifiers constructed as main defining features or ‘specifications’ of the Universal were 
very clearly articulated in chain AC, as the discussion in chapter 4 made clear. By 
(linguistically) articulating in chain AC the signifiers minimisation of discretion (or: 
clear rules of the game), competition, transparency, accountability and integrity as 
crucial elements or specifications of a society able to contain the threat of corruption 
constructed in chain C, IAC discourse works towards advancing its Universal. It 
conveys that a system featuring these things, and the incentives logic they bring with 
them, is superior to the problematic societal systems presented in chain C, allowing 
corruption to flourish, and is thus desirable.  
The chapter showed how even morally connoted concepts such as integrity and eth-
ics, which at first may not seem compatible with a rationalist discourse, are inte-
grated into chain AC. Instead of clashing with the incentives logic, they are coher-
ently rearticulated along the lines of interest-maximisation and incentive-setting. As 
chapter 4 argued, their positive, virtue-related connotation can increase the persua-
siveness of the discourse while their seemingly technical re-articulation enables the 
discourse to keep its ‘values’ rather implicit, shielding itself from (potential) accusa-
tions of imposing Western values and thus from dislocation.  
                                                 
3  Glynos/Howarth (2007: 145) 
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Besides these linguistic ways in which IAC discourse advances the Universal, articu-
lating it as filling the lack embodied by corruption, the thesis also analysed more 
practical or material ways in which IAC discourse works toward advancing this 
ideal. Chapter 5 inquired into the ‘instrumental claims’ of IAC discourse, by asking 
what IAC discourse constructs as the reform strategies to fight corruption and as the 
instruments to pursue these strategies. 
The discussion of the reform strategies (legal reform, institutional reform and civil 
society reform) through which IAC actors attempt to fight corruption, demonstrated 
how these reforms work as strategies for comprehensive restructuring of societies in 
developing countries (and in the case of TI in countries all around the world) accord-
ing to the incentives logic. Thus, what is articulated as strategies to fight corruption 
functions as political strategies to restructure the laws, institutions and the civil soci-
ety in target countries in order to re-orient them towards the Universal. As discussed, 
this advancement of the Universal is facilitated by the articulation in chain C of so-
cietal structures not based on incentives as inadequate and of developing countries as 
particularly problematic in that regard. 
The examination of the ‘instruments’ through which these reform strategies are pur-
sued in IAC discourse revealed the interesting and complex logics in which the three 
IAC actors work together but also in different ways towards advancing the Univer-
sal. Distinguishing the ‘institution/ perpetuation of subject positions for socio-
political forces’ (stratagem VI), the chapter showed on the one hand how the Univer-
sal is advanced through the engagement of the three powerful IAC actors in the fight 
against corruption. It became clear that they function as important discursive nodal 
points which, by way of their immense financial resources, political and business 
networks and authority, are able to considerably expand chain AC and advance the 
Universal in the target countries. However, it was also shown how IAC discourse has 
already incorporated a wide range of other socio-political forces as active supporters 
of the fight against corruption, enhancing its potential to hegemonize the discursive 
space.  
Yet the chapter also revealed the crucial function of the kind of knowledge used for 
the design of instruments of corruption but also produced and reproduced in IAC 
discourse as such an instrument in itself. The rational choice inspired research that 
319 
 
IAC discourse almost exclusively draws on and produces not only turned out to 
structure the constructions of corruption and the Universal in crucial ways, namely 
via the rational actor and the incentives logic it introduces in IAC discourse; it was 
also interpreted as capable of considerably aiding the fight against corruption and 
thus the advancement of the Universal by concealing the normative character of this 
enterprise. Given the established authority of positivist research as an objective and 
politically neutral way of understanding and explaining the world, the kind of re-
search IAC discourse draws on is able to imbue IAC efforts with an air of neutrality 
and objectivity. Its dissemination and production helps to justify the measures taken 
because they are advocated in scientific studies. This in turn may explain, at least to 
a certain extent, their almost universally unquestioned acceptance, and the lack of 
political contestation surrounding them. This lack of political contestation of the 
fight against corruption, and thus dislocation of IAC discourse, clearly facilitates the 
advancement of the Universal. Thus, the research that chapter 1 of this thesis cri-
tiqued as being unable to deal with the normative and potentially political nature of 
corruption and IAC efforts was revealed as not only structuring but also aiding the 
political logic of IAC discourse; as was shown in chapter 5, it has the potential to 
have a very real political impact if used to design anticorruption measures and map 
out a good society – irrespective of whether or not it is based on an ‘as if’ assump-
tion.  
Moreover, the analysis of the other ‘instruments’ applied by IAC actors in form of 
lending; technical assistance; and advocacy, awareness raising and civil society ca-
pacity building revealed that these ‘instruments’ are designed as means to implement 
the incentives logic. While the WB focuses more on lending, the UNDP’s focus is on 
technical assistance and advocacy, and TI’s focus is mainly on advocacy, awareness 
raising and civil society capacity building, the chapter demonstrated how these three 
actors combine their power as three prominent nodal points in IAC discourse to form 
a particular ‘instrumental logic’; through conditional lending for institutional reform, 
technical assistance for legal and institutional reform, global awareness raising, 
knowledge provision, coalition-building with manifold actors, and civil society mo-
bilisation they pursue in different ways the reform strategies discussed earlier, thus 
advancing the Universal in very material ways.  
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The analysis of instrumental claims also showed two linguistic ‘super-differential 
demarcations’ (stratagem IV) which work to shield IAC discourse from dislocation. 
The first draws a demarcation between IAC discourse and any claims for Western 
superiority, albeit in different ways. While chapter 3 already showed this demarca-
tion to be drawn by claims by TI that the CPI is not intended to brand countries, 
chapter 5 argued that the demarcation is enhanced by claims that IAC measures are 
context-sensitive, yet also drawn by claims that IAC discourse is not imposing West-
ern values because there is already a global consensus on what corruption means and 
how it should be fought. The second super-differential demarcation is drawn be-
tween IAC discourse and ‘political discourses’, articulating IAC measures as unpoli-
tical. While the former demarcation works to shield IAC discourse against criticism 
in the form of accusations of Western hubris or neoimperialist tendencies, the second 
demarcation shields it against inquiry into and potential criticism of its normative 
and political nature. Both demarcations work to secure the advancement of the Uni-
versal and are potentially strengthened by the seemingly objective and neutral 
knowledge upon which IAC interventions are based. It camouflages not only the po-
litical nature of the Universal advanced in IAC discourse and justifies its universalist 
approach but also allows IAC discourse to make ‘scientifically justified’ articulations 
that developing countries are more corrupt, thus justifying IAC intervention.  
The analysis of what the discourse articulates as concrete policy claims for fighting 
corruption revealed how the incentives logic traced in the specifications of corrup-
tion on the one hand and the instrumental logic linking up the different instruments 
employed by IAC actors on the other, combine in IAC discourse for a very particular 
reorganisation of the state, private sector and civil society, thus completing the po-
litical logic. Chapter 6 detailed the kind of society emerging from all these claims 
(the Universal) while tracing and highlighting the logics structuring it (see discussion 
of social logics above) and illustrating how IAC actors implement it according to 
their respective instruments. In showing how linguistic claims for particular policy 
measures and their material articulations combine in the attempt to realise the Uni-
versal, the chapter also drew attention to the ways in which the concepts of inclusion 
and participation, which are not typically associated with neoliberal political agen-
das, are smoothly incorporated into the discourse. While they may render the dis-
course persuasive for a range of subject positions, they are rearticulated in line with 
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the advanced liberal logic in which inclusion and participation of civil society in re-
sponsibilisation and incentivisation form a key feature.  
In sum, to speak with Laclau and Mouffe, the analysis of political logics has shown 
how the elaborate articulation of corruption as the symbol for a lack of fullness or as 
an enemy serves the construction of a common will regarding the proposed Univer-
sal as the best possible social arrangement. While chain AC works in different ways 
to advance the Universal, it does so via constant references to corruption as articu-
lated in chain C.  
 
Coherence and contradiction 
The third set of findings refers to the question of consensus or contestation i.e. of 
coherence or dislocation of the two antagonistic chains within the discourse.  
While there were reasons to doubt the consensus argued for by the critical literature 
and while one could have expected differences not only within but especially be-
tween the discourses of the three IAC organisations the thesis has shown a surpris-
ingly consensual picture of the IAC discourse on the discursive level of strategic pol-
icy documents that was investigated. The empirical chapters were able to show that 
IAC discourse consists of two quite clearly defined chains of equivalences, the pres-
ence of which also signals that IAC discourse is one coherent hegemonic project. 
The ‘equivalisation of differential claims oriented toward the Universal’ (stratagem 
I), chain AC (discussed in chapters 4, 5, and 6) as well as the ‘equivalisation of dif-
ferential claims oriented against the Universal’ (discussed in chapter 3) happen quite 
coherently, letting the ‘antagonistic divide’ emerge rather clearly, with only minor 
blurrings.  
Some articulations could be interpreted as smaller discourse-internal dislocations, for 
example contradictions with regards to the rational actor logic (in chapter 3) and the 
incentives logic (in chapter 4). Yet they were not very pronounced and easily diffuse 
in these dominant logics without affecting the overall constitution of the chains. 
Other divergences were found between the discourses of the three organisations but 
did not present dislocations to the chains either. For example, such divergences arose 
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with regards to the definitions of corruption (chapter 3); however these differences 
did not seem to lead to differences with regards to IAC measures and the Universal. 
Also divergences in the definition of vague aims did not dislocate chain AC but can 
rather be interpreted as enhancing the beatific dimension of the fight against corrup-
tion. Divergences with regard to the geographical scope of reform, while not ham-
pering the expansion of the hegemonic project in the first place, turned out to blur 
the boundaries of the discourse due to the global reach of actual IAC policies. More-
over, divergences with regards to the ‘instruments’ applied to fighting corruption 
came down to a division of labour for realising the Universal rather than a mutual 
dislocation of instruments. The high degree of consensus within IAC discourse was 
also expressed in mutual articulations of the respective other IAC organisations in 
the discourses of all three actors and in the subsequent absence of a fight over the 
‘actual advocate’ of the fight against corruption. Thus, organisational differences in 
constitution, overall focus, history and modes of operation make hardly any differ-
ence for the social and political logics of IAC discourse; this again points to the de-
fining power of the kind of knowledge shared in IAC discourse for the construction 
of the Universal and the ways through which to realise it.  
Furthermore, the thesis pointed out that some contradictions in the discourse do not 
necessarily endanger the coherence of the discourse but could actually serve its po-
litical logic if held together.4 Such examples were the articulation of everyone as po-
tential perpetrators of corruption but also as victims of corruption, the articulation of 
corruption as an omnipresent problem but one that is particularly bad in developing 
countries, the articulation of the fight against corruption as not imposing Western 
values but the articulation of Western systems as superior, the articulation of IAC 
measures as context-sensitive but also consensual and the simultaneous application 
of universalist measures in countries around the world, and the articulation of IAC 
measures as unpolitical and objective and the simultaneous restructuring of whole 
societies through IAC measures.  
Thus, as we have seen, the thesis has not simply confirmed the claim of the critical 
anticorruption literature that there is a consensus in IAC discourse; it has also re-
                                                 
4 What constitutes a contradiction is of course a matter of perception rather than an essential quality 
and this perception is shaped by the onlookers’ positionality in socially shaped structures. 
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vealed how this consensus is constituted and advanced, explained its nuances, and 
thus grounded its argument much more firmly in empirical material. In doing so, it 
has revised and clarified many of the unclarities in the critical literature discussed in 
chapter 1.   
 
Relevance for gaps in the literature 
Most of all, the empirical analysis conducted in this thesis refined the picture of the 
societal ideal advanced by the discourse. While the literature claimed there to be a 
neoliberal ideal without specifying the nature of this ideal much, the thesis revealed 
the constitution and social logics of this ideal in detail, showing how it is reflective 
of advanced liberal ways of governing.  
It was also able to show that such an interpretation is able to make sense of aspects 
of IAC discourse that had caused confusion in the critical literature (see chapter 1). 
For example, the confusion surrounding the role of morality and eventual tensions 
with a technical logic in IAC discourse could be resolved by showing how morally 
connoted concepts figure in the discourse but are rearticulated very coherently in 
terms of the dominant incentives logic, and by pointing to the potential political con-
sequences of this.5 Similarly, the analysis of civil society participation advocated in 
IAC discourse revealed that this feature, which so far had not received any attention 
in the critical anticorruption literature, is a central part of the incentivising structures 
of the advanced liberal society to be brought about through the cultural reform advo-
cated in the discourse. Concepts like equality were shown to mainly serve the per-
suasiveness of the discourse rather than to play a role in the actual Universal.6 The 
thesis also demonstrated that, far from leaving the private sector untouched, IAC dis-
course assigns it an important role in the incentivisation structures of the uncorrupted 
society.7 The confusion about the role of institutions in a society made up by rational 
                                                 
5 Cf. Polzer (2001); Bukovansky (2006) 
6 Cf. Bukovansky (2006: 195) 
7 Cf. Brown/Cloke (2004); Bukovansky (2006); Murphy (2011) 
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actors could easily be explained by demonstrating how institutions are constructed as 
main sites of mutual control of such rational actors.8  
Importantly, the thesis not simply confirmed the consensus argument but refined it 
substantively by showing that there are divergences within IAC discourse and trac-
ing the ways in which they nevertheless combine to a consensual advancement of a 
particular ideal through a division of labour between the three IAC organisations.  
In doing so, the thesis also spoke to disagreements in the critical literature about the 
role of TI in the neoliberal enterprise of fighting corruption. As the thesis revealed, 
TI’s grass-roots approach does not lead its discourse to differ much from the dis-
courses of the WB and the UNDP, either in terms of the Universal pursued or the 
ways in which to pursue it. Instead, by claiming the whole world as a discursive ter-
ritory for the expansion of its hegemonic project, TI discourse can be regarded as an 
even more ambitious promoter of the Universal than the other two. Given that the 
anticorruption efforts of the UNDP had so far completely avoided academic atten-
tion, the thesis made an important contribution in revealing how UNDP discourse 
forms an important part of the IAC consensus and hegemonic project. 
Furthermore, by refining some of the insinuations of the critical literature regarding 
hidden intentions of IAC actors,9 the interviews conducted for this thesis showed 
that, far from planning to improve the world for international business, many subject 
positions furthering the fight against corruption want to make the world more just for 
everyone. They believe in the aims of the fight against corruption, while at the same 
time holding that the right way to fight it is that suggested by rational choice models.  
 
IAC discourse within wider discursive structures 
Apart from fulfilling its main aim of investigating the logics of the operationalised 
section of IAC discourse and answering the research question, the thesis was also 
able to gain some ad hoc insights on the relations of IAC discourse to wider struc-
tures of power and knowledge. It became clear that the social and political logics of 
                                                 
8 Cf. Brown/Cloke (2004: 288) 
9 Cf. Murphy (2011) 
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IAC discourse are informed and supported by the dominance of positivist research 
approaches both in academia and in development practice, and that influential socio-
political actors are already active in pushing the fight against corruption further, 
helping to advance the Universal. The analysis of specifications also contributed to 
an understanding of good governance measures as incentives-based societal restruc-
turings. These insights contribute to an understanding of IAC discourse as a hege-
monic project that seems to connect with wider hegemonic structures that divide the 
discursive space in similar ways. This is also suggested by the ways in which the lo-
gics of the Universal seem to be reflective of the logics that Dean has distinguished 
as characterising contemporary neoliberal regimes more generally.  
 
Significance of findings 
The significance of the findings of this thesis on the political nature of IAC discourse 
become particularly clear against the background of the historical and cultural-
geographical variations of conceptions of corruption demonstrated in chapter 1. Ac-
cording to PDHT, the construction of hegemonic formations can only happen via the 
negation of many other discourses and their concomitant identities and alternative 
universals. Fighting corruption in IAC discourse concerns the transformation of ex-
isting social formations in the target countries and thus the negation of their existing 
orders and identities. Having uncovered the very particular and comprehensive Uni-
versal advanced in IAC discourse, we can now understand that the discourse is ne-
gating a wide range of alternative models. Excluded from the IAC hegemonic project 
are all sorts of other Western models of the state and of democracy (e.g. deliberative, 
participatory, radical, reform liberal, classical liberal, social democracy, socialism, 
communism, republicanism, anarchism etc.). The exclusion and thus delegitimisa-
tion of more socially inclined and more state-centred political projects in IAC dis-
course have become particularly obvious through its reaction to the global financial 
crisis. Rather than prompting IAC organisations to strongly condemn unsocial be-
haviour by private sector actors and to demand heavy regulation and restriction of 
financial and other markets by the state, instead it seems to have led to a deepening 
of the focus in IAC discourse on governing mechanisms according to market virtues. 
The Universal that IAC discourse advances also negates all other conceptions of cor-
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ruption and a good society that may exist in other cultural contexts (such as the local 
conceptions illustrated in chapter 1, but also many other examples such as theocratic 
models of society, or those dominated by particular ethnic or other social groups). 
This negation does not happen via violent intrusion or through moral condemnation 
but through arguments about the superiority of a particular, seemingly technical sys-
tem which are based in crucial ways on constructions of corruption as an enemy to 
this system, and through material structures backing them. Also, explicitly racist or 
fascist conceptions of societies are negated by IAC discourse; however IAC dis-
course expresses some distrust in the ability of non-Western people to pursue the 
right incentives and clearly contributes to persistent Western conceptions of people 
in the developing world as less able to construct good societies.  
Overall, IAC discourse delegitimizes any social constellation and political project 
that involves a conception of human beings which differs from ‘rational and self-
interested’. This also explains my discomfort back in 2005 when, during my TI in-
ternship, I was involved in the production of a ‘risk map’ which assessed the risk in 
government institutions according to the rational actor model – this was not the way 
in which I wanted to look at the human beings around me, and the incentives logic 
embedded in the risk map struck me as a strangely technical way of understanding 
social relations. These negations of different social structures and political projects 
are related to other negations, such as of non-positivist ways of acquiring knowledge 
and investigating corruption and possible counter-measures. In a political project that 
is structured consistently according to the presuppositions and findings of positivist, 
rational choice inspired research, any other ways of looking at the world (such as the 
one adopted in this thesis) can only be risky and wrong and endanger the fight 
against corruption.  
While IAC discourse seems to be rather successful in camouflaging its political na-
ture, as the seemingly unquestioned public acceptance of IAC measures as self-
evidently good indicates, it was particularly important to reveal not only the Univer-
sal advanced but also the manifold ways in which the discourse covers over its po-
litical nature and works to appear as a politically neutral and merely technical 
agenda. In that sense, the analysis of the political nature of IAC discourse conducted 
in this thesis can be understood as an intervention into these covering logics.  
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Wider debates in the literature that the thesis speaks to 
These findings on the political nature and strategies of IAC discourse speak in inter-
esting and important ways to wider debates in the critical literature especially on the 
international development agenda (of which IAC measures form a part through their 
link to powerful development institutions and their aim of creating development). 
However, it also points to the political implications of dominant Western research 
approaches and agendas.  
In finding the Universal in IAC discourse indicative of an advanced liberal logic of 
government, the thesis speaks to other critical studies of the international develop-
ment agenda which have pointed to its neoliberal or liberal nature. In particular, the 
findings on the role of civil society in the ‘uncorrupted society’ seem closely related 
to Williams’ findings in his study of the WB’s good governance efforts, where he 
argues that “the policies and practices of ‘good governance’ are a specifically liberal 
project of social transformation”.10  
Considering that it is international financial institutions such as the WB and the IMF 
which tend to be criticised as the main advocates of neoliberal policy agendas, and 
that NGOs still tend to be regarded as more socially oriented actors,11 the examina-
tion of TI’s discourse in this thesis makes an important contribution. It demonstrated 
that TI forms part of this neoliberal agenda, adhering to rational choice inspired 
forms of knowledge and closely cooperating with other international actors. This in-
sight contributes to findings regarding the role of NGOs and other civil society ac-
tors in the advancement of a Western-centric neoliberal agenda especially in devel-
oping countries, such as Medina’s study of how a transnational network of conserva-
tion NGOs introduces neoliberal, market-based governing techniques for environ-
mental conservation in Belize.12 
                                                 
10  Williams (2008: 6). See also Harrison (2004); Escobar (1995); Cooke/Kothari (2001); Craig et al 
(2006); Rankin (2001); Cammack (2002); Sukarieh/Tannock (2008); Thomas (2001); Moore 
(2000); Kothari (2005); Brohman (1995); Bracking (2009) 
11 Cf. e.g. Bukovansky (2006) 
12  Medina (2010). See also Wallace (2009); Gill (1997); Nelson (1996); Klees (1998); Shivji (2007); 




While other studies have critically examined the concept of participation in interna-
tional development efforts, the findings of the thesis on the role of civil society par-
ticipation as a central element of the advanced liberal rule advocated by IAC dis-
course add to problematisations of the role of participation in international develop-
ment, for example those in Cooke and Kothari’s edited volume on the ‘tyranny of 
participation’.13 
The findings regarding the significance of rational choice theory for the political na-
ture of IAC discourse relate to other examinations of the development agenda which 
have drawn attention to the links between the role of positivist knowledge in devel-
opment enterprises and their (neo)liberal nature. Brohman for example argues that 
the dominance of neoclassical economic theory leads to neoliberal development 
policies characterised by a neglect of sociocultural and political relations, values and 
their social formation14 - an argument which is related to my findings on the rational 
choice inspired incentives logic in IAC discourse but is also modified by the findings 
of the role of culture and values in the uncorrupted advanced liberal society. 
Related to this, my findings on the alleged unpoliticalness of IAC discourse and their 
discursive effects speak to other studies that have demonstrated the de-politicisation 
of the societal restructuring that is undertaken by powerful international organisa-
tions in developing countries, such as Ferguson’s study of the ‘Anti-Politics Ma-
chine’ at work in development projects in Lesotho.15  
Not least the thesis also applied two rather recent methodological takes on Laclau-
Mouffian hegemony theory – the hegemonic stratagems developed by Nonhoff16 and 
the set of discursive logics by Glynos and Howarth.17 Thus, it is of relevance for 
methodological debates about how to operationalise this theoretical approach in con-
crete empirical investigations,18 and for respective practical suggestions to do so.19 
                                                 
13  Cooke/Kothari (2001); see also Hickey/Mohan (2005) 
14  Brohman (1995); see also Williams (1999)  
15 See e.g. Ferguson (1990); Kurki (2011a); Kurki (2011b); White (19966); Nustad (2001); Williams 
(2004); Cooke/Kothari (2001); Berenson (2010); Harriss (2002); Gasper (1996) 
16  Nonhoff (2006) 
17  Glynos/Howarth (2007) 
18 See e.g. Nonhoff (2007); Nonhoff (2006); Howarth et al (2000); Howarth (2008); Howarth (2010); 
Müller (2008); Critchley/Marchart (2004); Glasze (2008); Glasze/Mattissek (2009); Gly-
nos/Howarth (2007); Howarth (2010) 
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The combination of these two theoretical tools, and the challenges this entailed, may 
be of interest to scholars aiming to further develop Laclau and Mouffe inspired re-
search methods.  
The thesis has shown the merits of taking seriously the theoretical model of hege-
monic discursive construction through antagonistic division of the discursive space 
into chains of equivalences. While bearing some practical challenges, sticking to the 
chains certainly helped to draw a clear picture of the structure of the discourse and 
the discursive links and logics between its elements. The investigation of the equiv-
alisations according to the two chains of equivalence has allowed for detailed in-
sights not only about the coherence of the hegemonic project but also about dis-
course-internal dynamics between the chains that contribute to its power. Further-
more, Nonhoff’s hegemonic stratagems proved helpful in understanding the ways in 
which IAC discourse seeks to advance as a hegemonic project. However, the thesis 
also showed that a perspective on the discursive logics distinguished by Glynos and 
Howarth can contribute considerably to the analytical potential of a Laclau-Mouffian 
framework, allowing for a widening of the analytical focus to include more specific 
logics of the discourse under consideration and a better understanding of the particu-
lar role of different discursive logics for the functioning of the discourse. Moreover, 
the thesis has shown that this composite theoretical framework, with slight revisions 
to the Nonhoffian take, is well capable of addressing also negatively framed societal 
projects such as the fight against corruption.  
 
Directions for future research  
Given that my research shed light on just one level of the international anticorruption 
discourse (the level of strategic policy documents mainly produced in the ‘centrals’ 
of the three IAC organisations examined), further research is needed in order to as-
sess the actual political effects of IAC discourse, and to understand how the discur-
sive structures traced in this thesis are perpetuated, subverted (or rearticulated), and 
resisted (or dislocated) in other discursive territories.  
                                                                                                                                          
19 See e.g. Wullweber (2010); Nonhoff (2006); Methmann (2010); Cornwall/Brock (2005); Marchart 
(2002); Glasze (2007); Habermann (2008) 
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With regards to TI for example, more research is needed into how exactly the policy 
recommendations and knowledge products produced in the Secretariat are or are not 
taken on board by the different national chapters. With regards to the UNDP, it needs 
to be examined how UNDP country offices take up the general anticorruption strate-
gies outlined by the UNDP headquarter section on anticorruption in New York. Con-
sidering the WB’s complex structures, more research is needed regarding the proc-
esses of anticorruption policy diffusion within the organisation, such as how exactly 
the GAC strategy is being translated into concrete project components. One cannot 
necessarily expect the analysed discourse to be the same in these local and regional 
branches of the three organisations.  
In addition, the practices of other anticorruption organisations and initiatives, such as 
Tiri, UNODC, the EU, the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), the 
TRACE initiative etc. merit attention in order to understand how they may or may 
not contribute to the political project assessed in this thesis.20  
However, apart from enabling an increased understanding of the inner workings of 
IAC actors, it is of course very important to investigate how IAC efforts play out in 
their concrete implementation on the ground. While IAC discourse may not be par-
ticularly successful in terms of combating what many people perceive to be corrup-
tion in the target countries (see CPI levels), and while this may be partly because the 
world is not full of rational actors (yet), however it may be successful in instituting 
particular elements of its Universal, such as distrust, control, free market institutions, 
competition and ‘responsible’ NGO initiatives into social relations in the respective 
societies. The investigation of how concrete anticorruption projects work will render 
interesting insights about the question of how advanced IAC is as a hegemonic pro-
ject and how it may be transformed, subverted, co-opted and resisted by different 
local discourses. 
Furthermore, the global dimension of IAC discourse merits further investigation. It 
will be interesting to examine how the kinds of corporate governance provisions that 
form part of IAC discourse and the respective civil society oversight mechanisms 
transform economic relations and the workings of companies. Also, given its influ-
                                                 
20 For more organisations see UNODC (c)  
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ential social networks, IAC discourse is likely to exert an influence on the political 
agendas of other powerful international actors who, if they do not already co-operate 
with one of the three IAC organisations, use and copy their indices, recommenda-
tions and ‘tools’. Such co-operations and ‘best practice’ sharing are likely to repro-
duce the conceptions of a good, uncorrupted society inherent in IAC discourse and to 
provide them with an even wider reach.   
 
Consequences for IAC work 
The insights that my thesis has rendered pose challenges to practitioners working on 
anticorruption and indirectly for those working on related issues such as develop-
ment and governance. 
For anticorruption actors my findings have clearly demonstrated that an unpolitical 
anticorruption agenda is not possible. It is understandable that IAC organisations in 
the design of their policy recommendations focus on the corrupt people, those who 
are inclined to damage public goods for their own interests. Yet my thesis has shown 
that the use of the simplistic rational choice model of human behaviour is not just a 
strategic decision about how to tackle the problem of corruption technically. It has 
become clear that if a whole societal system is modelled on an image of human be-
ings as purely self-interested and only exercised by their own economic advantage, 
the outcome is a particular Western economistic ideal type that makes more socially 
inclined political projects impossible, thus running the risk of breeding precisely the 
kind of behaviour that it attempts to avoid. While the ongoing denial of the political 
content of IAC activities by the respective actors serves to camouflage this, recognis-
ing the political content of their work would in turn generate important questions and 
new perspectives for IAC actors. The interest in my findings shown by TI staff dur-
ing a seminar given at the TI Secretariat in Berlin suggests that IAC actors are at 
least open to and interested in such considerations. 
Ideally, the acceptance of the normative and political nature of the concept of corrup-
tion and any anticorruption activity would open up a debate among IAC actors about 
the political content of the IAC agenda. Are the currently advanced conceptions of 





                                                
corruption or poverty that they have in mind? Given that at least some of my inter-
viewees seemed to be convinced of its moral underpinnings, the social aims and the 
context-sensitivity of IAC work, this might not actually be the case. 
So if one recognises, for example, that human nature and morality are at least partly 
shaped in socio-cultural processes, what would an IAC agenda that pays more atten-
tion to the complexities and social constitution of human nature look like? How 
should IAC actors deal with the unavoidable dilemma of wanting to advance certain 
norms but also wanting to avoid the imposition of Western norms onto non-Western 
people? Is an international fight against corruption still possible under such precon-
ditions? 
While such questions certainly do not make IAC work easier and are likely to en-
danger the unquestioned legitimacy of the international fight against corruption, they 
promise to provide more openings for thinking, discussing and eventually agreeing 
about what a good society should be like. After all, anticorruption fighters do not see 
themselves as self-interested rational actors, but decide to join IAC organisations be-
cause they “feel that they’re aligned in terms of their moral values”.21 These values, 
however, may differ from the ones that are right now embedded in the ideal of the 
uncorrupted society advanced in IAC efforts. It is my hope that this thesis has en-
abled better reflection on what those values actually are and thus better debate on 
what they should be.  
*** 
 
21 This is the full quote from a TI interviewee: “We honour people (...) we believe in change that is 
possible through people (...) and I would imagine TI to be a place where people come because they 
feel that they’re aligned in terms of their moral values” (Interview with TI-S interviewee 2). 
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